Memorandum from Rt Hon Bruce George MP,
Chairman, Defence Select Committee and Simon H Cooper, Post-Graduate
Student, University of Leeds
A REACTION TO
Throughout history, the "State" has
engaged various agencies either directly or indirectly to fulfil
its defence and security obligations. Offensive and defensive
actions were delegated to the military and the maintenance and
policing of public order to policing bodies. The individuals concerned
have either been directly employed by the state, privately contracted
or subject to duty through feudal obligation. The history of the
British army is one of feudal levies, conscription and the hiring
of foreign soldiers notably from Germany in the 18th century and
Nepal in the 19th century. In fact warfare during much of British
history was a private activity. Up to the middle of the 18th century
the Colonels of Regiments were virtually all military entrepreneurs.
Similar themes existed abroad. Indeed in global terms the last
3,000 years has witnessed an unclear line between the military,
militias, professional and conscripted armies. Privatisation of
"military" activities, traditionally considered to be
the responsibility of the State is of course still prevalent in
the modern era. Private military companies (PMCs), offering services
ranging from doctrine formation to hands-on military assistance
have been accepting contracts from Governments across the world
since their inception in the 1960's. Indeed the role of the first
PMC, founded in 1967 by David Stirling progressed from combat
training and support to the provision of "Military Advisory
Training Teams to foreign government clients overseas, particularly
in the Middle East but also in Africa, Latin America and East
The development of PMCs is directly linked to
a global trend whereupon some Governments are increasingly looking
to out-source military tasks to private firms for various different
reasons. Indeed a recent report prepared as part of the US National
Defense Authorization Act revealed that the US Department of Defense
employs 734,000 private-sector employees per annum compared with
a civilian workforce of 700,000.
Of the 734,000 individuals sub-contracted by the US Government,
the vast majority is employed to perform non-combat tasks such
as the research and development of various defence systems. Nevertheless,
a minority is engaged at the sharper end of US foreign policy.
Indeed the decision taken by the Clinton administration to hire
DynCorp, a US based company, to execute its unarmed Kosovo monitoring
responsibilities illustrates the movement towards the privatisation
of military activity. The reason for the American decision was
twofold as Kevin O'Brien identifies. Firstly, the US Government
did not believe it would be right to send highly trained yet unarmed
personnel into a potentially dangerous situation and secondly,
it ensured that US forces would not be exposed to a fragile security
situation that was little understood or domestically supported.
Closely behind the US in the quasi privatisation
of the military has been the UK. A study of British House of Commons
Defence Select Committee reports from the last 21 years reveals
the evolution of this process. Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)
and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have been regularly documented
by the Committee. Indeed reports in recent years have illustrated
the selling-off of married quarters for military personnel, the
use of contract security to guard military premises, the outsourcing
of emergency aid haulage duties
and the proposed PPP for the Defence Evaluation Research Agency
(DERA). According to Bruce George MP, "privatisation is getting
closer to the front line to the extent that the military's monopoly
in war-fighting is over."
As the demand for them has increased, PMCs have
developed to offer an alternative to the use of national militaries.
This has certainly not happened without criticism. Alex Vines
writes of "private military companies that engage in mercenary-like
activities". Indeed he goes on to say that
"Their poor human rights record, their lack
of transparency, their engagement in arms transfers, their training
in psychological warfare against civilians . . .and their use
of people with track records of human rights abuse does not bode
well for the upholding of international law."
Doug Brooks, President of the International
Peace Operations Association (IPOA) offers a different perception.
Under the umbrella of "military service providers",
he suggests that PMCs are essentially "lawful profit-seeking
companies with profit making structures. . .[providing]. . .the
whole gamut of legitimate services that were formally provided
by national armies".
To a significant extent, national armies still provide these services.
The fact nevertheless remains that in some cases they either cannot
cope or do not want to get involved. This does not mean "government
[should] get out of war completely and leave the whole field to
It means that licit PMCs are necessary entities in the modern
Most PMCs are most definitely not "mercenaries".
They are not intent on making money regardless of the political
or human consequences. Whilst Alex Vines and a number of other
commentators view them in an almost entirely negative light, this
paper argues that if properly regulated, PMCs can have a positive
impact when used. In the words of Doug Brooks, their "efficiency
makes them ideal for addressing Africa's military security problems
at affordable prices".
PMCs have evolved slowly and are here to stay. They are not a
new phenomenon and will certainly not fade away to extinction.
Indeed their presence in the international community is becoming
absolutely vital as States are left with few alternatives to solve
challenging strategic problems.
The entire debate surrounding PMCs has been
muddied by a blur in the distinction between the companies themselves
and the age-old exploits of mercenaries. There are fundamental
differences between the two that must be respected. In simplistic
terms, mercenaries have no ethical principles; essentially they
fight for the highest bidder. Of course providing an exact, all-encompassing
definition of what being a mercenary means is much harder. There
have been many attempts ranging from the 1972 Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries
to the 1989 UN Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries. This paper is not the arena to explain
them all in detail. Each have problems which out-way their advantages.
Perhaps the most acceptable definition of all is that presented
by Juan Carlos Zarate. He defines a mercenary "as a soldier-for-hire,
primarily motivated by pecuniary interests, who has no national
or territorial stake in a conflict and is paid a salary above
the average for others of his rank."
Indicating that a mercenary is a soldier for hire is particularly
important as "etymologically. . .`soldier' carries the meaning
`he who fights for pay.'"
Obviously, in times of actual conflict individuals will continue
to volunteer for active service regardless of financial reward
because they have a passion for the cause. However, regardless
of whether he is in favour of the cause, a mercenary will only
offer his services on the basis of financial reward. It is therefore
essential to stress that mercenaries are not just soldiers but
in the words of Zarate, "soldiers-for-hire".
The authors of this paper abhor any use of mercenaries;
indeed one only has to look at the illegitimate death and destruction
they have caused over their dismal history. Most PMCs on the other
hand have a positive role to play in ensuring peace and security
in unstable countries. Regarding them all in the same light as
mercenaries is as academically naïve as it is unfair.
As a pre-cursor to discussing the possibilities
for regulation, it is first prudent to provide an analysis of
two major PMCs; in this case, Sandline International and MPRI.
The authors have chosen these two firms as they respectively represent
the "hard" and the "soft" ends of the scale.
This analysis will also ensure that the terms of reference are
more clearly understood before the discussion of regulating PMCs
In a television interview broadcast in May 2000,
the head of Sandline International, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Spicer
was asked whether he thought the then crisis in Sierra Leone would
not have happened if Sandline and what the interviewer called
its "mercenary troops had been able to stay in place?"
Before responding, Spicer stated his belief that there is clear
blue water between private military companies and old-style mercenaries.
Spicer described PMCs as "formed bodies that have a sort
of corporate entity and they have, in the absence of other regulations,
self-regulating rules" who will "only work for the good
guys". On the other hand, he spoke of "old" mercenaries
having "no common doctrine. . .no common training standards,
they'll work for the highest bidder."
In saying this, Spicer was reiterating sentiments he expressed
in an interview to The Daily Telegraph published in its
features section on 3 December 1999. Spicer stated, "The
word mercenary conjures up a picture in people's minds of a rather
ruthless, unaligned individual, who may have criminal, psychotic
tendencies". He went on: "We [Sandline International]
are not like that at all. All we really do is help friendly, reasonable
governments solve military problems; it's not all about fightingit's
more about organisation, training, command and control."
As an extension of this, Kevin Clements' identifies that the distinguishing
difference between PMCs and Mercenaries lies in the fact that
"in the majority of cases they [PMCs] have worked in collaboration
with governments as opposed to attempting to destabilise them
as traditional mercenary groups sometimes do."
Founded in 1997, the London-based firm Sandline
International incorporate the self-regulating rules and corporate
entity that Colonel Spicer referred to during the May 2000 interview.
The Sandline website has a section on the background, mission
and policy of the firm. In the policy section they are keen to
point out "that the company only accepts projects which,
in the view of its management, would improve the state of security,
stability and general conditions in client countries."
It goes on to stress that Sandline will only work for internationally
recognised Governments, Institutions and Liberation Movements
Conducted to the standards of first
world military forces.
Where possible, broadly in accord
with the policies of key western governments
Undertaken exclusively within the
national boundaries of the client country.
Colonel Spicer has since left the firm and set
up a new company called Strategic Consulting International (SCI).
SCI's promotional literature appears to be very similar to that
of Sandline International. Indeed like Sandline, it claims to
"Operate within the law" and maintain "Respect
for human rights".
When interviewed for a report in the Financial Times, Spicer stated
that "Our [SCI's] preference is to help the national forces
of a legitimate government to help themselves, rather than do
the job for them," adding "That does not mean to say
we avoid going to the combat zone."
Eeben Barlow, CEO of the now defunct Executive
Outcomes (EO), consistently made similar claims. In 1996, Barlow
stated, "We are a professional military advisory group working
only for recognised governments".
EO drew its personnel in main from the former South African Defence
Force (SADF) although some of its more senior personnel previously
worked for a South African Special Forces' death-squad somewhat
ironically known as the "Civil Co-operation Bureau".
When in operation, the services offered by EO compare similarly
to those still advertised by Sandline and SCI. These include advice,
training, operational and intelligence support, humanitarian operations,
strategic communications and non-conflict support to law and order.
Incorporated in 1987 by eight former senior
military officers and based in Alexandria, Virginia, Military
Professional Recourses Incorporated (since 1996, just MPRI) was
originally started to provide doctrine for the US Armed Forces.
With close links to the US government and a significant level
of custom from the US Army, MPRI has grown in to a serious player
in the private military sphere with global revenues of $56 million
(1999 Forecast). Statutory regulation in the US sets MPRI apart
from firms like Sandline in that MPRI must obtain a license from
the State Department in order to execute it's services outside
the boundaries of the US.
Senior officials within MPRI are content with
this arrangement for a number of different reasons, all of which
were explained to us when we met the Vice President of International
Operations for MPRI, Harry E. Soyster (Retired Lieutenant General
US Army) at the House of Commons. Mr. Soyster's explanation was
"The first is that it would be a violation
of the law to carry out work without a license. The penalties
are very severe and no responsible company would contemplate working
without one. The second is that we have never been denied a license
because of the merits of our programs. Any delay or denial has
been for political reasons. Thirdly, our customers would demand
that we get licensed even if we thought we did not. That is why
it is imperative to get a license."
These words were reflected closely in a contribution
Mr. Soyster made to a PMC discussion group on the Internet. In
the same contribution, he stated the reasons for MPRI's positive
attitude towards public relations. "We handle media by trying
to answer all questions. There is virtually nothing that cannot
be known about the company. I have talked to 7-800 members of
the press, authors, academia, etc. We get a lot of free publicity
and transparency is our ally."
The real and fundamental difference between
MPRI and a company like Sandline International is that the former
does not engage in combat situations. It is part of the company
doctrine that none of MPRI's employees carry a gun. This was confirmed
by Soyster who when interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor
stated that "No one has ever carried a gun while at MPRI.
. .Sure, it gets in the way of business every now and then, but
that's all right."
Nevertheless, MPRI boast similar capabilities to Sandline offering
combat training centres, equipment training, force management
and development, peace keeping and logistics management support
as well as other functions such as police and coastguard training.
Close links with the Pentagon, Department of State and CIA have
enabled MPRI to secure several valuable contracts including one
in July 1996 to supply the Bosnian Federation with 46,000 M16
assault rifles, 45 M-60 tanks, 15 helicopters and a host of other
military hardware. Added to this, 163 MPRI personnel were sent
to Bosnia and Turkey to oversee the re-equipping and re-training
of the Bosnian Army.
Tom Marks, a contributing writer to Soldier
of Fortune Magazine described MPRI as "a glorified transportation
corps, as opposed to being a military outfit. They're almost like
the FedEx of government service".
Nevertheless, his accusation that they are "so desperate
to avoid being called mercenaries that they just scratch the surface"
seems to miss the point. If the surface is considered to be the
soft end of private military activity, the fact remains that MPRI
would not want to "scratch" any deeper as their company
policy would prevent them from doing so. MPRI are, as some would
say, a "passive" PMC,
providing services up to and including training and support. Sandline
and the now defunct South African operation Executive Outcomes
are on the other hand "active" in that they provide
This is an issue addressed by Tim Spicer in
his autobiography. Spicer argues that PMCs are not passive and
do more than just a guarding role. Instead of advising from the
sidelines, to be defined as a PMC, a firm must become actively
involved in providing what he terms "practical military help
in an acceptable form to legitimate governments".
If Spicer's definition of a PMC were used as the benchmark for
deciding whether a firm is or is not a PMC, because of its policy
of non-combat, it would be difficult to include MPRI. It is for
this reason that Spicer's definition is too restrictive. MPRI
and Sandline are both PMCs. It is just that MPRI operate at the
"softer" end and Sandline at the "hard" end
of the PMC spectrum. There are similar divisions of operational
activity in the guarding sector of the private security industry.
For example, Group 4 will not undertake the guarding of public
streets and Rights of Way whereas other small to medium private
security companies will.
It is "hard" PMCs such as Sandline
and the late EO that has been a bone of contention for the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Mr. Enrique Ballesteros.
The safeguards that Tim Spicer is so keen to promote have not
been enough to prevent accusations against Sandline and similar
firms. Mr. Ballesteros is one of many who disapprove of private
companies fulfilling a role traditionally belonging to the state
and its armed forces. It is his opinion that such companies recruit
traditional mercenaries to perform any combat support role, an
accusation that has been vehemently denied by PMC operations.
The authors of a paper submitted to the Special Rapporteur point
to a recent United Nations (UN) document that supports this view
claiming that mercenaries are often employed by security agencies.
This paper is not the place to begin such a debate; nevertheless
it does illustrate a primary reason why enforceable legislation
is so necessary to regulate the activity of PMCs.
Whether they engage in "hard" or "soft"
activities, PMCs require some form of statutory regulation. However,
as the Green Paper on PMCs makes very clear, deciding what type
will be an extremely difficult decision for the Government to
make should they eventually publish a White Paper. Let there be
no misunderstanding, regulating PMCs in a watertight fashion will
be virtually impossible. One only has to look at the inability
of the International community to properly regulate the private
security industry for an indication of how hard it would be to
comprehensively regulate all the activities of private military
companies. The authors of this paper would ideally like to see
the UN draw up some legally enforceable legislation to replace
the flawed 1989 Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries. If this proves impossible, EU legislation
could be a viable alternative. The authors acknowledge the extreme
difficulty involved in introducing International legislation.
It is quite clear that companies wishing to engage in mercenary
activity will endeavour to do so regardless of the penalties.
Nevertheless, this must not be seen as a deterrent. Besides sending
an irrepressible message out to individual mercenaries and illicit
military companies that they would face stiff penalties if caught,
International legislation would enable decent companies and responsible
Governments the world over to show that their "houses are
in order". Until such a time arises, the Government must
concentrate on the situation in Britain, something it clearly
intends to do having published the Green paper back in February
The Green Paper sets out the different regulatory
schemes between paragraphs 70 and 76. There is no need to go through
each one; to do so would be repetition of the Green Paper itself.
Opinions are what is required and of the six discussed the fifth;
namely "A General Licence for PMCs/PSCs" is in our view
Under the general license scheme, only companies
with a license would be able to bid for contracts abroad. It would
obviously be up to the Government to draw up a list of activities
that it deemed severe enough to warrant a license. Constant appraisal
of this list would then be necessary to ensure that it remained
up to date with new developments in the field. There are many
people more qualified to decide what activities should be on this
list. Nevertheless, the following provide a rough guide:
Combat support and training
Some companies take offence to the term PMC,
preferring the less contentious title of private security firm.
The adoption of the approach outlined above would avoid the need
to define what is and is not a PMC, the difficulty of which this
paper has already touched on. The need for a license would be
based on activities undertaken and not the nature or name of the
company concerned. The terms of the license itself would have
to be strict enough to deter irresponsible firms and ensure that
only companies that fulfil a comprehensive list of criteria are
able to gain one.
Rather than having to establish a completely
new body to issue the licenses, one option which the FCO could
consider is using the Security Industry Authority (SIA) that was
established as part of the 2001 Private Security Act.
Whilst this would require a degree of subordinate legislation
via statutory instruments, it would not necessitate new legislation
or amendments to any previous Acts of Parliament. Parliamentary
oversight of the license issuing process would be essential with
a number of Parliamentary Committees, individually or collectively
participating. The House of Commons Defence Select Committee,
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee or the Home Affairs Select
Committee could all have a role to play, either separately or
by operating along the lines of the so-called Quadripartite Committee.
By inviting officials from the SIA to give evidence as well as
representatives from the various companies involved, Parliament
would be able to oversee the process, investigating any claims
of malpractice or corruption as and when they arise.
As we have already said, the Green Paper suggests
various methods of regulation, none of which is ideal. Whatever
scheme is introduced will undoubtedly be abused to some extent.
Mercenaries will continue to practice as will a minority of illegitimate
companies that choose to operate without a license. This is a
reality that must be accepted regardless of the discomfort it
causes. It should not however be a reason for failing to act.
British legislation of the type set out above would enable the
majority of British PMCs to show that they are legitimate firms
practising in a competitive industry that will continue to flourish
in the 21st century.
Kevin A O'Brien. PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries:
The Debate on Private Military Companies. RUSI Journal, February
2000 Volume 145 No 1.
Ellen NakashimaWashington Post Staff
Writer. Pentagon Hires Out More Than In. In U.S. Trend, Contract
Workforce Exceeds Civilian Ranks, The Washington Post, Tuesday
April 3, 2001.
Alex Vines: Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality
in Abdel-Fatau Musah and J Kayode Fayemi, Mercenaries: An African
Security Dilemma. Pluto Press 2000.
Doug Brooks. Hope for the "Hopeless
Continent": Mercenaries. Traders: Journal for the South
African Region. www.tradersP.co.za/index.html Issue 3. July-October
2000. See: http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/00Brooks.pdf.
Joseph Heller, Catch-22. (New York: Simon
& Schuster Inc 1955). Scribner Paperback edition 1996.
Lieutenant Tim Spicer OBE, An Unorthodox
Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair. Mainstream
Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New
Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International
Law, and the New World Disorder. Copyright 1998 Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University Stanford Journal of International
Law, Winter 1998.
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European
States, AD 990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Lateline, 18 May 2000: Dogs of War. Australian
Broadcasting Corporation. See: www.abc.net.au/lateline/archives/s128621.htm.
Judith Woods interview with Lt. Colonel Tim
Spicer, "We don't operate in the shadows", UK
Daily Telegraph, 3 December 1999.
Text submitted by Mr Kevin P Clements, Secretary
General, International Alert. 21 November 1999. Submitted to the
Foreign Office for a Wilton Park Conference on the Privatisation
of Security: Framing a Policy Agenda.
Sandline International Website, Overview of
the Company Section. See http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html.
Strategic Consulting International Website,
"About Us" Section. See http://www.sci2000.ws/.
By Jimmy Burns, Francesco Guerrera and Andrew
Parker. Sandline Chief Sets Up New Company PRIVATE MILITARY
WORK MP URGES GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE MERCENARIES, Financial
Times, 5 March 2001.
Taken from David Shearer, Private Armies
and Military Intervention, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Adelphi Paper 316, Oxford University Press.
Jean-Francois Bayert, Stephen Ellis & Beatrice
Hibou. The Criminalization of the State in Africa. African
Issues Series, James Curry & Indiana University Press 1999.
William Reno. Warlord Politics and African
States. Lynne Reinner Publishers London.
Interview with the Vice President of International
Operations for MPRI, Harry E Soyster (Retired Lieutenant General
US Army) at the House of Commons, 2000.
Justin BrownStaff writer for the Christian
Science Monitor, Washington. "The rise of the private-sector
military", The Christian Science Monitor. Wednesday 5
MPRI Promotional Literature. Capabilities Section.
Tim Ripley, Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune,
Parragon Publishers 1997.
Daniel Burton-Rose and Wayne Madsen. Multinational
Monitor, Corporate Soldiers, The US Government Privatizes the
Use of Force. March 1999, Volume 20, Number 3. See www.essential.org/monitor/mm1999/mm9903.07.html.
Samia Kazi Aoul, Emilie Revil, Bruno Sarrasin,
Bonnie Campbell with collaboration of Denis Tougas. Towards
a Spiral of Violence? "The Dangers of Privatising Risk Management
of Investments in Africa". Mining Activities and the Use
of Private Security Companies. Montreal February 2000. Submitted
to Mr Enrique Bernales-Ballesteros, Mr Lloyd Axworthy and Mr Robert
Private Security Industry Act 2001, Chapter
12. Received Royal Assent on 11 May 2001.
Bruce George MP and Simon Cooper
21 Kevin A O'Brien. PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries:
The Debate on Private Military Companies. RUSI Journal, February
2000 Volume 145 No 1, p 6.0. Back
Ellen Nakashima-Washington Post Staff Writer. Pentagon Hires
Out More Than In. In U.S. Trend, Contract Workforce Exceeds Civilian
Ranks, The Washington Post, Tuesday 3 April, 2001 P A19. Back
Kevin A O'Brien. Op Cit, p 59. Back
Eddie Stobart Ltd lorries were used to transport aid to Kosovo. Back
Alex Vines: Mercenaries, Human Rights and Legality in Abdel-Fatau
Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi, Mercenaries: An African Security
Dilemma. Pluto Press 2000, p 188. Back
Doug Brooks. Hope for the "Hopeless Continent":
Mercenaries. Traders: Journal for the South African Region.
www.tradersP.co.za/index.html Issue 3. July-October 2000. See:
Joseph Heller, Catch-22. (New York: Simon & Schuster
Inc. 1955). Scribner Paperback edition 1996, p 269. Back
Doug Brooks. Op Cit. See also Lieutenant Tim Spicer OBE,
An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair.
Mainstream Publishing 1999, p 41. Back
Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New
World Disorder. Copyright 1998 Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University Standford Journal of International
Law, Winter 1998. Back
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D
990-1990. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p 82. Back
Lateline, 18 May 2000: Dogs of War. Australian Broadcasting
Corporation. See: www.abc.net.au/lateline/archives/s128621.htm. Back
Judith Woods interview with Lt Colonel Tim Spicer, "We
don't operate in the shadows", UK Daily Telegraph, 3
December 1999. Back
Text submitted by Mr Kevin P Clements, Secretary General, International
Alert. 21 November 1999. Submitted to the Foreign Office for a
Wilton Park Conference on The Privatisation of Security: Framing
a Policy Agenda. Page 2. Back
Sandline International Website, Overview of the Company Section.
See http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html. Back
Strategic Consulting International Website, "About Us"
Section. See http://www.sci2000.ws/ Back
By Jimmy Burns, Francesco Guerrera and Andrew Parker. Sandline
Chief Sets Up New Company PRIVATE MILITARY WORK MP URGES GOVERNMENT
TO REGULATE MERCENARIES, Financial Times, March 5 2001 Back
Jim Hooper, Sierra Leone: The War Continues, Janes Intelligence
Review, Volume 8, no.1, January 1996, p.41-43. Taken from David
Shearer, Private Armies and Military Internvention, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 316, Oxford University
Press, p.20 Back
Jean-Francois Bayert, Stephen Ellis & Beatrice Hibou. The
Criminalization of the State in Africa. African Issues Series,
James Curry & Indiana University Press 1999, p.63 Back
For a detailed account explaining the actions of EO and Sandline
in Sierra Leone see Chapter 4, p. 113-147 of William Reno. Warlord
Politics and African States. Lynne Reinner Publishers London. Back
Interview with the Vice President of International Operations
for MPRI, Harry E. Soyster (Retired Lieutenant General US Army)
in the House of Commons, 2000. Back
Message from Harry E. Soyster posted to pmcs list at www.yahoogroups.com
on Monday March 13 2000. Back
Justin Brown-Staff writer for the Christian Science Monitor,
Washington. "The rise of the private-sector military, The
Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday July 5 2000 Back
MPRI Promotional Literature. Capabilities Section. Back
Tim Ripley, Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, Parragon Publishers
1997, p.19 Back
Daniel Burton-Rose and Wayne Madsen. Multinational Monitor, Corporate
Soldiers, The U.S Government Privatizes the Use of Force. March
1999, Volume 20, Number 3. See www.essential.org/monitor/mm1999/mm9903.07.html
Kevin O'Brien, Various Sources. Back
Lieutenant Tim Spicer OBE, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War
and the Sandline Affair. Mainstream Publishing 1999, p.41. Back
Samia Kazi Aoul, Emilie Revil, Bruno Sarrasin, Bonnie Campbell
with collaboration of Denis Tougas. Towards a Spiral of Violence?
"The Dangers of Privatising Risk Management of Investments
in Africa". Mining Activities and the Use of Private Security
Companies. Montreal February 2000. Submitted to Mr. Enrique Bernales-Ballesteros,
Mr. Lloyd Axworthy and Mr. Robert Fowler. Back
Private Security Industry Act 2001, Chapter 12. Received Royal
Assent on 11 May 2001 Back