Professor Hugh Bochel, Dr Andrew Defty and Jane
Kirkpatrick
This paper sets out our views, as individuals, on
a number of the themes on which the Committee has invited evidence.
It draws, in part, upon the findings of, and other information
gleaned from, two research projects undertaken by us over the
past eight years, which so far have involved face-to-face interviews
with around 110 MPs and 120 Peers.
1. Size, composition and the electoral system—the
argument in the White Paper that 300 full-time members would be
able to fulfil the same duties as the current average daily attendance
of 388 has a clear logic to it and may be tenable. The proposal
that only one-third of seats will be contested at each election,
also has some logic and is comparable with other second chambers.
However, particularly given the proposed length of terms, this
is also likely to raise issues of legitimacy—would members
of the upper House elected 10 years ago have the same claim to
democratic legitimacy as those elected today?
Depending upon the electoral system, it also seems
inevitable that elected members of the House of Lords would develop
some form of 'constituency' ties and work, even if this is of
a different nature from that of MPs. Moreover, in the event of
STV being adopted, to achieve multi-member constituencies for
the House of Lords, constituencies would be very large by traditional
standards in the UK. The nature and demands of such work may therefore
be quite different from that which MPs are used to. Similarly,
a reformed Chamber may become even more open to the types of pressures
with which MPs are familiar, with greater attention from pressure
groups, other organised interests and the media, as well as demands
for 'outreach' type activities. Whether 300 members could adequately
fulfil all of those roles may perhaps be questionable.
2. Women in Parliament —given the
apparent desire to increase the number of women in Parliament,
the government might also wish to bear in mind that evidence appears
to suggest that larger multi-member constituencies (five or more
members) are of greater benefit in enabling the election of women
and people from minority ethnic groups than are smaller constituencies
(the use of STV in Scottish local government elections, for example,
appears so far to have led to no improvement in the level of representation
of women (Bochel and Denver, 2007)), and a floor of three seats
may be inadequate for this. On the other hand there are consequent
risks that the constituency link becomes much weaker in larger
areas.
3. Ministers—the White Paper does
not make clear whether there will be any limits, upper or lower,
on the number of ministers who could be drawn from the House of
Lords. The number of parliamentarians holding government positions,
the so called payroll vote, has increased in recent years, and
a number of bodies, including the Public Administration Select
Committee (2011) and the Conservative Party's Commission to Strengthen
Parliament (2000), have recommended a cap on the number of Ministers
and Parliamentary Private Secretaries. While the number of members
of the House of Lords in Government posts has always been considerably
fewer than in the House of Commons, the size of the payroll vote
in the House of Lords has increased in recent years and there
are now more Peers in Government posts than in the past (24 compared
to 20 in 1979). Even without any increase this would represent
a significantly larger proportion of a smaller House, but with
the creation of an elected Chamber, and the increased opportunities
for political patronage through the payroll vote that might involve,
future Governments might be tempted to increase the number of
Government posts in the House of Lords. If there were to be a
significant number of Ministers drawn from the House, that might
impact both upon the independence of the House and its ability
to undertake its scrutiny functions.
4. Appointed members—the purpose
of retaining an appointed element in a reformed House of Lords
is not clear, and appears to be inconsistent with the overall
rationale for reform. The statement in paragraph 13 that proposals
for a wholly or mainly elected second chamber 'is the fundamental
democratic principle' seems inconsistent. Presumably only a wholly
elected chamber would be fully democratic?
The subsequent arguments about the role of appointed
members reflect the main arguments for the existing House of Lords,
which have been those associated with claims for the expertise
and experience of its members and their independence. We have
argued elsewhere that despite frequent claims that the expertise
of its members is one of the distinctive features of the current
House of Lords, that expertise is patchy, may be deficient in
a number of key policy areas, and as members are appointed for
life, is in some cases a diminishing resource. We would also question
the assumption that elected members necessarily bring less expertise
to the House than appointed members. Our research indicated that
the greater access to resources, and the considerable research
and case work of some members of the House of Commons, meant that
in some important policy areas the elected members of the Commons
had greater expertise than members of the appointed House of Lords
(Bochel and Defty, 2010a).
Even if one were to accept the proposition that the
expertise of the House is enhanced by the appointment of a significant
number of crossbench Peers it is hard to see how the retention
of sixty appointed members would ensure the presence of sufficient
expertise and of the right type to make an effective contribution
to the work of the House. Rather than relying on the creation
of a body of expertise within the chamber through appointment,
it might be appropriate to consider the provision of resources
to enable elected members to develop expertise within the House,
and a more systematic and widespread use of external expert advice
and evidence, in order to support the work of elected members
and committees.
5. Representation—the White Paper
has little to say on the subject of representation. The notion
that reform should make the House of Lords 'more representative'
has, however, been a consistent feature of the various proposals
for reform since 1997, although what exactly is meant by representation
has not always been clear and the basis for improving the broad
representative base of the chamber has altered over time, from
the use of appointments to create a chamber which is representative
of British society as a whole, or more representative of gender,
ethnic minorities and other faiths, to one in which representation
is based upon elections (Bochel and Defty, forthcoming). Other
than the Church of England Bishops, the current proposals place
the emphasis firmly on elections as the basis for representation.
The White Paper does suggest that the use of proportional representation
may facilitate the election of more women and we have commented
on that above. However, the proposals do not say anything about
improving the representation of other groups, such as ethnic minorities.
Similarly, while earlier proposals for reform recommended the
representation of a wider range of faiths, the White Paper refers
only to the retention of Church of England Bishops. It is unclear
to us why the Church of England should retain up to 12 places.
The other established churches would have none, and other faiths
would have none. In the contemporary world, including where there
are significant questions of representation and fairness, it appears
hard to defend such a proposition. The White Paper does not provide
any rationale for this, and again it would seem to conflict with
the fundamental democratic principle which is claimed to underpin
the reforms. Perhaps most importantly, if the intention is to
introduce lasting reform, some further consideration of the nature
of representation desired in the reformed House would be likely
to be advantageous.
6. Resources: Changes to the composition
of the House of Lords will also have implications for costs, and
for the resources available to members of the House. These appear
to be somewhat under-explored in the White Paper. It is not clear
what the cost implications of reform are, but it does perhaps
imply that the creation of a smaller House and the shift from
a system of non-taxable allowances to a taxable salary will have
a relatively benign impact on expenditure. This needs more careful
consideration and explanation. It is far from clear that the salary
costs of 300 full-time members will represent a saving on the
allowances which are currently paid, largely on the basis of attendance,
to the 388 members who attend regularly. It is also suggested
that salaries for members of the House of Lords would be set at
a lower level than for members of the House of Commons, on the
basis that they would not have constituency duties, yet as noted
above, members of an elected House would indeed have constituencies,
and these would be larger and present new demands on members.
There are also considerable resource implications involved in
the movement to a House of 300 full-time members. At present there
is considerable disparity between resources, such as office space
and staff, made available to members of the House of Commons and
the House of Lords, with many Peers relying on resources available
to them through their personal and professional life outside the
House. While a reduction in the size of the House of Lords is
likely to result in some savings in terms of allowances and space
in the parliamentary estate, the cost implications of providing
support, presumably at least comparable with that available to
members of the House of Commons, for 300 full-time members, is
likely to be considerable. It is not our view that reform of the
House of Lords should be viewed as a cost-cutting measure; indeed
the House of Lords has arguably been under-resourced for many
years, and a well funded parliament with extensive staffing and
research facilities is vital to a healthy democracy. Therefore,
the cost implications of reform require clearer explanation and
should not be presented or implied to involve savings on the current
system.
7. Transition—why have a transitional
period, other than to reduce dissatisfaction among members of
the existing House? If the system needs replacing, it should arguably
be replaced as one, particularly given the at best erratic nature
of House of Lords reform over the last one hundred years. It is
pertinent to note that following the removal of the bulk of the
hereditary Peers in 1999, the current House of Lords is already
a transitional House. Consideration should also be given to a
number of implications of the proposals for transition. For example,
should the White Paper's option 2 for a transitional period be
accepted the number of members would be very large. A transitional
system might also lead to different 'classes' of member—those
who have been elected, and those who have not. The former would
be able to claim democratic legitimacy, while the latter would
not.
8. Vacancies—the notion of substitutes
for vacancies, rather than by-elections, does appear to have some
underpinning logic. However, the idea that if a party is unable
to find one of its previous candidates to take a seat it should
lose it would seem to go against the fundamental democratic principle
expressed elsewhere in the White Paper. There are so many factors
that might militate against this happening successfully (people
might move area, change jobs, might be unwilling to leave work
for a relatively short period in the House of Lords, and so on)
that it would seem to be an inappropriate stance to take. Indeed,
given the electoral sophistication of political parties, in many
instances it will be clear that they are unlikely to win more
than, say, two out of five seats in a constituency, so that they
might restrict themselves to only two candidates (see, for example,
what happened in local elections in Scotland in 2007, where only
in one ward did any party put forward a full slate of candidates).
The idea of substitutes would mean that parties would almost be
required to put forward candidates with no chance of them being
elected, simply to have a substitute available should a successful
candidate leave the House, for whatever reason.
References
Bochel, H. and Defty, A. (2010a) 'A Question of Expertise:
The House of Lords and Welfare Policy', Parliamentary Affairs,
volume 63, number 1, pp. 66-84.
Bochel, H. and Defty, A. (forthcoming, 2012), 'A
More Representative Chamber: Representation and the House of Lords',
Journal of Legislative Studies, volume 18, number 1.
Bochel, H. and Denver, D. (2007) Scottish Council
Elections 2007, Dundee, Election Studies.
Commission to Strengthen Parliament (2000) Strengthening
Parliament, London, Conservative Party.
Public Administration Select Committee (2011) Smaller
Government: What Do Ministers Do?, 7th Report of the
Session 2010-2011, London, The Stationery Office.
6 October 2011
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