CRIME AND DISORDER BILL [HL]
22. While this
is a large bill which contains controversial provisions, the delegated
powers in it are no more numerous than might be expected. The
department's excellent memorandum (printed in the Appendix to
this report) explains the need for each power and sets out the
Parliamentary control which will apply. In this report, therefore,
the Committee has thought it necessary only to add a commentary
on the Henry VIII powers (all of which are subject to affirmative
procedure) and on those powers which are not subject to Parliamentary
Henry VIII powers
29(4) allows the Secretary of State to amend by order the definition
in subsection (3) of "youth justice services". The case
for the power is made in the memorandum. The power is very limited
and is subject to affirmative procedure, which the Committee considers
32(6) allows the Secretary of State to amend by order subsection
(5) so as to alter the functions of the new Youth Justice Board.
The memorandum explains the need for the power which is narrowly
confined and subject to affirmative procedure.
46(7) allows the Secretary of State to change the maximum period
during which a violent offender may be subject to licence after
release from prison. The memorandum gives the background to this
very limited power (the order cannot increase the maximum above
10 years). Again affirmative procedure is applied. Corresponding
provision is made for Scotland in clause 70.
48(7) allows the Secretary of State to amend by order subsection
(2) to substitute different minimum and maximum periods limiting
drug treatment and testing orders. Corresponding provision is
made for Scotland in clause 72. The provisions apply affirmative
procedure and are explained in the memorandum.
82(5) allows the Secretary of State to amend by order the provisions
of subsection (4) which determined when a prisoner becomes eligible
for release on licence. This is a limited power subject to affirmative
procedure the need for which is explained in the memorandum.
Powers not subject to
60 creates a new custodial sentence for children and young persons
which will apply where the offence was committed on or after the
date appointed by the Secretary of State. The memorandum likens
this power to the power to make a commencement order.
83 inserts a new section in the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Subsection
(4) of that section provides that the person responsible for monitoring
the curfew condition included in a licence under section 34A of
that Act shall be of a description specified in an order made
by the Secretary of State. The memorandum justifies the absence
of Parliamentary control by citing the similar power in section
12 of the 1991 Act. While the precedent predates the establishment
of this Committee, it would be strange to have different procedures
in one Act for virtually identical powers and the discretion given
to the Secretary of State to decide what employment fits a person
to monitor a curfew condition is limited and similar to a power
to make administrative arrangements which would not be subject
to Parliamentary control.
91 allows the Secretary of State to make by order arrangements
about the problems associated with the repeal by clause 60 of
sections 1 and 4 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994. The memorandum argues persuasively that Parliamentary control
would not be appropriate for a purely transitory power like this.
96(2) is a common commencement power.
32. The Committee
draws the attention of the House to the inclusion in the bill
of the Henry VIII powers. There is nothing else in the bill to
which the House's attention need be drawn.