| Previous Section | Back to Table of Contents | Lords Hansard Home Page |
26 Mar 2009 : Column 799
“The central decision of principle might at that stage be significantly influenced by whether the cost estimates remained of the same order as those assessed in 2006-07”.
He argued that this revisiting should be approached “seriously”.
We should try to get from the Government a decision that was made by James Callaghan in 1978. He set up a study by the Civil Service, not influenced by Ministers, to decide what would replace the existing Polaris deterrent, and have it ready for any Government who took office after the general election of 1979. That study was the Duff Mason report. Sir Anthony Duff was a distinguished diplomat and former submariner. Ronald Mason was a chief scientist at the Ministry of Defence. The document was on the desk when Margaret Thatcher came to office, with an explanation written that day by James Callaghan of the discussions about a successor system that he had had in Guadeloupe with President Carter.
These issues are too serious to be left hanging from 2007 until a new Government come in, with all the tremendous pressures that they will be put under. We should undertake that study now. One option that should be considered was excluded, for ridiculous reasons, from the 2007 decision. That is for the UK to put nuclear weapons on cruise missiles in our SSN fleet. This is what has happened in the United States, which only deploys its nuclear missiles periodically in its SSN fleet. Of course, it has a very different, hyper-sophisticated ballistic missile deterrent. If you can afford it, that is the best system; but I believe increasingly that this country cannot afford it.
If we are serious about ultimately moving to abolition of nuclear weapons, some countries will have to move faster than others. It seems logical that those of us who have chosen a minimum deterrent must be ready at some appropriate moment to take the first step. I agree that this will not be in the immediate future of the next 10 years. However, I find it very hard to consider spending billions of pounds on a deterrent that will last into the 2050s when it is possible to retain our nuclear option over the next 15 to 20 years at a much cheaper rate, and hold open the option of giving up nuclear weapons.
People tell me that it would mean no longer having a veto power in the Security Council. This is a complete misreading of history, and how the veto power came out of the 1946 negotiations over the United Nations. There was never any doubt that a veto power would have to be there, because the United States Congress would never have agreed to anything else. It must also be recognised that the veto power cannot be taken away from Britain. We can veto any measure to take it away, and France and Britain have made it clear that they would do this.
I do not believe that France will be first to make a move on nuclear weapons. We might persuade France to move with us. However, some time down the track—it might be in 2020, or a little before or after that—I can see all logic backing a UK decision to give up its nuclear weapons, and to claim it as a virtue to justify our continued presence as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. I also wish to
26 Mar 2009 : Column 800
I will not go on any longer. These are troubling times. What worries me about the commitment ultimately to give up nuclear weapons is that it has been made by a lot of people who do not really believe what they are saying. The commitment risks going the same way as the pledge in the non-proliferation treaty, and that would be a tragedy. We have to give substance to that commitment. There is no country better placed than the UK to give that substance, and no Government will face the realities of the defence budget more than the Government that takes office in this country in 2010.
1.58 pm
The Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells: My Lords, as a new Member of this House, may I have the temerity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for her speech? To presume to take part in this debate after the many excellent contributions thus far may seem presumptuous.
Some 30 years ago, I was asked to act as a positive vet for a young serviceman seeking promotion. The interviewer who came to see me was a former high-ranking military police officer. At the time, I lived in a Christian community in the north of England—rather a remote place. On my study wall was a poster. It read simply, “It is a sin to build a nuclear weapon”. During a sandwich lunch, the investigating officer asked whether I believed the statement. I assured him that I did and, as you may imagine, it led to an interesting philosophical, but quite convivial, conversation, which concluded with him saying that in his former life he was responsible for protecting such weapons from people like me.
What was, I hope, not evident to this man at the time was the internal and divisive dispute in the particular Christian community of which I was a member. Regrettably, I was not an insignificant contributor the arguments, and there were times when the anger among us would have been sufficient to start the third world war all by itself. Paradoxically, I was at the time participating in the occasional “Ban the Bomb” demonstrations, declaring that Britain must unilaterally disarm.
The internal disputes of our community caused me to seek the help of a wise counsellor who I though might offer me consolation and justification, perhaps even siding with me. Instead he asked me, “When are you going to unilaterally disarm in this conflict?”. My response was somewhat incredulous. “You must be joking”, I said. “If I do, they will win.” “So”, retorted my friend, “if you can’t make a unilateral declaration, what makes you think that nations can?”. The question bothered me and, after a time, led me to two conclusions. First, reconciliation is the essence of Christianity. When its adherents, like me, fail to recognise and seek to live that out, something at the very core is missing. Secondly, however, I was reminded that human beings, whether people of faith or not, often fail to live up to the highest ideals to which they might aspire. When we do so, two possibilities face us: either we give up, or we begin again.
26 Mar 2009 : Column 801
In my situation at the time, those options faced me. In reality, the only option was to begin again: to commit myself to the task of reconciliation, however difficult and painful. Beginning again calls for a certain letting go, a leaving behind—an opening up to new possibilities. The Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is timely and I welcome it. She has judged a certain mood towards nuclear disarmament, not just within this House but within the wider nation as a whole. We must try to see the possibility of a new “grand bargain” in the light of the forthcoming nuclear proliferation treaty review in 2010 as a new beginning. The noble Lords, Lord Hurd, Lord Robertson and Lord Owen, together with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, spoke last June of a powerful case for a dramatic reduction in the stockpile of nuclear weapons.
In his St Patrick’s Day speech, the Prime Minister spoke of the nuclear question being at the heart of what he called the four great and interconnected challenges of our global society: the financial instability, climate change and energy needs, global poverty and global security. This is not an item on its own. In that same speech, he spoke of a need for a new internationalism that is both hard-headed and progressive; that has been borne witness to in speeches this afternoon. However, somewhat more controversially, he suggested that we will not meet the challenges of climate change without the far wider use of civil nuclear power. He spoke of the right of all nations to acquire nuclear power safely, and said that Iran should be a test case for this new philosophy.
While few can doubt that that will be anything but a difficult path, which the Prime Minister observed will be crossed in steps and not in one leap—I agree—what causes nations to arm themselves to the point of mutually assured destruction is a complex mix of fear, anger, xenophobia and much else besides. When the Prime Minister speaks of the need to act together to take the next steps in building confidence in a new and dangerous nuclear era, one can do little but say, “Amen to that”. However, I believe not in simply wishing for it, or being unrealistic about what we might determine as the future of disarmament programmes. We need a new ethic for our times: an ethic that enables us to leave for future generations a time marked by hope and not by fear and despair.
In your Lordships’ House last week, the noble Baroness, Lady Hooper, introduced what was to become a remarkable debate to mark the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Darwin. Predictably, perhaps, religionists, non-religionists and self-declared rationalists participated. There was a surprising unity within diversity. For my own part, I sought to observe that open-minded, honest, scientific research leads to wonder, mystery, respect and humility. I believe that these elements—wonder, mystery, respect and humility—are the building blocks of a new ethic of shared responsibility. Like the noble Baroness, I agree with WH Auden that love is the ultimate, but sometimes we have to build our way towards love. That comes about through understanding and learning to respect through mystery and wonder, and being humble enough to accept that we do not know all the answers. These elements are integral to both religion
26 Mar 2009 : Column 802
While there is much to debate over the issue of civil nuclear power, and at the risk of being too controversial this late into my speech, if it is “even handed”, as the Prime Minister has put it, to,
with due verification, rules and sanctions, by what criteria do we decide that it is even handed not to allow the possession of nuclear weapons? Who decides the moral case for some to have and others to have not?
Surely the future must lie in a universal commitment to disarmament: “to protect the human” in its totality. We must regain respect for the human through a new ethic based not on xenophobic fear, but on wonder, mystery, respect and humility—not least because the nuclear issue is inextricably tied in to the issues of poverty, climate change, energy, financial instability and global security. A friend of mine during the Northern Ireland peace process many years ago said that we must learn to be “1 per cent peacemakers”. Well, 1 per cent or 99 per cent, let us work towards the nuclear proliferation treaty review discussion in 2010 not by giving up but by beginning again; offering a “Yes we can” to the task of reconciliation and protecting the human; and knowing that if we cannot live together, then we shall certainly die together.
2.08 pm
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend for introducing this debate. That it is far from being a debate on the theoretical matter of foreign or defence policy was underlined on Tuesday by the Government launching their new counterterrorism strategy.
By and large, the provisions in that strategy were welcomed. However, in part 2, it talks of the need to improve the security of fissile material around the world and of the global threat reduction programme. It says that that is the UK’s largest co-operative counter-proliferation assistance programme. That strategy brings right home the urgency of what my noble friend has been talking about this afternoon. She gave us a clear picture of the urgency, which has been underlined by other speakers, with the volatility in the price of oil and the uncertainty of gas supplies encouraging so many new countries to look at developing their civilian nuclear capability. Countries are looking more and more to nuclear power, so any increase in the use of fissile material must be matched by a substantially increased effort to ensure its safe storage through robust stocktaking exercises. If the counterterrorism strategy had one fault when talking about these issues, it was that it did not stress enough the urgency of matching any development of nuclear power with the necessity for that work.
This spread also means that no country should fail to address what is happening not only within its own borders, but also those of its neighbours and the
26 Mar 2009 : Column 803
Every political party needs to sign up at least to a vision that a world without nuclear weapons is possible and desirable, but even signing up to that vision is a difficult move, as we know in this country where such a view has historically been held to be a sign of weakness. We cannot leave the debate only to those with an in-depth knowledge of foreign affairs and defence. As parliamentarians, we need to become involved not only in applauding actions taken, but also in questioning inaction and welcoming each step that our own or another Government take.
A fear shared by many of the parliamentarians I have met through PNND is that even as we take the small steps we are talking about today, or we take bigger steps, there is the distinct possibility of an accident due to the high alert status maintained by the US and Russia. I imagine that all who contribute to the debate today will be aware of the near misses. Some of them have been widely reported, but others may never have hit the headlines. Perhaps the US is more open about these issues than others, and some of the incidents are quite bizarre. My noble friend described to me how a flock of geese flying in formation could be mistaken for missiles and thus set off a nuclear holocaust. Last year, a Channel 4 documentary examined an incident in 1983 in the film, “The Brink of the Apocalypse”. De-alerting to a more acceptable level that does not lay us open to such random rolls of the dice must be the highest priority.
2.13 pm
Lord Jenkin of Roding: My Lords, I listened with enormous admiration to the opening speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. With others who are speaking in the debate, she and I attended the conference held last week at Lancaster House and listened to what I regarded as a very remarkable speech by the Prime Minister. I am not normally given to admiration, but I do not hesitate to say that I was impressed on that occasion. Most of the media reports of the conference concentrated, quite rightly and understandably, on what the right honourable gentleman said about the need for major nuclear weapons countries to reduce, as he put it, “step by step” their arsenals of nuclear warheads as part of a process to prevent proliferation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
26 Mar 2009 : Column 804
Other contributors to the debate have clearly demonstrated that they know a great deal more about nuclear disarmament than I can possibly profess to, but as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said, one has to remember that one of the main purposes of the conference was to take forward the proposals for a multinational approach to the nuclear fuel cycle for civil nuclear reactors, and I hope that it will not be regarded as a distraction from what has so far been the main thrust of the debate if I devote a little attention to that topic.
There are two underlying drivers of the need to take the multinational approach forward. First, modern reactors require a guaranteed—that word is very important—supply of low enriched nuclear fuel if they are to attract investment into new power plants, but few countries in the world are planning to spend the huge sums necessary to build enrichment capacity. However, they need low enriched fuel. Secondly, while the uranium enrichment process can be used to provide that fuel, it can also be misused to provide fissile material for a bomb. With an increasing number of countries across the world now planning investment in nuclear power plants primarily to provide a secure, low carbon source of energy, it is becoming, if I may put it this way, increasingly urgent for the international community to find a mechanism for ensuring supplies of enriched fuel to these countries, while ensuring that guarantees are in place that they have complied with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
It is now four years since the IAEA launched the search for such a mechanism. The director-general, Dr Mohamed El Baradei, has spelt out what he sees as the four essential criteria for success. The first criterion is that the system must unambiguously be under some form of multinational control because that is essential in order to reassure the rest of the world that it will not be misused. Secondly—this point has already been made—the system must be available to all states, as is their right under the NPT. It is a legal right and it must be honoured. Thirdly, the sale of nuclear materials should be,
- “determined by non-political criteria established in advance and applied in an objective and consistent manner”.
That is more difficult, but it has to be done if one is to operate the guarantee effectively. Fourthly, he said that the system must be part of an overarching multilateral nuclear framework.
These principles have attracted very wide support, and in response to the appeal for proposals, no fewer than 12 separate proposals were submitted by states or groups of states. The issue now is for the international community to reach decisions on the best way forward. Of course, this is far from being a simple question. The issues are extremely complex, and if anyone doubts that, I refer them to the papers that have been produced about the UK’s proposal for a nuclear fuel assurance programme. It is extremely complex.
These 12 proposals are different in many respects, and I have to say that I do not think I was alone in finding that the ways in which the different speakers at last week’s conference addressed the proposals became immensely confusing. Many conferences have been held and much study undertaken, but we do not seem
26 Mar 2009 : Column 805
We had a table by the UN Institute for Disarmament, which grouped the proposals into short-term, mid-term and long-term. There was an address by an extremely able Dutchman, Mr Henk Swarttouw, whose task was to give the conference what he called a forward look. He grouped the proposals under four different heads. The first was to leave it to the market, but I do not think that anybody is advocating that. The second concerned the various nuclear fuel bank proposals. These could function, but there would be no guarantee of security. The third consisted of several proposals that embodied arrangements to guarantee supplies of nuclear fuel to the users. This included the UK’s proposed nuclear fuel assurance scheme. However, it is described as a “virtual” arrangement, which I find difficult to grasp as the fuel cannot exist in cyber space. The fourth envisaged the establishment of multinational enrichment facilities—the speaker instanced the URENCO plant in this country, a joint UK/German/Dutch facility—and a Russian proposal for a plant at Angarsk. He also referred to a proposal for a new enrichment plant in neutral territory. After suggesting that all of them could be pursued side by side, he urged his audience to be creative. That was it. There was no guidance, no preference, just another rehearsal of the options.
This debate gives the Government a chance to tell the House what they now expect will happen. When do they expect a preferred solution to emerge, and how will this be achieved? Are they satisfied that there is a sufficient sense of urgency on this issue? It is clear that the IAEA has a crucial role to play. It launched the process and it sees itself as the guardian of its international nature. But we know that Dr El Baradei is due to retire in November this year and that the process of selecting his successor is going on as we speak. I am told that the vote took place a few hours ago. Can the Minister give us an up-to-date picture on that? I warned his office that I was going to raise this question. What has happened? One of the two candidates must attract at least a third of the votes of members of the IAEA council—not a third of those voting but a third of the whole council. If he does not, the whole process must start again, which would set it back enormously.
I return to last week’s conference, at which Iran was the elephant in the room. It is to the Prime Minister’s credit that he at least did not dodge the issue but insisted—I emphasise that—that the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions should be addressed, if Iran responds positively, not by isolating and abusing it but by applying the very processes which the Lancaster House conference had been convened to progress; namely, the MNA process. In this he was clearly drawing attention to
26 Mar 2009 : Column 806
As has been said by all other speakers, the overriding issue has to be to pursue a process of nuclear disarmament. I firmly agree with those who argue that this must—I stress, must—go hand in hand with the establishment of an international mechanism for guaranteeing the supply of low enriched fuel for peaceful use by countries exercising their right to deploy civil nuclear generation. I wish I could see a more hopeful prospect of this being achieved but I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some comfort when he winds up.
2.24 pm
Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank: My Lords, like other speakers, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for initiating this debate and express my admiration for the way in which she introduced this extremely complex subject.
I declare an interest: I am on the advisory board of Thorium Power, which owns the technology for replacing uranium with a blend of thorium and uranium in large nuclear reactors, which could make it impossible to produce the amount of material needed to make nuclear weapons. A thorium/uranium blend is designed to make proliferation impossible. Of course, we desire to see a world where all nuclear weapons are abolished but we have to be realistic and face the fact that this is unlikely to happen soon. Indeed, we will be fortunate if a nuclear weapon-free world comes about during the lives of any of us in your Lordships' House today or, indeed, before the 100th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This does not mean that we should give up and do nothing as there are significant risks, and nuclear proliferation is one of the greatest challenges we must face up to and do all we can to prevent.
| Next Section | Back to Table of Contents | Lords Hansard Home Page |