Memorandum by Dr T Thomas, Reader in Criminal
Justice Studies, School of Social Sciences, Leeds Metropolitan
University, Leeds
ABSTRACT
This submission explores the extent to which
non-police agencies have access to the Police National Computer
(PNC). These include other law enforcement agencies and some private
sector agencies. The information held on the PNC has normally
been considered confidential and for police purposes only. The
extent of the current access is not widely known and has seemingly
taken place without democratic oversight or debate.
THE POLICE
NATIONAL COMPUTER
(PNC)
1. The Police National Computer (PNC) came
on line in 1974 and since then has been regularly refurbished
and kept up to date. It holds information essential to police
work, including criminal records, details of stolen vehicles,
wanted or missing persons. Offenders who have given DNA samples
etc. This information has always been treated as highly confidential
and sanctions apply to officers who release information improperly.
2. As the PNC has developed and grown in
stature its customers have also grown. In 1992 Parliament was
told that only the DVLA and HM Customs and Excise had direct access
to the PNC for "read-only" purposes, although plans
to improve the speed of communications between the PNC and individual
forces "could be extended later to other agencies in the
criminal justice system" (Hansard HC Debates, 3 February
1992, cols 109-110). Today this position has changed. Apart from
servicing the needs of the 43 police forces in England and Wales,
the eight forces of Scotland and the Northern Ireland Police Service,
other smaller police forces and specialist units have direct access
to the PNC as do a number of non-police agencies—some of
them beyond the criminal justice system—who have demonstrated
a need for access.
3. A list of some of these other forces,
specialist units and non-police agencies has been compiled in
Table A. This is not presented as a definitive list but as examples
of how wide the dissemination of information on the PNC has reached.
Access is agreed by an ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers)
"PNC Access Application Panel" and "PNC Data Access
Agreements" duly drawn up; those with direct access must
comply with the ACPO Information Systems "Community Security
Policy".
4. Most of these recipients of PNC-held
data have "read only" access and no facility to update.
Some only have access to one database such as the DVLA with its
access to vehicle information and some only have access to names
of people with a criminal record rather than the full record from
Phoenix (as explained at Hansard HC Debates 18 April 1995,
Col 87-8).
5. A customs officer, for example, has described
how they use the PNC:
... we're able to use the PNC to gain background
information ... what we want to know is if someone we suspect—say
of drugs smuggling—has a criminal record or if a vehicle
has any markers against it. So we have limited access to the PNC
databases for vehicles and names.
("PNC keeps Customs and Excise in the picture",
PITO News, Issue No 14, December 1998).
6. A total of 1,638 Customs Officers out
of 25,000 reportedly had access across the UK (ibid).
7. In prisons access has proved particularly
useful with the assessment and categorisation of newly arrived
prisoners; 38 prisons had access by 1999 (Prison Service Order
1999, No 0905).
8. The spreading use of the PNC has been
facilitated by the PITO (Police Information Technology Organisation)
Directorate in charge of the computer. The "Phoenix Links"
project sought out new customers after 2001 and this later became
known as the PNC Application Integration Infrastructure. According
to PITO's Director of Operational Services at the time:
... we saw the need some years ago to develop
a new approach for the implementation of system-to-system links
between PNC and the increasing number of applications that were
beginning to arise on third party systems. (quoted in "Jurors
technology breaks new ground", PITO News Issue 30,
2002).
9. Exactly how many agencies have a direct
link is uncertain as no definitive list appears to exist. A four
page document describing non-police users of the PNC as at 29
April 2002 was produced at an Information Tribunal hearing in
2005, but this document has not been made public. The list was
shown to David Smith, the Assistant Information Commissioner during
the hearing:
... it is fair to say that Mr Smith expressed
some surprise .. at the length of the listed organisations (and)
... he asked the not unnatural question "is it really necessary
for all these organisations individually to have access?"
(The Chief Constables of West Yorkshire, South
Yorkshire and North Wales Police and the Information Commissioner,
Information Tribunal 2005 at para 126).
10. When asked in Parliament how many individuals
(as opposed to agencies) have access to the PNC, Home Office Ministers
always say the information is not available (see eg Hansard
HC Debates 22 January 2004, col 1440W and 9 February 2006, Col
1436-7W).
11. Apart from exact numbers and lists of
those with access the spreading use of the PNC could be feeding
a culture that says this information is not that confidential
after all. Informal access may be growing alongside the formal.
Co-operation between the police and housing departments, for example,
has been encouraged to tackle crime and anti-social behaviour.
In Nottingham a housing official has explained how they get information
from the PNC, working from the same premises as the police:
... we actually had a PNC terminal here, so I
could literally go to the sergeant and say "have you got
anything on this individual?" and within a matter of minutes
... he could give me information on that individual. (cited in
Burney, 2005: 126)
12. Housing departments have no direct access
to the PNC but working together and sharing information has made
access fairly easy. The use of vehicle-based terminals and hand-held
terminals arguably makes the "policing" of confidentiality
even more difficult.
Table A
AGENCIES HAVING DIRECT ACCESS TO THE POLICE
NATIONAL COMPUTER
British Transport Police;
Civil Nuclear Constabulary (previously the UK Atomic
Energy Authority Constabulary);
Isle of Man Police;
States of Jersey Police;
Guernsey Police;
Ministry of Defence Police;
Royal Military Police;
RAF Police;
Secret Intelligence Service;
Security Service;
National Ports Office;
National Identification Service;
National Criminal Intelligence Service;
National Crime Squad;
Scottish Crime Squad;
Scottish Criminal Record Office;
Northern Ireland Criminal Record Office;
Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices;
Port of Dover Police;
Hendon Data Centre;
Police Staff College, Bramshill;
Police Information Communication Technology Training
Services (PICTTS), Leicester;
Immigration Service;
HM Revenue and Customs;
Post Office;
Financial Services Authority;*
National Health Service;*
Department of Trade and Industry;*
Office of Fair Trading;*
Central Summoning Bureau (Dept of Constitutional
Affairs);
Department of Work and Pensions* (previously Dept
of Social Security);
Criminal Records Bureau;
Forensic Science Service;
Motor Insurance Database;
HM Prisons (some of them);
National Enforcement Service;
Drivers Vehicle and Licensing Authority; and
Schengen Information System.
* for prosecution purposes only.
Sources: Hansard HC Debates 22 March
1995 col 200; 18 April 1995 cols 87-8; 26 April 1995, cols 566-7;
5 February 2002, col 858w; 8 July 2003, col 716w; 15 July 2003,
col 278w; 4 July 2005, col WA63.
PITO News Issue No 8 (pp
14-15); No 9 (p 3); No 29 (p 11); No 30 (pp 8-9); No 35 (pp 8-9).
Home Office (2003(a)) Annex B Group 4.
13. In April 2006 the Government announced
its intention to replace the PNC as such by a new Police National
Database costing £367 million and due for implementation
by 2010. While this new Database was under development funding
would be made available "to update the hardware platform
of the PNC (to) ensure it remains fit for purpose until the Police
National Database is fully in service" (Hansard HC
Debates 19 April 2006, Cols 18WS to 19WS).
May 2007
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