Parliamentary Voting System
and Constituencies Bill
Introduction
1. The Constitution Committee is appointed "to
examine the constitutional implications of all public Bills coming
before the House; and to keep under review the operation of the
constitution." In carrying out the former function, we endeavour
to identify questions of principle that arise from proposed legislation
and which affect a principal part of the constitution.
2. In this report we draw the attention of the
House to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill.
The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 22 July 2010;
it received its second reading in that House on 6 September; committee
stage took place over five days on the floor of the House of Commons
between 12 and 25 October; and the Bill completed its Commons
stages on 1 and 2 November. It was introduced in the House of
Lords on 3 November and its second reading debate in this House
is scheduled for 15 November.
3. The Bill's progress through the House of Commons
was controversial. We note in particular that the House of Commons
Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform published
in October a markedly critical analysis of the Bill.[1]
In preparing this report we have taken into consideration the
evidence received by that Committee, as well as evidence separately
received by us from the Deputy Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Nick
Clegg MP, and the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform,
Mark Harper MP.[2]
4. We have also taken into consideration the
Government's Programme for Government which, under the heading
of political reform, stated that: "We urgently need fundamental
political reform, including a referendum on electoral reform,
much greater co-operation across party lines, and changes to our
political system to make it far more transparent and accountable."[3]
5. In his evidence to us the Deputy Prime Minister
discussed how all the different elements of the Government's proposals
on political and constitutional reform were linked. "[T]here
is an emphasis in everything that we are proposing on greater
accountability in the manner in which we conduct ourselves and
the way in which politics is conducted, greater legitimacy in
the political institutions that seek to represent people, and
breaking up excessive concentrations of power and secrecy. Whether
it is the power of recall, whether it is fixed-term Parliaments,
whether it is giving people the right to have a say over the electoral
system, whether it is pushing forward with House of Lords reform,
whether it is reforming party funding, all those things together
represent a significant step towards greater legitimacy, greater
accountability and greater openness in the way in which our politics
is conducted."[4]
6. He went on to say: "it is an unambiguous
judgment on our part that reducing the power of the Executive,
seeking to boost the power of the Legislature, making the Legislatures
more accountable to people ... collectively introduces the mechanisms
by which people can exercise greater control over politicians."[5]
Matters of process
7. The Bill's provisions are concerned with two
distinct aspects of constitutional reform: first, a national referendum
on the voting system for elections to the House of Commons (Part
1); and second, the number, size and boundaries of parliamentary
constituencies (Part 2). The Deputy Prime Minister has described
these "as simply two issues that relate to how we are elected
to this House".[6]
There is no reason in principle why both issues need to be provided
for in the same Bill.
8. The Bill is subject to a tight legislative
timetable. This is a result of the Government's stated aims of
holding the referendum on the voting system in May 2011 and having
the review of parliamentary constituencies completed and implemented
in time for the next UK general election (which the Government
have said will be held in May 2015).[7]
The detailed policies contained in the Bill were not subject to
any prior public consultation (for example, a Green or White Paper).
Nor has there been any pre-legislative scrutiny. We highlight
in this report some important issues which in our view should
have been subject to consultation and scrutiny before the Bill
was presented to Parliament; these issues mostly affect Part 2
of the Bill.
9. The Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged the
lack of scrutiny, arguing that if the Government were "to
introduce these changes before the next general election, we must
move fairly rapidly".[8]
However, this rapid pace of change is not supported by an all-party
consensus on the major issues of policy contained in the Bill.
10. We recognise that there are circumstances
in which the Government does need to move quickly, and that the
Government made a judgment about the referendum date which required
Part 1 of the Bill to be introduced at the beginning of the legislative
session. However, we do not believe that this was appropriate
for the more detailed provisions of Part 2.
11. We regret the fact that this Bill has
not been subject to either pre-legislative scrutiny, or to prior
public consultation.
12. In general, we regard it as a matter of
principle that proposals for major constitutional reform should
be subject to prior public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny.
We recognise that there may exceptionally be good reasons for
departing from this principle, but the perils of doing so are
well illustrated in the present Bill. The case for proceeding
rapidly with one Part of this Bill is far stronger than for the
other.
Part 1: voting system for parliamentary
elections
13. Clause 1 provides that a referendum is to
be held on 5 May 2011 on whether the current first-past-the-post
electoral system used for parliamentary elections should be replaced
with the alternative vote system (AV). Clauses 2 to 7 make provision
as to entitlement to vote in the referendum and as to the rules
under which the referendum is to be conducted. The effect of clause
8 is that the result of the referendum will be binding.
14. The variant of AV proposed is the optional
multi-preference system. Under this system voters do not have
to vote for more than one candidate (hence, "optional")
but, if they wish to do so, they may vote for as many candidates
as are on the ballot paper (hence, "multi-preference").
This voting system is not currently used for any other public
election in the United Kingdom, although a similar system, the
Supplementary Vote, is used for mayoral elections in London and
elsewhere.
15. The following issues arise with regard to
these provisions: (1) whether there should be a referendum on
this issue; (2) the wording of the referendum question; (3) clashes
with elections to the devolved institutions; and (4) whether the
Bill provides sufficient time for the holding of the referendum
by the proposed date. We consider each of these in turn, below.
16. Our analysis of these issues is shaped by
the conclusions of our report of last session, Referendums
in the United Kingdom.[9]
The report was debated in the House on 12 October.[10]
In it we made a number of findings and recommendations relevant
to the present Bill, as follows:[11]
- There are significant drawbacks to the use of
referendums. In particular the ad hoc manner in which they have
been used in the United Kingdom, often as a tactical device, is
to be regretted. Where possible, cross-party agreement should
be sought as to the circumstances in which a referendum should
be used. (paragraph 62)
- Despite these drawbacks, however, there is an
argument that if referendums are to be used, they should be used
in relation to fundamental constitutional issues. No definitive
list of such issues can be compiled, but among them is changing
the electoral system for the House of Commons. (paragraph 94)
- Referendums should not be held on the same day
as General Elections. For other elections, there should be a presumption
against holding referendums on the same day as elections, but
this should be judged on a case-by-case basis by the Electoral
Commission. (paragraph 145)
- The Electoral Commission should be given a statutory
responsibility to formulate referendum questions which should
then be presented to Parliament for approval. (paragraph 154)
- The presumption should be in favour of questions
posing only two options for voters but we recognise that there
may be occasions when multi-option questions are preferable. (paragraph
159)
- There should be a general presumption against
the use of voter turnout thresholds and supermajorities. (paragraph
189)
Throughout our report we recognised that the statutory
framework governing referendums, the Political Parties, Elections
and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), had not yet been tested in a
nationwide referendum and that, after this has happened, thorough
post-legislative scrutiny should be undertaken.
SHOULD THERE BE A REFERENDUM?
17. In the light of the above recommendations,
while we hold to the view that there are significant drawbacks
to the use of referendums, in our judgment reform of the voting
system does constitute a fundamental constitutional issue on which
a referendum may be judged to be appropriate. We note that
there is a general consensus that such an issue should be made
subject to a referendum before any change is made.
THE WORDING OF THE REFERENDUM QUESTION
18. We note that the Electoral Commission, in
line with its statutory duty under section 104 of the Political
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, considered the proposed
wording of the referendum question and that it recommended an
alternative wording, primarily to simplify the language used.[12]
We welcome the fact that the Bill was amended in the House
of Commons to give effect to the Electoral Commission's suggested
wording. We continue to hold the view that it should be a
legal requirement that the Electoral Commission should formulate
any referendum question, and that this formulation be presented
to Parliament for approval.
THE DATE FOR THE REFERENDUM
19. The date for the referendum specified in
the Bill, 5 May 2011, is also the date on which elections for
the Scottish Parliament, for the National Assembly of Wales and
for the Northern Ireland Assembly will be held. The Government
stressed the importance of the principle of "Communication
and Consultation" in the Devolution Memorandum of Understanding
between the UK Government and the three devolved administrations.[13]
However, following the announcement of the date in the House of
Commons, the Deputy Prime Minister did not confirm whether any
prior consultation with the devolved institutions took place before
the date of the referendum became public.[14]
20. The Scottish Executive have expressed the
view that holding the referendum on 5 May 2011 "shows a lack
of respect for the devolved administrations", and that it
"undermines the integrity of elections to the Scottish Parliament".[15]
The Welsh Assembly Government is likewise opposed to holding the
referendum on the same day as the Assembly elections.[16]
21. We note the concerns expressed by the Scottish
Executive that media coverage of, and public debate around, next
year's elections to the Scottish Parliament is likely to be affected
by the coverage of the simultaneous AV referendum and this could
potentially distort the outcome.[17]
It could equally be the case that coverage of the elections to
the devolved institutions could suppress coverage of the referendum
debate.
22. The Government have stated that it would
cost around £30 million of additional public money to hold
the referendum on another date.[18]
The Deputy Prime Minister argued that there was no justification
for doing so and that "it is disrespectful to people to assume
that it is too complex to ask them to vote on a referendum on
the same day as they are being invited to vote anyway."[19]
23. We note the Government's arguments in favour
of combining the two polls. However, we regard it as
regrettable that the Government should have failed to consult
appropriately with the devolved institutions on the timing of
the referendum.
THE DATE OF THE REFERENDUMADMINISTRATION TIMETABLE
24. In relation to the administration of the
referendum, the Electoral Commission believes that, "on balance
it should be possible to deliver the different polls proposed
for 5 May 2011". It is to be noted that this conclusion is
expressly contingent upon "the key practical risks"
being "properly managed".[20]
The Electoral Commission has several times repeated that "the
rules on how the referendum will be conducted must be clear from
at least six months in advance".[21]
It has added that "provided the Bill receives Royal Assent
in time to allow a referendum period of at least 10 weeks, there
will be adequate time for the Commission to register campaigners
and designate lead campaigning organisations, and for campaigners
to put the arguments to voters."[22]
Given that the Bill was introduced in the House only six months
before the proposed referendum date, there is a danger that these
deadlines will not be met.
25. The Minister for Political and Constitutional
Reform told us that this timetable would not fetter the House's
consideration of the Bill, but "if your Lordships made significant
changes, [the Electoral Commission] would have to consider those
and come back and express a view about what that meant for the
conduct of the referendum."[23]
He was unable to tell us what, precisely, would count as a "significant"
amendment.[24]
Part 2: parliamentary constituencies
THE SIZE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
26. Clause 11 of the Bill provides for the size
of the House of Commons to be reduced from its current number
of 650 constituencies to 600.
27. In their respective manifestos for the 2010
General Election the Conservative Party proposed to reduce the
size of the House of Commons by 65 seats (to 585) and the Liberal
Democrat Party proposed a reduction of 150 seats, albeit proposing
that such a reduction would be contingent upon the introduction
of the Single Transferable Vote electoral system (a form of proportional
representation). The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
heard evidence from bodies such as the Hansard Society, Democratic
Audit and Unlock Democracy who argued that the choice of 600 was
arbitrary, lacking a rationale and, in any event, put the cart
before the horse.[25]
It was argued that a more sensible approach would have been firstly
to review the functions of the House of Commons and secondly to
form a view as to the appropriate number of MPs required to perform
those functions.
28. We pursued with the Minister for Political
and Constitutional Reform whether there was a rationale for the
number chosen. He stated that the number was not based on "a
horse-trading exercise" of the numbers stated in the two
parties' respective manifestos[26].
He also argued that the Government considered that the reform
would "not qualitatively change the nature of the representative
role that Members of Parliament carry out."[27]
However, he acknowledged that this was a judgment: "I am
not going to pretend that there is a magic science to all this."[28]
29. We conclude that the Government have not
calculated the proposed reduction in the size of the House of
Commons on the basis of any considered assessment of the role
and functions of MPs.
30. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
also argued that the reduction in MPs would appear to be drawn
"entirely from the backbenches, with no proposals to reduce
the number of ministers or of others on the Government payroll
sitting and voting in the House, thus increasing the extent of
executive dominance of Parliament".[29]
31. An amendment was moved during the Committee
stage of the Bill in the House of Commons so as to reduce the
maximum number of ministers permitted to sit in the Commons proportionately
to any reduction in the overall size of the Commons. However,
the Government opposed the amendment and it was defeated.[30]
Although that amendment would have reduced the maximum number
of ministers in the Commons, it would not have reduced the number
of parliamentary private secretaries permitted to sit in the House
of Commons and might not therefore have reduced the overall size
of the so-called "payroll vote" in that House; nor would
it have dealt with any knock-on consequences in terms of the number
of ministers in the House of Lords.
32. The Deputy Prime Minister recognised that
"There is a strong argument that says that you must look
at this and adapt the number of people who are on the government
payroll so that you do not get a lopsided imbalance between those
on the payroll and those holding them to account. I totally accept
that."[31] The Minister
for Political and Constitutional Reform also accepted that "there
is a problem that needs to be dealt with" but argued that
this Bill was not "the right vehicle to do it in".[32]
He stated that the Government would bring forward proposals during
this Parliament.[33]
33. We agree with the thrust of the Minister's
evidence to us that the relevant issue in relation to the relationship
between the executive and Parliament is the Prime Minister's overall
patronage in Parliament (and particularly in the House of Commons).
The number of ministers in the Commons in proportion to the size
of that House is only one element of this, albeit an important
one.
34. The argument that this issue needs to be
fully considered, taking into account all possible consequences,
equally applies to the question of the overall size of the House
of Commons. The Government have embarked on one element of Commons
reform (size of membership) without a proper review of that House's
relationship with Government.
35. The size of the ministry in the House of
Commons affects fundamentally the constitutional relationship
between Government and Parliament. The provisions on reducing
the size of the Commons therefore contradict the Government's
stated aims of "reducing the power of the Executive [and]
seeking to boost the power of the Legislature."[34]
36. We conclude that the Government have not
made a proper assessment of the impact which the reduction in
the size of the House of Commons may have on the relationship
between the executive and Parliament. This is an unsatisfactory
basis on which to embark on fundamental reform of the legislature.
We are concerned that the Bill could possibly result in the Executive's
dominance over Parliament being increased.
THE TIMING OF THE BOUNDARY REVIEWS
37. Clause 10 provides that the four Boundary
Commissions (for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland)
must each complete a boundary review before 1 October 2013 and
then again every five years (in contrast with the 8-12 year cycle
currently employed). The Boundary Commissions have confirmed that
this timetable is achievable, although additional resources will
be required, particularly for the first such review.[35]
38. The Minister for Political and Constitutional
Reform informed us that the Government "think the process
for boundary reviews should be quicker, but also that it should
happen more frequently, so that boundaries are kept more in line
with shifts in electors than has previously been the case. Clearly,
the first review will be a significant one ... Subsequent to that,
the trade-off for Members of the House of Commons is that boundary
reviews will be more frequent but less disruptive".[36]
39. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is designed
to result in an election being held in May 2015 and every five
years thereafter (subject to any early dissolution). The combined
effect of these two Bills is therefore that each review will be
concluded 18 months prior to the expected date of the general
election.
40. We note two issues with this timetable. Firstly,
a period of 18 months may cause difficulties for political parties
in forming local associations and in choosing candidates for new
constituencies. This will be a particular problem in 2013 when
the reduction in number of seats and equalisation of size of constituencies
will result in significant changes to most constituencies. The
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee were concerned that
it was "not clear whether political parties have the necessary
resources and resilience at a local level to adapt successfully
within this timeframe to contesting new constituencies across
the whole of the country."[37]
We share this concern.
41. Secondly, if there is an early dissolution
under a Fixed-term Parliaments Act the combined timing of the
reviews and UK general elections may become even more strained.
This will be particularly so if a Parliament is dissolved one
year early which would result in a review always being completed
just six months prior to the next election.
42. The Deputy Prime Minister argued that one
of the reasons for bringing the Bill forward quickly was precisely
the need to ensure that candidates would know the shape of their
constituencies 18 months in advance of the election.[38]
However, the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform
dismissed concerns over timing of reviews arguing that the current
boundary reviews are not synchronised with parliamentary terms
and that they have sometimes taken place very near to a general
election: "I do not think it is important that they are absolutely
synchronised. We will see how it works."[39]
43. We do not consider that the Government have
given sufficient attention to the relationship between this Bill
and the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill in respect of the timing of
reviews and UK general elections. The Government should set
out how they propose to meet the need for parties, candidates
and electors to know the shape of their constituencies a sufficient
length of time in advance of each general election.
EQUALISATION
44. Clause 11 changes the basis on which the
Boundary Commissions are to work, requiring the equalisation of
parliamentary constituencies. This is currently a relevant criterion
for the Boundary Commissions to take into account, but is only
one of several such criteria; the Bill will give paramountcy to
this criterion over all others.
45. Only two exceptions to the principle of equalisation
are allowed for in the Bill. Firstly, the remote island constituencies
of Orkney and Shetland and of Na h-Eileanan an Iar will remain
as they are, despite the fact that the size of the electorate
for these seats is substantially smaller than that for other constituencies.
Secondly, no constituency will be larger than 13,000 square kilometres,
even if this results in a smaller than normal electorate.
[40]
46. Applying the new rules as to equalisation
will necessitate the creation of constituencies crossing regional
and county boundaries; in addition, many more constituencies than
at present will cross local authority boundaries. This has significant
administrative and political consequences, in terms of such matters
as electoral administration and party political organisation.
The pace of change is unlikely to lessen such administrative and
political challenges and, indeed, seems likely to make them more
difficult to manage.
47. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
heard evidence from Democratic Audit that the new rules as to
equalisation were being imposed "without any attempt to form
a consensus" and without the Government having first investigated
what people actually want from representation.[41]
There did not appear to be any evidence that the electorate considers
equalisation to be significantly more important than, say, geographical,
customary or traditional boundaries.[42]
Pre-legislative scrutiny and public consultation would have
enabled a better assessment of whether the new rules as to equalisation
are overly rigid.
WALES
48. Due to their current smaller than average
size, the number of Welsh constituencies will be reduced by 25
per cent, from 40 to 30 seats. The Deputy Prime Minister argued
that, for a number of reasons, Wales is currently overrepresented
in the House of Commons and that "One either works on the
basis of the principle of trying to equalise constituencies so
that, broadly speaking, votes are valued in the same way across
the whole of the United Kingdom, or one does not."[43]
He concluded that if there is to be an equality of votes, there
will need to be a reduction in the number of Westminster seats
for Wales.[44]
49. The Minister for Political and Constitutional
Reform stressed the Government's view that it was "simply
not justifiable" that there was "an enormous disparity"
between the size of constituencies in Wales and those in the rest
of the country.[45] He
added that "in the debate, we have not heard any good reasons,
apart from sticking with the status quo, why that should be the
case."[46]
50. However, the Commons Welsh Affairs Select
Committee has concluded that "it is important that the interests
of each region of the United Kingdom are properly heard at Westminster."[47]
We also note their view that "the unique position of Wales
in terms of its geography, culture and history has long been recognised
in its Westminster constituencies"[48]
and their recommendation that the Government amend the Bill "to
permit the Boundary Commission to give greater weight to these
factors when drawing up new constituencies."[49]
51. We reiterate that pre-legislative scrutiny
and public consultation would have provided an opportunity for
these concerns to be properly addressed.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
52. Clause 12 will abolish local inquiries for
boundary changes. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee
heard evidence that local inquiries are "dominated by the
political parties" and that they generally had "little
impact" on final recommendations.[50]
However, other evidence received by that Committee stressed that
the inquiries serve a useful function.[51]
We also note that local inquiries lend legitimacy to the process
which risks being lost with their abolition.
53. Clause 12 would place a duty on the Boundary
Commissions to "take such steps as they see fit to inform
people in the constituency of the effect of the proposed recommendations"
and provides that representations may be made to the Commission
for a period of 12 weeks (extended from the current four week
provision). We agree that there is a need to ensure that the public
are made fully aware of any proposed changes to constituency boundaries
in order that they have time to prepare and make their representations.
54. We recommend that the Government give
consideration to whether the Boundary Commissions should be directed
to comply with the requirements of the Code of Practice on Consultation.
Conclusion
55. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Bill provides for significant changes to the British constitution.
We note that the questions of what voting system should be used
to elect MPs, how many MPs there are and whether constituencies
should be equalised are of prime importance. We recognise that
the Government wish to address them. However, we believe that
a number of concerns, particularly with Part 2 of the Bill, have
not been properly addressed by the Government.
56. Furthermore, we have noted in relation to
the timetable of the boundary reviews[52]
that the provisions of this Bill and the Fixed-term Parliaments
Bill are interrelated. We also draw to the House's attention that
the subject matter of this Bill closely relates to proposals for
recall of MPs[53] and
for reform of the House of Lords. It is expected that the forthcoming
draft Bill on Lords reform will provide for at least a part-elected
House. Both the size of the Lords and the way in which Members
are to be elected should be determined in conjunction with decisions
made concerning the size and electoral system of the House of
Commons. Fully effective scrutiny of this Bill would be possible
only when considered alongside these proposals.
57. We are concerned that the constitutional
relationship between the provisions of this Bill and the Government's
other proposals for constitutional reform have not been adequately
thought through.
58. The Government should set out how they
consider that this Bill and its place within their programme of
constitutional reform makes the political system "more
transparent and accountable."[54]
1 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11): Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Bill (HC Paper 437); Welsh Affairs Committee, 1st
Report (2010-11): The implications for Wales of the Government's
Proposals on constitutional reform (HC Paper 495), on which
we have also drawn. Back
2
A transcript of the evidence from the Deputy Prime Minister was
published in Constitution Committee, 5th Report (2010-2011):
The Government's Constitution Reform Programme, (HL Paper
43). Evidence from Mark Harper MP was taken on 3 October following
questions on our current inquiry into the Fixed-term Parliaments
Bill. The transcript has not yet been published, but an uncorrected
version can be found on our website: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/constitution-committee/.
References to Q numbers in respect of the Deputy Prime Minister
and Mark Harper MP are references to Q numbers in these two respective
transcripts. Back
3
HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government. Back
4
Q 53 Back
5
Q 55 Back
6
HC Deb, 6 September 2010, col 35. Back
7
HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government. Back
8
Q 70 Back
9
Constitution Committee, 12th Report (2009-10): Referendums
in the United Kingdom (HL Paper 99). We received the Government's
response in September and published it as Constitution Committee,
4th Report (2010-11): Government response to the
report on Referendums in the United Kingdom (HL Paper 34).
Back
10
HL Deb, 12 October 2010, cols 428-73. Back
11
What follows is an outline only of those findings and recommendations
which we deem most relevant to the present Bill. Back
12
The Electoral Commission, Referendum on the UK Parliamentary
Voting System: Report of views of the Electoral Commission on
the proposed referendum question, paragraph 4.11. Back
13
Cm 7864 (2010), Devolution: memorandum of understanding and supplementary agreements between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee
paragraphs 4-5. Back
14
HC Deb, 5 July 2010, cols 23, 26 and 28. Back
15
Scottish Affairs Committee (2010-11): Scottish Parliament and
the AV Referendum, AV17: letter of Jim Mather MSP, Minister
for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism, to the House of Commons Scottish
Affairs Committee, 1 October 2010. Back
16
As reported by the BBC on 2 July 2010: www.bbc.co.uk/news/10485257 Back
17
Scottish Affairs Committee (2010-11): Scottish Parliament and
the AV Referendum, AV17: letter of Jim Mather MSP, Minister
for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism, to the House of Commons Scottish
Affairs Committee, 1 October 2010. See also, written evidence
from the Scottish Parliament Local Government and Communities
Committee, 30 September 2010. Back
18
Welsh Affairs Committee, 1st Report (2010-11), op.cit,
paragraph 11. Back
19
Q 72 Back
20
Scottish Affairs Committee (2010-11): op.cit., AV17: written
evidence from the Electoral Commission, 22 July 2010. Back
21
See for example: The Electoral Commission, Parliamentary Voting
System and Constituencies Bill: House of Commons Second Reading
, 6 September 2010. Back
22
See The Electoral Commission, Parliamentary Voting System and
Constituencies Bill Committee Stage: 18/19/20 October 2010.
Back
23
Q 172 Back
24
Q 173 Back
25
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., paragraphs 62-63. The Government
have conceded that the number is indeed "an arbitrary figure":
HC Deb 20 October 2010 col 1056 (Mr David Heath CBE MP, Deputy
Leader of the House of Commons). Back
26
Q 170 Back
27
Q 168 Back
28
Q 168 Back
29
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op. cit., paragraph 70. Back
30
HC Deb, 25 October 2010, cols 108-32. Back
31
Q 70 Back
32
Q 174 Back
33
Q 174 Back
34
Q 55 Back
35
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., PVSCB04. Back
36
Q 165 Back
37
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., paragraph 92. Back
38
Q 71 Back
39
Q 163 Back
40
Clause 11, inserting new rules 4 and 5. Back
41
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., PVSCB01. Back
42
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., paragraph 84. Back
43
Q 70 Back
44
Q 70 Back
45
Q 167 Back
46
Q 167 Back
47
Welsh Affairs Committee, 1st Report (2010-11), op.
cit., paragraph 29. Back
48
Welsh Affairs Committee, 1st Report (2010-11), op.
cit., paragraph 33. Back
49
Welsh Affairs Committee, 1st Report (2010-11), op.
cit., paragraph 33. Back
50
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., paragraphs 120-21. Back
51
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 3rd
Report (2010-11), op cit., paragraph 122. Back
52
Paragraphs 31-37. Back
53
HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government. Back
54
HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government. Back
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