7 JUNE 2000
By the Select Committee appointed to report whether
the provisions of any bill inappropriately delegate legislative
power, or whether they subject the exercise of legislative power
to an inappropriate degree of parliamentary scrutiny; to report
on documents laid before Parliament under section 3(3) of the
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 and on draft orders
laid under section 1(4) of that Act; and to perform, in respect
of such documents and orders, the functions performed in respect
of other instruments by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL
1. According to the Home Office's Memorandum, printed
in the Annex to this report, this bill is intended to:
- update the law on the interception of communications;
- tighten up the regime for the acquisition of
- regulate the use of surveillance by public authorities;
- regulate the use of covert human intelligence
sources by public authorities;
- introduce a power for access to protected electronic
- establish an oversight and redress regime for
the use of all of these powers.
2. Part I of the Bill deals with the interception
of communications (both postal and telecommunications) and replaces
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 which is repealed
by the bill (except for an amendment to the Telecommunications
Act 1984). Part I also covers the acquisition and disclosure of
communications data. Part II deals with "surveillance and
covert human intelligence sources". Part III is concerned
with the investigation of electronic data protected by encryption.
Part IV provides for the appointments of Commissioners to scrutinise
investigatory powers and the functions of the Intelligence Services
and establishes a Tribunal to consider complaints.
3. The Home Office Memorandum identifies the delegated
powers in the bill and the Parliamentary controls over them and
gives a brief account of the justification for taking delegated
powers. This report comments only on those powers which have raised
significant issues for the Committee. Any bill which is concerned
with the interception of communications, intrusive surveillance,
covert surveillance and similar matters is bound to be controversial
but the Committee's remit is confined to delegated powers. The
Committee has examined the powers in the bill with particular
care because of their significance in the context of provisions
which are in themselves controversial.
4. The Committee also received a memorandum from
JUSTICE and this is also printed in the Annex.
5. The Committee has two major concerns about the
delegated powers in the bill. These were indicated to the Minister
and front bench spokemen on the bill in writing on 24 May, in
the hope that this might not only inform the Second Reading debate
but also enable officials to start work on any related amendments
thought to be necessary to the Bill for Committee stage. During
the Second Reading debate the Minister indicated that the Government
was minded to accept these recommendations.
6. As each of these concerns relates to several clauses,
it seems appropriate to discuss those issues first and then to
consider the bill in clause order.
PURPOSES FOR WHICH INVESTIGATORY POWERS MAY BE GRANTED
7. Five provisions in the bill list the purposes
for which particular investigatory powers may be exercised. The
first is clause 5(3) which lists three purposes (paragraph (d)
is not an independent fourth purpose but an "international"
form of paragraph (b)). The others are clauses 21(2), 27(3), 28(3)
and 65(3) (see the new subsection (4) inserted in section 5 of
the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949). Each of these has six purposes
in common with the others. Clause 21(2) has a seventh purpose
(in an emergency, preventing death, injury or damage to health).
All four end with a power given to the Secretary of State to specify
any other purpose for the purposes of the Clause. The Committee
is of opinion that the defining of the purposes for which an investigatory
power may be used is a vital part of placing restrictions on the
exercise of those powers and does not consider it to be appropriate
to delegate to the Secretary of State what appears to be an unlimited
power to specify other purposes. We therefore examined with particular
care the justification given in the Memorandum for these powers.
8. The commentary on clause 21 points out that the
list of purposes in the clause is narrower than the legitimate
purposes in Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights
and that the protection of morals and the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others had been omitted deliberately. The Memorandum
says that the need to make use of those exceptions may emerge
over time. The notes in the Memorandum on clauses 27, 28 and 65
simply refer back to that on clause 21. It appears, therefore,
that the apparently unlimited powers in all four clauses may be
intended to allow no more than the addition of the protection
of morals and the rights and freedoms of others to the purposes
set out in those clauses. If this is so, why are the powers not
limited in this way? Paragraph 19 of the Memorandum argues that
section 6 of the Human Rights Act will apply and that the powers
are thus constrained by Article 8(2) "although that limitation
need not appear on the face of the bill." The Committee does
not accept that it is appropriate to use wide terms to define
a new power and to rely on the Human Rights Act to restrict its
scope when it is possible to define it so that it covers only
its intended scope.
9. The Committee draws the House's attention to
the width of the powers in clauses 21(2), 27(3), 28(3) and 65
in contrast to their intended use and invites the House to consider
whether those clauses should be amended to limit the powers to
correspond with the use that Ministers apparently intend to make
10. All four powers are subject to negative procedure.
Whether or not they are amended their content is of such significance
that the Committee is of opinion that affirmative procedure is
PERSONS WHO MAY BE AUTHORISED TO EXERCISE INVESTIGATORY
11. Four clauses list the persons who may be granted
warrants or other authority to exercise investigatory powers.
The first is clause 6(2) which lists the heads of various police
and intelligence services, Customs and Excise and the competent
authority of a country seeking assistence under any international
mutual assistance agreements. The others are clauses 24(1), 29(4)
and 39(1) each of which contains a short list of public authorities
but also a power to add any other public authority (the individual
to represent each public authority is specified by an order made
by the Secretary of State). The Committee considers that delegation
in this open-ended way is inappropriate in a bill concerned with
such important issues of human rights - the significance of an
investigatory power cannot be judged in isolation but must be
considered in the light of the number and character of the persons
who may exercise it.
12. The Memorandum deals with each power in turn.
In the case of clause 24 it comments that "there are many
other public authorities with investigatory functions which could
obtain communications data to help fulfil their statutory functions.
They will need to be named by order if they are to use the power
in this Bill rather than the permissive provision in the Data
Protection Act 1998" but adds "there are no current
plans to add to the list in clause 24 but it will be important
for the Secretary of State to keep the list under review and to
update it as necessary". The note on clause 29 comments that
"there are a number of other public authorities that currently
carry out directed surveillance and benefit from covert human
intelligence sources" and adds that "this matter is
considered appropriate for subordinate legislation at present,
because of the need to resolve with the Scottish Executive the
right extent provision in respect of each authority before any
designation can be made. The list of authorities will change from
time to time and the Secretary of State will keep the list under
review and will need to update it as necessary." The note
on clause 39 comments "Intrusive surveillance is the highest
level of surveillance permitted under Part II. At present applications
for intrusive surveillance are limited to law enforcement bodies,
intelligence agencies and organs of the Ministry of Defence"
but the Memorandum adds "However, the position could change
over time and more authorities may need to use these techniques
in order to combat serious crime."
13. The Committee sees two possible uses for the
powers in clauses 24, 29 and 39 - to take account of changes affecting
authorities listed in the bill and to add new bodies. The Committee
accepts that the first is an appropriate matter to delegate but
the second is not. Parliament should decide which existing public
authorities should be granted the powers. New public authorities
created in the future will almost certainly be created by legislation
which could amend the bill to give powers to the new authority.
If circumstances should change and there is a case for conferring
the powers on an existing authority not named in the bill, that
is a matter of sufficient importance to require primary legislation.
14. The Committee does not regard negative procedure
as appropriate for any of these powers, which clearly merit the
affirmative procedure. Different considerations would apply
to a power limited to naming the successor body if one of those
named in the bill is abolished or some of its functions transferred
to another body; the Committee accepts that negative procedure
would be appropriate for such a power, as it is for the powers
(discussed below) to remove bodies from the lists.
15. This clause authorises interception of telecommunications
in certain circumstances defined in the clause. Interception authorised
by this clause does not require a warrant under clause 5. Subsection
(1) is concerned with communications from or to a person outside
the U.K.; subsection (2) with legitimate business practices involving
the business's apparatus or services; subsection (4) with prisons;
and subsection (5) with high security hospitals.
16. Subsection (1) contains in paragraphs (a) to
(e) conditions which have to be satisfied before "overseas"
communications can be intercepted under the clause. Paragraph
(d) is the condition that "the situation is one in relation
to which such further conditions as may be prescribed by regulations
... are required to be satisfied before conduct may be treated
as authorised by virtue of this subsection". If no regulations
have been made, no situation is such that further conditions have
to be satisfied and interception would be lawful if conditions
(a) to (c) were satisfied. The Memorandum explains that there
may be a need to impose further conditions in relation to certain
situations and paragraphs (d) and (e) make appropriate provision
for this. The Committee sees negative procedure (provided by clause
69(3)) as appropriate for a power which can only increase the
restraints on intercepting communications.
17. Subsection (2) contains a separate regulation-making
power also subject to negative procedure. This allows the Secretary
of State to authorise interception by a business for the purpose
of monitoring or keeping a record of business transactions or
"other communications relating to that business or taking
place in the course of its being carried on". Subsection
(3) limits subsection (2) to the interception of communications
"in the course of ... transmission using apparatus or services
provided by or to the person carrying on the business for use
wholly or partly in connection with that business". That
limitation has the effect that interception authorised by regulations
under subsection (2) must take place on the business premises
(or somewhere else under the control of the business or of a person
contracted to provide telephone services to the business) and
not during the transmission of the communications on the public
18. The Home Office memorandum justifies the power
in subsection (2) in the following terms:
is considered appropriate for this because detailed provisions
will be necessary, will change over a period of time, and may
have to apply to widely different kinds of business practice.
The balance between the protection of privacy and the legitimate
concerns of businesses is a delicate one which will undoubtedly
be affected by developments in technology."
The Committee accepts that the balance is a delicate
one but, in view of the limited purposes for which interception
may be allowed, considers that negative procedure is appropriate
even though this is a power to authorise interception.
19. Subsection (1) enables the Secretary of State
to make orders placing on the providers of public postal services
or public telecommunications services the duty of making arrangements
to be able to comply with interception warrants under the bill.
Subsection (6) requires consultation and subsection (7) imposes
affirmative procedure, which the Committee considers appropriate
for what the Home Office memorandum recognises is an important
20. This clause deals with the obtaining and disclosing
of communications data (defined in clause 20(4)) where it is necessary
for one of the purposes listed in subsection (2). Paragraph (h)
of that subsection, which has been discussed earlier, allows the
Secretary of State by order (subject to negative procedure) to
add to the list of purposes.
21. This clause deals with the form and duration
of authorisations under clause 21(3). That provision allows "the
designated person" to authorise another person in the same
public authority to "engage in any conduct to which this
Chapter applies" (i.e. to require communications data to
be disclosed or obtained and disclosed). The relevant public authorities
are listed in clause 24(1) (police, Customs and Excise and the
intelligence services) and the designated persons for each are
those holding "such offices, ranks or positions" as
may be prescribed under clause 24(2).
22. Subsection (8) of clause 22 provides that as
soon as the person who gave notice under clause 21(4) requiring
disclosure is satisfied that the notice no longer satisfies the
requirements of the bill "he shall cancel the notice".
But what if the person who gave the notice is no longer available
to do that? Subsection (9) provides the answer by way of a regulation-making
power subject to negative procedure. The Committee is satisfied
that this power is necessary, and that negative procedure should
provide the appropriate degree of parliamentary control for it.
23. Subsection (2) of clause 24 provides power to
prescribe the persons who are to be the persons designated to
act in respect of the public authorities listed in subsection
(1). An order under that power is subject to negative procedure
as are orders under subsections (1)(f), (3) and (4). The first
of these is a power to specify one or more other authorities as
public authorities for the purposes of clauses 20 to 24, and has
been discussed earlier. Subsection (3) allows the Secretary of
State to limit the power of the delegated person to appoint another
person to exercise the powers of a delegated person under these
clauses. Subsection (4) allows an order to remove "for the
time being" an authority from the list of relevant authorities.
Because it does not involve an amendment to the text the Committee
does not regard this as a Henry VIII power. The Committee considers
that the powers in subsections (2), (3) and (4) are appropriate
delegations and that negative procedure is appropriate for each.
24. This clause is concerned with the grant of authorisation
for the carrying out of directed surveillance (defined in clause
25(2)). An authorisation can only be granted for one of the purposes
set out in subsection (3) but paragraph (g) of that subsection
allows an order to specify further purposes. This power has been
25. This clause is concerned with the grant of authorisation
"for the conduct or the use of a covert human intelligence
source", this somewhat surprising term is defined in clause
25(6) to (8)). Subsection (2) allows the grant of an authorisation
only if the requirements of subsection (2) are satisfied. One
of these is "that arrangements exist for the source's case
that satisfy the requirements of subsection (5) and such other
requirements as may be imposed by order made by the Secretary
of State". This power to add further protection is subject
to negative procedure. The Committee considers this appropriate,
since, as the Home Office memorandum explains, the provision "will
only be used to further the protection given to ... [certain categories
of covert] sources."
26. Subsection (3) provides that an authorisation
may be granted only for one of the purposes set out in that subsection.
Paragraph (g) allows the Secretary of State to specify additional
purposes. This power has been discussed earlier.
27. Subsection (6) allows the Secretary of State
to make an order to prohibit the authorisation under the clause
of conduct or uses described in the order or to impose additional
requirements which must be satisfied before any authorisation
of conduct or uses described in the order. Negative procedure
applies, which the Committee considers appropriate for a power
to add safeguards.
28. This clause deals with the persons entitled to
grant authorisations under clauses 27 and 28 and includes provision
similar to that in clause 24. The power in clause 29(1) is similar
to that in clause 24(2); the power in clause 29(4)(h) is similar
to that in clause 24(1); and the power in clause 29(3) is similar
to that in clause 24(3). The later provisions (subsections (5)
to (11)) are concerned with who may make orders under the clause.
Subsection (5) empowers the Secretary of State to do so and subsections
(6) to (11) allow the power to be exercised also for Northern
Ireland by the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting
29. The Committee has no comments to make on subsections
(2) and (3) which are subject to negative procedure. The power
in subsection (4)(h) is a power to add other authorities to the
list in that subsection and has been discussed earlier in our
comments on clause 24.
30. Subsection (1) provides that a person who grants
or cancels "a police or customs authorisation for the carrying
out of intrusive surveillance" (defined in clause 25(3))
shall notify "an ordinary Surveillance Commissioner"
(defined in clause 72(1) as "a Surveillance Commissioner
other than the Chief Surveillance Commissioner" - see clause
53 for the appointment of Commissioners). The matters to be included
in a notice are to be specified by order (subsection (2)(c)).
An order is subject to draft affirmative procedure (subsection
(5)) save that the first order is subject to the procedure which
is normally provided as the emergency procedure as an alternative
to draft affirmative procedure (see subsections (7) and (8)).
The Home Office memorandum explains that this is to achieve a
commencement date for Part II before the Human Rights Act comes
The Committee considers both the provisions and the parliamentary
procedure provided for them appropriate.
31. This clause regulates the grant by the Secretary
of State of authorisations for "intrusive surveillance"
- the highest level of surveillance permitted under part II.
Subsection (1) lists those who can apply for such an authorisation.
Subsection (1)(d) (with subsection (3)) allows the Secretary of
State by order to designate other public authorities so that "an
individual holding an office, rank or position" with such
an authority may apply for authorisations. This power has been
discussed earlier in our comments on clause 24.
32. Subsection (5) allows the Secretary of State
to make an order (subject to negative procedure) imposing restrictions
on the grant of authorisation. Presumably he could achieve much
the same result by exercising his discretion to grant authorisation
but the Committee sees obvious advantage in having the more important
rules set out in an order.
33. This clause contains general rules about the
grant, renewal and duration of authorisations for directed surveillance,
intrusive surveillance or the conduct and use of covert human
intelligence sources. Subsection (8) allows the Secretary of State
to provide by order shorter periods for the validity of an authorisation
than those set out in subsection (3). Negative procedure applies.
As the order can only reduce the duration of an authorisation,
the Committee considers this an appropriate provision.
34. This clause makes special rules for authorisations
granted to the intelligence services (such authorisations are
excluded from clause 41 by subsection (10) of that clause). Subsection
(6) makes provision corresponding to that in clause 41(8). Negative
procedure applies, which the Committee considers appropriate.
35. This clause deals with the cancellation of authorisations
as soon as the need for them has gone. Subsections (4) and (5)
allow the Secretary of State to make regulations about who is
to cancel an authorisation when the person required to do so by
subsections (1) to (3) is no longer available. This power is very
similar to that in clause 22(8). Negative procedure applies, which
the Committee considers appropriate.
36. This clause gives the Secretary of State power
to make an order doing either or both of:-
(a) applying Part II of the bill (with or without
modifications) to other forms of surveillance which are "neither
directed nor intrusive";
(b) providing for "any description of directed
surveillance to be treated ... as intrusive surveillance".
The effect of applying Part II of the bill to a kind
of surveillance to which it does not apply at present would be
to place restrictions on the use of that kind of surveillance
and to provide remedies to those who believe that their rights
have been infringed. The effect of providing that a description
of directed surveillance is to be treated as intrusive surveillance
would be to apply a more restrictive regime to that surveillance.
In either case the order would increase the protection for the
individual and the Committee sees nothing here to draw to the
attention of the House.
CLAUSES 57 AND 58
37. Subsection (1) of clause 57 establishes the Tribunal
and subsection (2) sets out their jurisdiction. Subsection (2)(d)
allows the Secretary of State to make an order extending that
jurisdiction to "such proceedings falling within subsection
(3) as may be allocated to them in accordance with" the provisions
of the order. Subsection (3) list proceedings against the intelligence
services or other persons in respect of the conduct of those services
and "proceedings relating to the taking place in any challengeable
circumstances of any conduct falling within subsection (5)".
Subsection (5) contains a list which is limited by subsection
(6) and "challengeable circumstances" is defined in
subsections (7) and (8). The definition in subsections (10) and
(11) are also relevant.
38. Clause 58 regulates the making of orders under
clause 57. The most significant provision is that in subsection
(1)(a) which allows an order to give the Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction
in relation to particular proceedings allocated to the Tribunal
by the order. If the order does this, it must empower the Tribunal
to remit the matter to the appropriate court or tribunal (subsection
(1)(b)). Subsection (2) lists particular matters to which the
Secretary of State is to have regard when making an order. Subsection
(3) applies affirmative procedure.
39. The Committee considered this power with particular
care, but concluded that it was appropriate as part of the process
of providing a remedy without depriving the investigatory powers
of their effectiveness.
40. This clause deals with the exercise of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. Subsection (8) provides that the decisions of the
Tribunal "shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to
be questioned in any court" but provides an exception to
this by giving power to the Secretary of State to make an order.
Such an order must allow for an appeal to a court against any
exercise by the Tribunal of their jurisdiction under clause 57(2)(c)
(complaint of detriment in civil proceedings because of the exclusion
under clause 16 of evidence in those proceedings) or (d) (proceedings
allocated to Tribunal by Order made by Secretary of State). The
order may include any provisions in subsection (10). These include
the creation "of a tribunal or body to hear appeals";
the conferring of jurisdiction to hear appeals on any existing
court or tribunal; and provision in relation to appeals under
the order such as may be made by rules under clause 61. That clause
is discussed below but for present purposes the important powers
are those about the admissibility of evidence (subsection (2)(g))
and excluding the complainant from the hearing (subsection (4)(b)
and (c)). Subsection (11) applies affirmative procedure.
41. The exclusion of jurisdiction by subsection (8)
will attract debate but the Committee sees the order-making as
appropriate as part of the process of creating remedies where
none exists at present and recognises the need for safeguards
to ensure the continued effectiveness of the investigatory powers
with which the bill is concerned.
42. Clause 60 deals with the procedure of the Tribunal.
Subsection (1) provides that "Subject to any rules under
section 61, the Tribunal shall be entitled to determine their
own procedure ...". Clause 61 confers on the Secretary of
State wide powers to make rules regulating the exercise by the
Tribunal of their jurisdiction. All the provisions of the clause
are important. Subsection (6) sets out the matters to which the
Secretary of State is to have particular regard in making rules.
In effect he has to balance the need to secure that a case is
properly heard and considered and the need to protect the country
from damaging disclosure of information. Subsection (8) applies
the normal affirmative draft procedure but the first order is
regulated by subsections (9) to (10) which provide, in effect,
the procedure frequently provided for making orders in an emergency.
43. The Home Office's memorandum explains the case
for the unusual procedural arrangements in the following terms:
"The standard affirmative
resolution procedure is displaced for the first exercise of this
power. Those rules will instead come into force on making, and
must be approved by subsequent resolution. This procedure is more
normally found in situations of urgency. Its adoption here is
prompted by the Government's intention to bring the Human Rights
Act into force on 2 October. The department intends that parts
of the Bill, and in particular Part II, should be in force by
that date in order to give a proper legal basis for surveillance.
In order for Part II to be compliant with the Convention, the
Tribunal's complaints function must be in force by that date,
and it is highly desirable that it should assume its jurisdiction
for the purposes of section 7 of the Human Rights Act also. The
timing of the summer recess means that rules would be unlikely
to be approved before 2 October."
The Committee accepts the need for this special procedure.
44. This clause provides for the Secretary of State
to issue codes of practice "relating to the exercise and
performance of the powers and duties" arising under Parts
I to III of the bill, section 5 of the Intelligence Services Act
1994 (warrants) and Part III of the Police Act 1997 (authorisation
by police and customs and excise of interference with property
or wireless telepathy). Clause 64 states the effect of codes of
practice. Clearly these codes are of great importance. Subsections
(3) to (9) regulate the making of orders. Subsection (3) requires
public consultation; subsection (4) requires a draft to be laid
before Parliament; subsection (5) provides for a code to be brought
into force by an order made by the Secretary of State; and subsection
(9) applies affirmative procedure to that order, which the Committee
considers appropriate in view of the great importance attaching
to these orders.
45. This clause amends section 5 of the Wireless
Telegraphy Act 1949 - the amendments are concerned with the interception
and disclosure of wireless telegraphy messages. At present section
5 consists of two paragraphs, the first (not affected by the bill)
creates an offence of sending misleading messages, the second,
an offence of intercepting (paragraph (b)(i)) or disclosing (paragraph
(b)(ii)) messages without, in either case, having "the authority
of [the Postmaster General] or, being a servant of the Crown,
acting in the course of his duty". Subsection (2) substitutes
for those lawful justifications for interception and disclosure
the test of acting under the authority of a designated person.
Subsection (3) adds 10 new subsections to section 5 about the
grant of authority for the purposes of that section. New subsection
(11) defines "designated person" as the Secretary of
State, the Commissioners of Customs and Excise and any other person
designated by regulations made by the Secretary of State (section
16(2) of the 1949 Act applies negative procedure). Subsection
(10) defines "separate authority" as authority given
otherwise than under the substantive provisions of the bill. Subsection
(3)(a) limits the giving of authority to cases where it is necessary
on grounds within subsection (4) or (5). Subsection (4)(g) is
"any purpose ... which is specified ... by regulations made
by the Secretary of State" (again negative procedure is applied).
Subsection (7) requires authorisation to be signed by the Secretary
of State, one of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise or "a
person ... designated ... by regulations made by the Secretary
of State" (again negative procedure is applied).
46. The Committee has commented earlier on the power
in subsection (4)(g) but sees nothing else in this clause which
needs to be drawn to the attention of the House.
47. While there are serious concerns about the
bill, most of these relate to the substantive provisions and the
Committee sees the majority of the delegated powers as appropriate
delegation subject to the appropriate level of Parliamentary control.
48. The Committee's concerns about the delegated
powers in this bill relate to two main groups. There are four
provisions in the bill which authorise surveillance or other action
for specified purposes but allow the list of purposes to be extended
by subordinate legislation (in clauses 21(2)(h), 27(3)(g), 28(3)(g)
and 65(3)). The scope of these significant investigatory powers
is not determined by the bill, and so by the decision of Parliament,
but can be extended to "any purpose" specified by an
order made by the Secretary of State, subject to negative procedure
- which is clearly inappropriate. The Committee can see no justification
for the use of language which is apparently at large but which
is intended to be limited in practice by the Human Rights Act.
In its view, if these powers are to remain in the Bill they should
be explicitly limited on the face of the bill to the protection
of morals and the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
They should also be made subject to the affirmative resolution
49. The second group of powers raises more complex
issues. Clause 24(1)(f) contains a power for the Secretary of
State to specify other public authorities, again by an order subject
to the negative resolution procedure. The Committee considered
this significant power together with the similar powers in clauses
29(4) and 39(1). In each case powers are conferred on a "relevant
public authority" and the bill contains a list of those authorities
which are to be able to exercise the powers but allows an order
to add authorities to the list. During the passage of the bill
through the Commons it became apparent that as many as 32 public
authorities might be added to what is currently a list of only
seven on the face of the bill. The Committee considers this delegation,
in an area which touches on the rights of the individual, inappropriate.
In its view the bill should be amended to list all the public
authorities which the Government wishes to have the power, and
any amendment should be limited to changes made necessary "because
structures within an authority may change, making it necessary
to update amend the order" (Home Office memorandum, paragraph
41). Any such order should, in the Committee's view, be subject
to the affirmative resolution procedure.
50. The Committee considers that no other amendment
is necessary either to the delegated powers in the bill or to
the parliamentary control provided for these powers.
1 Paragraph 2. Back
2 The Committee noted that the Scottish Parliament's Subordinate
Legislation Committee had considered the delegated powers provisions
in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Bill on 6
June, and understands that witnesses from the Scottish Executive
said in an opening statement that the Executive would propose
several amendments to that Bill which appear to address the concerns
which this Committee had expressed in connection with the present
3 Paragraph 11. Back
4 Paragraph 16. Back
5 Paragraph 30. Back
6 Paragraph 49. Back
7 Paragraph 51 of the Home Office's memorandum. Back
8 Paragraph 76. Back
9 This report is also published on the Internet at the House of
Lords Select Committee Home Page (http://www.parliament.uk), where
further information about the work of the Committee is also available. Back