Judgments - Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire (Appellants) v Wallbank and another (Respondents)

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    58. There is no doubt that parochial church councils are an essential part of the administration, on the authority of the General Synod, of the affairs of the Church of England. The parish itself has been described as the basic building block of the Church and the PCC as the central forum for decision-making and discussion in relation to parish affairs: Mark Hill, Ecclesiastical Law, 2nd ed (2001), pp 48 and 74, paras 3.11 and 3.74. It is constituted by section 3 of the Parochial Church Councils (Powers) Measure 1956 as a body corporate. It has statutory powers which it may exercise under section 2 of the Chancel Repairs Act 1932 against any person who appears to it to be liable to repair the chancel, irrespective of whether that person is resident in the parish and is a member of the Church of England. In that context, perhaps, it may be said in a very loose sense to be a public rather than a private body.

    59. But none of these characteristics indicate that it is a governmental organisation, as that phrase is understood in the context of article 34 of the Convention. It plainly has nothing whatever to do with the process of either central or local government. It is not accountable to the general public for what it does. It receives no public funding, apart from occasional grants from English Heritage for the preservation of its historic buildings. In that respect it is in a position which is no different from that of any private individual. The statutory powers which it has been given by the Chancel Repairs Act 1932 are not exercisable against the public generally or any class or group of persons which forms part of it. The purpose of that Act, as its long title indicates, was to abolish proceedings in ecclesiastical courts for enforcing the liability to repair. The only person against whom the liability may be enforced is the person who, in that obscure phrase, "would, but for the provisions of this Act, have been liable to be admonished to repair the chancel by the appropriate ecclesiastical court in a cause of office promoted against him in that court on the date when the notice was served:" see section 2(3); Wickhambrook Parochial Church Council v Croxford [1935] 2 KB 417, 429, per Lord Hanworth MR.

    60. Then there is the fact that the PCC is part of the Church of England. The Court of Appeal said that it exemplifies the special status of the church of which it forms part: [2002] Ch 51, 61, para 32. The fact that it forms part of the church by law established showed, it was said, that the PCC is a public authority: p 63, para 35. The implication of these observations is that other bodies such as diocesan and deanery synods and the General Synod itself fall into the same category. In my opinion however the legal framework of the Church of England as a church by law established does not lead to this conclusion.

    61. The Church of England as a whole has no legal status or personality. There is no Act of Parliament that purports to establish it as the Church of England: Sir Lewis Dibden, Establishment in England: Essays on Church and State (1932), p111. What establishment in law means is that the state has incorporated its law into the law of the realm as a branch of its general law. In Marshall v Graham [1907] 2 KB 112, 126 Phillimore J said:

    "A Church which is established is not thereby made a department of the State. The process of establishment means that the State has accepted the Church as the religious body in its opinion truly teaching the Christian faith, and given to it a certain legal position, and to its decrees, if rendered under certain legal conditions, certain civil sanctions."

The Church of England is identified with the state in other ways, the monarch being head of each: see Norman Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England (1996), p 9. It has regulatory functions within its own sphere, but it cannot be said to be part of government. The state has not surrendered or delegated any of its functions or powers to the Church. None of the functions that the Church of England performs would have to be performed in its place by the state if the Church were to abdicate its responsibility: see R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth, Ex p Wachmann [1992] 1 WLR 1036, 1042A, per Simon Brown J. The relationship which the state has with the Church of England is one of recognition, not of the devolution to it of any of the powers or functions of government.

    62. The decisions of the Strasbourg Court in Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) 20 EHRR 1 and Hautanemi v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR CD 156 support this approach. It is also worth noting that, while the two main churches in Germany (Roman Catholic and Lutheran) have public legal personality and are public authorities bound by the provisions of article 19(4) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) or Basic Law which guarantees recourse to the court should any person's basic rights be violated by public authority, they are in general considered to be "non-governmental organisations" within the meaning of article 34 of the Convention. As such, they are entitled to avail themselves of, for example, the right to protection of property under article 1 of the First Protocol: Frowein and Peukert, Kommentar zur Europäishen Menschenrechtskonvention, 2nd ed (1996), art 25, para 16. Maunz and Dürig, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (looseleaf), art 33, para 38 explain the position in this way:

    "Keine hoheitsrechtlichen Befugnisse nehmen die Amtsträger der Kirchen wahr, soweit sie nicht kraft staatlicher Ermächtigung (etwa in Kirchensteurangelegenheiten) tätig werden; die Kirchen sind, auch soweit sie öffentlich-rechtlichen Status haben, nicht Bestandteile der staatlichen Organisation."

    [Church officeholders do not exercise sovereign power so long as they are not acting by virtue of state empowerment (for example, in matters concerning church taxes); the churches do not, even though they have public law status, form an integral part of the organisation of the state.]

    This reflects the view of the German Constitutional Court in its 1965 decision (BVerfGE 18, 385) that measures taken by a church relating to purely internal matters which do not reach out into the sphere of the state do not constitute acts of sovereign power. The churches are not, as we would put it, "core" public authorities although they may be regarded as "hybrid" public authorities for certain purposes.

    63. For these reasons I would hold that the PCC is not a "core" public authority. As for the question whether it is a "hybrid" public authority, I would prefer not to deal with it in the abstract. The answer must depend on the facts of each case. The issue with which your Lordships are concerned in this case relates to the functions of the PCC in the enforcement of a liability to effect repairs to the chancel. Section 6(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection (3) if the nature of the act which is alleged to be unlawful is private. The Court of Appeal said that the function of chancel repairs is of a public nature: [2002] Ch 51, 63, para 35. But the liability of the lay-rector to repair the chancel is a burden which arises as a matter of private law from the ownership of glebe land.

    64. It is true, as Wynn-Parry J observed in Chivers & Sons Ltd v Air Ministry [1955] 1 Ch 585, 593, that the burden is imposed for the benefit of the parishioners. It may be said that, as the church is a historic building which is open to the public, it is in the public interest that these repairs should be carried out. It is also true that the liability to repair the chancel rests on persons who need not be members of the church and that there is, as the Court of Appeal observed at p 63B, para 34, no surviving element of mutuality or mutual governance between the church and the impropriator. But none of these factors leads to the conclusion that the PCC's act in seeking to enforce the lay rector's liability on behalf of the parishioners is a public rather than a private act. The nature of the act is to be found in the nature of the obligation which the PCC is seeking to enforce. It is seeking to enforce a civil debt. The function which it is performing has nothing to do with the responsibilities which are owed to the public by the State. I would hold that section 6(5) applies, and that in relation to this act the PCC is not for the purposes of section 6(1) a public authority.

The incompatibility issue

    65. This issue does not arise if, as I would hold, the PCC is not for present purposes a public authority. But I should like to offer these brief comments on it, as I do not agree with the Court of Appeal's finding that Mr and Mrs Wallbank's right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions under article 1 of the First Protocol, read either alone or with article 14 of the Convention, has been violated: [2002] Ch 51, paras 38- 46.

    66. Article 1 of the First Protocol provides:

    "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

Article 14 of the Convention prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms which the Convention sets forth.

    67. Article 1 of the First Protocol contains three distinct rules: see Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 35, para 61; James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR123, 139, para 37. The first rule is set out in the first sentence, which is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property. It then deals with two forms of interference with a person's possessions by the state: deprivation of possessions which it subjects to certain conditions, and control of the use of property in accordance with the general interest. In each case a balance must be struck between the rights of the individual and the public interest to determine whether the interference was justified. These rules are not unconnected as, before considering whether the first rule has been complied with, the court must first determine whether the last two rules are applicable. As it was put in James, para 37, the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. They should be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.

    68. The Court of Appeal appear to have overlooked this guidance. They did not address the question whether Mr and Mrs Wallbank were being deprived of their possessions according to the second rule, and they did not deal with the question whether there was an interference with the first rule. They held that the liability to defray the cost of chancel repairs was levy upon the personal funds of Mr and Mrs Wallbank, that this was a form of taxation within the third rule in the second paragraph of article 1, and that it was arbitrary and disproportionate. They rejected the PCC's argument the source of the liability was their ownership of Glebe Farm. They held that there was in this case an outside intervention by the general law which made ownership of the land a fiscal liability: para 40.

    69. Ferris J said in his judgment that, if the law relating to chancel repairs was as understood it to be (which he described as "the supposed rule"), it did not involve a deprivation of possessions. As he put it, at para 23:

    "The argument for Mr and Mrs Wallbank seems to assume that the starting point is that they are to be regarded as the owners of Glebe Farm free from incumbrances or other burdensome incidents attached to the ownership of the land. But this is not in fact correct if the supposed rule represents the law. The liability to repair the chancel is, on that basis, one of the incidents of ownership of that part of Glebe Farm which consists of land allotted under the inclosure award in lieu of tithe or other rectorial property. It is, of course, an unusual incident because it does not amount to a charge on the land, is not limited to the value of the land and imposes a personal liability on the owner of the land. But in principle I do not find it possible to distinguish it from the liability which would attach to the owner of land which is purchased subject to a mortgage, restrictive covenant or other incumbrance created by a predecessor in title."

He said that the case was quite different from that in which there was some kind of outside intervention in the form of taxation, compulsory purchase or control over the way in which the property can be used.

    70. I prefer Ferris J's analysis to that of the Court of Appeal. The principle which we must follow was described in James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123, 139, para 36. We must confine our attention, as far as possible, to the concrete case which is before us. It must not be directed to the impact of the law relating the enforcement of the chancel repair liability in the abstract, but to its impact as it affects Mr and Mrs Wallbank.

    71. How then does the liability arise? It cannot be considered in isolation from the obligation that gives rise to it. That is the obligation which rests on the owner of rectorial land, not as a result any outside intervention with the possession of the land by the state but as a matter of private law. The conveyance of Glebe Farm to Mrs Wallbank's parents in 1970 described the land as subject to the liability for the repair of the chancel mentioned in previous conveyances. Their deeds of gift to Mrs Wallbank in 1974 and 1986 also referred to the chancel repair liability. This is a burden on the land, just like any other burden that runs with the lands. It is, and has been at all times, within the scope of the property right which she acquired and among the various factors to be taken into account in determining its value. She could have divested herself of it at any time by disposing of the land to which it was attached. The enforcement of the liability under the general law is an incident of the property right which is now vested jointly in Mr and Mrs Wallbank. It is not, as the Court of Appeal said (para 40), an outside intervention by way of a form of taxation.

    72. I recognise that Mr and Mrs Wallbank may well need to draw on their personal funds to discharge the liability. But they are not being deprived of their possessions or being controlled in the use of their property, as those expressions must be understood in the light of the general principle of peaceful enjoyment set out in the first sentence of article 1 of the First Protocol. The liability is simply an incident of the ownership of the land which gives rise to it. The peaceful enjoyment of land involves the discharge of burdens which are attached to it as well as the enjoyment of its rights and privileges. I do not think that in this case the right which article 1 of the First Protocol guarantees, read alone or in conjunction with article 14 of the Convention, is being violated.

Conclusion

    73. The law relating to the liability for chancel repairs is open to criticism on various grounds. The liability has been described by the Law Commission as anachronistic and capricious in its application and as highly anomalous: Liability for Chancel Repairs (1985) (Law Com No 152), para 3.1; Land Registration for the Twenty-first Century (1998) (Law Com No 254; Cm 407), para 5.37. The existence of the liability can be difficult to discover, as most lay rectories have become fragmented over the years as a result of the division and separate disposals of land: Transfer of Land, Liability for Chancel Repairs (1983) (Law Commission Working paper No 86), para 2.29. The fact that it is a several liability may operate unfairly in cases where there is more than one lay rector and the person who is found liable is unable to recover a contribution from others who ought to have been found liable.

    74. On the other hand it was noted in the 1983 Law Commission Working Paper that there were some 5,200 chancels for which there is a chancel repair liability. Not all of these cases involve individual landowners. About 800 are the liability of the Church Commissioners, 200 the liability of Cathedrals and 200 the liability of educational foundations. Charitable donations may provide relief in some cases, while in others grants may be available from English Heritage. But there is no other source of private funding that can be relied upon, and there is no right of access to public funds. Unsatisfactory though the system may appear to be, there is no obvious alternative. Ferris J recognised in para 18 of his judgment that the law relating to chancel repairs is capable of operating arbitrarily, harshly and unfairly. But he did not find any basis for declaring the law to be otherwise than it appeared to be on the authorities.

    75. It is not open to us to resolve these problems judicially. All one can say is that the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide a vehicle for doing so. I would allow the appeal and restore the order and determination made by Ferris J.

LORD HOBHOUSE OF WOODBOROUGH My Lords,

    76. It is admitted by the defendants that, apart from the Human Rights Act 1998, they are, as the joint owners of Glebe Farm, Aston Cantlow, and have been at all material times personally responsible for the repair of the chancel of the church of St. John the Baptist Aston Cantlow and that, they having failed to repair the chancel, the Parochial Church Council (PCC) is entitled to a judgment against them under s.2(3) of the Chancel Repairs Act 1932 for such sum as represents the cost of putting the chancel into a proper state of repair. This is because the defendants, Mr and Mrs Wallbank, being liable to repair the chancel, would, but for the 1932 Act, have been liable to be admonished to repair the chancel by an ecclesiastical court. The obligation of the defendants is the obligation to repair. Under the 1932 Act the remedy of an order that the obligation be performed is no longer to be available and the monetary remedy is provided in lieu but the character of the obligation was left unchanged.

    77. The obligation to repair is one which derives from the ownership of land to which the obligation is attached. The obligation runs with the land. The 15th and 16th Century origins of this are helpfully explained in the Opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Scott of Foscote. In the present case the obligation arose not from the receipt of tithes but as a result of an enclosure award of 1743 made under the private Act of Parliament of 1742. It is a personal obligation but only exists so long as the person in question is the owner of the land. Thus he acquires it by a voluntary act - the acquisition of the title to the land of which the obligation is an incident. He can divest himself of the obligation by a further voluntary act - the disposal of the land or, under s.52 of the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measure 1923, by redemption. At all the times material to this case, the obligation was categorised by s.70 of the Land Registration Act 1925 as an over-riding interest. The person or persons who are under such an obligation are described, using the historical terminology, as the 'lay rectors' or the 'lay impropriators'.

    78. In fact the defendants knew that ownership of the land was believed to carry with it the obligation. It was referred to in all the title deeds and, in at least one conveyance, an express indemnity had been taken by the vendor. In other cases some special consideration might arise from the fact that the relevant landowner had acquired the title to the land without any notice of the existence, or possible existence, of the obligation. But that is not this case and it need not be discussed further.

    79. The only defence now raised by the defendants to the claim of the PCC under the 1932 Act is based upon the Human Rights Act 1998 and/or the Convention. The 1998 Act had not come into force at the time when the defendants failed to carry out the relevant repairs, nor when the PCC served the notice required by s.2(1) of the 1932 Act, nor at the time when Ferris J tried the case and gave judgment for the PCC. He was formally trying two preliminary issues ordered by Master Bragge but, when he decided the human rights issue against the defendants, the defendants, having abandoned their case on the other issue, admitted that they had no defence to the claim except as to quantum. He accordingly made a declaration of liability, ordered an inquiry as to quantum and ordered the defendants to pay to the claimants the sum found due on the inquiry. The question of quantum arose under s.2(3) of the 1932 Act: "[the] court ... shall give judgment ... for such sum as appears to the court to represent the cost of putting the chancel in proper repair". The points which the defendants were taking on quantum were pleaded in paragraph 1 of the Outline Defence. The judgment of Ferris J was in English procedural law a final judgment. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal. By the time that the defendants' appeal was heard, the 1998 Act had however come into force.

    80. This timetable raises again the question of the extent to which the Act has a retrospective effect, a question on which the Court of Appeal did not express an opinion since no point was taken in that regard by the PCC. Your Lordships were not satisfied that this was necessarily correct; however it was clearly convenient and in the interest of both of the parties that the House should first hear the parties' arguments upon the points which the Court of Appeal did decide. I stress that the House have not heard any argument upon the question of the extent, if at all, to which the Act has retrospective effect. It is not appropriate that any view should be expressed on it in the present case. Anything said will not be authoritative. The retrospectivity point will arise for decision in other unrelated appeals and will then fall to be decided after full argument and due consideration. It is in any event not correct to approach that question on the basis that the judgment of Ferris J was undeterminative or merely interlocutory. In English procedural law, it was a final judgment which, unless reversed on appeal, determined the parties' rights and liabilities, subject only to quantum. I will accordingly proceed on the basis of assuming that the Human Rights Act applies to this case in accordance with the provisions of sections 22(4), 7(1)(b) and 6.

    81. The structure of the defendants' argument under the Human Rights Act is that they have to establish three propositions. If they fail on any one of these, their defence fails. They are:

(a)

    that the PCC is a public authority, the s.6(1), (3) and (5) point, and

(b)

    that there has been a breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol, the Article 1 and Article 14 point, and

(c)

    that the exclusion in s.6(2) does not apply.

Before Ferris J only point (b) arose and he decided it in favour of the claimants. In the Court of Appeal all three points were decided in favour of the defendants.

    82. These were the questions of law raised on this appeal. They are questions which are of relevance not only to the present case but to many other cases or potential cases concerning the enforcement under the 1932 Act of the obligation to repair chancels. Other cases may, on their facts, raise special considerations not found in this case and, similarly, legal questions not dependent upon the Human Rights Act may arise. Your Lordships' decision of this appeal does not touch upon any of them. But I must expressly disassociate myself from any suggestion that there is a cap upon the monetary liability under s.2(3) of the 1932 Act or that any such point is presently open to the defendants upon the inquiry ordered by Ferris J as discussed in the Opinion of my noble and learned friend Lord Scott of Foscote, which I have had the privilege of reading in draft after I had prepared this Opinion, together with his questioning of the correctness of the decision in Wickhambrook PCC v Croxford [1935] 2 KB 417. The question was neither raised nor argued. There are contentious points which will arise if it ever is: Does the cap apply where the express words of the 1932 Act are applicable? How does it apply to successive or continuing and cumulative breaches of the obligation to repair? Does the cap apply where the liability is not attributable to the ownership of a tithe rent charge but simply to the ownership of land? If so, how does one assess what the cap should be? It is by no means clear that any of these questions should be answered in a way that could assist the defendants. But they have not been argued and I will say no more about them.

Is the PCC a Public Authority?

    83. Historically Parochial Church Councils did not exist. They were introduced by the Parochial Church Councils Measure 1921 as a body at parish level which would better enable the lay members of the congregation to be represented. It was agreed that at the material times the powers and functions of PCCs were defined by the PCC (Powers) Measure 1956. Section 2 (as amended) provided -

"General Functions of Council (1) It shall be the duty of the minister and the [PCC] to consult together on matters of general concern and importance to the parish. (2) The functions of [PCCs] shall include - (a) cooperation with the minister in promoting in the parish the whole mission of the Church, pastoral, evangelistic, social and ecumenical; (b) the consideration and discussions of matters concerning the Church of England or any other matters of religious or public interest, but not the declaration of the doctrine of the Church on any question; (c) making known and putting into effect any provision made by the diocesan synod or the deanery synod, but without prejudice to the powers of the council on any particular matter; (d) giving advice to the diocesan synod and deanery synod on any matter referred to the council; (e) raising such matters as the council consider appropriate with the diocesan synod or deanery synod. (3) In the exercise of its functions the [PCC] shall take into consideration any expression of opinion by any parochial church meeting." Section 3 provided that the PCC was to be a body corporate with perpetual succession. Section 4 made provision for the PCC as successor to certain other bodies to have the relevant powers of those bodies: (1) ......... the council of every parish shall have -   ....................... (ii) the like powers duties and liabilities as, immediately before [1st July 1921], the churchwardens of such parish had with respect to - (a) The financial affairs of the church including the collection and administration of all moneys raised for church purposes and the keeping of accounts in relation to such affairs and moneys; (b) The care, maintenance, preservation and insurance of the fabric of the church and the goods and ornaments thereof; (c) The care and maintenance of any churchyard (open or closed) and the power of giving a certificate under the provisions of s.18 of the Burial Act 1855 with the like powers as, immediately before [1st July 1921] were possessed by the churchwardens to recover the cost of maintaining a closed churchyard: ................... ................" Of these powers, the most relevant to the present case are those in s.4 (1) (ii) (b) but it is important to note that these are only those powers and duties which the churchwardens had and that the churchwardens did not have a duty to repair the fabric but only a duty to report its disrepair. As stated by Chancellor Richard Burn in the 9th edition of his work on Ecclesiastical Law, 1842, edited by Robert Phillimore, vol I, p.357,

    "And although churchwardens are not charged with the repairs of the chancel, yet they are charged with the supervisal thereof, to see that it be not permitted to dilapidate and fall into decay; and when any such dilapidations shall happen, if no care be taken to repair the same, they are to make presentation thereof at the next visitation."

It was no doubt following this logic that the PCC were given the power (and correlative duty) in 1932 to bring the action to obtain a remedy for the failure of a lay rector to repair the chancel. (The changes later introduced by s.39 of the Endowment and Glebe Measure 1976 relating to incumbents of a benefice are not relevant to this case.)

 
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