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The Lord Bishop of Worcester: My Lords, I feel obliged to reiterate more strongly the point that I made earlier today. As we debate the matters, a picture is being built up in which organised religion always takes one view of the question. What will be the situation of the Government in the discussions, when they are faced with people who purport to represent the views of a religious body but actually represent only part of that body, in which there are others who hold the opposite point of view with equal force?
I do not know whether it is known in the House, but when the House of Bishops of the Church of England discussed this subject, it was clear that we had to acknowledge the existence in the Church of England of two equally strongly held doctrinal positions on the matter. I shudder at the thought of government having to adjudicate on the doctrinal position of an organised religion. I recognise that the words,
- "religious susceptibilities of a significant number of its followers",
For the Government to confer on religious bodies the right to create membership qualifications that go against the convictions of the society in which those religions function, and to be protected when they do so, is a dangerous precedent. I urge the Minister to bear in mind in the conversations that will proceed in the coming months that, like gender, organised religion is a complex matter. The convictions and doctrines of organised religion are also complex. I am well aware of a significant number of members of the Church of England who find the collection of exemptions along these lines deeply offensive.
8.45 p.m.
Lord Elton: My Lords, I shall listen to the Minister's reply with great interest, and shall do so in part in the light of what the right reverend Prelate has just said. What my noble friend has proposed is permissive, not obligatory. It is available for that section of any belief that holds her view without compelling any section that does not hold her view. To that extent, I feel that the objection of the right reverend Prelate is without much force.
I want to return to something that the right reverend Prelate said earlier when he expressed his discomfort in general—not in particular terms—at the position taken by my noble friend. Had it been expressed in particular terms, I would have been less concerned by it. He said that he was very concerned when the Church asked for shelter from the consequences of disagreeing with something with which the majority of society had come to a conclusion. I always thought that it was the function of Churches to do exactly that—to stand firm when the majority of society got things wrong. I am not saying that society got it wrong in this respect, as I see the right reverend Prelate quivering on the edge of intervening. I am referring to the general principle. I am thinking of the Church in Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s, and indeed, of our Churches during the civil war. It is plainly the duty of a religious body—especially a Church, and my own Church, in particular—to stand by principles when the majority of society has got them wrong, as they now have in many respects. I am not speaking about the Bill when I say that.
The Lord Bishop of Worcester: My Lords, perhaps I may assist the noble Lord. It might help if I say what my intervention would have been, rather than what he thought it might have been.
My concern is not that the Church should comply with everything that society says. It cannot be said that I advocate that position. My concern is that the Church should not seek protection from the costs of its obedience.
Lord Elton: My Lords, that is a much more honourable and enlightened position, but as to my first question, I shall leave it to the Minister.
Lord Filkin: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Elton, for that challenge. It almost feels too late to go into full detail on all these issues. However, I am
grateful for being exposed to an alternative set of pressures from the ones to which I am usually exposed on this Bill. That is healthy and it is a reminder to Government of how one has to be cautious in trying to uphold two sets of rights. Clearly, in part, much of these discussions has concerned trying, if possible, to provide the proper rights to transsexual people that we clearly believe should be provided in a civilised society, and to do so in a way that does not, at the same time, infringe the right to freedom of religion and to freedom of religious expression. We are debating on that cusp.The noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, gave me plenty of fervour and examination questions to take away with me. I shall not respond to them all tonight, but I shall look at them. For now, I shall make a few comments on the record.
Amendments Nos. 100, 102 and 108 would add a new Section 33A to the Sex Discrimination Act and Article 34A to the equivalent Northern Ireland order. The provisions will provide religious bodies with the freedom to restrict membership or the provision of benefits, facilities or services in such a way as to exclude a person who is recognised in the acquired gender or who will not consent to the disclosure of any entry relating to them in the gender recognition register. Amendment No. 108 has the same purpose.
On the face of it, that is a wide-ranging exemption. However, it would have no effect, as neither the Sex Discrimination Act nor the Northern Ireland order at present extends protection to transsexual people in terms of membership of religious organisations or the provision of benefits, facilities or services. As I have already explained, we do not consider it appropriate in this Bill to extend protection against gender reassignment discrimination to the area of goods, facilities and services, not as a point of principle, but as a point of practice. There is a better forum for engaging in those issues.
The Bill is concerned with providing transsexual people with access to a means of acquiring legal recognition; it is not an anti-discrimination Bill per se. The only changes that it makes to anti-discrimination law are consequential changes: providing access to legal recognition in the applied gender. We have had, and no doubt will continue to have, discussions with the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, and representatives of Evangelical Alliance, for whom I hasten to say she does not speak. I was not seeking to ally her with a Christian institution.
On the outcome of Mr Parry's case, I do not want to comment on a particular case. The Bill does not open up a new class of discrimination claims. As I have already said, we are not using the Bill to extend discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment.
On sporting bodies, one is damned if one does and damned if one does not. We have been willing to provide an exemption for sporting bodies, but the Bill is not about discrimination. The exemption for sport is of a different character. It does not permit a sporting body to restrict the participation of all transsexual people; it allows a restriction only where that is necessary to secure fair competition or safety of other
competitors. An exemption for religion, at least under the terms proposed, would apply to all transsexual people.I shall say no more about access to lavatories or other such issues. On a general point, I recollect, either tonight or previously, a question being asked about the Women's Institute. The present law would not prevent an organisation like the Women's Institute discriminating against a transsexual person if it wished to do so, as the Women's Institute could not be considered to be exercising a public function in considering applications for membership and, therefore, it would not be a public body. But I hope that it would not discriminate.
Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, I thank the Minister again. I see the Bill as opening up the prospect of litigation against the Churches, which concerns me. I know that between now and Third Reading there will be discussions so I shall beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 101 and 102 not moved.]
Baroness Buscombe moved Amendment No. 103:
- Page 6, line 22, at end insert—
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in speaking to Amendment No. 103 I return to a debate that we had in Grand Committee about peerages. Noble Lords will recall that Clause 16 states:
Noble Lords will note that my noble friend Lord Ferrers has tabled an amendment about peerages. I defer to him for he knows much more about peerages than do I. Indeed, I suspect that he knows much more about succession than do I.
The Government conceded in Grand Committee that there were "issues to consider", not only about how title is officially recognised, but also about how other matters flow from the holding of a title. The Minister has since courteously written to me about those further considerations. It seems that a possible solution has been found. However, I would prefer to wait to hear the Minister's response to my noble friend Lord Ferrers about that solution. I beg to move.
"( ) Nothing in this section shall prevent the holders of any peerage or dignity or title of honour who are in receipt of a gender recognition certificate from styling themselves as if they had inherited the peerage or dignity or title of honour in their acquired gender, and the persons concerned shall have the right to require any organisation or body of which they are a member to address them by the style appropriate to their acquired gender.
( ) A person who is the holder of an order of chivalry which is limited to one sex shall after receipt of a gender recognition certificate have the right to petition for conferment of the equivalent degree of the order of chivalry appropriate to their acquired gender."
"The fact that a person's gender has become the acquired gender under this Act . . . does not affect the descent of any peerage or dignity or title of honour".
In a sense, the clause provides for an exceptional treatment for peerages, in the way that Clause 15 provides for a different treatment for succession. In Grand Committee, we expressed our concern that if, for example, a male baron were to become a female, that male would not then be able to call himself a baroness. Similarly, an earl could not become a countess. Amendment No. 103 illustrates to the Government just one of our concerns about a number of anomalies in the Bill relating to how individuals should be treated in particular circumstances.
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