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Royal Military Police: Deaths atAl Majarr Al Kabir
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach): My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
The appalling incident at Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 June 2003 resulted in one of the most serious losses suffered by British forces since the beginning of operations in Iraq. It was felt deeply within the British Army, in particular the Royal Military Police, and struck a grievous blow to the families of the six soldiers. From the moment news of the incident came through we have been doing all that we can, in conjunction with the Iraqi authorities, to bring the perpetrators of this crime to justice. We have also been working hard to find out as much as we can about the circumstances leading up to deaths of the six soldiers, to ensure that if there were lessons for the service then these would be learnt for the benefit of future operations.
The service board of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the six soldiers has now completed its work. This inquiry is fundamentally about learning lessons to prevent a recurrence. It is not about attributing blame or calling individuals to account. These are governed by separate procedures. It is also entirely internal in nature. However, we recognise that the families of the six soldiers have a close and fundamental interest in the board's work and its findings. We have therefore sought to keep the families as closely informed as we can on both these processes. To this end, representatives of the bereaved families are today receiving a briefing from the board president, following which I will meet them to hear their views and discuss any outstanding concerns they may have.
We recognise, too, that there is a wider parliamentary and public interest at stake, which is why we have taken the unusual step of providing a summary of the board of inquiry's findings for Parliament and the press. I am therefore making arrangements for a copy of the board's opinion, findings and recommendations, together with the overlaid opinions of the chain of command, to be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
So as not to prejudice the criminal investigation, the board was instructed to look at the events leading up to the incident in which the six soldiers died and not to examine the particular circumstances of their deaths. The board of inquiry was an exhaustive internal review conducted for service reasons and its report is an open and frank account of the events of 24 June 2003. The board made 10 recommendations (a further two were subsequently added by the chain of command) concerning military policies and procedures. Most of these have been accepted and will be implemented as a matter of priority.
The board found that the incident at Al Majarr Al Kabir was a surprise attack, which could not reasonably have been predicted. The board also found
that a number of factors may potentially have had a bearing on the deaths of the six soldiers, including issues relating to ammunition, communications and command relationships within the battle group to which the Royal Military Police platoon was attached. The board was not, however, able to state that any of these factors, either in isolation or in combination directly determined the six soldiers' fate.I am aware that some of the families have been critical of the Army's response to the deaths of the six soldiers. I hope they recognise the board's work for the thorough and detailed review that it is. I hope, too, that they now have a much better understanding of the events leading up to the death of their loved ones and the wider context in which the events occurred, and can take some comfort from this.
The families will shortly receive full copies of the board's documentation. A separate meeting will be arranged with the board president once the families have had a chance to digest this detail. This will be a further opportunity for the families to ask questions and to increase their understanding of the circumstances surrounding this tragic incident.
Defence Intelligence and Security Centre:Key Targets
Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
The Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) is the centre for defence intelligence training in the UK. CE DISC is responsible for training authorised personnel in intelligence, security and information support disciplines and maintaining an operational capability. The key targets for the agency for the 12 months from April 2004 are:
Key Target 1: Training Quantity and Efficiency
To produce trained personnel in accordance with defence requirements, while reducing wastage by 1 per cent in financial year 2004-05.
Key Target 2: Training Quality
To ensure that training complies with defence training quality standards and customer requirements.
To satisfy all operational tasking.
Key Target 4: Change Programme
To deliver process improvement milestones in accordance with the owner's directive.
Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency: Key Targets
Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
DGIA is responsible for meeting defence needs for responsive, accurate geospatial and imagery intelligence. The key targets for the agency for the 12 months from April 2004 are:
Key Target 1: Provision of Imagery Intelligence
To meet defence needs for imagery intelligence against an imagery intelligence exploitation programme agreed with customers.
Key Target 2: Provision of Geospatial Intelligence
To meet defence needs for geospatial intelligence against a geospatial intelligence programme agreed with customers.
Key Target 3: Provision of Deployable Functions
To provide force elements at a level of operational readiness agreed with customers.
Key Target 4: Provision of Training Capability
To meet defence needs for geographic training against a geospatial training plan agreed with customers.
To improve the efficiency of production within DGIA by 1 per cent in 2004-05.
Defence Storage and Distribution Agency:Key Targets
Lord Bach: My right honourable friend the Minister of State for Defence (Mr Adam Ingram) has made the following Written Ministerial Statement.
Key targets have been set for the chief executive of the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency (DSDA) for financial year 2004-05. The targets are as follows:
Key Target 1
To meet the customers' requirements as negotiated and agreed in business agreements (BAs). This key target is broken down into two sub-targets:
Key target 1a: For explosive materiel; to supply 95 per cent of available maintained munitions within demand timescales.
Key target 1b: 95 per cent of the number of issues of non-explosive materiel to consumers, as forecast and agreed in BAs, to meet that element of the supply chain pipeline time (SCPT) for which DSDA has a responsibility.
Key target 1c: To process within limits, agreed with each individual customer, 98 per cent of all receipts that conform to the specifications laid down in the contract and/or materiel regulations.
Key Target 2
To achieve an average 5 per cent reduction in the unit cost of output.
Key Target 3
The value of inventory written off as a result of DSDA's actions to be less than the levels agreed with each business agreement. This key target is broken down into two sub-targets:
Key target 3a: The value of explosive materiel written off as a result of DSDA's action to be less than 0.02 per cent.
Key Target 3b: The value of non-explosive materiel written off as a result of DSDA's action to be less than levels agreed within each specific customer supplier agreement.
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