6 The impact on media freedom and
democratic accountability
The missing issue in the Green
Paper
193. As
we indicated in Chapter 1, the proposals in the Green Paper have
significant implications for the freedom of the media to report
matters of public interest and concern. Yet this important right
does not feature in the Green Paper. It is not mentioned in the
"Key Principles" outlined in the Executive Summary,
which the Government says have guided the development of the proposals,
nor is there any systematic assessment of the impact of the proposals
on this fundamental democratic right.
194. A number
of the submissions we received in response to our call for evidence
have emphasised that the proposals in the Green Paper engage the
principle of open justice, which concerns the basic proposition
that trials should, as a general rule, be conducted in public
and judgments should also be given in public. Responses to the
Government's own consultation have also raised similar concerns.
The Guardian News and Media Ltd., for example, says in its response
to the Green Paper that the proposals amount to "an unnecessary
and unjustifiable restriction on the media's role as a public
watchdog". The starting point, according to Dr Lawrence McNamara,
is that the media are "the eyes and ears of the public".[104]
195. We have also
received submissions specifically concerning the impact of the
Green Paper proposals on the media from Dr. Lawrence McNamara
and Index on Censorship. A number of other submissions also include
comment on this aspect, including those from Justice, Liberty,
Amnesty International, Redress and Big Brother Watch. We took
oral evidence on this question from an investigative reporter,
a legal journalist, a media lawyer and an academic lawyer with
relevant expertise.
The principle of open justice
196. The
status of the open justice principle as both a foundational common
law principle and an important human rights obligation is not
in doubt. In Al Rawi, for example, Lord Dyson said:
There are certain features of a common law trial
which are fundamental to our system of justice (both criminal
and civil). First, subject to certain established and limited
exceptions, trials should be conducted and judgments given in
public. The importance of the open justice principle has been
emphasised many times [...] The open justice principle is not
a mere procedural rule. It is a fundamental common law principle.
In Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline
(p 476) criticised the decision of the lower court to hold a hearing
in camera as "constituting a violation of that publicity
in the administration of justice which is one of the surest guarantees
of our liberties, and an attack upon the very foundations of public
and private security." Lord Haldane LC (p 438) said that
any judge faced with a demand to depart from the general rule
must treat the question "as one of principle, and as turning,
not on convenience, but on necessity".
197. The
importance of the role played by the media in exposing to scrutiny
matters of public interest and concern, and making publicly available
to a wide audience the information necessary to hold governments
to account, is also an acknowledged feature of the principle of
open justice and, correspondingly of the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights under Article 10 of the ECHR, the right
to freedom of expression. That right has been regarded by the
Strasbourg Court as being of particular importance to the healthy
functioning of democratic accountability, and has been interpreted
broadly to give effect to both the right of the media to impart
information and the right of the public to receive it. It has
also been the subject of ringing judicial endorsement in recent
years. The importance of open justice as a fundamental principle
was the subject of Lord Neuberger's 2011 Judicial Studies Board
lecture, Open Justice Unbound?, in which he explicitly
linked the importance of open justice to the rule of law:[105]
Public scrutiny of the courts is an essential means
by which we ensure that judges do justice according to law, and
thereby secure public confidence in the courts and the law".
198. Many
of our witnesses invoked what is rapidly becoming the classic
statement of the interrelationship between freedom of expression,
democratic accountability and the rule of law in the judgment
of the Court of Appeal in the Binyam Mohamed litigation,
in which the Lord Chief Justice distilled a number of principles
from the relevant legal authorities. The significance of the
statement warrants its quotation at length:
37. Quite apart from Mr Mohamed's personal interest
in seeing the full and complete reasoning of the court, there
was considerable discussion about the principle of open justice
generally, and as it might affect the media. This developed along
familiar lines. From time to time judges of the highest distinction
have identified the reasons which underpin this principle, naturally
enough, in the overall context of the possible application of
the principle to the individual case. For present purposes I derive
the following principles from the authorities.
38. Justice must be done between the parties.
The public must be able to enter any court to see that justice
is being done in that court, by a tribunal conscientiously doing
its best to do justice according to law. For that reason, every
judge sitting in judgment is on trial. So it should be, and any
exceptions to the principle must be closely limited. In reality
very few citizens can scrutinise the judicial process: that scrutiny
is performed by the media, whether newspapers or television, acting
on behalf of the body of citizens. Without the commitment of an
independent media the operation of the principle of open justice
would be irremediably diminished.
39. There is however a distinct aspect of the
principle which goes beyond proper scrutiny of the processes of
the courts and the judiciary. The principle has a wider resonance,
which reflects the distinctive contribution made by the open administration
of justice to what President Roosevelt described in 1941 as the
"[
] first freedom, freedom of speech and expression".
In litigation, particularly litigation between the executive and
any of its manifestations and the citizen, the principle of open
justice represents an element of democratic accountability, and
the vigorous manifestation of the principle of freedom of expression.
Ultimately it supports the rule of law itself. Where the court
is satisfied that the executive has misconducted itself, or acted
so as to facilitate misconduct by others, all these strands, democratic
accountability, freedom of expression, and the rule of law are
closely engaged.
40. Expressed in this way, the principle of open
justice encompasses the entitlement of the media to impart and
the public to receive information in accordance with article 10
of the European Convention of Human Rights. Each element of the
media must be free to decide for itself what to report. One element
would report those matters which reflect its distinctive social
or political stance, and a different section of the media will
report on different matters, reflecting a different, distinctive
position. This may very well happen with this judgment, reflecting
the diversity of the media, and symbolising its independence.
In short, the public interest may support continuing redaction,
or it may not. If it does not, each element of the media will
decide for itself what, if anything, to publish. In the context
of two further features of the evidence I should add that the
investigative role of the media exists independently of the principle
of open justice, and that the right of the media to enlist the
assistance of legislation like the Freedom of Information Act
to acquire access to information is similarly distinct. Neither
diminishes the principle of open justice.
41. Although expressed in wide and general termsand
perhaps inevitably so expressedin my judgment the principles
of freedom of expression, democratic accountability and the rule
of law are integral to the principle of open justice and they
are beyond question. They do not enable the media to require parties
to litigation to continue it if they do not wish to do so in order
for the media to have a better story, or permit the media to study
material which has been made subject to non-disclosure on well
established PII principles, or to report proceedings where, in
the interests of justice, by operation of law, such reporting
is prohibited. It is, of course, elementary that the courts do
not function in order to provide the media with copy, or to provide
ammunition for the media, or for that matter private individuals,
to berate the government or the opposition of the day, or for
that matter to berate or laud anyone else. They function to enable
justice to be done between parties. However where litigation has
taken place and judgment given, any disapplication of the principle
of open justice must be rigidly contained, and even within the
small number of permissible exceptions, it should be rare indeed
for the court to order that any part of the reasoning in the judgment
which has led it to its conclusion should be redacted. As a matter
of principle it is an order to be made only in extreme circumstances.
42. The open justice principle (by which I include
the ordinary right of all the parties to litigation to know the
reasons for the decision of the court) is undiminished either
by the possible exercise by the Intelligence and Security Committee
of its responsibilities to inquire into possible wrongdoing by
the intelligence services or by the responsibility of the Attorney
General to authorise criminal proceedings against any member of
the services who may have committed a criminal offence. These
are distinct elements of our arrangements which serve to ensure
that the rule of law is observed, but they do not impinge on the
principles of open justice.
The effect on investigative journalism
199. We
took evidence from an investigative journalist about the difficulties
the proposals in the Green Paper are likely to cause him in his
reporting on matters of public interest and concern. Ian Cobain,
an investigative reporter on The Guardian who has been
responsible for a lot of award-winning investigative journalism
in recent years concerning matters such as complicity in torture
and extraordinary rendition, told us that material disclosed in
legal proceedings has been "vitally important" as a
source of information for journalists.[106]
He said that journalists such as him were "heavily reliant
on documents that have been disclosed in court", which were
often crucial either to corroborate allegations of wrongdoing
which had been heard elsewhere, or to contradict assurances or
denials.
200. Two cases
in particular, Al Rawi and Binyam Mohamed, had resulted
in the disclosure of evidence and documentation which had enabled
journalists to build up a true picture of the Government's involvement
in certain actions since 9/11. In Al Rawi, for example,
Mr. Cobain told us that Government ministers gave assurances that
any suggestion of British involvement in rendition was a conspiracy
theory, and it was only through the court proceedings that the
documentation was disclosed showing that a decision had in fact
been taken by the Government that British nationals detained in
Afghanistan could be sent to Guantanamo.
201. According
to Mr. Cobain, the proposals in the Green Paper will prevent the
sort of investigative reporting he has done on complicity in torture
and rendition from happening again.[107]
Once allegations of wrongdoing against the Government disappear
into a closed court, he said, the media will not be able to see
how the allegations are tested in open court, and they may not
even find out at the end of the process if the relevant part of
the case is in a closed judgment.[108]
In the Binyam Mohamed case, for example, had the proceedings
been closed the media would not have been able to find out what
the truth of the matter was about the Security Service's awareness
of the treatment Mr. Mohamed had received before he was interrogated
by UK officials. Mr. Cobain's message was plain and simple: "we
would not learn these matters if the proposals were adopted."[109]
The overall effect on the media
202. The
evidence of Dr. Lawrence McNamara, an academic lawyer who has
carried out research into the effect of counter-terrorism laws
on media freedom, was that making closed material procedures generally
available in all civil proceedings would have a "significant
detrimental impact on the ability of the press to access and report
information" and would constitute a "major retreat from
open justice traditions." He makes a similar point to Mr.
Cobain about why courts are so important to the media: "information
comes out in court; it is where detail comes out and where the
parties cannot craft or spin the information."[110]
His research shows that journalists regard courts as "vitally
important avenues for information to be exposed." He was
concerned about "the normalisation of justice occurring behind
closed doors"[111]
and about CMPs becoming routine because the parties may have an
interest in agreeing to them taking place, which would prevent
material coming into the public domain which might be important
in holding the state to account.[112]
203. Joshua Rozenberg,
the well-known legal correspondent and broadcaster, pointed out
another reason why court material and court proceedings have a
great advantage for the media in terms of the ability to inform
the public of what is going on: reports of them enjoy the protection
of privilege, which means that journalists cannot be sued for
libel if they publish a fair and accurate account of what is said
in court.[113]
204. A number
of witnesses who gave evidence about the impact of the Green Paper
on media freedom were particularly concerned about the potentially
wide scope of application of the proposals for closed material
procedures. Dr. McNamara for example, was concerned that "we
will end up with whole categories of activities and scrutiny that
will become less and less visible." Joshua Rozenberg, asked
how the proposals in the Green Paper will affect his ability to
report legal proceedings, said:[114]
We do not know because, we do not know how widely
they will go if they go as far as the Government is proposing.
As I see it, they would cover international relations, crime prevention,
police informers' identities and perhaps even commercially sensitive
information in which the Government has no direct interest. If
all those were to be subject to these closed material proceedings,
it would very much limit our ability to cover a wide range of
cases [...] If that were inhibited to the extent envisaged in
the Green Paper, I think that the public would be very much the
poorer.
205. The
representatives of the media from whom we heard were also very
clear that the current law on PII not only works reasonably well
in practice as far as the media are concerned, but also adequately
accommodates the right to freedom of expression when deciding
whether certain material should not be disclosed. The main reason
for this is that, under the current law of PII, there is a judicial
balancing exercise in which the court, rather than the executive,
balances the rights and interests in play, including the importance
of the public's right to know the particular information in question.
Jan Clements, a specialist media lawyer from Editorial Legal
Services at The Guardian, pointed out that the courts already
have considerable powers to manage difficult and sensitive cases
in a way which enables the media to "at least get access
to some of the key information."[115]
She pointed to the careful judicial balancing of the various
interests, including national security, in the Binyam Mohamed
litigation.[116]
Her fear was that, under the proposals in the Green Paper, the
arguments that were played out in court in that case and considered
very carefully would not take place: the whole thing would take
place under a CMP and "the court would be deprived of the
very important role of balancing those interests."
206. Joshua Rozenberg
similarly said that under the current law, "at least we have
the feeling that the court has carried out a balancing exercise
and perhaps has even heard from the press making an application
on whether material of a certain sort ought to be covered by public
interest immunity."[117]
Under the proposals for CMPs, however, "[t]he fear is that
we would not have any rights to make an application to the court
before it went into closed session, not least because we would
not know why it was going into closed session."
The effect on court reporting
207. A
number of concerns were expressed to us about the impact of the
proposals in the Green Paper on court reporting in particular,
and the implications of this for the legal certainty and the accessibility
of legal precedents which, particularly in a common law legal
system, is vital to the preservation of the rule of law.
208. The inaccessibility
of closed judgments is particularly problematic in this respect.
As Joshua Rozenberg put it, "the problem with closed judgments
is that we do not know what they contain."[118]
The particular nature of a court judgment makes this especially
problematic. It contains the court's reasons for determining an
issue in litigation a particular way. Both the parties and the
public have a strong interest in knowing what those reasons are,
whether they relate to the facts or the law.
209. There appears
to have been little thinking so far about how to address the many
problems to which closed judgments give rise. How can they be
made accessible to those, such as special advocates, who are both
entitled to access them and require to do so in order to perform
their function of representing the interests of parties to litigation
who are excluded from closed material procedures? If closed judgments
have legal precedent value, as the special advocates told us they
sometimes do, how can that content be extracted and made publicly
accessible as the rule of law requires it to be? How long will
judgments remain closed for? What should be the mechanism for
closed judgments becoming open? We
recommend that the Government brings forward proposals to deal
with the important questions we raise which relate to closed judgments.
210. It was also
pointed out to us that the current trend, throughout the court
system, is towards greater openness and transparency: in family
courts, the Court of Protection, coroners' inquests and the Supreme
Court, for example.[119]
The Green Paper, however, is directly at odds with this trend.
The impact on public trust and
confidence in the Government and the Courts
211. The
Secretary of State in his Foreword to the Green Paper refers to
"improved executive accountability" as one of the prizes
of getting reform right.[120]
Both he and the Foreign Secretary have spoken of the need to restore
the public's trust and confidence that the intelligence and security
agencies and the Government are acting in accordance with the
law.
212. With the
exception of the ministers, not a single witness in our inquiry
suggested that the proposals in the Green Paper will improve the
accountability of the executive. On the contrary, a great deal
of evidence has expressed concern that the proposals will greatly
reduce the accountability of the executive. Dr McNamara described
the "culture of closure and caution" that he found in
Australia where, since the introduction of the National Security
Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004, "the
default position became to used closed proceedings where possible."[121]
Dinah Rose QC thought it "inevitable" that there is
the possibility of wrong decisions being made in CMPs without
any kind of accountability, "because the people you are asking
to make the decisions are people who are not neutral but have
an interest in the outcome. With the best will in the world, however
professional they are, they cannot look at it in the same way
that a judge would look at it."[122]
213. Moreover,
a number of witnesses have expressed the distinct but no less
important concern that extending closed material procedures into
civil proceedings will undermine public confidence in the courts
because it may give the appearance that the judiciary has been
co-opted by the Government and the security and intelligence agencies.
Jan Clements, for example, observed that secrecy undermines public
confidence, and pointed to the risk that under the Green Paper's
proposals the public may perceive the court as simply going along
with the Government's decision that a matter should be head in
private, which would result in the courts as well as the Government
being mistrusted.[123]
214. We
welcome the Government's recognition in the Green Paper that one
of the guiding principles of reform in this area is that, even
in sensitive matters of national security, the Government is committed
to transparency, and that it is in the public interest that such
matters are fully scrutinised.[124]
We also welcome the Government's avowed desire to improve executive
accountability. We are concerned, however, about the potential
impact of the proposals on public trust and confidence not only
in the Government but in the courts. As Lord Kerr said in Al
Rawi, "the public interest in maintaining confidence
in the administration of justice [...] is an extremely important
consideration and one which ought not to be overlooked."[125]
Possible safeguards for open
justice
215. Dr.
McNamara said in his submission that there is "a strong need
for mechanisms which counter the pressures towards normalising
closed proceedings". He points out that the Australian Law
Reform Commission recommended that open justice be an express
consideration in national security law, but the Australian statute
did not follow this advice. He recommends a number of safeguards
which he says could be inserted into any legislative regime in
order to ensure that open justice is not only taken into account
as a relevant consideration but is given appropriate weight by
the courts. We see some virtue in this suggestion, in the contest
of the amendment and clarification of the law on PII as it applies
to national security-sensitive material that we have recommended
in Chapters 3 and 5 above.
216. We
recommend that in the statutory amendment and clarification of
the law on Public Interest Immunity that we have recommended,
consideration is given to including open justice as an express
criterion to be taken into account and given due weight by the
court when conducting the judicial balancing exercise.
Conclusion
217. It
is regrettable that the Green Paper overlooks the very considerable
impact of its proposals on the freedom and ability of the media
to report on matters of public interest and concern. This is
a serious omission. The role of the media in holding the government
to account and upholding the rule of law is a vital aspect of
the principle of open justice, as has been amply demonstrated
in the decade since 9/11. We are also concerned about the impact
of the proposals on public trust and confidence in the courts.
We recommend that the Government expressly recognises these considerations
in its framework of "key principles" guiding the development
of policy in this area. We also expect the human rights memorandum
accompanying the forthcoming Bill to include a thorough assessment
of its impact on media freedom and on continuing public confidence
in the administration of justice.
104 See Lord Bingham in Turkington v Times Newspapers
Limited (Northern Ireland) [2000] [UKHL 57 at [4], describing
press representatives is court as "the eyes and ears of the
public to whom they report." Back
105
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, MR, Judicial Studies Board annual
lecture 2011, para. 4. Back
106
Q101. Back
107
Q102. Back
108
Q104. Back
109
Q103. Back
110
Q118. Back
111
Ibid Back
112
Q132. We also have a concern about the media freedom of CMPs
taking place by consent: see para 113 Back
113
Q110. Back
114
Q110.See, to similar effect, the evidence of Jan Clements, Q130. Back
115
Q121. Back
116
Q120 and 128. Back
117
Q113. Back
118
Q112. Back
119
Q111. Back
120
Green Paper, Foreword, p. viii. Back
121
Q123 Back
122
Q 34 Back
123
Q138. Back
124
Green Paper, Executive Summary, p. xii, para. 10. Back
125
Al Rawi. See also Lord Neuberger MR in the Court of Appeal
in the same case. Back
|