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Will the Minister urge his Secretary of State to resolve the problem over the pay of Royal Marines serving in Afghanistan? The MoD has misled more than 4,000 marines over their pay levels, some of whom will receive more than £3,000 less than expected for a six-month tour. This will have a huge effect on the morale—especially in the run-up to Christmas—of personnel engaged in some of the most dangerous war fighting for years. Does the Minister agree that our troops deserve better than this?

3.30 pm

Lord Garden: My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement on the NATO summit. From these Benches we welcome the historic location of the summit in Riga. We also welcome the fact that, for once, the summit seems to have passed without too much public acrimony between the participants.

I was slightly surprised at the claims in the Statement about the three priorities with which the UK went to the summit. I had previously tabled a Written Question about the UK’s priorities and the Answer that I received on 9 October from the Minister’s colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, did not mention those as the three priorities. It might be useful—not now—if the Minister could consult his colleague and decide whether the Foreign Office and the MoD were working to different agendas and let us know in writing.

In the short time available, the summit inevitably focused on the current operational problems in Afghanistan rather than on the long term. I think that the diplomatic fudge—because that is what it was—that was achieved was probably the best that could be achieved in the time.

I share in one respect the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, about the availability of back-up forces in an emergency. We know that we should have had Reserve Forces when we went into the south, but did not; we now seem to have a

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commitment for emergencies. How are these emergencies defined? At what state of readiness will the forces provided for emergencies be on? It will be no good if they are at days’ notice.

I do not share the fierce criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, of our European allies, which I notice has also come from some government spokesmen as well—but, I am sure, not from the Minister. Such criticisms do not help in keeping NATO together in these matters. I also believe that they are not fair. Does the Minister agree that what the other European members of NATO have achieved during the five years that we have been in Afghanistan in the north and the west—particularly when the UK could do relatively little because it was busy away invading Iraq—has done a great deal to stabilise those parts of the country? Some of those nations’ forces have been put at risk and they have lost people as well. They have been relatively successful in their areas with a rather different technique for winning hearts and minds than we are now seeing applied in the south, which we all know is a different area. Does the Minister agree that it would be a matter of regret if calling on them to deploy into the south meant leaving the places that they have secured in the north to return to anarchy and chaos?

I am surprised at the enthusiasm with which the Statement welcomes the fact that there will be no national caveats. Does that mean that in future British forces operating in coalition and alliance operations will operate without national control over what they do? That is what it sounds like. If we expect other nations to do it, we presumably will do it ourselves. That would be a massive step change.

The Statement trumpeted the great operational declaration of the NATO response force of 20,000 highly capable troops, with associated air and naval support, ready to deploy at five days’ notice. That is an impressive capability. But I again ask the question that I have asked on several occasions in different debates: if we have a NATO force that is operationally capable of doing that, why are we scratching around for 2,500 troops and a few helicopters? Why can we not call on the apparently operationally capable force that NATO has?

All kinds of strange things are missing from the Statement. There is no mention of the comprehensive political guidance that most people expected to be formally agreed at Riga. We all know that NATO needs a new strategic concept to replace the way out-of-date one of 1999. The chances of getting all the members to agree to such a document are fairly slim and, as I understood it, the comprehensive political guidance was going to be a way of papering over the cracks. Does the fact that it is not mentioned in the Statement mean that it is so bland that it is not worth mentioning, or does it mean that even that was not agreed at Riga?

The Statement also does not address the enlargement strategy. The noble Lord, Lord Astor, highlighted parts of that. We on these Benches agreed that the time was not right for extending relationships

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further with Ukraine and Georgia. There is, however, the question of the Balkan strategy, which he raised. I was surprised that the Statement did not talk about what is now reported in the press: the UK’s support for Serbia moving ahead, with the status of Kosovo and the question of the war criminals still to be settled. What is the Government’s position, and why did they change their minds? There has also been the question of whether NATO should link more closely with like-minded countries in distant parts, an issue raised particularly by the United States, Japan, South Korea and Australia. Did that come up at the summit? If so, what was the Government’s position, and what was decided?

While there was no time in the short summit at Riga to take a hard look at where the alliance is going, there could have been an opportunity to steer the agenda for the 2009 summit. That will be NATO’s 60th anniversary—a suitable occasion for NATO to renew itself. A new strategic concept document could define the alliance’s operational and membership limits. It could change the funding arrangements for operations, which are the bane of all NATO’s activities, so that costs are shared equitably among members. It would also need to analyse whether the alliance is properly prepared for military tasks in the 21st century, instead of continuing to acquire equipment for past battles. It would need to show that the alliance could co-operate more closely with the European Union, which can, as the Minister said, offer complementary capabilities. Would the Government support such an agenda for that important future NATO summit, which might re-energise the alliance?

3.36 pm

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords for their support, in parts—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Garden—and for highlighting, rightly, the limitations. In response to the questions raised, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Astor, it is important to say that this clearly does not go far enough. However, in our attempts to persuade our NATO allies, our policy is not to point the finger and criticise in public, but to recognise and show appreciation for those countries that have moved in the direction we wish to see, and firmly but privately to make the points to those countries that we believe should go further. We welcome the willingness of those countries that have removed caveats and agreed to provide further resources, while we continue to make the case firmly for the additional resources to be provided to NATO commanders to do the job that they are tasked with doing on behalf of the international community in Afghanistan.

I was asked about such matters as the definition of an emergency. These are issues that we need clarification on. As noble Lords know, they are important to NATO commanders in terms of the effectiveness of operations. Such clarity is required. As I said in repeating the Statement, we need to recognise that those countries, having made certain commitments, need to go back and confirm exactly what those commitments are. However, our focus is to stress the importance of ensuring the greatest possible operational effectiveness,

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taking into account the significant challenge that we recognise the international community is up against in Afghanistan. That is our policy.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Garden, when he says that it is important for us, while highlighting the importance of a reserve into the south, not to lose focus on the progress that has been made in other regions within the country. We need a whole-country approach. That is our strategy. We have seen real progress within Afghanistan because of the effectiveness of the strategy that we are taking, but there is no doubt that, as we have described, there is a shortfall between what NATO commanders have said that they need to pursue this strategy and what countries have, to date, committed. However, that gap has got significantly smaller as a result of the Riga summit, and that is progress.

The noble Lord, Lord Garden, asked about our position on national caveats. We should not confuse the positions, about which I have been asked many times in this House, of our sovereign control over our troops and the caveats on the difference in rules of engagement—what troops are actually allowed to do within NATO operations and the difficulties that commanders face when rules of engagement are significantly different among the coalition partners.

I was asked a number of questions about our position on Serbia and what has changed our policy. This reflects the pressure in terms of the view of the whole community, which we have recognised. The decision to grant Partnership for Peace status to Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro follows the achievements of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in moving towards full NATO membership, and marks further progress on the region’s Euro-Atlantic path.

We remain firmly committed to this work and have not abandoned the points relating to conditionality and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The progress on full ICTY co-operation in Serbia remains essential. We expect that the NATO communiqué will make it clear that NATO will expect Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to co-operate fully with the ICTY and closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard. I believe that the message that it sends is really an opportunity for Serbia to move towards closer Euro-Atlantic contribution and co-operation.

I was asked a number of other points for which I do not have full details. I will follow them up and, where I can do so, I will write to noble Lords with an answer.

3.42 pm

Lord Anderson of Swansea: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Garden, said, the venue in this case was very significant. Fifteen years ago, Riga was within the Soviet Union; it has a large Russian minority, including many retired Soviet military. Given the proximity to Russia and the failure of President Putin to attend, was there any attempt to have a stocktaking of the success or otherwise of the NATO-Russia agreement? As I understand it, there has been some significant technical interchange in terms of air-sea rescue and

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attendance at manoeuvres, and so on, but there seems very little life left in the agreement. Was there any attempt at the summit to look at the current relationship with Russia? Relevant to that is the alleged attempt by Russia to have regime change in Georgia. Given the enlargement perspectives in respect of Ukraine and Georgia, was there any attempt to consider expressions of solidarity with Georgia or to enhance NATO’s relationship with Georgia?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the feedback that I have had on the discussions at the Riga summit have not indicated that there was any such discussion. However, I will ask further and, if I am able to provide any information on the relationship with Russia, I will write to my noble friend.

In my response to the noble Lord, Lord Astor, I forgot to mention the pay of Royal Marines. This is of real concern; it is not a good situation and I will commit to passing the points made by the noble Lord to my colleagues in the ministry.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, caveats have been extensively discussed by previous speakers and the Minister has responded to them. I want to pursue not the matter of the individual caveats in Afghanistan and how much they have been whittled away but, rather, the general issue. In the 1990s, NATO was intensely critical of the United Nations because its peacekeeping operations in Bosnia were caveated so fundamentally. Now it seems as if NATO has a bad attack of the measles, too. Does the Minister agree that there really needs to be some ring-fencing or limiting of caveats when troops are committed to NATO if the credibility of the alliance in an operation as difficult as that in Afghanistan is not to be fundamentally undermined? The more those caveats get discussed in public, the more the opposition will take advantage of them and play on them. Is anything being done in NATO through the supreme commander and SHAPE and others to find a way, if not to get rid of all caveats, then at least to limit them—and if they cannot be limited, then to thank those who offer their troops but say that they had better send them somewhere else?

Lord Drayson: My Lords, the noble Lord makes a vital point. It is very important for us to make progress within NATO on these caveats. What we can see from the Riga summit is that some progress has been made, although not as much as we would like.

This area reflects the differences of opinion among member countries within NATO as to the role of NATO forces and, in particular, differences of opinion over the acceptance of the need for a comprehensive approach as we describe it—in other words, the integration of military effect with the other lines of development such as action taken for reconstruction and governance. Certain NATO members ask whether this is a proper role for a NATO force and whether the relationship is clear in terms of the civilian-military partnership in these areas.

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I believe that we are going through a process of evolution of NATO in which we need dogged determination in making these points, based on our experience of implementing the comprehensive approach and, if I may say so, the progress that we are seeing with it. We need to convince our NATO partners of the need for this alignment and for that to be reflected in how caveats are structured and in the rules of engagement. We need to have patience as we pursue this with dogged determination, and we can take heart from the important progress that has been made recently in Riga.

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: My Lords, NATO in the past has had a wider dimension beyond the military. For example, it has encouraged civil society in a variety of ways in NATO countries, such as in scientific areas. As NATO moves out of its traditional European area—and just a few years ago I was involved in the NATO meeting in Ukraine—and moves into places such as Afghanistan, is that wider civilian aspect of NATO also being extended to those areas, in all aspects of the society of the country in which it works? I have not heard about that, but it is a dimension of NATO’s work that needs to be changed as NATO changes its area of activity.

Lord Drayson: My Lords, my noble friend has highlighted the process of evolution that NATO is going through. I should reiterate that there is no unanimity within NATO on the speed and direction of that evolution. Some see NATO as focusing primarily on a Euro-Atlanticist position, primarily from a defence posture, and do not take on board the position that we subscribe to of the importance of the effectiveness of the comprehensive approach, the civilian-military partnership and the development of NATO’s role to be a force for good globally. When we consider what NATO is doing globally today, it shows the real potential for NATO to be that.

As I have said before in this House, we need to be patient, because NATO is itself a relatively young thing, the world is changing very rapidly and these institutions take time to evolve. We must be dogged and clear about the direction that we see ahead and use diplomacy and persuasion as I have described.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I am bound to say that NATO is slightly older than the Minister, so it is not really a young organisation.

I should like to question the noble Lord further on the national caveat. I welcome the debate on this, but there are some real questions of sovereignty. It is one thing for the British Government to demand that other European Governments abandon their national caveat, but if other European Governments demanded that Britain abandon its national caveats, the Daily Mail and the Sun would have a great deal to say about that—they would be talking about the imposition of a European army.

There are some real questions of force doctrine. Disagreements in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo have partly been about how you treat civilians and

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what you do about collateral damage. Those are real questions about how you fight. Those disagreements are not only among the Europeans but between the Europeans and the United States, as the largest member of NATO. I recall a number of people involved both in Bosnia and Kosovo remarking from the British perspective that some of the most difficult caveats were those that the American forces imposed on themselves about their operations, which were not entirely helpful to their allies there.

Lord Drayson: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for describing me in terms of my youth, but I feel the speed at which I am ageing doing this job.

I agree that this is a very difficult area, with which the international community has to grapple. We have made progress. The issues relate to getting alignment, rules of engagement and national caveats to provide military commanders with the greatest effectiveness, given the resources that their community provides—while at the same time preserving the right level of national sovereignty control for those nations—so that politicians are able to balance the concerns that exist in the public of a nation that is committing troops.

It is important for us to acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that it is not very helpful to our force commanders to talk too much about the detail of the differences in the public forum. That needs to be done behind closed doors, so to speak, as much as it can be. We must recognise that this is a difficult and dangerous operation, and that all the coalition partners, at whatever level of national caveat they may be operating, have taken significant losses in support of the United Nations effort and NATO force in Afghanistan. It would not be right to criticise any nation that has lost people on operations in support of this cause.

EU Committee: EU and Africa

3.52 pm

Lord Bowness rose to move, That this House takes note of the report of the European Union Committee on the European Union and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership. (34th Report, HL Paper 206, Session 2005-06)

The noble Lord said: My Lords, for the convenience of the House, I shall speak also to the second report on the Order Paper, which I am also due to move. In May 2004, the African Union started to attract the attention of Sub-Committee C of the European Union Committee, which carried out this inquiry. There was a desire to know more about the African Union and how it related to the European Union. The decision to proceed was postponed until autumn last year when the Commission produced a draft strategy for Africa, which was followed by a paper from the High Representative, Doctor Solana. The European Council then agreed a substantial document in December 2005.

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I thank the members on the sub-committee who conducted this inquiry. We also had the assistance of a special adviser, Alex Ramsbotham, who was able to share with us his first-hand knowledge of Africa and who assisted with the preparation of the report. I also place on record our special thanks to the sub-committee’s then Clerk, Doctor Emily Baldock, who prepared the majority of the report, which is in a form that not only covers the scope of the inquiry but is in a very readable form and for interested parties is a work of reference of the different initiatives, organisations and policies involving Africa at this time. My thanks are also due to her for her assistance in the preparation of the follow-up report.

We are grateful to our witnesses, including the Secretary of State for International Development, Mr Hilary Benn; the Minister for Africa, the noble Lord, Lord Triesman; Elmar Brok, of the European Parliament; and Doctor Solana, who was—as always with this committee of your Lordships’ House—generous with his time. I also thank the other witnesses who contributed evidence, both orally and in writing. The report notes that we were unable, despite very considerable efforts, to obtain direct evidence from African Government representatives or other organisations. Nevertheless it was pleasing to note that when we presented the report to a seminar of invited participants in Brussels, two ambassadors from Africa attended.

The sub-committee decided to take the strategy as given and to concentrate on how it was to be implemented. The strategy itself sets out the areas in which the European Union can support African efforts to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future. Key to all the proposals is African ownership and responsibility. Chapter 1 of the report sets out the background. Chapter 2 and the following chapters look at the implication that the EU is the natural partner for Africa and the building of an EU-Africa partnership; asks whether Europe can deliver on its promises; and examines the problems with development assistance, governance and human rights, and peace and security. The final chapter examines how the partnership can be realised.

Given the international focus on Africa in 2005, we considered that the right policies to help Africa were in place. What was needed was fulfilment of the promises. Our inquiry looked not into what Europe should do for Africa, but into what it could in practice achieve. Our central question was: how can the European Union deliver on the commitments made? There is no doubt that the European Union and its member states are well equipped to make significant differences to sustainable development in Africa, but a number of challenges remain to be met by the Union, its member states and Africa.

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