Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, Section
157(1) and (2)
157 Consequential and incidental provision
(1) The Secretary of State may by order make
consequential or incidental provision in connection with a provision
of this Act.
(2) An order under this section may, in particular
(a) amend an enactment;
(b) modify the effect of an enactment.
affirmative, if it amends an enactment; otherwise negative (section
Departmental Explanation: (The
clause which became section 157 was introduced at Third Reading
in the House of Lords.)
"We are seeking to insert this clause due
to the large number of government amendments made at a late stage
of the Bill
will not be adequate time before Third Reading to identify all
the possible consequential and incidental amendments that may
be necessary to deal with these late amendments. We are also aware
of a number of consequential amendments that will need to be made
to a number of previous enactments on the subject of nationality
Therefore we consider,
with the agreement of Parliamentary Counsel, that there needs
to be a power to deal with consequential and incidental amendments
to the Bill that may only come to light in due course.
The orders under this power, where they amend
any enactment, will be made by the affirmative resolution procedure.
Where no amendments to other enactments are made
the negative resolution procedure will apply."
Note: as introduced at
Third Reading, the clause read "may by order make provision
which he thinks necessary in consequence of or in connection with
a provision of this Act". On Lords' consideration of Commons
amendments, this was changed to "may by order make consequential
or incidental provision in connection with a provision of this
Committee Report (28th of 2001-02):
"While we find the delegation and the level
of scrutiny sufficient, the Committee is concerned about the tabling
of a significant Henry VIII power at a stage when effective scrutiny
of the power, either by this Committee or by the House, is impossible.
We are also surprised that, instead of referring to precedent,
the arguments in favour of this power put forward by the Government
include the lack of time to identify all the possible consequential
and incidental amendments that may be necessary, and the need
to make consequential and incidental provision, the need for which
"may come to light in due course"."