19. All members of the Armed Forces automatically
become members of the Armed Forces Pension Scheme (AFPS). It is
a defined benefit scheme which means that the rules of the scheme
determine how much pension the member will get, based on final
salary, rather than on the amount of contributions. The main benefits
of the current Scheme are
- Immediate pension for officers at age 38 or after 16 years'
service and at age 40 for other ranks or after 22 years'
service (whichever is later). Reckonable service begins
at age 21 for officers and 18 for other ranks.
- Full pension payable at age 55 based on 34 years' service
for officers and 37 years for other ranks. A terminal grant
of three times pension is paid on retirement as a lump sum.
- Death in service lump sum for spouses of 1
to11/2 times pay, plus a pension of 50 per cent of the ill-health
pension that would have been payable had the member retired
at the date of death.
- Death in retirement pension for spouses of
50 per cent of the pension the member was receiving at the
time of death.
- Ill-health retirement pension is payable dependent on
rank and length of service. A terminal grant of three times
the annual rate of pension is also payable.
- Additional years can be purchased to provide additional
survivor benefits, and additional pension benefits can be
purchased through Additional Voluntary Contributions (AVCs)
up to Inland Revenue limits, funded by the individual.
Forms of pay other than basic pay, such as specialist
pay, are not pensionable. Examples of specialist pay include flying
pay and deep diving pay. Pensions are increased annually from
age 55 (or the date of ill-health retirement) in line with the
Retail Prices Index.
Purpose of a pension scheme
20. The Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy
sets out the principles of the pensions policy as being
- to provide a suitable End of Service Benefits and Pensions
package to enable the Armed Forces to retain Service personnel
- to provide the foundations for secure living for personnel
and their dependants once they have left the Armed Forces;
- to provide a pension scheme for the Armed Forces that
reflects modern standards and is consistent with the legitimate
expectations of Service personnel;
- to provide for those who are unable to remain in the Services
through illness or injury and for the dependants of those
The MoD have told us that, where the Government
is the employer, a pension scheme should
... provide an income, after the normal retirement
age for the scheme, that relates to the length of service
given by the individual and provides incapacity benefits and
protection for dependants ... provide benefits valued by the
employees and the incentives should be geared towards the
recruitment, retention and motivation needs of the particular
employment ... encourage desirable behaviours, such as retaining
people while they are particularly needed by that employment.'
21. In evidence, it was emphasised that, for
the Armed Forces, pensions are seen 'as part of a remuneration
package designed to recruit and retain'.
The Minister repeated on a number of occasions that the pensions
scheme 'is part of the overall manning strategy' and that both
pensions and compensation arrangements were being addressed now
because of recruitment and retention needs.
We accept the proposition that, for the MoD, as for any major
employer, pensions are part of the pay package and therefore have
a role as a management tool in recruitment and retention. In fulfilling
this function, the Armed Forces Pension Scheme has a specific
and unique element: it provides an Immediate Pension for those
who leave the Services at a relatively early age and without completing
a full career. This element is regarded by the MoD as a significant
retention incentive. We discuss this in greater detail below (see
paragraphs 58 to 70).
22. However, a pension scheme for the Armed Forces
also needs to take proper account of the fact that the 'job' which
the Armed Forces do, and the terms of service under which they
do it, is fundamentally different to that of any other group of
employees, in that they may be asked to kill or to be killed in
the course of their duties. The Forces Pension Society takes the
Government places unlimited demands on Armed
Forces personnel of a quite different order of magnitude to
those placed on any other public servants: moreover Service
people have no form of independent representation. Government
therefore bears a heavy moral duty to provide pension conditions
for Service people which are at least broadly in line with
those provided for other public servants, plus any special
provisions to meet the particular requirements of military
service. It is not acceptable that the requirements of military
service should lead to benefits being provided that are worse
We agree and believe the MoD therefore has
a responsibility to Service personnel which goes beyond that of
a normal employer. Most people who join the Services are young,
some as young as 17 or 18. It is highly unlikely that pensions
will be high up their list of considerations in choosing a career.
If the MoD is to be an effective and responsible employer it should
therefore accept that it has a duty of care for the welfare and
long term interests of these young people and that one aspect
of this duty is to ensure that the pension provision in place
for them when they leave the Services is a proper reward for the
commitment they have made.
23. We believe that, in conducting the pension
review, the MoD has placed too much emphasis on how the pensions
system can be used to benefit the Armed Forces as employers, rather
than on ensuring there is proper provision in place for Service
personnel as employees, and that this has had a negative influence
on the proposals it has brought forward.
Reasons for change
24. The Forces Pension Society believes that
... is well overdue for modernisation.
It has many anomalies and shortcomings, and no independence
of governance. It also fails to reflect modern best practice
standards or the legitimate expectations of Service personnel
and their dependants.'
The MoD believes that: 'a number of features
of the scheme are inconsistent with other public sector schemes
and some provisions fall short of best practice in modern pensions
An example is that the AFPS currently provides benefits linked
to length of service and calculated on the basis of representative
pay, depending on rank, rather than on actual pay at the time
of retirement. This means that individuals retiring at the same
time, at the same rank and with the same length of service will
receive the same pension, even if their actual salaries at retirement
25. Having decided that a review of the pension
scheme was necessary, the MoD's overall objective was
... to set a benchmark for new pensions arrangements
which supported Armed Forces career structures by contributing
to recruitment, retention and morale, and which provided a fair
level of benefits for individuals while remaining cost effective
The stated aims of the exercise were to assess
- any parts of the scheme needed to be modernised in the
light of good practice elsewhere
- any benefits needed to be improved
- the special features designed to meet the specific circumstances
of the Armed Forces were still necessary and cost-effective
The main areas which were examined were whether
- there was 'headroom' to increase benefits up to Inland
Revenue limits if these were otherwise considered 'desirable
- pension should be linked to actual earnings, rather than
- the age at which reckonable service begins should be the
same for officers and other ranks
- there should be an even rate of accrual of benefits
- there were more flexible alternatives to the Immediate
- specialist pay (eg flying pay, submarine pay) should be
- ill health benefits should be based on level of invalidity,
rather than simply on rank and length of service
- the death in service gratuity is adequate and whether
widow(er)s' benefits should be withdrawn on remarriage.
26. The last major improvements to the AFPS were
made in 1973 and most people would therefore regard a review as
timely and necessary. Our concern in examining the review's findings
was to assess whether the reasons for proposing change, and the
new proposals themselves, are in the best interest of the Service
personnel who are the scheme members.
Proposals for a new pension scheme
27. The key proposals in the consultation document
- the scheme would remain unfunded (ie paid for from taxation)
- pensions would be based on final salary on retirement,
rather than on representative pay, and would accrue from
the date of entry, at an even rate, offering a full pension
after 35 years
- no distinction would be made under the new scheme between
officers and other ranks
- immediate pensions would be payable from age 40 or after
18 years' service, with an option to choose instead a bonus
payment and a later pension
- a new three tier structure of ill health benefits would
be established, with levels varying according to the level
- dependants' benefits would be improved, including an increase
in the death-in-service grant to three times pensionable
Is the AFPS a generous scheme?
28. The Minister for the Armed Forces told us,
at the beginning of his session of oral evidence
I believe there are few who contest that
the current pension and compensation schemes are generousas
indeed they are.
He went on to say that the pension scheme was
already 'substantially funded' and that pensions do not appear
to be a key issue causing dissatisfaction amongst personnel.
The pension review was therefore conducted on the assumption that
no additional funds were required. We wished to evaluate this
assumption and assess whether it could be justified.
Cost to the MoD
29. The Armed Forces Pension Scheme is unfunded,
which means that there is no pool of money building up from contributions
and investment income to cover the costs of future pensions. Instead
current benefits are paid from current taxation. Although the
AFPS accounting officer is the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
of Defence, the Pension Scheme expenditure is a separate Vote
from the main MoD expenditure (the Consolidated Departmental Resource
Accounts). Pensions are paid from Annually Managed Expenditure.
The cost is demand-led and there is no flexibility about what
is paid out; it therefore falls outside the expenditure control
regime of the MoD's Departmental Expenditure Limit which is borne
by the MoD mainstream budget. In December 2000 the MoD estimated
that the cost of paying Service pensions would rise from £2,257
million in 2000-01 to £2,727 million by 2004-05.
In 2000-01, the actual cost was £2,275 million.
30. However, the MoD's main budget is charged
a contribution, known as the Accruing Superannuation Liability
Charge (ASLC), towards the cost of future pensions liabilities
of the existing Armed Forces. This charge is calculated on the
basis of 33.8 per cent of the total pensionable pay for officers
and 18.2 per cent for other ranks, equating to an average of 22
per cent of Armed Forces pensionable pay.
It is paid out of the main MoD Vote and into the separate AFPS
Vote to help offset the latter's gross expenditure. This ASLC
contribution in the last financial year was £1,039 million.
The ASLC payments have to come from the MoD's Departmental Expenditure
31. This means that, although the Treasury technically
meets the costs of Armed Forces pensions paid to those who have
retired from the forces, the MoD shares this burden. If a new
pension scheme provided enhanced benefits at a greater cost, the
MoD would either have to find the extra money from within its
budget by reducing other expenditure, or ask the Treasury for
an increase in its Departmental Expenditure Limit to accommodate
32. The AFPS is a non-contributory scheme in
that no contributions are explicitly deducted from salaries. However,
the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) takes into account the
deferred pay represented by pension provision in making its recommendations
on Armed Forces pay levels. The benefits of the AFPS against those
provided by civilian comparator pension schemes are evaluated
by independent consultants on behalf of the AFPRB every five years.
The AFPRB then applies an abatement to pay to reflect the enhanced
benefits of the Armed Forces Pension Scheme over comparators.
The level of abatement has been 7 per cent since 1997, and has
decreased from 11 per cent since 1981. The Forces Pension Society
believes that the decrease in the abatement figure demonstrates
that the AFPS has failed to keep pace with modern good practice
in pension provision.
33. The abatement evaluation and calculation
are complex processes. The most recent comparative valuation was
carried out in 2000 and the findings published as an appendix
to the AFPRB Report for 2001.
The 7 per cent abatement level has been retained, although the
actuaries' research indicated that 6 per cent 'would be the most
appropriate and fair adjustment for all members of the Armed Forces'.
If officers and other ranks are assessed separately, the figure
for officers is 5.2 per cent and for other ranks 7.2 per cent,
which reflect improvements in officer comparator schemes but a
deterioration in other rank comparator schemes.
34. Abatement of pay could be regarded as a means
of 'clawing back' any additional expenditure on Armed Forces pensions,
in that, if the relative value of the pension scheme increases
because of an enhancement of benefits, it would be reasonable
to assume that the AFPRB would then increase the abatement percentage
to reflect this. The MoD told us that it would be a matter for
the AFPRB to decide whether any change in pension benefits should
be reflected in a change in the abatement rate, based on a wider
assessment of Service pay levels. However the MoD accepted that
Should the AFPRB decide to abate comparator
pay to the full value of additional benefits, it is expected
that the overall cost to the Department would be neutral,
with the caveat that the Department would
wish to take a view on increasing pensions at the possible expense
of pay. This allows
at least the possibility, even within the constraint of cost neutrality,
which we discuss below, for the MoD to achieve an overall uplift
in pension benefits without contributing additional resources.
Should the AFPS be an overtly contributory scheme?
35. One of the key differences between abatement
and an overt contributory scheme is that abatement is a deduction
from pay before the gross pay of an individual is calculated.
This contrasts with arrangements for employees in other pension
schemes, where the pension is deducted from the gross pay as specified
on their pay slip. When it comes to calculating the pension to
be paid, the service man or woman's final salary on which the
pension calculation is based will be a sum from which the 7 per
cent abatement has been deducted. Employees in contributory schemes,
however, will have their pension calculated on the basis of their
gross pay before the pension contribution is deducted. Service
personnel could therefore be considered to be losing out in terms
of final pension received compared with other employees who might
be making a seven per cent contribution to their pension. This
disadvantage was highlighted to us in evidence from the Forces
Pension Society as a key factor to be borne in mind when comparing
the AFPS to other schemes.
36. The MoD had not considered the possibility
of introducing overt member contributions into the pension scheme
as part of the review, as they believed this would be an 'additional
Director General, Service Personnel Policy felt that a contributory
scheme would have to be linked to a funded scheme, as contributions
without a fund would mean that there was an 'element of artificiality'.
We find this a very weak argument. All of the public sector schemes
listed in the table below, with the exception of the local government
scheme, collect contributions from members while remaining unfunded.
37. There are certainly complications in making
the AFPS an overtly contributory scheme, and it would affect the
way the Armed Forces Pay Review Body calculates Service pay, particularly
while the old and new pension schemes were operating. But there
would be advantages to the employer, in that actual rates of pay
to Service personnel would be higher, in that the 7 per cent abatement
would not have been applied, and might therefore be more attractive
to potential recruits. There would clearly be advantages to employees
as their pensions would be calculated on a gross pay figure, rather
than the abated figure. We believe the MoD has dismissed the
possibility of contributions without properly considering it.
There would inevitably be obstacles to overcome in introducing
such a system, but there is no reason to assume, without first
properly examining them, that these would be insuperable.
We recommend that the MoD look again at the issue of making
the Armed Forces Pension Scheme an overtly contributory scheme.
Comparison with other pension schemes
38. We asked the Minister on what evidence his
assertion that the Armed Forces Pension Scheme was 'generous'
was based. He told us
Because we are not comparing, in many ways,
like with like, it is very hard to take our schemeexisting
and proposedand set it against the wider trend within
both the public and private sector, because people retire earlier
and there are other matters relating to dependants' benefits
and so on, which we have tried to correct. I think it can be
tested, but it is only an opinion. It is for that reason that
I have asked if there is a way in which this can be examined
on an independent basis to make sure that that particular statement
stands true examination ... I am fairly sure, in terms of the
overall breadth and depth of the existing scheme, that it does
The MoD set out in its initial memorandum the
steps it has taken to compare the benefits offered by the AFPS
with those offered by comparable civilian schemes
The pensions review ... specifically examined
the benefits offered under other public pension schemes, in
terms of the value and nature of benefits that would be paid
in certain circumstances. It also looked at the National Association
of Pension Funds survey of private sector schemes.
The Minister undertook to provide us with additional
information on comparator schemes.
This largely reflects the information we had received from the
Forces Pension Society, set out below.
Comparison of the AFPS with other public sector
Cost of benefits as % of pensionable pay
Cost to employer
Armed Forces Pension Scheme (current and proposed schemes)
7.0% (through abatement)
Civil Service (current scheme)
* Members' contributions for the new Civil Service
scheme will be 3.5 per cent.
Source: Ev 20 and 120
In private sector schemes, the average member
contribution is 4.7 per cent.
39. The Forces Pension Society told us that the
MoD's claim that the AFPS was the most expensive scheme in the
public sector is based on 'very, very dodgy arithmetic' because
it failed to take account of the abatement of pay figure. If the
abatement is taken into account, then the AFPS is 'broadly around
the average'. The
MoD believes that the AFPS compares well with all the main public
schemes except the police and fire services, and told us that,
as these services generally provide longer careers, it is 'more
valid' to compare these schemes against Armed Forces officers'
pensions rather than the Services as a whole.
We regard this reasoning as somewhat specious, given that abatement
is the same for both officers and other ranks in the Armed Forces;
moreover, the AFPRB's actuaries' assessment is that officers'
pension benefits have reduced against comparator schemes while
other ranks have improved.
40. Inland Revenue limits allow for a maximum
pension of two-thirds of pay: the AFPS currently pays 48.5 per
cent, plus a lump sum equal to three times pension; this will
increase under the new arrangements to 50 per cent , plus a lump
sum, which will aggregate to 62.5 per cent of pay. The Review
document acknowledges that the Inland Revenue limits would have
allowed a greater increase in retirement benefits but believed
that this would be 'very expensive indeed'.
41. The Inland Revenue limit for spouses' benefits
is two-thirds of the member's pension. The current AFPS provides
a spouse's pension at 50 per cent of the member's pension; the
review proposed no change because this would 'significantly add
to expenditure on pensions'.
The Government Actuary points out that most private sector schemes
calculate spouse's pension on the basis of the member's pension
before commutation of any lump sum. But under the AFPS, the lump
sum is separately calculated, so a spouse's pension is calculated
on the basis of the member's pension net of the lump sum, giving
a lower pension. In
the private sector, spouse's benefits are almost universally provided
for life; the present AFPS, like the majority of public sector
schemes, provides a spouse's pension until the spouse dies, remarries
or cohabits. Under the new arrangements, Armed Forces spouses'
pensions will be payable for life, even after remarriage.
42. Inland Revenue limits for lump sum payments
on death in service are four times pensionable pay. The AFPS currently
provides a sum between one and one-and-a-half times pensionable
pay; this will increase to three times pensionable pay under the
new scheme. Half of private sector schemes provide a lump sum
of four times salary, and 36 per cent provide three times salary.
43. Occupational pensions have been in the news
because of a spate of announcements from private sector firms
about the closure of their final salary schemes to new entrants.
In general, the companies were substituting money-purchase (defined
contribution) for final salary schemes, and contributing substantially
less in many cases. This is likely to mean deteriorating pension
prospects for many in the future. According to the National Association
of Pension Funds (NAPF) 2001 survey, average employer and member
contribution rates to money purchase schemes are 6.0 per cent
and 4.76 per cent of salary respectively, compared to 9.21 per
cent and 7.38 per cent for final salary schemes.
One study suggests, for instance, that only under the most optimistic
investment assumptions will 10 per cent of pay be sufficient to
give someone a money-purchase pension equivalent to that in a
good final-salary scheme, and then only after contributing for
44. While continuation of this trend in the private
sector might affect the calculations of the abatement by the Armed
Forces Pay Review Body, we do not believe it provides any argument
for the MoD to reduce the quality of the package offered to the
Armed Forces. The comparison should be with best practice,
and good employers are continuing with final salary schemes because
they believe they give security to employees. The John Lewis Partnership,
for example, has recently announced that it is increasing its
contribution to its final salary scheme, despite a fall in profits,
because it sees it as a boost to recruiting and retaining staff.
45. The Government Actuary's assessment of the
current AFPS is that
When compared to best practice in the private
sector, AFPS provides some benefits which are more generous,
and some which are less generous than best practice. Overall
the scheme can be considered as generous and compares favourably
with the majority of private sector arrangements. There are
some areas where the AFPS may appear poor, in particular the
benefits payable on death in service and under ill-health.
These areas should be considered as part of the review process.
The Review has attempted to address the deficiencies
in death in service and ill health benefits but it has not increased
benefits up to Inland Revenue limits, which was an option open
to the MoD. It should be noted that the term 'generous' is qualified
by the Government Actuary as relating to certain benefits and
compared to the private sector; the Minister did not qualify
his use of the term.
46. We would expect the AFPS to be generous in
comparison with private sector schemes, given the very different
commitment the members of the Armed Forces make and the very difficult
and dangerous role they are often asked to perform. We are
not convinced that the Armed Forces Pension Scheme, even under
the proposed new arrangements, could be regarded as generous either
by comparison with other public sector schemes, or with what is
appropriate to the special status of the Armed Forces.
47. We had some difficulty establishing whether
the MoD had conducted the pension review on the basis of cost
neutrality or not. Cost neutrality would mean that any new scheme
would not increase benefits overall; any improvement in one part
of the scheme would be paid for by reduced benefits in another
part of the scheme.
48. The Review document says that
It is Government policy that improvements
in public service pensions should generally be paid for either
by savings elsewhere in the scheme, or by scheme members through
contributions. The recommended new scheme would introduce
important modernisation compared with the current arrangements,
and a number of worthwhile improvements; resources have been
provided for the improvements by adjusting some other provisions
of the scheme. The recommendations are cost-neutral as a package.
In written questions the Committee asked the
MoD to set out what Government policy on public sector pensions
is. Cost neutrality is not mentioned as part of overall policy,
although the response does say
In some contexts, such as the provision of
benefits to unmarried partners, the Government has made it
clear that it is prepared to consider changes in pension scheme
rules to provide for the benefit improvements if the members
want such changes and are prepared to meet the full cost of
The MoD was also asked specifically whether cost
neutrality was taken as a fundamental basis for the review. The
Initially, cost-effectiveness and affordability
were specified rather than cost neutrality. The aim was that
the new scheme should be well balanced to meet the evolving
recruitment and retention needs of the Armed Forces and that,
both in terms of individual measures and as a whole, the scheme
should represent value for money. The review team considered
whether improved pension benefits would assist recruitment
The Review team decided that 'non-pension approaches'
were more appropriate for dealing with recruitment and retention
The conclusion that the review should work
within broadly cost-neutral terms was therefore reached at
a relatively early stage, reflecting a judgement that a scheme
that met the manning needs of the Forces could be delivered
within that parameter, and at the same time recognising the
high cost and value of the current scheme.
49. We explored this in more detail with the
Minister in oral evidence. He told us that
... cost-neutrality was not originally and
necessarily one of the ground rules for the pension review,
although cost-effectiveness and affordability were specified.
However, we could only justify more money if we could prove
that the pensions area caused us real problems in recruitment
and retention. Objectively we cannot do that.
So although cost neutrality was not the review's
'original driver', the fact that pensions were not regarded as
a major influence on recruitment and retention meant that the
review concluded at an early stage that no additional money would
be available, because 'a general increase in pension levels could
not be a priority'.
The effect of that on the proposals for the new scheme was therefore,
in the Minister's words, that
... what we are doing is reshuffling the
pack, so to speak; to take some elements and modify them to
pay for enhancements and improvements elsewhere.
The Forces Pension Society told us that they
had been led to expect that the pensions review would be a fundamental
examination of the existing scheme, with alternatives properly
costed, before decisions on affordability and priorities were
made. But because the constraint of cost neutrality was applied
at an early stage, what resulted was simply 'a tinkering at the
edges, a redistribution of resources within the existing cost
parameter', as indeed
the Minister in effect admitted.
27 Armed Forces Overarching
Personnel Strategy, Ministry of Defence, February 2000, p 55 Back
Ev 38 Back
Ev 40 Back
QQ 127, 131, 190 Back
Ev 17, paragraph 8 Back
Ev 25 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 3.1 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 3.9 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, Executive Summary Back
Pensions Review Document, op cit, Section 3 Back
Q 127 Back
QQ 127, 130, 162 Back
Second Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2000-01, Strategic
Defence Review: Policy for People, HC 29-II, p 242 Back
Armed Forces Pension Scheme Resource Accounts 2000-01, p 10 Back
Ev 52. The basis for the calculation is 'that percentage of pensionable
salary which, if paid throughout service, would be just sufficient
to provide the promised benefits, assuming that future experience
were to be line with the actuarial assumptions for the calculation'.
The difference in the percentages for officers compared to other
ranks reflects the higher proportion of officers who continue
in post until attainment of early pension age. See Ev 119-120 Back
The MoD paid £1,042 million into the AFPS Vote, but nearly £4
million of this represented Additional Voluntary Contributions
paid by Service personnel themselves. Back
The MoD's Vote is mostly Departmental Expenditure Limit, but temporarily
about a third (approximately £11 billion) is regarded as Annually
Managed Expenditure (cost of capital employed and depreciation)
until government departments build up experience in estimating
and controlling these notional costs. These elements will be counted
as DEL in the 2002 Spending Review onwards. Back
Ev 18, paragraph 12 Back
Armed Forces Pay Review Body, Thirtieth Report 2001, Cm 4993,
Session 2000-01, Appendix 4 Back
ibid, Appendix 4, paragraph 4.5 Back
ibid, Appendix 4, paragraphs 4.17 and 4.49 Back
Ev 113, paragraph 3 Back
Q 105 Back
Q 151 Back
Q 149 Back
Q 138 Back
Ev 40 Back
See Ev 113 and 119-126 Back
Ev 124 Back
Q 125 Back
Ev 113 Back
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Report 2001, Cm 4993, op cit,
Appendix 4, paragraph 4.6 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 4.13 Back
Ev 19 and 122 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 5.2 Back
Ev 124, paragraph 9.1 Back
National Association of Pension Funds Survey 2001, tables 70 and
Contributions to money purchase schemes must increase,
HSBC Actuaries and Consultants Newsletter, April 2002, pp 1-2 Back
'John Lewis raises pension contributions', Guardian, 27
March 2002 Back
Ev 125, paragraph 13 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 6.3 Back
Ev 39 Back
Ev 39 Back
Ev 39 Back
Q 127 Back
Pension Review document, op cit, paragraph 4.13 Back
Q 154 Back
Q 64 Back