Select Committee on European Union Forty-Second Report

PART 4: Reform of the Governing Council


124. As we mentioned in our introduction, the composition of the ESCB can be seen as a series of concentric circles. The innermost circle represents the full-time Executive Board of the ECB (which comprises the President, the Vice-President and four other members). Moving outwards, the next circle corresponds to the Governing Council of the ECB, which is composed of the members of the Executive Board and the governors of the national central banks (NCBs) of the countries that have adopted the euro. Moving outwards again, the outer circle signifies the General Council of the ECB, whose membership comprises the President and Vice President of the ECB and the governors of the NCBs of all Member States. All decisions about monetary policy are taken by the Governing Council of the ECB.

125. The European Council of Heads of State or Government recently decided to modify the voting modalities in the Governing Council of the ECB on the basis of a recommendation from the ECB. This reform is aimed at preventing the Governing Council from becoming too large, which, it was feared, would prevent it from taking decisions in a timely and efficient manner in an enlarged euro area. The ECB proposal came in for a large amount of criticism and was rejected by the European Parliament. Nonetheless, it was adopted by the Council, despite the fact that critics argue that the reform will not solve the problems posed to the workings of the Governing Council by enlargement of EMU, indeed some say that it could compound the difficulties. Furthermore, they argue that the reform will increase the complexities of the decision-making process and make the ECB less transparent.

How the Governing Council currently operates

126. The Governing Council consists of the 6 members of the Executive Board and the 12 NCB governors of the euro area. The Governing Council usually operates by consensus, but if there were a vote on monetary policy, each member of the Governing Council would have one vote (making 18 votes in total), and the decision would be taken by simple majority, with the President having a casting vote.

How Enlargement of EMU would affect an unreformed Governing Council


127. Under the current proposals for enlargement of the EU, the Governing Council could greatly expand from its present size of 18 members up to a possible 33 members (the 6 members of the Executive Board, plus the governors of the NCBs of the 15 current Member States, the 10 accession countries and the 2 applicant countries, Bulgaria and Romania). All of our witnesses considered this number to be far too large for efficient decision-making. If each speaker had 10 minutes to present his or her position, that alone would take over five hours!


128. Professor Thygesen wrote of the importance of avoiding a structure in which a coalition of smaller countries could override the consideration of the larger, more economically significant participants (p.24). An enlarged Governing Council run on the principle of 'one member one vote' could result in a situation where a coalition of smaller countries could effectively control the monetary policy decisions of the ECB, despite only accounting for little more than 20% of euro area GDP.[83]

The agreed reform of the voting modalities of the Governing Council

The limitations imposed by the Nice 'enabling clause'

129. The need to reform the Governing Council was recognised in the Nice Treaty (which was meant to pave the way for enlargement of the EU). Article 5 of the Nice Treaty introduced a new Article 10.6 into the Protocol on the Statue of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, annexed to the EC Treaty. This 'enabling clause' has the effect of allowing changes to be made to the Governing Council voting modalities as laid down in Article 10.2 of the Protocol. The enabling clause allows the European Council, acting unanimously, and after having consulted the European Parliament, to approve reform of the voting procedures of the Governing Council on a proposal from the Commission or a unanimous recommendation from the Governing Council itself. The ECB shall be consulted about any proposal from the Commission and vice versa.

130. The enabling clause thus imposes significant constraints and limitations on the type of reforms that the ECB and Commission can propose. They can only propose amendments to Article 10.2 of the Protocol, which concerns the voting procedures of the Governing Council; the ECB and the Commission do not therefore have the mandate to put forward a proposal for more fundamental reform of the governing structure of the ECB. Changes to the composition of the Governing Council or to the distribution of tasks between the Executive Board and the Governing Council cannot be considered under an amendment to Article 10.2.

From ECB proposal to Council agreement of the reform

131. On 20 December 2002, the ECB announced that it was going to put forward a recommendation for reform of the voting procedures in the Governing Council. The Governing Council formally adopted a proposal on 3 February 2003, just two days after the Nice Treaty came into force. On 19 February the Commission issued its Opinion on the ECB proposal (COM(2003)81). On 10 March the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament rejected the ECB's proposal (A5-0063/2000). On 21 March 2003, the European Council endorsed the ECB proposal and agreed to its proposed reform of the voting modalities of the Governing Council.

An overview of the agreed reform

132. The agreed reform caps the number of members of the Governing Council that can vote on monetary policy decisions at 21. All the governors of the NCBs of the euro area will continue to be present at all Governing Council meetings, but the right to vote in the meetings will be rotated between them. The 6 members of the ECB's executive board will maintain permanent voting rights, but the NCB representatives will share on rotation up to 15 votes.[84] In determining how the votes are to be rotated between the NCB governors (who may number up to 27), the agreed reform distinguishes between different groups of countries.

133. The votes will not be rotated equitably between the Member States; this is so that the larger Member States with more financial influence vote more frequently than the smaller Member States. This is a notable change from previous ECB policy. The concern was that otherwise a coalition of smaller Member States representing a small proportion of the euro area economy could push through a decision against the wishes of the larger Member States and the members of the Executive Board (see above paragraph 128). Therefore, the Member States will be divided into groups according to a composite ranking indicator based on two components: the relative size of the economy (measured by the Member State's share in the aggregate euro area GDP at market prices), and the relative size of the financial sector (measured by Member State's share in "the total assets of the aggregated balance sheet of monetary financial institutions" in the euro area).

134. The reform will happen in two stages. When there are more than 15 but less than 22 Member States, the Member States of the euro area will be divided into two groups. In this first stage of reform, the 5 largest Member States (measured by the ranking indicator) will form the first group, which will have 4 votes.[85] The remaining 11-16 smaller countries will share the other 11 votes. The Governing Council can decide to postpone the start of the rotation system until the number of governors exceeds 18. This would mean that the 14-16 smaller Member States would share 11 votes, and so they would less frequently than the 5 largest Member States, who would share 4 votes.

135. In the second stage of reform - to be implemented from the point when the euro area expands to 22 or more Member States - the Member States will be divided into three groups. The first group will remain confined to the 5 largest Member States, who will still share 4 votes. The second group will comprise the next largest countries; it will contain half the total number of euro area Member States, rounding up if necessary (i.e., 11-14 countries); these countries will share 8 votes. The third group will contain the remaining 6-9 countries, and will have 3 votes.

Criticisms of the agreed reform


136. The ECB's Recommendation for a Council Decision states that there is "a need to maintain the Governing Council's capacity for efficient and timely decision-making in an enlarged euro area, irrespective of the number of Member States that adopt the euro." This is patently true. However, our witnesses were certain that the agreed reform would not achieve this vital objective. All members of the Governing Council (with and without the right to vote) would continue to sit at the table and have the right to participate in the discussion. The agreed reform would thus not solve the problem of the excessive size of the forum. Our witnesses dismissed the agreed reform because it would create a decision-making body that would be "totally unwieldy". Professor Buiter pointed out that in an enlarged euro area there could be 27 NCB governors present at the meetings of the Governing Council, plus 6 Executive Board members, making 33 members in total for the discussion,[86] with 21 voting: "That is three football teams for the discussion, and two with one man sent off for the voting! It is too large." If implemented, the reform would create an unprecendently large body for monthly monetary policy decision-making. Professor Thygesen criticised the ECB and the Council for paying insufficient attention to considerations of efficiency, which would certainly have made it desirable to reduce the size of the Governing Council. Instead, the Governing Council would take a form "more suited to a parliamentary debate than to a decision-making forum on interest rates."[87] There was concern that with such a large number of members the Governing Council might suffer from "an inability to react promptly to changes in the economic environment" (QQ 26, 35-36, 62, 73; pp.24-25, 80-81).


137. In its Opinion on the ECB recommendation, the Commission asked why, for determining which Member State would be in which group, the ranking indicator employed the criterion of the relative size of the financial sector.[88] The Commission suggested that it might have been more appropriate to use population size, since the Maastricht Treaty uses GDP and population size (in a balanced 50-50 split) to determine country contributions to subscribed capital of the ECB. If these factors had been used in this way in the ECB's rotation model, they would have had the effect of placing Luxembourg in the third group, rather than the second group as it will be under the agreed reforms.

138. The Commission also pointed out that the ECB proposal left several questions unanswered. The details of the reform are not fully specified in the ECB's proposal. For example, the length of time of the rotation period, which will determine the frequency of rotation, has not been announced. It is not even explicit that the rotation frequency will be identical for each of the three groups. Similarly, the sequence to be followed for assigning voting rights within a group is still unknown, as is the time from when the rotation model will take effect. Furthermore, the ECB has not announced when it will provide these details.


139. Transparency is one of the five fundamental principles that the ECB, in its Recommendation, said should guide reform of the Governing Council. On 19 December 2002, President Duisenberg wrote to Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament, and emphasised that "the Governing Council sought to design a rotation scheme which is transparent so that its main features and functioning can be communicated easily." The agreed reform cannot be described as transparent, however; its functioning is difficult to communicate because it is so complicated. The Governing Council "requires broad and ongoing public support in Europe," because, as Professor Bofinger explained, "from time to time the common monetary policy will exert negative effects on certain areas." One consequence of this situation is that citizens need to be able to trust in and "easily understand the workings of this system."[89] Yet, as Professor Buiter said, the ECB's proposal is "an incredibly complicated scheme. You literally have to use a formula to figure out who is going to vote how often and what the rotation scheme is." He called the outcome "an inelegant mess". (Q 35)

140. President Duisenberg has admitted that the adopted changes in the voting modalities are complex.[90] But, as explained above (paragraphs 129-30), the Nice Treaty imposed strict conditions to the proposal that the ECB was allowed to put forward. President Duisenberg explained that in formulating a proposal the Governing Council found "the most stringent" condition to be the need to ensure unanimity:

"I can certainly think of a simpler system, but not if, at the same time, I had to ensure unanimity."[91]


141. One of the founding principles of the ECB statutes is that NCB Governors sit on the Governing Council "in a personal and independent capacity", not as national representatives.[92] This principle of so-called "ad personam participation" is there to try and guarantee that members participate in a personal and independent capacity and make their own personal judgement without being influenced by national interests. One of the commendable aspects of the Governing Council's decisions so far is that it seems to have focused on aggregates for the euro area in reaching its conclusions. The rotation system, however, establishes nationality as the basis for who has a vote at any one time; the NCB governors will be given different voting rights according to the economic importance of the Member States that they represent. There was concern that, by giving up the principle of equality of Member States, the proposal threatens to undermine the theory that all members of the Governing Council "should forget the particular interests of their home country and act only in the interest of the euro area."[93] The reform will create "a three-class voting scheme which treats the governors differently according to their national origin." This system may "threaten the independence of the ECB's decision-making processes from national considerations." Professor Buiter explained that the result of the reform was a "very uncomfortable paradox of an institution with a euro area-wide mandate, and specifically charged to ignore national considerations and not to take orders from national authorities, yet with the majority of the Governing Council, selected not on competency grounds, but subject to nationality constraints." He criticised this "internal contradiction", which meant that national appointments were given a mandate to consider exclusively the euro area (QQ 35, 54).

The speed with which the proposal was agreed by the Council did not allow the requisite time for parliamentary scrutiny

142. Under the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union,[94] a minimum period of 6 weeks is provided to enable documents to be scrutinised by national parliaments before they are agreed to in the Council of Ministers by governments. In the case of this proposal, the Financial Secretary signed a short, cursory explanatory memorandum for the UK Parliament on 8 March 2003; she then wrote to our Committee on 20 March 2003, saying that the Government intended to override scrutiny and agree to the proposal at the Council meeting on 21 March.

143. In its recent report, The UK and the euro, the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons concluded that it was "regrettable that such an important decision on reform was taken so quickly and with limited debate."[95] Professor Thygesen also regretted that there had not been "more discussion of [the proposal] in public", including in the UK, as the proposal raised "serious questions of concern" (Q 73).

The way forward: how should the Governing Council be reformed?

A comparison with other central banks

144. In the US, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) uses a similar rotating voting system to that agreed for the Governing Council of the ECB, although it is considerably simpler and more transparent. The 7 members of the Federal Reserve Board, which is the equivalent in the Federal Reserve of the ECB's Executive Board, have permanent voting rights on the FOMC; 5 others votes are shared between the 12 Federal Reserve Bank presidents. The President of the New York Reserve has a permanent seat, due to the importance of the financial sector in New York; the remaining 4 seats rotate among the Presidents of the remaining 11 regional central banks on one-year terms. All members participate in the meetings and in the discussions, and contribute to the overall assessment of the economy and policy option, but the total number of members on the FOMC is only 19 (compared to a possible total of 33 in the Governing Council). Furthermore, the FOMC only consists of 12 voting members, whereas there could be 21 in the Governing Council of an enlarged euro area.

145. At the Bank of England, there are only 9 members on the Monetary Policy Committee (5 full-time executive members and 4 external experts appointed by the Chancellor); there are also 9 members on the Reserve Bank Board of the Reserve Bank of Australia (Australia's Central Bank). This board, which has responsibility for monetary policy decision-making, comprises 3 ex officio members—the Governor (who is Chairman), the Deputy Governor (who is Deputy Chairman) and the Secretary to the Department of the Treasury—and 6 external members, who are appointed by the Treasurer. The Executive Board of the Riksbank (the central bank of Sweden) makes all of the bank's monetary policy decisions. The Executive Board comprises six full-time members appointed for six-year terms. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (New Zealand's Central Bank) employs two external advisors on one-year contracts (with one possible renewal) to provide advice to the Governor, who has responsibility for setting the Official Cash Rate. As can be seen from these comparisons, the agreed reform of the Governing Council of the ECB will make it "by far the largest monetary policymaking body among industrial countries."[96]

The considerations of efficiency and nationality

146. All of our witnesses agreed that it would be highly desirable to have a much smaller group of people making monetary policy decisions for the ECB; the reduction in members would make for a more efficient Governing Council (QQ 26, 40). Dr Schmieding considered that the "awkward nature" of the agreed voting reform was a result of:

"the compromise between what you could call technocratic efficiency, which would call for a small group of experts taking the interest rate decisions, and what you could call the legitimacy of the multinational institution, which in the extreme would call for the one-country one-vote system. The real question is whether, given the probably inevitable nature of making such awkward compromises, the compromises or trade-offs have gone too far against efficiency or not" (Q 61).

147. His position was that, from an academic or theoretical point of view, it would be "easy to improve on" the ECB's proposal, but the ECB faced some difficult political realities when making its proposal—namely, the feasibility of securing unanimity within the Governing Council for its proposal (Q 73).

148. Professor Thygesen also referred to a compromise between efficiency and the need to assure continuing democratic legitimacy. He considered that in reforming the Governing Council, "equality of treatment of participants" had been discontinued but "without significant gains in efficiency" (p.24). Mr Lorenzo Codogno, Managing Director, Co-Head of European Economics at the Bank of America, also recognised that there was an inevitable "trade-off between the political need to maintain country representation and the even more understandable and justified economic need to have the best designed decision-making body". He argued that the agreed reform tilted the balance between the political considerations of nationality and the economic considerations of efficiency too far in the direction of a political fix. He understood the context in which the decision was made and concluded that the "only benefit" of the new reform was "to provide a politically acceptable way to accommodate EMU enlargement." (p.81)

149. In designing an ideal model for the euro area, Professor Buiter would abandon national representation on the rate-setting body. Instead, he would "have people appointed on the basis of expertise without regard to nationality - outside members and Executive Board members." (QQ 46, 48)

150. When Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Edward George, in testimony to the Treasury Select Committee, said that he did not see the reform as "the end point" in the evolution of how the ECB sets monetary policy. This reform was "a first stage", possibly towards a smaller, technical committee that would make proposals to the Governing Council (QQ 1166-71).

151. Mr Walton pointed out that whilst economists would favour reducing the size of the body making interest-rate decisions, there was an argument that said that the ECB needed to maintain the direct link to the Member States that the governors currently represented (Q 26). The question was whether the time was right to move from a system of national representation on the Governing Council to a system based purely on individual expertise. Professor Thygesen pointed out, however, that considerations of efficiency and national representation need not be mutually exclusive. Monetary policy decisions could be taken by a small, technical body, whilst the NCB governors would continue to sit on the Governing Council, where they would "contribute their unique, indeed indispensable, knowledge of economic developments and sensitivities in their own area," but they would delegate decisions on policy interest rates to the smaller Monetary Policy Council which presumably would be "better placed to evaluate the financial market indicators for the euro area as a whole" that were so crucial to reaching the proper monetary stance in the shorter run (pp.24-25). Mr Codogno also supported this idea of a small technical committee taking monetary policy decisions for the euro area, working under the guidance of the Governing Council, which would have "an advisory role". The NCB governors would exchange views on their national situations and monitor developments at regional level. In doing so, they would continue to bring to the ECB important information of local conditions. The Governing Council could even set broad guidelines for the MPC to follow when making interest-rate decisions. This two-level arrangement would probably close "the perceived democracy-gap of not having a representative from each country presenting regional issues to the decision-making body of the ECB." Moreover, "it would enable central bank governors of this enlarged Council to communicate ECB policy in a credible way to market participants and to the wider public." (p.81)

152. Dr Schmieding advised that the nature of the trade-off between national representation and technocratic efficiency changes over time. Initially, it might be advisable to have a system of one-country one-vote. "But, as the bank acquires credibility on its own over time and legitimacy with the population in the nations at large within the monetary union, then over time probably the balance of arguments could shift more in favour of technocratic efficiency." (Q 61)

The way forward in the IGC

153. A number of witnesses called for progress on the issue of reform of the Governing Council to be made at the IGC. They did not expect the Member States, who only agreed to endorse the ECB proposal in March 2003, to reverse this decision in the IGC and immediately reach a decision on an alternative model. Instead, a feasible way in which progress could be achieved would be for a new 'enabling clause' to be provided by the new constitutional Treaty. Dr Schmieding favoured this method of approach which would allow the Member States to revisit the issue of reform of the Governing Council without the need to convene a full IGC. The UK Government explained that Finland was likely to propose such a provision at the current IGC. Mr Codogno suggested that the IGC could go further and "design a 'road map' to move gradually away from the current country-based representation in favour of appointments based exclusively on professional grounds." (QQ 74, 216; pp.81-82)

154. Professor Giavazzi cautioned that a new enabling clause should be drafted more carefully than the previous one introduced by the Treaty at Nice. This was for two reasons. First, reform needed to go beyond the voting modalities outlined in Article 10.2. Secondly, urgent consideration needed to be given as to who should be mandated to come up with the further proposal for reform - he favoured the Commission:

"The bottom line is that NCB governors are simply the wrong group of individuals to propose new voting rules for the ECB. It was inevitable that they would come up with a set of rules that preserves their current rights, rather than proposing the most efficient mechanism for setting interest rates in the eurozone. More generally, the institutional design of a central bank should not be delegated to the central bankers themselves."[97]


155. The Governing Council is the highest decision-making body of the ECB; it sets interest rates for the euro area. The question of reform of the Governing Council of the ECB is therefore an issue of major importance. It is regrettable that the enabling clause provided by the Treaty of Nice was drawn so tightly as to prevent the Commission and the ECB from considering more radical proposals for reform of the Governing Council but instead limited them to considerations of its voting procedures.

156. The agreed reform, based on an overly complex rotation model, is not a sensible way to deal with the fundamental problems posed to the workings of the Governing Council by enlargement of the euro area. It fails to achieve what it was meant to do because it does not satisfy the principles on which it was supposed to be based. It is not an efficient mechanism for setting interest rates in the euro area; it caps the number of voting and non-voting members of the Governing Council at a level which is far too high; it is not transparent; it is overly complicated and difficult to communicate, so it will be extremely difficult for it to gain the trust of the public. Furthermore, it violates the principle of the ECB statutes, which prescribe that the NCB Governors sit on the Governing Council as individual experts, not as representatives of their own countries. All in all, we do not consider that the agreed reform will work satisfactorily. It is extremely disappointing that such an important decision on reform was taken so quickly and with limited opportunity for consultation, debate or parliamentary scrutiny.

157. There is a functional need for the ECB to have the best possible design for its interest-rate setting body. The reason that we have independent central banks is to ensure that monetary policy is not compromised by political considerations. For this reason we recommend that the ECB should eventually have a small Monetary Policy Council composed of the six members of the ECB Executive Board and up to six independent external experts. These part-time, non-executive members of the Monetary Policy Council would be appointed for their individual expertise, without regard to their nationality, by an open and transparent process; like the Members of the Executive Board, they would be mandated to consider exclusively the interests of the euro area. We believe that such a model is the most sensible consequence of the decision to operate a single monetary policy. We recognise and appreciate the political impetus for there to be some national input into the running of the ECB. That is why we recommend that the Monetary Policy Council should operate under the oversight of the current Governing Council, where the central banks of all of the Member States of the euro area are represented. The Monetary Policy Council would meet monthly and take decisions on interest rates; the Governing Council would retain all the other responsibilities that it currently holds. The Governing Council would continue to formulate the monetary policy strategy for the ECB, which the Monetary Policy Council would follow and implement. The Governing Council would set general guidelines for monetary policy in, say, quarterly meetings and monitor the policy execution by the Monetary Policy Council. Such meetings would allow the national central bank governors to continue to contribute their indispensable knowledge of economic developments and sensitivities in their own countries to the working of the ECB. If independent experts were appointed to the Monetary Policy Council, it would mean that all the members of the rate-setting board would become directly accountable to the European Parliament, which is not currently the case, as it cannot call the national central bank governors to appear before it.

158. The Member States should, as a matter of urgency, reconsider reform of the Governing Council at the present Inter-Governmental Conference. A new enabling clause should be provided allowing fundamental reforms to the structure of the ECB to be agreed by the European Council, acting unanimously. There should be a new provision in the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank that would facilitate reforms that go beyond amending Article 10.2 of Protocol. Proposals for reform under a broader remit are necessary to allow changes to the functions of the Governing Council and the establishment of a Monetary Policy Council as a decision-making body of the ECB. Without such a provision, it would be extremely difficult to amend the structure of the ECB any further, making reform of the Governing Council unlikely in the foreseeable future.

83   At present, the weighted average inflation for the euro area is dominated by 7 Member States (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), whose macro-economies are reasonably in line with one another and make up 85% of the euro area GDP. After enlargement of EMU, the economies of what are currently the accession countries are likely to have higher levels of growth and inflation than these 7 'core' countries. Under the present voting rules, the smaller Member States, despite accounting for only a small proportion of the euro area GDP, could achieve a blocking coalition in the Governing Council. Although perhaps improbable in practice, the theory has caused academics some concern (see, for example, 'The New Governing Rules of the ECB', Briefing Paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, February 2003, Professor Guillermo de la Dehesa, pp.2-3). Back

84   The Commission questioned whether the limit of the number of voting national central bank governors might possibly increase to 18 during a transitional period. It considered that the Governing Council could defer the effective start of the rotation model until the number of governors exceeded 18 (rather than 15) (p.89 and COM(2003)81 final, p.4.). Back

85   The Member States that would form this first group are currently France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands; if the UK joined the euro area, it would replace the Netherlands in this group. Back

86   In fact, the number for the discussions could be even higher, because the President of the Eurogroup and a representative of the Commission also have the right to attend meetings of the Governing Council and participate in the discussion. Back

87   This comment by Professor Thygesen echoes that of Dr Gros, Deputy Director of the CEPS, who said that if the Governing Council ended up with over 30 members it would be "more like a mini-parliament than a decision-making body that has to manage a global currency in fast-moving financial markets." (op.cit., p.1) Back

88   COM(2003)81 final, pp.3-4, 7. Back

89   'Consequences of the modification of the Governing Council rules', Briefing paper for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, 7 February 2003. Back

90   'Presentation of the ECB's Annual Report 2002 to the European Parliament', Introductory statement delivered by President Duisenberg, Strasbourg, 3 July 2003. Back

91   Monetary Dialogue with the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, 12 June 2003. Back

92   The importance of this principle is stressed in the Explanatory Memorandum of the ECB's Recommendation to amend the voting modalities of the Governing Council (Official Journal of the European Union, C 29, 7 February 2003). Back

93   Dr Gros, op. cit., p.2. Back

94   Annexed to the EU and EC Treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Back

95   Sixth report of session 2002-03, HC 187-I, paragraph 28. Back

96   'The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement', Herge Berger, IMF Working Paper WP/02/175, p.4. Back

97   The UK and the euro (House of Commons Treasury Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume II, HC 187-II), p.198. Back

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