Defence Written evidence from the Oxford Research Group
Protracted UK military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the serious challenges created by applying twentieth century military approaches to the twenty-first century phenomenon of “hybrid war”. Even in Mali, the misguided notion that the majority of efforts should be devoted to providing military assistance still appears to characterise the UK’s approach. Recent operations have proved the resilience of extremist ideology in vulnerable areas, where social and political marginalisation of parts of society make violence appear to hold greater promise to achieve their ends than peaceful participation in political and social life. This has led to a “renaissance” of the al-Qaida and jihadist visions in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, Yemen, Somalia and wider East Africa. The experience of the past decade shows us that terrorism and violent extremism can only be effectively countered by targeting the conditions that allow extremist groups and their ideologies to prosper, not by singularly military approaches.
Therefore, there is a need for more nuanced approaches in “the next generational struggle” against international violent extremism, which seek to address the conditions that allow such ideologies to thrive. The 2015 SDSR process will also need to devote considerable time to consideration of incorporating non-military solutions to today’s security risks, particularly non-traditional threats such as climate change and severe socio-economic marginalisation of large parts of the “Global South”. To this end, Oxford Research Group (ORG) urges the Committee to engage with existing strategies such as the Building Stability Overseas Strategy and the International Defence Engagement Strategy to consider how best to integrate ideas for non-combat and preventive approaches to conflict.
There must be a rebalance of priorities within the UK Defence and Security Strategy for it to produce relevant and effective policies in light of modern security threats, with a shift towards a greater role for conflict prevention and provision on non-combat security support in fragile states. The 2010 SDSR states; “Our approach recognises that when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily, it costs far more.” Yet serious questions remain about the extent to which a focus on conflict prevention is being constrained over-reliance on somewhat out of date ideas about containment, deterrence and military intervention. The next SDSR is a very important opportunity to shift the balance in concrete policy terms towards of tackling “threats at source” and so examining the specific ways this can be done must become a top priority.
Finally, ORG notes the current heavy budgetary weighting in defence spending towards deterrence and questions its impact on the Committee’s assessments of strategic balance. We also urge the Committee to include use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) within its overarching Inquiry towards the next Defence and Security Review, as it significantly relates to considerations of the legitimacy of the use of force, the utility of force, and the relationship between hard and soft power. Moreover, the Committee must do everything it can to encourage the Government to prioritise the updating of the NSS over the period of 2013–14 so that this document can genuinely inform the 2015 the SDSR and give it a strong strategic rationale. To this end, we also urge the Committee to work with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy to consider the important questions of which principles, frameworks and objectives are included in the updated NSS.
1.1 Oxford Research Group (ORG) welcomes the new Inquiry of the Defence Select Committee as a timely move towards a comprehensive assessment of British defence policy, particularly given the limitations of the somewhat rushed 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) process. Following ORG’s submission of evidence to previous Committee inquiries prior to and following the release of the SDSR, we welcome the invitation to submit our analysis on the key challenges to getting the review process right in 2015.
2.0 Lessons Learned from Current and Recent Operations: The Limits of Force
2.1 Protracted military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade have highlighted the serious challenges created by applying twentieth century military approaches to the phenomenon of a “21st century vortex of violence” (a complex mix of insurgents and militias, organised crime, political violence and terrorism)1 or “hybrid warfare”.2 Following the Prime Minister’s announcement of UK commitment to a “new generational struggle”3 against Islamist extremism and international terrorism, the next Defence and Security Review must seek alternative approaches to addressing terrorist threats in the lessons of the failed “War on Terror” and counter-terrorism methods over the past decade.
2.2 In Afghanistan, following the events of September 11 2001, UK and coalition forces aimed to dismantle the operational base of al-Qaida, using intensive airpower, special forces and re-arming the Afghan Northern Alliance, to great effect initially. The Taliban, hosts of al-Qaida in the region, were dispersed within weeks. However, despite calls for a substantial stabilisation force to be deployed across the country, the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) specified securing Kabul only.4 Within five years, Taliban elements had regained much of the south of the country, forcing a substantial increase of Western coalition forces under NATO leadership—140,000 foreign troops by 2010. However, it has proved impossible to constrain Taliban and other armed groups, a process complicated by the availability of cross-border sanctuaries in thinly governed frontier regions of Pakistan. Indeed, following the Committee’s warnings about the possible civil war in Afghanistan after 2014, Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond MP recently admitted that “the UK’s ability to influence outcomes [in Afghanistan] is very limited… nobody can say with certainty what the future for Afghanistan will be…”.5 These doubts come as reports of the growing influence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—an ethnic Uzbek insurgent group with reported close links to al-Qaida and the Taliban—in Tajik and Uzbek dominated northern Afghanistan.6
2.3 In Iraq, US-led Western coalition forces sought termination of a regime seen as a member of the “Axis of evil”, developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorist groups. However, Saddam Hussein’s demise was not followed by peaceful transition but instead by the bitter and complex combination of insurgency, inter-communal violence and terrorist acts that comprise “hybrid warfare”. By 2008, the conflict was estimated to have cost $3 trillion in total.7 Coalition forces saw an estimated 4,000 killed and more than 20,000 seriously injured, often resulting in lifelong disabilities. Moreover, at least 120,000 civilians are reported to have been killed,8 close to 4 million displaced and 120,000 detained without trial, and frequently abused or tortured. Al-Qaida in Iraq is now thought to have merged with Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra, with claims that it was set up by al-Qaida in the first place.9
2.4 Following drawn out campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, UK involvement in situations such as Libya has been markedly different. There are lessons to be learnt from this new mode of intervention, particularly as the UK becomes more involved in Mali. The misguided notion that the majority of efforts should be devoted to providing military assistance (comprised of logistical, surveillance and training support) still appears to characterise the UK’s approach, particularly in Mali. While it is encouraging that £2 million has been pledged for activities in Mali to help support political processes and build stability, the sum is outmatched by the £3 million pledged to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) military mission. Most importantly, there appears to be little sign that the UK government is asking serious questions about how the root causes of the conflict in Mali could have been addressed at an early stage (eg through active and sustained support for negotiations between the marginalised population of the north and the central government in Bamako) and what the lessons of this might be for the wider region.
2.5 It is clear that the interconnected threats of political violence and international terrorism present a risk to UK national interests and security. However, recent failures in military responses designed to control these problems show the need for a concerted effort to refocus UK approaches away from simply responding to today’s crises and towards addressing the underlying trends which produce these threats over the long-term. This goal was reflected in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) which stated: “We must address trends that contribute to instability, as well as tackling risks directly”. Addressing the long-term drivers of global insecurity must now move from being an aspiration in White Papers and strategy documents and instead be made a top priority at the heart of British defence policy. There are signs of acknowledgement of the need for new approaches in recent strategies such as the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the International Defence Engagement Strategy, with their focus on upstream conflict prevention and non-combat security assistance in fragile states. However, the 2010 SDSR proved a missed opportunity to think carefully about ways of undertaking such a refocus in all areas of defence and security policy. In particular, as the lessons of efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, the challenge of hybrid warfare demands new thinking and honest reflection as to the appropriateness of current security paradigms based on traditional ideas about the use of force.
2.6 Recent UK military undertakings have also highlighted the resilience of groups like al-Qaida and their potency as an idea. This resilience underlines the limits of militarised responses to the spread of Islamic terrorism and countries vulnerable to the spread of extremism. While the campaign in Afghanistan did much to disperse al-Qaida from the country, affiliates of the group have been responsible for numerous attacks across the world since 2001. In addition to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, attacks and attempted attacks took place in Spain, Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Indonesia and, of course, the UK.10
2.7 Worse still, recent developments point to a widely spread “renaissance” of the al-Qaida vision through jihadist groups around the world11:
Syria: Although armed militias within the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces have struggled for funding, radical Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Mujaharin have continued to get external support, mainly from benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. They also have links with opposition elements in neighbouring Iraq. In Syria the importance of the Jihadist paramilitary groups continues to grow. They tend to be more determined, more adequately armed, more coordinated and more competent in urban insurgency, with a significant minority having previous combat experience, often against US forces in Iraq. There are many examples of more secular paramilitary rebel groups working very closely with Jihadists and even being led by them. Even if the new National Coalition becomes effective (which is not too likely given the disparate nature of the militias within Syria), the more radical Islamists are now thoroughly entrenched and it will be very difficult for them not to have a role should a post-Assad environment emerge.
Iraq: Two related elements are important. One is that there have been numerous mass protests by Sunnis against the Shi’a-dominated Maliki government. These have been near-daily occurrences, especially in Anbar Province and have been hardly covered in the Western media. In parallel with this has been an upsurge in violent paramilitary actions against the government by Jihadists embracing the al-Qaida vision. A series of bombings and shootings across Baghdad and several other cities on 17 March were the worst for more than six months. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) is a coalition of many of these groups, which have collectively targeted government officials, police and security forces and, on occasions, Shi’a communities. The ISI regards Sunni politicians as having sold out to the Maliki regime. Significantly, some of the members within the coalition have very close links with the Syrian Islamist rebels, so that there is a seamless trans-border connection. The Syria-Iraq connection is probably the strongest current expression of the al-Qaida vision and has potential for further development.
Nigeria: The Boko Haram rebellion in northern Nigeria continues without respite. Boko Haram has a wider regional connection—it is known to recruit from neighbouring countries, including Niger, Chad and Cameroon; Islamist groups are increasing their influence in Mauritania and Niger; and there are indications that Boko Haram supporters have received combat training in Somalia. While Boko Haram is primarily focused on the state, its offshoot, Ansaru, has a much broader transnational outlook, which is closer to the al-Qaida vision. Its recent kidnapping and killing of foreign workers has suddenly focused attention on what may be a trend towards making the whole of the Boko Haram movement more transnational.
Mali: The intervention in Mali is leading to a new western/jihadist confrontation. There was some expectation that the French intervention would lead to a period of quiet during the hot season, with the confrontation developing later in the year, but French and Chadian forces have faced unexpected resistance from jihadist paramilitaries. Chadian troops lost 24 killed and around 50 wounded on a single day (22 February). Paramilitaries even infiltrated the town of Gao, there was a suicide bomb attack in Kidal and a number of harassing attacks that contrast strongly with expectations that jihadist paramilitaries are restricted to a few remote mountainous areas. France still plans to withdraw most of its forces during April, but there are serious doubts that units from several West African countries, now slowly arriving in Mali, will prove to have the capacity to enhance security.
East Africa and Yemen: Despite some improvements in security, those areas of Somalia that experience radical Islamist influence continue to connect with other zones of conflict, with indications that Boko Haram paramilitaries have established connections. Meanwhile, significant developments in neighbouring East African countries include an unexpected undercurrent of Islamist influence further south. The main locations so far have been the Kenyan port city of Mombasa, together with Dar es Salaam on the Tanzanian coast and the island of Zanzibar. In all three cases, Islamist elements are building on perceptions of marginalisation to increase their influence. The individual developments along the East African coast have not merged into any kind of sustained and coherent radical Islamist movement, but they all feed on perceptions of marginalisation and consequent resentment, with (in Kenya’s case) anger at sustained corruption. While it is therefore unwise to talk of a new “front” for radical Islam as part of an al-Qaida re-awakening, the conditions exist for movements to develop rapidly and unexpectedly. This connects with the underlying factors that enable Boko Haram in Nigeria to maintain its support—relative marginalisation combined with determined suppression by security forces.
The radical Islamist movements described above form part of a post 9/11 phenomenon and are increasing in intensity, geographical reach and distribution. There appear to be informal linkages, made easier by modern communications technologies, which allow connections with developments in South West Asia and the Middle East.
2.9 The experience of the last eleven years shows us that terrorism and violent radicalisation can only be effectively countered by targeting the conditions that allow extremist groups and ideologies to prosper. This does not mean making simplistic correlations between conditions of poverty and the use of terror as a political instrument, but instead taking seriously the marginalisation of large parts of the population in key areas of the “Global South”. The ideology of al-Qaida is nothing without the individuals willing to carry out attacks in the movement’s name. These individuals come from social and political circumstances in which violence appears to them to hold greater promise of achieving their ends than peaceful participation in political and social life. The process towards the next SDSR must take these hard learnt lessons into account to devise approaches that can counter the roots and conditions of security threats such as international extremism.
3.0 The Utility of Force
3.1 As stated in paragraph 2.9, the last decade of the War on Terror has shown that force has limited use in countering terrorism and violent extremist. The need for protracted campaigns in the hybrid conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resilience of al-Qaida ideas in a new wave of jihadism, show that radicalisation must be targeted with more nuanced approaches than simply the application of force. Recent analysis makes a strong case that while abject poverty may not inevitably be a factor, relative deprivation and marginalisation most certainly can be.12 It is clear from the continued spread of extremist groups in the face of costly military campaigns against them, that solutions for the “next generation” of Islamist extremism must include non-military approaches to address the circumstances that allow for violent ideologies to take hold.
3.2 Non-traditional threats: Many analysts are increasingly concerned that the world currently faces the confluence of two large-scale trends which have important impacts on global security—growing socio-economic divisions between a rich, transnational elite and poor and marginalised non-elite and severe global environmental constraints, particularly climate change.13 Both are discussed in the Ministry of Defence’s own report on “Global Strategic Trends—Out to 2040”14 as “ring road issues” (what the report describes as “a driver that is so pervasive in nature and influence that it will affect the life of everyone on the planet over the next 30 years”), but the 2010 SDSR gave little thought to how these issues can be addressed at source. Military force is of little use to preventing the increase of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere or reducing the gap between a global elite and a disenfranchised global underclass. Yet if the next SDSR is to be a coherent policy response to the trends that have the potential to threaten the UK’s national security, it must find a way of incorporating non-military solutions to these issues. Given the novelty and complexity of this task, the 2015 SDSR process will need to devote considerable time to these issues.
3.3 There have been a number of promising steps towards a whole-of-government approach to security threats, particularly in BSOS and the International Defence Engagement Strategy, both of which signal a shift towards a preventive security agenda, acknowledging that “our prosperity and security is intertwined with peaceful development and security across the globe”15. We welcome the focus on upstream conflict prevention present throughout BSOS and many of the activities outlined for non-combat defence engagement in fragile and post-conflict states, such as counter-terrorism capacity building and security sector reform, and applaud plans to work in concert with diplomatic and development programmes. We therefore encourage the Committee to assess how these approaches can be drawn into national security and defence strategy to become an integral part of the UKs approach to twenty-first century threats.
4.0 The Strategic Balance Between Deterrence, Containment, Intervention and Influence
4.1 Based on threat environment outlined above, there must be a rebalance in these elements of defence and security strategy. Indeed several of these concepts require reflection. While some traditional state-based threats may still exist—in which older ideas about containment, deterrence and intervention remain relevant—recent, current and the most likely future UK military operations all point to the need for an alternative framework which shifts the balance towards a greater role for conflict prevention.
4.2 Intervention: As discussed in sections 2 and 3, lessons of military undertakings over the past decade show the limits of the utility of force in the face of complex modern conflict dynamics. Yet, as evidenced in current efforts in Mali, UK approaches still prioritise military assistance and there is little sign that the UK government is asking serious questions about how the root causes of the conflict in Mali could have been addressed at an early stage and what the lessons can be learnt for the region. However, as the resurgence of al-Qaida transnational ideology has shown, military approaches to security threats will have limited use in countering violent extremism. Again, we urge the Committee to reflect in further detail the options for a better integration of non-combat approaches such as those outlined in BSOS and the International Defence Engagement Strategy.
4.3 Prevention: The final concept that needs to be considered in this mix is prevention. It is clear that many of the most important trends in global security, including the increasing importance of “revolts from the margins” and the implications of climate and energy insecurity, can only be addressed at source. Traditional military responses are by their very nature reactive. The 2010 SDSR states: “Our approach recognises that when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily, it costs far more.”16 Yet serious questions remain about the extent to which a focus on conflict prevention is being constrained by over-reliance on somewhat out of date ideas about containment, deterrence etc. The National Security Council (NSC) has clearly been unable to focus as much on prevention as it has on specific reactions to various global crises since its creation in 2010. In its report of 11 February 2013, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy stated that it was
“…not convinced that the NSC has maintained its strategic focus since completing the NSS and SDSR in 2010. It appears to have focused on operational matters and short-term imperatives. We have continued to look for evidence of the NSC considering long term and blue skies topics and have found little.”17
The next SDSR is a very important opportunity to shift the balance in concrete policy terms towards the tackling of “threats at source”18. Examining the specific ways this can be done must become a top priority.
5.0 The Defence Select Committee and the SDSR
5.1 We question whether the Committee, in its Inquiry, will be able to properly assess what balance is required between deterrence, containment, intervention and influence given the current heavy budgetary weighting towards deterrence. The limitations become clear when you consider that the MOD budget in 2012 was an estimated £34 billion19, yet it would cost at least £25 billion to replace the current Trident system over the next two decades20 (and whole life costs are estimated to be in excess of £100 billion21).
As it becomes increasingly clear that a like-for-like replacement for Trident is fiscally unsustainable and unsuited to modern security needs, the need for a comprehensive public debate on the future of the deterrent becomes overwhelming. In a much-discussed interview with The Guardian, Chief Secretary to the Treasury and lead of the Cabinet Office-led Trident Alternatives Review, Danny Alexander MP, stated:
“When budgets are under pressure, and when the assumptions that our current approach are based on are very much cold war assumptions, and we are in the 21st century and the world is changing, that this is absolutely the right time to have a serious, considered objective look at the way in which this policy is constructed”.
The only way the SDSR can genuinely review the role of deterrence in the UK defence posture and whether it is balanced with other approaches is to treat the outcome of the current Trident Alternatives Review seriously. This and the final report of the independent, cross-party Trident Commission set up by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC),22 are likely to come up with a number of serious alternatives to the continuous-at-sea deterrence approach of a like-for-like Trident replacement which could, in principle, allow for some serious discussions within the SDSR process of the role of deterrence in British defence policy.
5.2 We note the exclusion of an important line of inquiry set to be explored in “Towards the next Defence and Security Review”. The Committee’s announcement of 10 December, 2012, specifically included the following inquiry to be carried out, either as part of an over-arching inquiry or as a more specific one:
“…the effect of changes in the interpretation of the law on the prosecution of operations, and the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs, commonly known as ‘drones’)”
ORG questions the removal of this line of inquiry and whether it has been removed for a separate inquiry or completely excluded. If this inquiry has been removed to pursue more specific investigation, we would urge the Committee to also consider investigation within the overarching Inquiry, given the significant role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a shifting approach to modern warfare.
The increasingly prolific use of surveillance and armed drones by the UK and other states is part of a wider shift in the character—and perhaps nature—of 21st century warfare. This new mode features increased use of armed drones, special operations forces, privatised military companies, rendition– a concept increasingly referred to as “remote control”.23 Understandably, this has given rise to concerns that a shift towards “war-lite” leaves room for decreased accountability of states for their actions in conflict, lower thresholds of military engagement and greater scope for controversial action. This could be one of the most important shifts in defence thinking since the end of the Cold War and should therefore be a subject for sustained public discussion. The Committee could play a central role in this discussion in the lead up to, and during, the SDSR process.
For this reason, ORG urges the Committee to include use of UAVs within its overarching Inquiry towards the next Defence and Security Review as it significantly relates to considerations of the legitimacy of the use of force, the utility of force, and the relationship between hard and soft power.
5.3 The 2010 NSS committed the government to producing both a new NSS and SDSR every five years.24 This means that to some extent, the questions about what needs to go into the 2015 NSS are just as important as the questions the Committee is considering about the 2015 SDSR. The NSS should be “a hard-headed reappraisal of our foreign policy and security objectives and the role we wish our country to play, as well as the risks we face in a fast-changing world.”25 In the Committee’s Sixth Report on Session 2010–12 (released in 2011), it noted that the NSS should “enable the SDSR to take informed resourcing decisions.”26 If this is to be the case, the timing of the updating of both documents is crucial. In our previous submission to this Committee we noted:
“The revised NSS released in 2010 includes some very complex and, to a certain degree, unprecedented (at least in terms of scale and immediacy) security threats. Dealing with these threats will require significant shifts in defence thinking and strategic planning and in some cases recalibration of personnel and force structures… Therefore, if UK defence and security policies are to keep up with these changes, the NSS should be reviewed (probably over a slightly longer time period than was the case between May-October 2010) and then announced before the SDSR so that the latter can be a truly coherent and strategic response to the NSS.”27
We urge the Committee to do everything it can to encourage the Government to prioritise the updating of the NSS over the period of 2013–14 so that this document can genuinely inform the 2015 the SDSR and give it a strong strategic rationale. We also urge the Committee to work with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy to consider the important questions of which principles, frameworks and objectives are to be included in the updated NSS as part of its work over the next few years, and to ensure that the SDSR process is treated as a separate exercise to the updating of the NSS.
Oxford Research Group is an independent non-governmental organisation and registered charity which works to promote a more sustainable approach to global security. ORG has been building trust between policy-makers, academics, and the military and civil society since 1982. ORG and its internationally recognised consultants combine detailed knowledge of security issues, together with an understanding of political decision-making, and many years of expertise in facilitating constructive dialogue.
More information can be found at: www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk
Dr Benjamin Zala is the Director of Oxford Research Group’s Sustainable Security programme. He is also a member of the editorial team for the academic journal Civil Wars (published by Routledge). Ben holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Birmingham.
Zoë Pelter is the Research Officer of Oxford Research Group’s Sustainable Security programme. She works on a number of projects across the programme, including Rethinking UK Defence and Security Policies. Zoë holds an honours degree in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge.
Dr Benjamin Zala and Zoë Pelter
1 Shannon D Beebe and Mary Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human security and the new rules of war and peace, PublicAffairs Books (New York), 2010, pp57-62,
2 See Frank G Hoffman, Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict, Strategic Forum, No. 240, April 2009
3 UK in “generational struggle” against terror, says PM, BBC News, 21 January, 2013 available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21130484>
4 See History of Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, available at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html >
5 Afghanistan's future after Nato troops leave uncertain, admits Hammond by Richard Norton Taylor and Sam jones, the Guardian. 10 April 2013, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/afghanistan-future-uncertain-hammond>
6 Uzbek fighters gain support in Afghan north by Bethany Matta, Al Jazeera, 10 April 2013, < http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/20134910314648770.html >
7 See Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War, Allan Lane (London), 2008
8 See: Iraq Body Count, available at <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/>
9 Al-Qaeda in Iraq claims merger with Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra by Richard Spencer, The Telegraph, 9 April, 2013, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9982477/Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq-claims-merger-with-Syrias-Jabhat-al-Nusra.html >
10 Paul Roger and Benjamin Zala, The “Other” Global Security Challenges: Socioeconomic and environmental realities after the War on Terror, RUSI Journal, August-September 2011, Vol 156, no.4, pp26-33
11 Cases taken from: Oxford Research Group Monthly Global Security Briefings, Al Qaida: The Potency of an Idea and Al Qaida and the wider Jihadist Phenomenon by Global Security Consultant Paul Rogers, available at: http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/monthly_briefings
12 Atle Mesøy, Poverty and radicalisation into violent extremism: a causal link?, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), January 2013, available at <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/e60a8a679f48427d592a1906daf569d4.pdf>
13 On this combination, see Christian Parenti, Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence, Nation Books: New York, 2011 and Fathali M Moghaddam, The New Global Insecurity: How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing Our World, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger 2010.
14 Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040, 4th Edition, London: The Stationery Office, January 2010.
15 BSOS, 2011, p. 8.
16 SDSR, 2010, p. 3.
17 House of Lords-House of Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Second Report of Session 2012–13: The work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012, HC 984, p.4, available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtnatsec/115/115.pdf>.
18 SDSR, 2010, p. 44.
19 Armed forces fear more manpower cuts by James Blitz, The Financial Times, 7 December, 2012, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/47b9ba8c-408e-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JZjJEmLO>
20 p8, Beyond the Trident Alternatives Review, Dr Nick Ritchie, British American Security Information Council, April 2013
21 Trident: no need for like-for-like replacement, says Danny Alexander by Nick Hopkins, The Guardian, 22 January 2013, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/22/trident-replacement-danny-alexander> See also: Trident is no longer key to Britain’s security by Des Browne and Ian Kearns, The Telegraph, 5 February, 2013
22 See British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Trident Commission, available at <http://www.basicint.org/tridentcommission>. For a good summary of some of the realistic approaches to continuous-at sea-deterrence see Nick Ritchie, Beyond the Trident Alternatives Review, BASIC, April 2013, available at <http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basic_ritchie_beyond_trident_report.pdf>.
23 As an introduction to the concept of “Remote Control” please see Remote control: a new way of war, by Paul Roger, openDemocracy, 18 October, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/remote-control-new-way-of-war. For in-depth exploration of the concept, please see Network for Social Change pilot project “Remote Control - Examining Changes in Military Engagement”. Initial information available at: <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/news/new_org_hosted_project_remote_control_examining_changes_military_engagement>
24 NSS, 2010, p. 11.
25 NSS, 2010, p. 9
26 House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 761, p.5.
27 Oxford Research Group, Written Evidence to the Defence Select Committee Inquiry into the Strategic Defence and Security Review & the National Security Strategy, February 2011, available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/761/761vw32.htm>