European Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference - European Union Committee Contents


Chapter 5: Process

The source of demand for a CFR

82.  We have described the background to the CFR in dealing with its history. At the political level, impetus was supplied by the European Parliament (which continues to press for progress and the devotion of resources to the project)[28], by the Council (though we have commented on the ambiguous nature of its input) and then above all by the European Commission. This was not primarily an initiative from the Member States, although Professor Vogenauer speculated that, had a CFR been available in the period when the states of eastern Europe were in transition to democratic market economies after 1989, it would have been very attractive for at least some of those states (Q 24). Professor Vogenauer noted that the results of the Commission's consultations indicated no welling up of enthusiasm for a CFR among business organisations, though he speculated that there was more sympathy there than among the bodies representing the legal professions.

Impact assessment

83.  There is still little hard evidence on the fundamental question whether and how far differences in substantive law are a source of extensive problems which require addressing at the European level or whether and how far a common framework of contract law in the EU would bring net benefits, which would justify the expenditure of time, effort and money in developing it and the transactional costs for users of adaptation to a new product. Any idea of general harmonisation of substantive law can, we think, be put on one side: for reasons we have identified, it is not going to happen. But, even in relation to the suggestion that an optional instrument might be prepared, there appears to be no real idea whether and how far this would be welcomed, worthwhile and feasible. As we have said, an optional instrument would only really be effective, if it were combined with a European instrument giving it a validity, when adopted by contracting parties, which would over-ride any otherwise applicable legislation in whatever law would otherwise govern. We have not seen any research into the extent to which this might create problems or indeed be acceptable.

84.  Professor Vogenauer was unaware of any cost-benefit analysis (Q 20). Jonathan Faull acknowledged that no assessment had yet been made since he did not yet know the "nature of the beast". The Commission would want to consult stakeholders to ascertain what problems are caused by the existence of different contract laws (QQ 147-148).

85.  If any form of mandatory harmonisation or optional instrument were to be proposed, an impact assessment in respect of the proposals should be undertaken.

86.  The development of a set of non-binding guidelines, as suggested by the Council of Ministers on 18 April 2008, is a different matter. The issue here is probably not so much whether there should be a conventional impact assessment, but how far it is desirable and feasible to develop even non-binding guidelines, on the basis of the present DCFR, in a manner which would add appreciable value to the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), the existing DCFR and other material available to law-makers, and justify the time and cost involved.

Consultation

87.  The Commission's Communication of October 2004 noted that stakeholder participation in the process of preparing a CFR was "essential" (see paragraph 11), but in the event the process appears to have been problematic. Professor Vogenauer, who was not himself involved, said that stakeholders were reported to have been generally "rather frustrated" by the processes for consultation. They received drafts at a late stage and the meetings to discuss them were too short (Q 68). He also noted that the consultation period between the production of the interim DCFR in December 2007 and the final academic version a year later was very short (Q 65)—though in his view the Commission itself had tried to be transparent and had not sought to steer the outcome of the research (Q 69).

88.  Professor Whittaker noted the problem encountered at the workshops (and the limited range of the workshops' subject-matter) was "that many of the provisions of the DCFR have not yet enjoyed the systematic input from legal practitioners and, indeed, other jurists outside the two main groups of researchers".[29] The Committee thinks that this is an important point in deciding now how much further and how the CFR project may sensibly be pursued. Jonathan Faull also noted that if the matter went further, the Commission would consult in order to make this a "practical exercise in the interests of the real stakeholders" (Q 152).

89.  We stress the importance of focused and effective consultation, by both the Commission and the Government, if the Commission decides to pursue the CFR project.

A European law commission?

90.  We asked Lord Bach and Jonathan Faull whether, for a project of the size of the CFR, a European institution on the lines of the Law Commissions of the United Kingdom might be useful. Lord Bach thought the idea interesting but said the Government had not formed a view on it (Q 113). Mr Faull acknowledged that lessons on method should be learned from the CFR project and the suggestion for a law commission would have to be considered (Q 153).

91.  We hope the Government and the Commission will give further consideration to the idea of an EU law reform body to promote the coherence of European Law.

Next steps

92.  The academic research teams have, with the publication of the outline edition of the DCFR, concluded the work called for by the Commission's Action Plan. The initiative now lies with the EU Institutions, in particular the Commission. It is with no disrespect to the authors of the DCFR that we endorse Jonathan Faull's statement that "we are not doing this for professors … and we will only do it if it has a genuine positive practical impact" for European businesses and citizens (Q 152).

93.  The key message we took from Jonathan Faull's evidence is that the Commission will not be rushed into decisions on the next steps. As he put it, "We want to get this right rather than hurry it" (Q 152). In any event, the appointment of a new Commission and the European Parliamentary elections this year would mean that key initial decisions may take longer than normal (Q 155). Mr Faull pointed out that the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security which he leads only recently took over responsibility for the CFR from the Directorate General for Health and Consumers which had responsibility while the CFR project was closely linked to work on consumer protection. The transfer of responsibility reflected a policy view that the CFR should be addressed in the broader context of EU action in the area of civil justice (Q 143) where justice ministers had long held it belonged (Q 156).

94.  Mr Faull explained that officials in the Commission were reviewing all the work undertaken so far and would develop proposals from the range of possibilities that have been canvassed, for consideration initially by the Commissioner responsible for justice matters, M. Barrot, and then by the College of Commissioners. In the meantime, there would have to be "something credible" in the Commission's proposal (expected to be published in June 2009) for the EU's next five-year programme for justice and home affairs to be agreed by the European Council (already being referred to as the Stockholm Programme) (QQ 123, 155).

95.  Having heard Jonathan Faull's evidence, we are confident that the Commission does not and will not under-estimate the nature and difficulty of the task facing it. Much effort and no doubt a good deal of money have been invested in this project, and there are still strong voices calling for radical progress. Jonathan Faull's Directorate has, as he frankly put it, "inherited a matter of enormous size and complexity" and has until now only been able to put a few people to work on it, although they plan to allocate more resources in due course as necessary (Q 130).

96.  However, the nature and scale of the work already undertaken adds, if anything, to the difficulty in carrying matters forward. For the reasons we have identified, we consider that even the first three Books of the DCFR could not directly be adopted as a political CFR either by an inter-institutional agreement or by the Commission alone. Even if they were to be adopted only as a non-binding set of guidelines to be used on a voluntary basis that would, in the real European world, invest them with a role and weight which they could not and should not bear. Nothing can or should stop the Commission or any other European or national body referring to and gaining inspiration from the DCFR in its present form.[30] That is indeed one of the main values of such an academic exercise, and one which the DCFR, with the forthcoming back-up discussion and comparative law material, will on any view fulfil. We think that there is an important question whether further work on a political CFR should be a priority for the Commission or the Council.

97.  If it is decided to proceed with the production of a political CFR, with a view to adopting this on some formal basis, the question needs to be faced, whether and if so how the DCFR can be re-evaluated and converted into a workable and acceptable political CFR. One could perhaps contemplate a renewed process of academic work (such as Professors Eidenmüller, Faust and others suggested in the article to which we have referred),[31] this could be combined this time with a series of structured workshops involving leading business and legal stakeholders; these exercises would, we think, need to take place under the oversight of a Commission chairman, who would control the scope of the project, identify the nature of the decisions of principle to be taken and the order in which they should be taken and ensure that individual articles in the existing text were reviewed systematically and thoroughly. But all this confirms the size and difficulty of any future task.

98.  Of course, much depends upon what nature of document the Commission might envisage distilling from the present DCFR. But, if it were a full-scale revision of the existing DCFR, with a view to creating, in effect, a draft code of contract for use to guide any future legislation which the Commission might at some future date decide to propose in the field of contract law, this seems to us to be an unprecedented and extremely ambitious task for the Commission to undertake.

99.  We also express a doubt about whether it is either wise or cost-effective for the Commission to attempt to develop a draft code of contract, merely in order to have this available as "voluntary" guidance in case the Commission should at some future date decide to legislate in particular areas. If such a draft is voluntary guidance only, the matter will always have to be re-considered whenever the need for future legislation is suggested. (We note in this connection the history of drafting of the consumer protection proposals using the then draft of the DCFR: see paragraph 67 above.)

100.  That the DCFR is a full draft code means that it contains areas where there are not, and are not likely in the foreseeable future to be, significant European legislative proposals. Without knowing or pre-judging what the Commission may have in mind for the future or intending to limit the field of inquiry, we believe that it would, for example, be worth analysing, in particular, to what extent and in what respects, if any, such proposals are likely in areas such as those covered by Book II, Chapters 4 (Formation), 6 (Representation), 7 (Grounds of Invalidity), 8 (Interpretation), 9 sections 2 (Simulation) and 3 (Third party rights); or Book III, Chapters 2 (Performance), 4 (Plurality), 5 (Change of parties), 6 (Set-off) and 7 (Prescription).

101.  If the Commission were to conclude that the matter should be taken forward then one way might be to identify particular key areas that give difficulty under existing Community law or are likely in the near future to require legislative intervention, and to focus on these, rather than to attempt to restate in the abstract at a European level the whole of the law of contract.


28   See the Report on European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward of the Committee on Legal Affairs, 2 March 2006 (A6-0055/2006); and see Faull Q 146. Back

29   Op. Cit. p 33. Back

30   As is already happening in the Court of Justice-see footnote 27 above. Back

31   Footnote 22 above. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2009