47.In a global political and strategic environment that is likely to become more multi-polar and fragmented over the next 20 to 30 years, there are both advantages and disadvantages to membership of a large political and economic bloc such as the EU. The balance, ultimately, will depend in part on events over which the UK and the EU may have little control, including global economic trends, the future trajectory of current “rising powers”, and political developments in the USA, Russia, China and elsewhere. Domestically, the extent to which the Government continues to prioritise spending on diplomacy, development and defence will also have a major impact on the UK’s role in the world, regardless of whether it remains in the EU or leaves.
48.Future UK governments are likely to continue co-operating closely with European allies outside the EU framework. Assuming that the UK’s overarching foreign policy values would remain largely similar to those set out in the 2015 National Security Strategy, the UK and EU would continue to share many common interests including countering extremism, dealing with Russia and the Middle East, building good relations with rising powers, and strengthening the rules-based international order. For this reason, as well as for trading purposes, the UK would retain a long-term interest in the stability and cohesion of the remaining EU, and might have to dedicate considerable diplomatic resources to maintaining strong relations with Brussels and other European capitals. It would have to exert influence from the outside; we heard from Canadian representatives how challenging this is, so substantial effort would be required to maximise our indirect influence. The Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who served as Defence Secretary from 1992–1995 and as Foreign Secretary from 1995–1997, told us:
The irony is, if we were not in the European Union, such are the common strategic interests between Britain and the rest of Europe that a lot of our foreign policy effort would have to be devoted to trying to influence the European Union, of which we were no longer a member. There is no geostrategic threat to France or Germany or continental Europe that would not also be a threat to Britain, as we found both in 1914 and in 1939. So we would be in the extraordinary situation of having given up the power to either control or influence policy, but seeking as outsiders nevertheless to influence it anyway, because the outcome would be very important to us.
49.Since EU defence co-operation remains intergovernmental, withdrawal from the EU should arguably have a relatively minor impact on the UK’s long-term defensive posture and capabilities. The UK would remain an important member of NATO, particularly if Britain maintains its commitment to the 2% spending target. The UK would also be able to maintain its bilateral defence co-operation with France, which is conducted on the basis of the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties rather than through the EU. If the UK wished to continue participating in some of the EU’s CSDP missions, moreover, it would almost certainly be able to do so, either directly (as 25 non-EU countries have done), or through the crisis management co-operation measures the EU has in place with NATO, the UN and other international organisations.
50.Some submissions and witnesses argued that “Brexit” would have a negative long-term impact on US-UK relations in particular. Professor Wyn Rees of Nottingham University wrote that the UK’s role as a “bridge” between the EU and US is crucial to Britain’s stature in Washington. In his view, UK withdrawal from the EU would eventually result in a “diminution of Britain’s influence on both sides of the Atlantic,” as “there would be no reason for US diplomatic efforts to work with EU states to be routed through London.” Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform told us:
What I hear when I go to Washington is people saying, “If you leave the EU, don’t expect us to take you very seriously any more, because although, yes, you are a P5 country in the Commonwealth, you will not be part of the most influential, dominant power in Europe, which also is an influence in its neighbourhood.”
Similarly, Graham Avery, a former Commission official, told us that the Americans “would simply pay less attention” to the UK if it left the EU, adding: “They would fly direct to Berlin and Paris, and pass over London more often.”
51.President Obama and his Administration have made it clear that they would prefer the UK to remain inside the EU, where it is generally seen to promote Atlanticist policies (such as TTIP, which the UK has championed in part to bolster the political relationship between the US and EU). If the UK can no longer act as a bridge between Brussels and Washington, it is realistic to assume that the US will seek to strengthen its bilateral relationships with EU allies, especially France and Germany. It is important, however, to avoid over-stating the extent of the UK’s potential marginalisation in the transatlantic alliance if it leaves the EU. So long as the UK retains the largest defence budget in Europe and continues to meet both NATO’s expenditure target and the UN’s 0.7% target for development aid, it is likely to remain an important player in world affairs and a key strategic partner for the US. US effort would be focused on getting the EU into alignment with US policy, whilst the UK position would be assumed to be more closely aligned, so relatively less US effort would be invested in that relationship. If the EU cannot align with US policy, the UK position would become more important, giving credibility and multilateral cover for example for US military operations with deployable armed forces.
52.Inevitably, however, the effectiveness and cohesion of NATO as a whole would be affected by the trajectory of EU foreign and defence policy after a UK exit. There are multiple paths that the EU could follow. It is possible that the departure of one of the EU’s two main military powers could damage the development of a common defence policy—which has in any event stalled in the last decade—particularly if UK withdrawal triggers instability that reduces the EU’s overall effectiveness as a foreign policy actor. Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform, for example, told us that the EU’s common foreign policy would be “weaker” and its defence policy “a joke” without the UK.
53.However, there continues to be a strong lobby for the European Union to have a real defence dimension, including a common European army. This includes the stated preferences of the President of the European Commission as well as the governments of Germany and Spain. The Treaty language recognises this as an aspiration, although a British veto exists. Britain remaining in the EU, committed to its current policy, prevents the creation of this active EU defence identity, opposing, for example, the establishment of joint EU military operational headquarters. It is therefore possible that “Brexit” and the absence of this continuing British veto could free the EU to pursue a more cohesive and effective common defence policy around the resources they are prepared to devote to defence.
54.Both outcomes contain risks for the NATO and, by extension, for the UK. With the US increasingly looking to its European partners to shoulder more of the burden for their own defence, a weak and divided EU might unsettle the NATO alliance. Conversely, the EU could become more coherent and unified, but—in the absence of the UK—might do so in ways that threaten to decouple it from NATO, damaging the integrity of the transatlantic alliance. Stephen Booth of Open Europe, for example, told us that he would be “very concerned” about the EU developing “a different view” from the UK and USA on issues such as relations with Russia. Both of these scenarios pose significant risks that the UK would wish to prevent, but they also represent extreme ends of the probable spectrum of outcomes. Although the UK and its European partners might disagree in future on policy responses to particular issues—as they do today—the UK and EU are likely to retain many shared priorities including countering extremism, building good relations with rising powers, and strengthening the rules-based international order.
55.The need to co-operate with European partners on counter-terrorism would undoubtedly continue even after leaving the EU, and we consider it likely that the UK and EU would find new mechanisms for this co-operation. Outside the EU, the UK would not be a member of Europol and would no longer be part of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which provides simplified and uniform EU-wide extradition arrangements. Although there is some debate as to the merits of the EAW system for UK security, the UK would be able to replace it—albeit at some cost in terms of negotiating effort—either with a UK-EU bilateral extradition agreement, or with individual agreements between the UK and each of the Member States. The “Five Eyes” network of the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, meanwhile, which provides the UK’s most important intelligence-sharing framework, does not involve the EU, and leaving it is unlikely to affect this relationship in the immediate future or in the long term.
56.As a group of experts from the LSE noted in their evidence, so-called “rising powers” are increasingly questioning the current institutional structures of global governance, calling for reform to reflect “the changing distribution of power” in the international system. This trend is likely to continue, increasing the pressure on European states—including the UK—to accept reforms that would better reflect the global distribution of power in the 21st century. The submission concluded that, outside the EU, the UK may in future find it increasingly difficult to make its voice heard in organisations such as the UN. Similarly, Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform told us that, in the context of growing calls for UN Security Council reform, the “moral pressure” on Britain to give up its permanent seat and veto would rise if it were no longer part of a major bloc like the EU. David Campbell-Bannerman MEP offered an opposing view, arguing that leaving the EU would preserve the UK’s role in international organisations, including on the UN Security Council, because the EU aims to “take over” Britain’s position and replace it with a single, unified EU seat. In either case, however, it should be noted that the UK retains the power to veto any proposed reforms that could threaten its role on the UNSC.
57.The UK has not used its veto alone since 1972. Britain and France together representing both their own combined interests and the probable view of the whole of the European Union have had the weight to prevent resolutions being put to the UNSC that are not in their joint interests. If the UK were to leave the European Union, France could still claim this role and exercise more effective authority in the Security Council with the potential of a French veto backed by the rest of the EU. This is a much more likely prospect than a British veto exercised on its own in the British interest, as a relatively small country exercising a veto in the teeth of global opposition would be seen as much less legitimate.
58.The UK has a unique connection to many nations through the Commonwealth, which some have suggested could be re-invigorated following a UK withdrawal from the EU. Of the 53 nations in the Commonwealth, moreover, the vast majority are developing economies. Some of the evidence we received has cast doubt on the suitability of the Commonwealth as a potential framework for new trading relationships, given the political and economic differences between its members. Updating and modernising the Commonwealth framework to engage in a more sustained way with these countries, however—using the full range of foreign policy instruments including diplomacy, trade and development aid—could make the UK more flexible and adaptable in a world where states such as India, South Africa and Nigeria are likely to become ever more important players. However, it is the bilateral relationships with these relatively rising powers, assisted by the historical and cultural links through the Commonwealth as a background, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which should be developed by the UK as it pursues a definitively global role having left the EU.
59.The UK’s potential position in international trade 20 or 30 years down the line arguably depends, more than any other aspect of Britain’s global role, on the specific arrangements that are negotiated between the UK and EU if the UK votes to leave, as well as on the evolution of global trading systems. The level of UK access to, and integration with, the single market will have a strong impact on the types of trade deals the UK can pursue with non-EU states, and on how independently the UK can act with respect to both tariffs and non-tariff barriers such as standards and regulations.
60.On the one hand, many witnesses and submissions argued that the UK would be less able to promote its interests and secure favourable terms on FTAs outside the EU. As a major (the largest) market, representing 16.6% of world trade in goods and services and as the largest trading partner of about 80 countries, the EU has substantial leverage in trade negotiations. However, this is not an unqualified good, as the negotiating position is compromised around the interests of the individual EU Member States as well as the greater complexity of these negotiations and the time taken to negotiate them.
61.Asked if the UK could negotiate a more favourable trade deal with Canada than that obtained by the EU, for example, Baroness Ashton—who served as Trade Commissioner before her appointment as the first High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—told us that trade deals were first and foremost about “commercial interest”. She said:
If the offer that you make is that you are going to represent half a billion people and the markets of 28 countries, arguably, what they are willing to give might be better. It does not mean every industry benefits all the time—there is no bilateral trade agreement in the world that can do that for everybody—but you can generally get a much better deal. […] You could get a trade deal—lots of countries have trade deals—but would it be better? I would be surprised, because I think that, commercially, for them to want to enter into it, it has to be worth it. The EU is the biggest grouping that countries can enter into an agreement with, so they are very keen to do it.
Similarly, Dr Stephen Woolcock of the LSE told us:
Most trade agreements are based on reciprocal commitments between parties, meaning that your negotiating leverage in an agreement depends on the size of your market and how open your market is. So if you have a large market that is relatively closed, like China’s, you have significant negotiating leverage. If you have a relatively small market, the UK is still an important economy, but it is very open, so that means you have very limited negotiating leverage.
62.Dr Woolcock also emphasised that, outside the EU, the UK might have less influence on the standards and regulations that constitute the major barriers to trade in today’s low-tariff global environment, particularly in services. It would still, however, have to abide by those rules—increasingly set through major multilateral agreements, rather than at the WTO—to trade with the countries involved. Citing the example of TTIP, he said:
For example, one of the core elements in TTIP is regulatory co-operation between the US and the EU. If the UK is not sitting at the table, part of the EU, in those negotiations about how you reconcile different domestic regulations, the UK will not have any influence on those. Okay, the UK can be a price taker but it will have to adopt the regulations that have been agreed between the EU and the US. It can still trade but it will not have any more influence on the outcome. It would have much more influence if it were within the EU.
63.On the other hand, free to act on its own, the UK could be a more flexible and adaptable trader, potentially concluding FTAs more easily and quickly and with a more effective focus on sectors that matter most to Britain, such as financial services. The UK would be able to pursue its own trade negotiations whereas the EU’s negotiating position inevitably involves compromises amongst the interests and positions of Member States. The ability, however, of the UK alone to get agreement from other states to open up their markets (when they may be reluctant to do so) may be reduced compared with the EU. Alternatively, the UK could choose to drop barriers to trade unilaterally, as Professor Patrick Minford of Cardiff University advocated in his evidence. He said:
…These trade agreements are totally irrelevant. They will not make any difference to anything. We do not need any trade agreements. We need to get out of a protectionist trade arrangement—namely, the EU customs union. Everyone says how wonderful it is to be in the EU but they forget that it is a highly protectionist organisation, not just in agriculture, but also in manufacturing. It is infinitely preferable to be in the global market under conditions of free trade. That will give us huge gains. The trade issue, far from being a great negative in terms of leaving the EU, is a huge positive. People think that it is terribly negative because you cannot negotiate these trade agreements, but they have totally misunderstood the irrelevance of these trade agreements to our situation in the global market.
64.The UK outside the EU would face something of a trade-off between the weight that comes from being part of the world’s largest single market and the flexibility that the UK could have if it acted alone. These considerations are finely balanced. As Stephen Booth, Co-Director of the Open Europe think tank, told us:
…The UK could survive and do well outside [the EU]. We published our research which suggested that the worst-case scenario outside the EU would be 2% GDP worse off and 1.6% better off, depending on the policies of the UK Government and the successor deal with the EU. That would also be important in the trading relationship with the EU, because it remains our biggest trade partner.
But I think the fact is that if the UK were outside, it would become more of a niche player and would have to trade on its strengths. That means that on trade agreements, we would be focused on a narrower set of issues than the EU would as a whole, which gives a greater nimbleness and flexibility, perhaps, but you would lose the collective weight. That is the trade-off that the UK would have to judge, and that has to be part of the equation. That is not to say that the UK could not make a success of it, because I think it could.
He later added: “In some ways, it is hard to argue that the UK would have greater leverage, but on some specific issues, such as financial services, we might be able to be much more forceful, while the EU as a whole might be less so.”
65.The evidence we heard suggested that, on the one hand, leaving the EU could result in the UK becoming a “smaller” or less influential international player, especially in the context of increasing pressure from rising powers on the post-1945 global economic and governance frameworks. Yet on the other hand, we heard that what the UK might lose in collective weight, it could gain in flexibility and adaptability, becoming a more nimble power that focuses on pursuing its core interests and alliances. Given the number of variables to consider, it is impossible to determine with certainty what the eventual outcome will be. In either case, however, much will depend on the choices made by future Governments, and particularly on their willingness to commit sufficient political and economic resources to securing the UK’s global position.
66.As recent events have made clear, the EU cannot remain static; its structures and institutions will need to evolve in order to cope with the challenges of the 21st century. With respect to the potential risks and benefits to the UK, much will depend on the extent to which the EU is able to resolve the migration and eurozone crises, the future direction of the EU’s institutions and common policies, and the global competitiveness of its economy.
67.Although further EU enlargement is not currently on the political agenda, 20 or 30 years in the future the EU could be a union of 33 countries or more, encompassing the states of the Western Balkans and, theoretically, Turkey. Eventually the EU may also be forced to define clearly the limits of its eastward expansion, as countries such as Ukraine may begin to seek closer and closer ties.
68.The UK has, historically, been among the “most enthusiastic” champions of EU enlargement. Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform told us that enlargement has generally been perceived as a foreign policy success for the EU, insofar as it helped to re-integrate Central and Eastern Europe from the 1990s onwards, and has been an important lever for stabilisation in the Western Balkans:
Even some of my very Eurosceptic friends have admitted to me that the best thing that the EU has done is enlarge, spreading democracy, stability, peace and security across most of the continent. That was driven not only by the British but largely by the British and the Germans. I guess not everybody is very happy with the result; it may have been enlarged a bit too quickly in some places. Essentially that was a foreign policy achievement of the British.
69.An EU of 33 or more states with such large economic and political disparities between them, however, may exacerbate existing fissures within the EU and further complicate its institutional arrangements. Without appropriate arrangements for controlling migration from new states, moreover—especially from Turkey, should it eventually join the EU—enlargement could put great strain on the resources of the existing Member States. The UK Government remains in principle supportive of Turkish accession to the EU, though the Minister for Europe, the Rt Hon. David Lidington MP, has said it has “a long way to go.” The Prime Minister told Parliament in March 2016 that Turkish accession is “not remotely on the cards… for many, many years to come.” Turkey’s trajectory over the past decade, however, raises serious questions as to its suitability for accession, while recent developments demonstrate the deep flaws in the EU’s current approach to Turkey. As the House of Lords EU External Relations Sub-Committee recently concluded, the EU-Turkey relationship is in “strategic disarray”, and the EU needs to “revisit the whole EU-Turkey relationship on the basis of first principles.” If these tensions remain unresolved, its position as a candidate state and eventually a potential EU member poses major political and economic risks for the EU, and by extension for the UK.
70.Although the UK has a permanent opt-out from the common currency, the stability and performance of the eurozone nevertheless has a major impact on the UK economy. If the UK remains in the EU, it has an especially strong interest in resolving the eurozone crisis and ensuring that the currency union is able to weather future global economic storms more effectively than in recent years. Professor Iain Begg of the LSE told us that the process of stabilising and reinforcing the eurozone has come a long way, likening it to “a jigsaw puzzle that is 80% complete,” while Dr Angus Armstrong of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research said that proposals for the future of the eurozone—most recently set out in the so-called “Five Presidents’ Report”—were “radical” and went “as far as any economist could have expected” towards securing the common currency’s future. The report proposed steps towards economic, financial and political union for eurozone members, with increased coordination of economic policies, a euro-area wide fiscal stabilisation function and eventually a euro-area treasury which would take some decisions on taxation and allocation of budgetary expenditures.
71.Asked what the eurozone would look like in 20 years’ time, Dr Armstrong’s vision was of:
A much smaller currency enjoyed by far fewer countries, or a currency area that has all the institutions that you would expect of a successful monetary union. I do not think that there is a middle way position over a 20-year period—it is not a stable equilibrium. Either there has to be a full institutional framework to support a monetary union, or there will not be the number of countries in the euro that there are today.
Dr Scott James of King’s College London largely agreed with Dr Armstrong’s assessment, adding:
If you look back to where the eurozone was 20 years ago, the basic contours of where we are now was more or less there, so I would say that 20 years from now you will be looking at the “Five Presidents’ Report” fully implemented, perhaps a bit more of a centralised fiscal capacity, but probably not more, and perhaps another three or four members of the eurozone.
Both Dr James and Professor Begg also emphasised that the eurozone would probably continue to expand in future, leaving the UK part of an ever-smaller minority of non-euro states inside the EU.
72.This poses somewhat of a paradox for the UK inside the EU. On the one hand, an effective, high-performing and sustainable eurozone would be likely to benefit the UK economically. On the other hand, the reforms proposed for the euro area, including more economic, financial and fiscal co-ordination would, if implemented, represent a substantial deepening of integration between those states. This has led to concerns that the UK could be left on the outside of an ever-tighter decision-making majority, which, by voting as a bloc, could introduce measures that threaten UK interests in the single market. The Rt Hon Gisela Stuart MP, for example, told us:
The Five Presidents’ Report, which charts out the plan for the next 15 years and the deeper integration requirements, says in the introduction that those countries that are not yet members of the euro are invited to join. There is no recognition that there will be, for the foreseeable future, a number of countries that are neither part of Schengen nor part of the euro. It’s a matter of simple arithmetic: if you are one versus 27, however much you wish to engage, at some stage you are just left behind.
73.For this reason, as part of its renegotiation package, the Government secured agreement on principles to prevent non-eurozone states being discriminated against (enforceable by the ECJ and by UK domestic courts), and on a mechanism for any one non-euro state to request further discussion on proposed measures that might contravene the principles. This new mechanism, however, relates only to “legislative acts relating to the effective management of the banking union and of the consequences of further integration of the euro area.” It could not therefore be assumed that the UK would be able to trigger debate on other policy issues, such as trade, on which the eurozone states may eventually begin to converge.
74.Witnesses told us that eurozone countries might indeed begin to club together on matters relating to the economic governance of the eurozone itself, and potentially on financial regulation. Professor Begg, for example, said that the deepening and broadening of the eurozone posed a “tension” for the UK which, he added, would be “very difficult to resolve”. However, in general witnesses were more cautious about the prospect of euro area states converging on all or even most political matters, and referred to a continuing degree of diversity of economic and political interest amongst the countries of the eurozone. Professor Begg said:
There are some aspects of economic governance where you can expect more of a division, but key political issues could include, “What do you do about Syria?”, where we are more likely to find common cause with the French than we are with the Austrians.
Dr James agreed, adding that “on broader political issues, there is very little evidence of consensus or a shared viewpoint across the eurozone.” Later, he emphasised “the importance of getting away from the idea that at any point in the foreseeable future this is going to be a coherent economic or political union.” Similarly, Dr Armstrong said: “Apart from financial regulation […] I am not quite sure I see why it necessarily follows that because you have a single currency area, the political decisions are somehow biased in favour of that currency or currency area.” This view was also expressed in evidence given to the Treasury Select Committee by Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House.
75.Although the witnesses did not see a current trend towards eurozone caucusing, and the EU’s budget will continue to require unanimous agreement, it nevertheless remains a long-term possibility that carries risks for the UK if it chooses to stay in the EU. These risks are deeper and more complex than the prospect of the UK simply being out-voted in the Council of Ministers, where in any event most business is done by consensus. With the institutional changes that will be necessary to implement tighter integration of the eurozone, more and more of the daily business of EU governance could eventually spill over into forums where the UK is not present. In addition to the numerical disadvantage it might face in the Council, therefore, the UK could find itself reacting to positions that have already been discussed and agreed informally amongst the euro area states, rather than setting the EU’s agenda. In this way, even if the most severe predictions of eurozone caucusing do not come to pass, the UK could find itself facing a steady, de facto decline in its relative influence inside the EU.
76.On the other hand, the UK outside the EU would forgo opportunities to participate in EU policies which could advance UK interests, such as the proposed liberalisation of capital markets. Whilst leaving would bring regulatory flexibility, it risks eurozone countries implementing policies inadvertently or deliberately against UK interests, without the UK being able to rely on the formal protections of the single market or even an appeal to “Community solidarity”.
77.In a volatile and multi-polar world, membership of a secure, globally-engaged and democratic EU could benefit the UK well into the future. Yet the EU is currently beset by crises. If these crises go unresolved, the EU could face ever-decreasing relevance on the world stage, with concomitant damage to the UK and all other Member States. If the UK chooses to remain, it will need to play a leading role in ensuring that the EU survives its current crises and faces up to the need to remain competitive and outward-looking with a relevant institutional framework and appropriate democratic oversight.
80 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, , November 2015, pp 9–10
81 ; see also Appendix 3
82 Dermot Hodson and Dr David Styan, , para 11; European External Action Service, “”, accessed 10 March 2016
83 Prof. Wyn Rees, , para 12
87 “Exclusive: Obama wants the UK to remain part of the EU”, BBC News, 23 July 2015; Stefan Wagstyl and George Parker, “EU Referendum: US Secretary of State urges UK to stay”, Financial Times, 13 February 2016
89 “We need a European army, says Jean-Claude Juncker”, BBC News, 9 March 2015; Sarah Spickernell, “The Germans want an EU army, but Britain is against it”, City A.M., 8 March 2015; “UK, Central Europe frown at Juncker’s European army”, EurActiv.com, 25 March 2015
91 ; Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Prof. Karen E. Smith and Dr Stephen Woolcock, , para 15
92 Prof. Wyn Rees, , para 14; Nick Witney, , para 23; Steven Erlanger, “Shrinking Europe military spending stirs concern”, The New York Times, 22 April 2013; David Blair, “America, our great protector, is looking the other way”, The Telegraph, 23 April 2013; Bruce Ackerman, “Europe needs to provide for its own defence”, Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2014; Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”, The Atlantic, April 2016
94 Centre for European Reform, , para 25
96 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, , November 2015, pp 9–10
99 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Prof. Karen E. Smith and Dr Stephen Woolcock, , para 6
100 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Prof. Karen E. Smith and Dr Stephen Woolcock, , para 6
102 David Campbell-Bannerman MEP, , para 4
103 Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides, “”, United Nations, accessed 13 April 2016
105 ; Nick Witney, , paras 16–18
106 ; ; Q223; Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Prof. Karen E. Smith and Dr Stephen Woolcock, , paras 13–14; Nick Witney, , paras 8–15; Confederation of British Industry, , paras 6–7
114 European Commission, “”, accessed 17 March 2016
117 At the European Council meeting at which the British renegotiations were agreed, 18–19 February 2016, (p. 24): “With regard to future enlargements of the European Union, it is noted that appropriate transitional measures concerning free movement of persons will be provided for in the relevant Acts of Accession to be agreed by all Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. In this context, the position expressed by the United Kingdom in favour of such transitional measures is noted.”
118 Oral Evidence taken before the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on 19 November 2015, Evidence Session No. 15, [Lord Dubs]
119 HC Deb, 21 March 2016, [Commons Chamber]
120 Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2015–16, The UK’s role in the war against ISIL following the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria in February 2016, HC 683, para 26
128 Charles Grant, “Could eurozone integration damage the single market?” Centre for European Reform Bulletin, August/September 2015, p 4
131 European Council — Conclusions, , 19 February 2016, Annex II, p 26
138 Oral Evidence taken before the Treasury Select Committee on 3 November 2015, HC (2015–16) 499, [Mr Garnier]
139 Voting Behaviour in the EU Council, , House of Commons Library, May 2013