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Earl Russell: My Lords, if the Minister wished to satisfy us on this amendment, he could do so perfectly easily either by specifying the additional requirements which might be required, or by taking a power to make

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regulation to set out in future any additional requirements that the Government might think of in future. It would not cost the Minister very much to do one or other of those things. In terms of legal certainty the value of doing so would be considerable. Why should he not, and will he?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, Amendment No. 30 would have the effect of ensuring that if a person subject to a banning order failed to comply under Section 19(2C), which provides for additional requirements to the banning order, nevertheless, he would not be guilty of an offence. If there is to be a power to impose additional requirements in a banning order, it follows that there must be some sanction against anyone who chooses to breach it. I am sure that I need not detain your Lordships long on this amendment because I do not believe that anyone would dispute that particular proposition. I believe that the power--

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, I am puzzled by this reaction. I made it clear that Amendment No. 30, which leaves out the words, ("or(2C)"), was purely a paving amendment and was consequential on Amendment No. 32, which removes (2C) itself so that there is no (2C) to which the new Section 40J refers.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I recognise that it is a paving amendment and I shall address most of my comments to Amendment No. 32. I had almost finished with Amendment No. 30. Amendment No. 32 would deprive the enforcing authority of the power to require people subject to banning orders to comply with any additional requirements and to establish associated criteria.

I am not clear why objection is being taken to the concept of additional requirements. They can only be ancillary to the main purpose of the banning order. If they were oppressive or capricious, they could be immediately annulled by a court. I do not have a long list of examples of such additional conditions. They are likely to cover only minor administrative matters as well as restrictions on behaviour ancillary to a banning order. For instance, there may be a requirement not to frequent the immediate area of the stadium or, as I said yesterday, a bus or train station where football fans might gather and from which the person concerned is banned on match days.

I see nothing sinister about the powers and they seem to be entirely necessary to make the banning orders effective. I cannot recommend that these amendments, actual or paving, should be accepted.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, I hear what the Minister says. I find his answer unsatisfactory but at this stage of the proceedings I do not intend to divide the House. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 31 to 35 not moved.]

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Lord Ackner moved Amendment No. 36:

Page 9, line 28, leave out ("his reasons for detaining him in writing") and insert ("full particulars of the facts and matters relied upon in support of his suspicion and of his belief").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I attended the meeting called by the Home Secretary in order to launch the Bill. I read through the clauses which seemed to me the most likely to be contentious. I made the somewhat diffident suggestion that the allegations made in what has become new Section 21A--that the officer had reasonable grounds for suspicion that the respondent had at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder and,


    "had reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order in his case would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches"--

told the respondent nothing about the case which he had to meet. He would therefore appear before a court 24 hours later still unaware of exactly what were the alleged grounds for suspecting and what were the reasonable grounds for belief; suspicion and belief contrasted. I made the mild suggestion that since these were looked upon as civil proceedings one should follow the generally accepted situation in such proceedings; that if you make an unparticularised allegation you will be met with a request for further and better particulars of that allegation. That is stock and simple and straightforward.

I was gratified to hear it announced that the Minister had thought that was right and would make provision. According, at the Second Reading debate the noble Lord the Minister paid me a nice compliment at the outset. When I had made my criticism, to which I shall refer in a moment, he, at the end of the debate, was kind enough to say:


    "The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, made a number of helpful detailed points about drafting, particularly on new Sections 21A and 21B. We are of course going to pay very close attention to his advice, and I should like to place on record our thanks to him for the advice and encouragement that he gave us during the open session with my right honourable friend Jack Straw".--[Official Report, 20/7/00; col. 1258.]

Therefore I put down in some detail the amendments which I thought were appropriate. They do no more than exactly what one would have done in a simple civil case. Perhaps I may give your Lordships an example. If the particulars of a claim in a county court allege that the defendant had, by reason of his negligent driving, caused damage to the plaintiff's car, unparticularised, immediately there would follow a request for further and better particulars of the negligence alleged, identifying the facts and matters relied upon in support of that allegation. That is simple and straightforward and is exactly what I put in my amendment.

The Minister said, under new Section 21A as drafted in the Bill, which deals with detention, that the officer,


    "shall give the person his reasons for detaining him in writing".

But, quite simply, his reasons are: "I believe or suspect that at some time you have caused or contributed to violence or disorder, and I have a belief on reasonable grounds that it would help to prevent violence or

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disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches that you are detained for me to make further inquiries". We gain nothing from that at all.

Basically, the Minister has done the same under new Section 21B, which deals with the notice which causes the person to appear before a magistrates' court within 24 hours. According to new Section 21B(2), the grounds must be stated. Why in one case it is "reasons" and in another "grounds" has never been explained.

What saddens me is that the Minister has provided absolutely no justification for the attitude which he adopted in the early hours of this morning when the noble Lord, Lord Cope, was kind enough to move on my behalf the amendments which I have just indicated. The Minister said--this comes within the missing part of Hansard, to which I drew attention earlier today--that,


    "the amendment goes beyond the kind of requirement which we see in analogous provisions of PACE"--

I do not know what he is referring to--


    "and the requirements of the common law".

What does he mean by,


    "the requirements of the common law"?

The common law requires that in civil proceedings one must particularise one's allegations. If this were a criminal case, one would be even more obliged to specify the nature of the crime which it is alleged has been committed. That was his answer with regard to my first amendment.

With regard to my second amendment, he said:


    "Lord Ackner ... makes the same point in relation to the issue of a notice as was made in relation to the power to detain under [new] Section 21A".

Of course I make the same point because the wording is the same. I read on:


    "The amendment is based on the premise, which we accept, that people issued with notices commencing a banning order by the complaint [process] need to know the case against them so that they can prepare for their hearing".

That is conceding the very basis of my amendment. In those circumstances, simply reciting the wording of the criteria in new Section 21A would not be appropriate. The Minister also said:


    "We are not clear that the full particulars formulation is the right one either. If the requirement is too onerous, that may lead to an extension of the detention period while a substantial notice is prepared, thus adding to the bureaucracy of it all".

Those are not answers. That is a species of forensic waffle that does not meet my point. How is the respondent to know the full nature of the case against him--of the foundation of his detention or of the notice--unless it is properly particularised?

I do not wish to be over-critical, because those comments were made in the early hours of the morning. I do not suppose that the Minister has yet got his beauty sleep back, but I hope that he has had a little time to reflect on his answers so that he can tell us clearly why the ordinary particularity that any court would order in a civil case should not apply here to what he has emphasised over and over are civil proceedings.

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Amendment No. 39 would fill a lacuna in Section 21B. Section 21A says that there are two hurdles, but that is missing from Section 21B. A specific reference back to Section 21A is needed, because it provides the foundation for Section 21B. I beg to move.


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