Appendix 1d: Letter dated 22
January 2007 from Paul Goggins MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, re Justice and Security (Northern
Ireland) Bill
Thank you for your letter to the Secretary of State
about the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill. As Minister
responsible for the Bill, the Secretary of State has asked me
to reply. Your letter asked a number of detailed questions about
aspects of the Bill. I shall reply to each question in turn.
Q1 - Please provide a more detailed justification
of the need for the new power, including up to date evidence of
the incidence of juror intimidation in Northern Ireland compared
to the rest of the UK, and an explanation of why the other measures
in the Bill to reduce the risk of jury intimidation are not considered
by the Government to be adequate.
Given the restrictions on enquiring into what goes
on inside the jury room it is difficult to gain a true picture
of the scale of jury tampering and perverse verdicts in Northern
Ireland. What is clear is that for the last 35 years many of the
most serious cases in Northern Ireland have been tried in the
Crown Court without a jury.
The police only have intelligence of eleven cases
where jury tampering has been reported since 1999. However, seven
of these have occurred between 2004 and 2006 and seven of the
eleven involved persons with paramilitary connections. From talking
to practitioners within the system I am aware of many more anecdotal
examples where there appears to have been intimidation in a case
and one recent case where a trial collapsed as a result of jury-tampering.
Obviously, I cannot comment on the latter in any detail.
Paramilitaries continue to maintain control over
communities in what is still very much a divided society. In their
Seventh Report on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland (published
in October 2005) the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) concluded
that "Paramilitaries sometimes use violence within those
communities, sometimes threats and intimidation… Activities
of this kind go hand in hand with unofficial forms of control."
They have not contradicted this view in subsequent reports. It
is therefore those cases that have been tried without a jury under
the Diplock system that would be most vulnerable to intimidation
of jurors were alternative arrangements not put in place.
It is therefore helpful to look at information about
the prevalence of intimidation more generally. Although there
is not an absolute read-across between intimidation of victims
and witnesses and that of jurors it is fair to assume that the
same tactics would be used if there were jury trial in all cases
and it provides a broad indicator of trends.
Intimidation of witnesses appears to be an increasing
problem. PSNI recorded 29 instances of witness intimidation in
2001/02 and 74 in 2004/05, with two instances of threats to harm
a witness. However, the Northern Ireland Crime Survey in 2003/04
(the most recent year for which I have figures) revealed that
intimidation is a significantly under-reported offence. Only half
of all cases of intimidation or harassment are reported to the
police. Around 7% of victims of criminal offences have experienced
harassment or intimidation, and this has mainly come from the
person who committed the offence.
Intimidation is therefore still a significant problem
in Northern Ireland, despite the recent improvements in the security
situation. It poses a significant risk to the ability of the criminal
justice system to deliver fair trials in certain cases. Money
appears to be used in many cases as an incentive to encourage
jurors to reach a particular verdict (six of the eleven cases
mentioned above). Blackmail and intimidation seem to be used if
financial motivators do not have the desired effect. Intimidation
already occurs in (among others) assault, murder and attempted
murder cases, (all of which are scheduled offences that can currently
be tried without a jury). If these patterns of incidents continue,
it is clear that significant numbers of such cases relating to
paramilitaries will continue to go through the criminal justice
system when the alleged perpetrators are prosecuted.
The perception that intimidation occurs also represents
a serious risk to the delivery of high quality justice via jury
trial (and this was recognised in the Diplock report, which acknowledged
that 'a frightened juror is a bad juror, even though his own safety
and that of his family may not actually be at risk'). The close-knit
nature of Northern Ireland society means that individuals are
known within their communities. Even when jurors do not personally
know a defendant, they could live within a threatening environment
and fear that they could become targeted by associates of the
defendant. This less overt form of intimidation and the fear of
intimidation could potentially be as significant for jurors as
the actual acts of intimidation described above.
Many of the juror protection measures in this Bill
should not only reduce the scope for jurors to be intimidated
but should also help to reduce this fear. For example, balloting
jurors by number and restricting access to information about jurors
should increase feelings of safety and make it more difficult
for individual jurors to be intimidated. However, it does not
prevent a juror being recognised by the defendant or his associates
if the juror is known to them. Screening of jurors from the public
gallery and separate juror accommodation reduce this problem still
further, but does not prevent a juror being recognised by the
defendant during the trial, or when entering or leaving the court
building.
Out of town juries are less likely to be susceptible
to intimidation, but in a small jurisdiction like Northern Ireland
a notable risk still remains. The police could take action to
protect jurors and their families in the way that significant
and vulnerable witnesses can be protected in certain cases. However,
for this to be effective it would involve significant disruption
to the life of the juror and their family - it would involve changes
of home, school and employment. In extreme cases, it could mean
leaving Northern Ireland. I think that members of the public would
consider this too high a price to pay for serving on a jury and
it would have a very negative impact on confidence in the justice
system.
The security assessment I have received from PSNI
(and the IMC have reported in similar terms) is that this context
of paramilitary control of communities, intimidation and fear
of intimidation is expected to continue for the time being. Dissident
republicans remain the most significant threat to the security
forces, and continue to plan for future attacks. They generally
continue to use violence as a means of settling internal disputes
and imposing discipline, and in an effort to exert control within
local communities. The INLA have maintained a military campaign
and have been involved in public order situations in 2005. Such
situations indicate that INLA are prepared to respond violently
to police activity, particularly when it is directed against their
organised crime operations. Loyalist paramilitaries continue to
pose a threat to members of the security forces.
Levels of paramilitary linked incidents have decreased
significantly since 2000 but they remain common. Paramilitary
linked shootings incidents are down 10% in 2005 compared to 2004
while bombings have risen 28% over the same period. The rise in
bombing incidents is largely due to both Loyalist and Dissident
Republican paramilitaries carrying out attacks on security forces
during public order situations in the Belfast area during July
and September 2005.
It is important to recognise that intimidation of
victims and witnesses, perverse verdicts and juror intimidation
are only likely to happen in a minority of cases. It is, however,
significant enough to pose a risk to the safety of those members
of the public who participate in the system as jurors or witnesses.
Returning to jury trial in all cases is likely to increase the
occurrence of juror coercion and the fear of intimidation felt
by jurors. Government and the criminal justice agencies in Northern
Ireland could be in breach of their obligations to ensure the
safety and security of all those in Northern Ireland if this risk
is not addressed.
Q2 - To assist the Committee's consideration of
whether the width of the power to certify constitutes a justifiable
interference with a person's freedom of association and right
to respect for their private and family life, please provide a
more detailed justification for applying the power to certify
to people who are 'associates' of members or former members of
proscribed organisations.
The security assessment I have received is that members
of paramilitary groups do attempt to intimidate witnesses and
jurors in cases where close friends or family members are the
defendant in order to secure acquittals. This provision is designed
to deal with that problem. It also applies to former members of
paramilitary groups as these individuals may retain positions
of power within their communities as a result of their former
status. Again, the security assessment I have received is that
former members of paramilitary groups continue to use intimidator
tactics to retain control over communities and attempt to use
this to secure acquittals in certain cases.
It is important to note that a connection with a
member or former member of a paramilitary group would not be enough
on its own to justify a decision for non-jury trial in a case.
The DPP would need to make a judgement, in the round, of the risks
to the administration of justice posed by such a case. If the
risks were low, then the defendant would be tried in the Crown
Court with a jury. Summary cases would continue to be tried in
the magistrates' court with no special arrangements.
Q3 - What safeguards are contemplated to guard
against the risk of the power being abused?
The DPP's decision is one of mode of trial only.
The DPP in Northern Ireland already makes such decisions (for
example, whether certain offences should be tried summarily before
a magistrate or on indictment in the Crown Court). As is the case
at present, the defendant will be able to make representations
to the DPP about the mode of trial decision. The DPP can take
those into account in his decision-making, or can vary his decision
at a later stage on foot of the representations received.
Unlike Diplock, no special rules of evidence or sentencing
will apply in non-jury trials under the Bill. The sole difference
will be whether the case is tried before a jury or by a judge
sitting alone. In either case the court will remain the ultimate
arbiter of guilt or innocence.
Where the case is tried by a judge sitting alone
and there is a conviction, the judge must give a reasoned verdict
(under the current Diplock system judges also often give reasons
for acquittals but I do not think it appropriate to require this
in all cases given the risks that such a judgment could interfere
with the presumption of innocence in a case or damage the reputation
of victims or witnesses).
It will also be possible to appeal conviction or
sentence from a non-jury trial without the need to seek leave
of the court first.
I am satisfied that these safeguards provide adequate
protection to the defendant in the case and ensure that defendants
will suffer no detriment from being tried without a jury.
Q4 - What is the Government's justification for
proposing such a wide statutory ouster of the courts' jurisdiction
to review the legality of a delegated decision?
The restrictions on challenge to the DPP's decision
for non-jury trial in the Bill are intended to put the current
caselaw on challenges to the Attorney General's decision whether
or not to deschedule a case on a statutory footing. In In Shuker
and Others [2004 NI 367] the High Court in Northern Ireland
considered a challenge of the Attorney General's decision not
to certify a case for jury trial (under the Diplock system, the
default is non-jury trial for specified offences, but the Attorney
General has the power to decide mode of trial by certifying a
case into jury trial, a process known as de-scheduling). The court
ruled that the procedure for determining mode of trial of the
accused is not a process suitable for the full panoply of judicial
review. Judicial review would be possible, however, on grounds
such as bad faith, dishonesty or other exceptional circumstances.
The restriction also has to be seen in the context
of the nature of the DPP's decision. The DPP's decision is one
of mode of trial only. He already takes decisions that result
in a case being tried summarily or on indictment. The consequence
of this decision is that in certain circumstances a defendant
can be diverted to a form of trial that is every bit as fair as
jury trial, but one which is free from the risk of injustice caused
by partisan verdicts of juror intimidation.
To allow every decision of the DPP to be challenged
would result in a very considerable delay - which itself undermines
justice - in order to argue over issues that are not even relevant
to the subject matter of the indictment. This would be wasteful
of the limited resources available to the criminal justice system
and would act to damage public confidence. It may also result
in cases that are not safe to be tried before a jury having to
be because the intelligence on which the Director's decision is
based could not be disclosed.
Q5 - Please explain why in the Government's view
it is compatible with the rule of law to legislate to prevent
any court from considering whether a delegated decision-maker
has acted without jurisdiction or on the basis of an error of
law.
I am not seeking to exclude judicial review altogether:
my intent is to put the caselaw in Shuker on a statutory
footing, and to allow limited challenges to the issue of a
certificate under clause 1(2) as set out in my response to Question
4 above. The judgment in Shuker does not suggest that the
rule of law is compromised where at least limited challenge is
allowed.
During Commons Committee stage on the Bill there
was considerable discussion on this clause. Whilst I remain committed
to the principle behind clause 7, in light of the comments made
during the debate I undertook to reflect further on the wording
of the clause before Report stage. I will write to the Committee
again with the outcome of that process.
Q6 - Will a draft of the Attorney General's proposed
guidelines [additional juror checks] be made available while the
Bill is still before Parliament? If not, what will be the likely
content of those guidelines?
I understand that the Attorney General's guidelines
will be in line with those that apply in England and Wales. Additional
juror checks will only be possible in cases relating to national
security or terrorism. I have attached a copy of the Attorney
General's current England and Wales guidelines at Appendix 1 to
this letter.
In relation to the guidelines on challenge, the restrictions
on access to juror information will apply to both the defence
and the prosecution. It is considered that the fear of intimidation
felt by jurors is exacerbated by the fact that the current system
permits their personal details to be known, particularly to the
defence. Indeed, Lord Carlile of Berriew QC indicated that it
would provide considerable reassurance for jurors, and would diminish
the risk of jury intimidation and perverse verdicts, if they could
attend court knowing that their details were unknown to the defence
and their connections.
While total juror anonymity would carry some benefits,
it was considered important to balance these against the risk
that prohibiting access to juror information would inhibit the
carrying out of additional juror checks by the police, which are
themselves designed to reduce the risks of perverse verdicts and
juror intimidation. As is the position already in England and
Wales, there may be certain exceptional types of case of public
importance where routine checks may not be sufficient to ensure
the proper administration of justice. In such cases it is in the
interests both of justice and the public that there should be
further safeguards against the possibility of bias and in such
cases checks which go beyond investigation of criminal records
may be necessary.
As indicated previously, it is not considered that
providing for additional jury checks in limited circumstances
would confer any unfair advantage on the Crown, or subject the
accused to any unfair disadvantage. Nonetheless, to allay any
concerns over fairness and equality of arms, administrative guidelines
prepared by the Attorney General will set out clearly the circumstances
in which jury checks may be carried out by police not connected
to the prosecution. The policy in relation to the guidelines on
jury checks has yet to be settled, but at this stage it is anticipated
that they will closely reflect those already in place in England
and Wales.
Q7 - Please provide the justification for the
abolition of the defendant's right of peremptory challenge. Why
is it considered necessary to abolish the right in Northern Ireland
but not in the rest of the UK?
The abolition of peremptory challenge is not peculiar
to Northern Ireland. The defendant's right of peremptory challenge
was abolished in England and Wales by the Criminal Justice Act
1988. The provisions in this Bill are therefore a normalising
measure, bringing Northern Ireland into line with England and
Wales.
The Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibits the obtaining,
disclosing or soliciting of any statements made or opinions expressed
by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations. It
is therefore difficult to obtain specific evidence in relation
to partisan juries and factors influencing jurors' decisions.
However, it is considered likely that, in a polarised society
like Northern Ireland, there are jurors who may be influenced
by their political and religious backgrounds in reaching a verdict.
It is in this context that it is considered that the abolition
of peremptory challenge is desirable, as it will limit the defendant's
ability to 'pack a jury' and thereby reduce the risk of perverse
verdicts.
In its response to the Diplock Review (2000) the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission called for the abolition
of the peremptory challenge, arguing that such challenges pander
to a stereotypical thinking and further entrench prejudice in
Northern Ireland.
It is for these reasons that we seek to abolish peremptory
challenge in criminal trials, while retaining challenge for cause
only by both the prosecution and defence.
Q8 - Will a draft of the Attorney General's proposed
guidelines [restriction of stand-by] be made available while the
Bill is still before Parliament? If not, what will be the likely
content of those guidelines in this respect?
I understand that the Attorney General's guidelines
will be the same as those that currently apply in England and
Wales. I have attached a copy of the Attorney General's current
England and Wales guidelines at Appendix 1 to this letter.
As far as the issue of equality of arms is concerned,
it is considered that any imbalance is acceptable and does not
breach Article 6 human rights principles. The right to trial by
jury in itself is not a guaranteed right. The prosecution are
under a duty to act with absolute propriety in every case, and
will only exercise their right of stand-by in future, where in
accordance with the Attorney General's guidelines, information
comes to light suggesting that a juror is not suitable for jury
service. Both parties will retain the right to challenge for cause.
It is considered that this arrangement best serves the requirements
of the justice system.
Having considered carefully the equality of arms
issue we concluded that to abolish this right should not, in principle,
compromise in any way the defendant's right to a fair trial. Such
rights as the defendant may enjoy in this respect will continue
to have adequate protection in the perpetuation of his entitlement
to challenge an unlimited number of jury panel members with cause
and the diligent and impartial exercise by the trial judge of
his supervisory duties. Moreover, in so far as any counterbalancing
is required, this will surely be provided by the introduction
of restrictions on the exercise by the Crown of its right to require
jury panel members to 'stand by'. Even in the absence of significant
restrictions on the exercise of this Crown right, the fairness
of the trial should not be jeopardised for the reason provided
by the Court of Appeal in Regina -v- McKinney viz, the obligation
on the Crown to act with absolute propriety and the obligation
of the court to intervene to ensure that appropriate standards
of propriety are observed. This will obviously be reinforced still
further if guidelines on the exercise of this right are promulgated.
Q9 - Please provide further justification of the
restrictions placed on the NIHRC's proposed powers to compel evidence
and to access places of detention.
This Bill extends new powers to the Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission to compel evidence and access places of
detention when carrying out investigations. The Government believes
that it is right that the Commission has these new powers to allow
it to carry out its investigations effectively. We have always
been clear that the powers would be subject to proportionate safeguards
to ensure that they are used appropriately by the Commission and
complied with appropriately by public authorities.
The Commission's key function, for the purpose of
which it can carry out investigations, is set out in Section 69
of the Northern Ireland Act 1998: to "keep under review the
adequacy and effectiveness in Northern Ireland of law and practice
relating to the protection of human rights". Compared with
most public bodies with investigatory powers, this remit is very
broad. It is the Government's view that, since the Commission's
investigations can rightly range very widely and the new powers
which it is to be granted are so significant, it is important
that the powers are subject to appropriate safeguards on their
use. There are many public bodies with responsibility for ensuring
compliance with human rights law in specific parts of the public
sector and it is not necessary for the Commission to duplicate
the work of these bodies.
The power to access places of detention during an
investigation will require no forewarning of the timing of each
visit. The Government has concluded, however, that each investigation
should be preceded by a 15 day period during which affected public
authorities can appeal to the county court, if they believe the
Commission's intention to access is unnecessary or unreasonable
for the purpose of its investigation. The court will be able to
order the Commission not to access the place of detention, or
to place restrictions on the access. After 15 days if no appeal
is made, or after an appeal has concluded if the court does not
prevent the Commission from accessing a place, the Commission
will have unrestricted access for the duration of the investigation.
The place of detention will retain the right to appeal against
an investigation at any stage but, after the initial 15 days,
they can only restrict access after a court has ruled in their
favour. It will be a criminal offence for a public authority to
obstruct access, other than through this appeal process.
This appeal process parallels the right of appeal
that applies when the Commission issues a notice compelling evidence;
a right of appeal that is also present in the Equality Act setting
out the powers of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights
in GB. If there was no 15 day period for appeals at the beginning
of the process, places of detention could feel under pressure
to appeal all applications for access as soon as the Commission
attempts to gain entry, without a proper consideration of whether
each case is actually unnecessary or unreasonable.
I am advised that the Northern Ireland Prison Service
has been subject to inspections and external reviews from seventeen
different bodies since 2004. The particular expertise of the Commission
should ensure that its investigations complement those of other
bodies; but it is in the Government's view right that places of
detention have the opportunity to suggest that an additional investigation
is not necessary if it has only recently co-operated with an investigation
by another body in very similar territory. It is also important
to remember that the Commission are not an emergency response
body.
There are other bodies that are more appropriate to handle serious
allegations which require immediate investigation. I am advised
that any such serious allegations, for instance an allegation
of assault, would be reported to the PSNI without delay.
The Commission will not be able to use the new power
to compel evidence to seek information where its disclosure would
have national security implications. This mirrors the arrangements
that will be in place for the Commission for Equality and Human
Rights, and the relevant provision is closely modelled on the
provisions of the Equality Act 2006 in this area. Government is
clear that national security must be afforded the same level of
protection across the UK.
The power to compel evidence will also be focused
on events after 1 January 2008 and information that is created
after 1 January 2008 or relates to events after 1 January 2008.
The Government believes that the Commission's investigations should
be forward looking. That is the best way to ensure that its investigations
make a positive contribution to the present and future development
of human rights law and practice in Northern Ireland. There are
other bodies that are better placed, and specifically mandated,
to investigate historic issues. This restriction will not prevent
the Commission making or commenting on proposals relating to dealing
with the past.
We remain committed to the view that the Commission
should use its new powers in ways that are forward looking. However,
following discussions between the Secretary of State and the Commission,
and consideration in Committee, I have agreed to give further
consideration prior to report stage, to the date from which the
new investigatory powers will become effective.
Q10 - Please provide the Government's assessment
of whether the power to access places of detention as set out
in the Bill is sufficient to enable the NIHRC to be part of the
UK's National Preventive Mechanism under OPCAT.
Discussions are still in progress within
Government and with the United Nations about the nature of the
UK's National Preventive Mechanism. These discussions include
which bodies should be part of the NPM and what powers the various
bodies making up the NPM should have. No final judgment
has been reached on either issue.
Q11 - Why is the power to stop and question not
expressed in terms of the amount to time that is reasonably
necessary?
This issue arises from the absence on the face of
clause 20(1) of any limitation on the amount of time for which
an individual may be questioned under this power.
As you will know, the European Court and domestic
judgments have recognised a distinction between a temporary restriction
of movement, and deprivation of liberty within the meaning of
Article 5. In particular, the European case of Guzzardi v Italy
makes the distinction between the restriction on liberty to which
Article 5 is directed, and 'mere restrictions on liberty of movement'.
The difference between these 2 situations a matter of intensity
and must be determined by reference to a number of factors.
It was held in HL v United Kingdom (2004)
40 EHRR 761, paragraph 89 that, "in order to determine whether
there has been a deprivation of liberty, the starting-point must
be the concrete situation of the individual concerned and account
must be taken of a whole range of factors arising in a particular
case such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation
of the measure in question."
The House of Lords considered this issue in Gillan
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The case concerned 2 individuals
who had been stopped for approximately 20 and 30 minutes respectively,
while the police searched them for articles in connection with
terrorism. The powers to stop and search were exercised under
sections 44 - 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000. There is no requirement
for such a stop and search to be based on any reasonable suspicion.
It was common ground that the stop was in no sense voluntary:
the Act gives a constable the power to detain for the purpose
of the search, and to use reasonable force to detain; non-compliance
is an offence. A person so detained had to remain for as long
as it took in order to complete the search, with no limit of time
on the face of the legislation.
In considering whether the power was compliant with
Article 5, it was held that the exercise of stop and search powers
would not ordinarily involve a deprivation of liberty within the
meaning of Article 5. Lord Bingham, noting the Guzzardi
decision, looked at the factors which would distinguish between
a mere restriction on liberty of movement and a situation in which
Article 5 is engaged. He held that the instant case was not one
to which Article 5 applied, and that the legislation was compatible
with the Human Rights Act 1998, based on the following factors:
stops under section 44 would ordinarily be brief, they did not
involve the person being arrested, handcuffed, confined or kept
in custody. The appellants were detained only in the sense of
being prevented from proceeding, or being made to wait. There
was therefore no deprivation of liberty in such a case [para 26].
In the alternative, Lord Bingham held that were such
a stop to involve a deprivation of liberty, it was permitted by
Article 5(1)(b) (detention to secure fulfilment of obligation
prescribed by law). Since the legislation makes it an offence
to obstruct a constable in the exercise of this power, the obligation
had been prescribed by law.
In deciding where these powers fall between restrictions
on liberty of movement, and deprivation of liberty, it is clear
that the power in clause 20(1) is similar to that considered in
Gillan. The same factors mentioned in Lord Bingham's speech at
paragraph 26 apply equally to our proposed power to stop and question.
The detained person will not be handcuffed or imprisoned, and
while there is no explicit duration stated in the clause, the
questioning would normally amount to no more than a few minutes.
Other than in unusual or special circumstances, questioning will
only be for a very limited time because it can only relate to
the matters stated in that clause.
Moreover, if this power does engage Article 5, by
the same reasoning as Gillan, it is justified because it is in
order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by
law. The public are, by virtue of the provisions in clause 20(3)(non-compliance
is an offence) and 32(3) (use of reasonable force) placed under
an obligation to provide any information relating to the matters
in clause 20 if requested to do so by the police and army and
any detention is to secure that information.
For these reasons I am content this clause satisfies
Article 5.
Turning to your specific question, we do not have
the requirement that the stop be reasonably necessary as it appears
to add little in the way of safeguards but confers significant
disadvantages.
The duration of questioning of individuals under
this power is limited only by reference to what is necessary.
The decision as to how long a detention is necessary cannot logically
be qualified by 'reasonableness' - it is either necessary or it
is not. While the concept of reasonable suspicion can be contrasted
with unreasonable suspicion, there is no analogous concept of
unreasonable necessity.
We do not think this, in fact, adds anything. Whether
a particular decision was necessary can be probed and subject
to cross examination; while it is a subjective decision of the
officer that does not mean it is closed to challenge. It remains
open to a court on the facts to find that it was not necessary,
or that the officer did not believe it to be necessary. This is
a safeguard against abuse, but avoids the danger that a reference
to reasonableness in the legislation would introduce an element
of uncertainty as to the scope of the power. That would undermine
the ability of police officers and especially members of the armed
forces (who are not as experienced as police officers in applying
such legal requirements) to use the power effectively. This in
turn would affect the operational effectiveness of police and
armed forces in Northern Ireland.
We therefore believe that the addition of the word
'reasonably' would introduce uncertainty whilst providing no real
benefit.
Q12 - What is the precise justification for not
requiring a member of the armed forces to state the grounds for
arrest when exercising this power?
Although we expect the armed forces to be deployed
less and less, it is still necessary for them to have a power
of arrest in order for them to be operationally effective when
they are deployed. Their ongoing role in Northern Ireland will
include a potential role in public order incidents, if the Chief
Constable judges such support necessary. This is not a role the
armed forces are expected to fulfil in England and Wales. During
such a deployment it would be impossible for the armed forces
to operate effectively if they were not able to arrest individuals
who were, for instance, involved in public order offences and
posing a risk to members of the armed forces. It would be impractical
to expect the police service to carry out arrests on behalf of
the armed forces in an active operational environment. It is also
worth noting the considerable differences in the operating environment
for the armed forces between Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
which remains a unique operating environment despite the progress
towards normalisation seen in recent years. Thus, a simple to
use power of arrest that is effective in the range of circumstances
in which it might arise, and is suitable for members of the forces
(who will not have the extensive experience of the police in exercising
such powers) is essential.
In considering the armed forces' power of arrest
I note that any detention within the meaning of Article 5 must
comply with the procedural safeguards in paragraphs (2) -(4).
This power of arrest is justifiable because it falls within one
of the exceptions to the right to liberty in Article 5(1).
Article 5(2) requires that a person be informed promptly
of the reasons for his or her detention. That obligation has been
held to require that a person be informed in simple non-technical
language of the factual basis for the detention, and in particular
be given an opportunity to deny the allegation.
The purpose of the arrest power is to enable members
of the armed forces to arrest individuals, and hold them for a
period sufficient to enable the police to arrive without imposing
the detailed requirements which police officers must comply with.
Police officers, having a greater knowledge and understanding
of evidential issues will generally be able to make a more accurate
assessment of the situation and decide whether the person should
be re-arrested for the offence or released. 4 hours is the maximum
time for which a person will be held pending that decision - in
the vast majority of cases it is a much shorter time. If the police
do re-arrest, they apply the PACE (Northern Ireland) Order 1989,
which fulfils the obligation in Article 5(2).
The maximum period of delay is therefore 4 hours
before the information is given to the individual. It has been
held that the requirement that the relevant information be given
'promptly' does not imply that it should be at the moment of arrest.
In Fox, Campbell and Hartley, the ECtHR considered the
case of 3 individuals who had been arrested and detained for some
hours before being interviewed. It was accepted by all parties
that the arrest did not comply with the obligation in Article
5(2). It was held that the applicants had sufficient information
to enable them to understand the grounds for their detention and
to deny the allegations only at the point they were interviewed
- in all the cases this was some hours later. In the case of the
applicants Fox and Campbell, they were arrested at 3.40pm and
questioned at between 8.15 and 10pm the same day. Mr Hartley was
arrested 7.55 am and questioned at 11.05 - 12.15 pm the same day.
The Court held that the requirement for 'prompt' information could
be satisfied if it was given within this time scale: "in
the context of the present case these intervals if a few hours
cannot be regarded as falling outside the constraints of time
imposed by the notion of promptness in article 5(2)."
I am therefore content that this clause satisfies
the procedural requirement in Article 5(2).
The rationale for this decision is so as not to impose
excessive requirements on the armed forces. Members of the armed
forces are not trained police officers, and could not realistically
be expected to fully exercise the procedural rules which constables
can. In addition, the changing role of the armed forces in Northern
Ireland will mean they are deployed with less and less frequently;
we expect the power of arrest will therefore be used increasingly
rarely, making it even more impractical for members of the armed
forces to become familiar with these procedural requirements.
There is a danger that these powers would be impossible
to apply if they were too onerous. If the grounds of arrest were
wrongly stated by a member of the armed forces it could mean that
the arrest would be held to be unlawful, and any actions to restrain
the individual may also be illegal. If members of the armed forces
became reluctant or uncertain about the use of these powers, their
ability to react appropriately to complex and fast-moving situations
would severely hampered.
It may reassure you to know that, although there
is no requirement on the face of the provision, in fact where
a person is detained by a member of the armed forces they will
be informed in general terms of the reason for their arrest. Soldiers
are given guidance in training to state "as a member of Her
Majesty's Forces I am arresting you for… (reason)".
In giving their reason the solider would normally refer to the
facts giving rise to the arrest - such as the individual being
seen throwing a petrol bomb.
Members of the armed forces, unlike police officers,
are neither trained nor empowered to question detainees under
caution. In those rare situations when members of the armed forces
are forced to arrest suspects the circumstances of the arrest,
and anything said by the suspect, would be reported by the soldiers
when they transferred the suspect to the PSNI. This information
is obviously relevant for a decision by the PSNI as to the propriety
of any continued detention after transfer. But any policy which
required soldiers to question detainees would be inappropriate
as it would trespass into powers and responsibilities properly
reserved to the PSNI.
Q13 - Bearing in mind that the member of the armed
forces must suspect that the person arrested has committed, was
committing or was about to commit an offence, why should the arresting
officer not be required at the very least to inform the detainee
of the facts which are the foundation of the decision to detain,
and asked whether he admits or denies the allegation?
As noted above, the practice is to explain the factual
grounds giving rise to the arrest. As the power is compatible
with Article 5(2), imposing any further requirement would be too
onerous and risks undermining the usefulness of the power.
Q14 - Why is the power of entry not at least expressed
in objective terms, such as where the police officer or member
of the armed services reasonably considers it
necessary?
The danger, as with the issue raised in question
11, is that this creates uncertainty. The test proposed would
be a mixture of subject and objective. The power is designed to
be used in situations such as when an individual is spotted running
into a private house after the firing of shots during a public
order event. Such situations require the ability to react swiftly
to changing events. The danger of introducing this test is that
it may prevent officers making decisions which are operationally
necessary because they are not certain whether a third party would
consider it to be reasonably necessary. Moreover, it also provides
fertile ground for argument as to whether a particular decision
was reasonably necessary or not. Currently, as with the power
to stop and question, the officer's factual basis for believing
the action to be necessary can be tested in court and it would
be open to a court to find that it was not necessary, or that
he did not believe it to be necessary, and to take such action
as is appropriate. This provides oversight and safeguards, without
causing uncertainty as to the scope of the power.
Q15 - Which of the enumerated exceptions to the
right to liberty in Article 5 does the Government rely on in cases
where the exercise of this power amounts to a deprivation of liberty?
This power is limited to four hours, although may
be extended to eight on appropriate authority. The arguments in
response to question 11 are equally appropriate here; the use
of this power would normally amount to a restriction rather than
detention, and therefore would not normally engage Article 5.
However, the power could clearly be applied in ways,
and for a duration which would engage Article 5. In such a case,
the power, like that exercised in Gillan is in order to
secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law - the
Bill includes an offence at paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 of obstructing
or frustrating a search of the premises.
The Committee will also wish to be aware that such
powers are in part provided for the safety of police officers
and members of the armed forces conducting the searches, as individuals
may seek to set off devices hidden within the premises to disrupt
a search and injure officers and members of the armed forces.
The police and armed forces have used similar powers
for a number of years and are clear that they are only used in
a proportionate manner. The powers are unlikely to be used unless
individuals attempt to interfere with searches, attempt to leave
the property or take other actions which require the police or
army to respond. Officers and members of the armed forces take
into account the circumstances in the premises - for instance
they may allow a mother-in-law entry to the premises where a young
mother is at home with a number of young children (making clear
to her that she may not be allowed to leave again for a period
of time). General police search guidance focuses on a taking a
practical approach to searches, such as by ensuring that kitchens
and toilets are searched first, in order to make them available
again. I am confident that in fact the power will be exercised
in a way which is outwith Article 5, but where Article 5 is engaged,
the guidance to which you refer will help to ensure that the powers
are used in a way which is proportionate and does not violate
Article 5.
Q16 - Will the Government make available in draft
form while the Bill is still before Parliament the guidance on
which it intends to rely to ensure that the power is not exercised
incompatibly with Article 5?
The Committee will understand that such guidance
will take time to develop. However, I intend to make a draft of
the guidance available during the passage of the Bill, most likely
for the House of Lords stages.
I have tried to answer your questions as fully as
possible and I hope that this will help the Committee in its deliberations
on the Bill. Please let me know if I can assist in any other way.
Appendix 1 Attorney-General's Guidelines
Exercise by the crown of its right of stand-by
1. Although the law has long recognised the right
of the Crown to exclude a member of a jury panel from sitting
as a juror by the exercise in open court of the right to request
a stand-by or, if necessary, by challenge for cause, it has been
customary for those instructed to prosecute on behalf of the Crown
to assert that right only sparingly and in exceptional circumstances.
It is generally accepted that the prosecution should not use its
right in order to in?uence the overall composition of a jury or
with a view to tactical advantage.
2. The approach outlined above is founded on the
principles that (a) the members of a jury should be selected at
random from the panel subject to any rule of law as to right of
challenge by the defence, and (b) the Juries Act 1974 together
with the Juries (Disquali?cation) Act 1984 identi?ed those classes
of persons who alone are disquali?ed from or ineligible for service
on a jury. No other class of person may be treated as disquali?ed
or ineligible.
3. The enactment by Parliament of s. 118 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 abolishing the right of defendants to remove
jurors by means of peremptory challenge makes it appropriate that
the Crown should assert its right to stand by only on the basis
of clearly de?ned and restrictive criteria. Derogation from the
principle that members of a jury should be selected at random
should be permitted only where it is essential.
4. Primary responsibility for ensuring that an individual
does not serve on a jury if he is not competent to discharge properly
the duties of a juror rests with the appropriate court officer
and, ultimately, the trial judge. Current legislation provides,
in ss. 9 and 10 of the Juries Act 1974, fairly wide discretions
to excuse or discharge jurors either at the person's own request,
where he offers 'good reason why he should be excused', or where
the judge determines that 'on account of physical disability or
insufficient understanding of English there is doubt as to his
capacity to act effectively as a juror'.
5. The circumstances in which it would be proper
for the Crown to exercise its right to stand by a member of a
jury panel are: (a) where a jury check authorised in accordance
with the Attorney-General's guidelines on jury checks reveals
information justifying exercise of the right to stand by in accordance
with para. 9 of the guidelines and the Attorney-General personally
authorises the exercise of the right to stand by; or (b) where
a person is about to be sworn as a juror who is manifestly unsuitable
and the defence agree that, accordingly, the exercise by the prosecution
of the right to stand by would be appropriate. An example of the
sort of exceptional circumstances which might justify stand-by
is where it becomes apparent that, despite the provisions mentioned
in para. 4 above, a juror selected for service to try a complex
case is in fact illiterate.
Jury checks
1. The principles which are generally to be observed
are (a) that members of a jury should be selected at random from
the panel, (b) the Juries Act 1974 together with the Juries (Disquali?cation)
Act 1984 identi?ed those classes of persons who alone are either
disquali?ed from or ineligible for service on a jury; no other
class of person may be treated as disquali?ed or ineligible, and
(c) the correct way for the Crown to seek to exclude a member
of the panel from sitting as a juror is by the exercise in open
court of the right to request a stand-by or, if necessary, to
challenge for cause.
2. Parliament has provided safeguards against jurors
who may be corrupt or biased. In addition to the provision for
majority verdicts, there is the sanction of a criminal offence
for a disquali?ed person to serve on a jury. The omission of a
disquali?ed person from the panel is a matter for court officials
but any search of criminal records for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not a jury panel includes any disquali?ed person is
a matter for the police as the only authority able to carry out
such a search and as part of their usual function of preventing
the commission of offences. The recommendations of the Association
of Chief Police Officers respecting checks on criminal records
for disquali?ed persons are annexed to these guidelines.
3. There are, however, certain exceptional types
of case of public importance for which the provisions as to majority
verdicts and the disquali?cation of jurors may not be sufficient
to ensure the proper administration of justice. In such cases
it is in the interests of both justice and the public that there
should be further safeguards against the possibility of bias and
in such cases checks which go beyond the investigation of criminal
records may be necessary.
4. These classes of case may be de?ned broadly as
(a) cases in which national security is involved and part of the
evidence is likely to be heard in camera, and (b) terrorist cases.
5. The particular aspects of these cases which may
make it desirable to seek extra precautions are (a) in security
cases a danger that a juror, either voluntarily or under pressure,
may make an improper use of evidence which, because of its sensitivity,
has been given in camera, (b) in both security and terrorist cases
the danger that a juror's political beliefs are so biased as to
go beyond normally re?ecting the broad spectrum of views and interests
in the community to re?ect the extreme views of sectarian interest
or pressure group to a degree which might interfere with his fair
assessment of the facts of the case or lead him to exert improper
pressure on his fellow jurors.
6. In order to ascertain whether in exceptional circumstances
of the above nature either of these factors might seriously in?uence
a potential juror's impartial performance of his duties or his
respecting the secrecy of evidence given in camera, it may be
necessary to conduct a limited investigation of the panel. In
general, such further investigation beyond one of criminal records
made for disquali?cations may only be made with the records of
police Special Branches. However, in cases falling under para.
4(a) above (security cases), the investigation may, additionally,
involve the security services. No checks other than on these sources
and no general inquiries are to be made save to the limited extent
that they may be needed to con?rm the identity of a juror about
whom the initial check has raised serious doubts.
7. No further investigation, as described in para.
6 above, should be made save with the personal authority of the
Attorney-General on the application of the Director of Public
Prosecutions and such checks are hereafter referred to as 'authorised
checks'. When a chief officer of police has reason to believe
that it is likely that an authorised check may be desirable and
proper in accordance with these guidelines he should refer the
matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions with a view to his
having the conduct of the prosecution from an early stage. The
Director will make any appropriate application to the Attorney-General.
8. The result of any authorised check will be sent
to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Director will then
decide, having regard to the matters set out in para. 5 above,
what information ought to be brought to the attention of prosecuting
counsel.
9. No right of stand-by should be exercised by counsel
for the Crown on the basis of information obtained as a result
of an authorised check save with the personal authority of the
Attorney-General and unless the information is such as, having
regard to the facts of the case and the offences charged, to afford
strong reason for believing that a particular juror might be a
security risk, be susceptible to improper approaches or be in?uenced
in arriving at a verdict for the reasons given above.
10. Where a potential juror is asked to stand by
for the Crown, there is no duty to disclose to the defence the
information on which it was founded; but counsel may use his discretion
to disclose it if its nature and source permit it.
11. When information revealed in the course of an
authorised check is not such as to cause counsel for the Crown
to ask for a juror to stand by but does give reason to believe
that he may be biased against the accused, the defence should
be given, at least, an indication of why that potential juror
may be inimical to their interests; but because of its nature
and source it may not be possible to give the defence more than
a general indication.
12. A record is to be kept by the Director of Public
Prosecutions of the use made by counsel of the information passed
to him and of the jurors stood by or challenged by the parties
to the proceedings. A copy of this record is to be forwarded to
the Attorney-General for the sole purpose of enabling him to monitor
the operation of these guidelines.
13. No use of the information obtained as a result
of an authorised check is to be made except as may be necessary
in direct relation to or arising out of the trial for which the
check was authorised.
Appendix 2: Letter dated 16 January
from The Rt Hon The Baroness Ashton of Upholland, Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State, re Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Bill
Thank you for your letter of 19 December, asking
for a further explanation of the Government's view that provisions
in Part 3 of the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights.
Taking your points in turn:
1. Why does the Government consider that the "reasonable
belief" of an enforcement agent as to the status of individual
premises as the basis for a) entry without a warrant and b) the
use of forced re-entry without prior judicial authorisation provides
adequate protection to debtors, and other third parties, rights
to respect for their home and private life (Article 8 ECHR)?
Article 8 is a qualified right. It is limited in
that interference is allowed as is permitted by the law for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. A successful
monetary claim represents a "possession" of the creditor,
and therefore lawful creditors have the right pursuant to Article
1, Protocol 1 ECHR to enjoy their "possessions" and
not to be deprived of them. It is necessary, of course, to find
an appropriate balance between the rights of debtors and creditors
which, in my view, the Bill achieves.
Having said that, I do accept that the enforcement
agent should have a reasonable belief that he is attending the
right property before attempting entry or re-entry into premises.
This will be based upon the evidence that the agent will have
to hand when calling at the premises.
When calling for a judgment, the enforcement agent
will be acting upon the information contained within a warrant
issued by the courts. When calling for a tax debt, the agent will
be acting upon information held on government records, provided
and updated by the taxpayer. When calling for a CRAR debt, the
agent will be calling at the address specified within the tenancy
agreement. This information should give the enforcement agent
a "reasonable belief" that he is calling at the right
premises. If calling at premises other than where the agent reasonably
believes the debtor resides or carries on a trade or business,
the agent will require prior judicial authority to do so.
2. Has the Government considered limiting powers
of forcible re-entry without judicial oversight to purely commercial
premises (i.e. by excluding properties occupied as a dwelling)
in order to limit the risk posed to debtors and their families
and to third parties rights to respect for their home and to their
physical integrity (i.e. those rights protected by Article 8 ECHR)?
Yes, we are considering whether to amend to the Bill
to restrict re-entry without a warrant to premises that are wholly
commercial.
3. What conditions do the Government consider
must be satisfied before a warrant for forced entry will be compatible
with the rights of debtors and third parties under Articles 6
and 8 ECHR and Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR? Why are these conditions
not expressly included on the face of the Bill?
I have outlined in the detailed policy statement
on delegated powers for the Bill (a copy of which is enclosed)
the conditions the Government believes a judge should take into
account before granting a warrant for entry using reasonable force.
They are contained at paragraphs 149-150, and are repeated below:
"149. Judicial authority may be granted under
paragraph 20 or 21 provided that prescribed conditions are met.
It is intended that the court's power should only be used as a
last resort and each individual case will be judged upon its merits.
The conditions of which the court needs to be satisfied for granting
forced entry will be contained in regulations under paragraph
22(1) of Schedule 12. It is our intention that these conditions
will include:
- that other methods of enforcement have failed;
- the property is inhabited by the debtor;
- normal entry attempts have been unsuccessful;
- there is reason to believe there are suitable goods
on the premises to satisfy the debt (and evidence to support that
belief);
- the enforcement agent has considered the likely
means required to gain entry; and
- the enforcement agent will leave the property in
a secure state.
150. The judge may also take other factors into account
when making his decision, including:
- the size of the debt;
- the type of debt; and
- any other information about the debtor's personal
circumstances."
I believe these conditions to be sufficient to ensure
that the provisions relating to warrants for forced entry are
ECHR compliant. The conditions are not on the face of the Bill
to ensure the necessary flexibility to change these requirements
in the future, should circumstances dictate, without the need
for further primary legislation.
Of course, it is important to bear in mind that judges
will rightly have the discretion to make appropriate decisions
in individual cases, based on the evidence with which they are
presented.
4. Why is the Government persuaded that the new
certification scheme will ensure that enforcement agents have
adequate and appropriate levels of experience to ensure that in
practice, their extended powers of entry are used in a way which
respects Convention rights?
The new enhanced and extended certification process
will include a requirement for enforcement agents to undergo training
in certain key areas. Therefore as well as needing a thorough
knowledge of enforcement law, agents will have to undergo training
in fields such as diversity awareness, dealing with conflict (including
restraint techniques), and identifying vulnerable or potentially
vulnerable debtor groups. Such training will ensure that enforcement
agents are fully aware of the rights of all parties with whom
they come into contact guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR and Article
1, Protocol 1 ECHR.
Judicial oversight of the system will also ensure
impartiality in its application. Judges will have a discretion
not to award certificates if the applicant has not successfully
completed the required training or has failed to exhibit a full
understanding of these rights. Also, debtors or a third party
will be able to complain about the actions of a certificated enforcement
agent to the judge who issued the certificate. This procedure
will be more easily accessible and more widely advertised than
the complaints procedure for the current certification scheme,
and will enable complaints to dealt with speedily and appropriately,
should an agent abuse their position.
5. What conditions do the Government imagine might
be applied to individual certificates to ensure that appropriate
levels of experience and maturity are guaranteed? Is there any
reason why these conditions, or categories of conditions, could
not be specified on the face of the Bill?
Concepts such as 'experience' and 'maturity' would
be very difficult to define. Certificates will be granted on the
basis of the applicant producing evidence of having completed
the relevant training and exhibiting a suitable level of knowledge
of the law, as well as providing suitable bonds, insurance etc,
rather than based on concepts such as 'experience' or 'maturity'.
Any conditions of a certificate would relate to the debts that
an agent can enforce or the geographical area in which he can
operate, rather than dealing with issues such as 'experience'.
Judges will have the right to refuse an application for a certificate
where an applicant has not sufficiently exhibited the right knowledge
or skills. Again, for reasons of flexibility, I would prefer to
leave such definitions to delegated legislation.
6. What has persuaded the Government that permitting
third parties to assist enforcement agents in the execution of
forced entry does not create a risk that debt recovery agencies
may exercise their powers in a manner which poses a disproportionate
interference with the Convention rights of debtors, their families,
and third parties?
I believe there are justifications for allowing third
parties to assist the enforcement agent, for instance by providing
assistance at large premises and preparing detailed inventories.
In addition, the enforcement agent will be personally responsible
for actions taken, which will include actions taken by those assisting
him (other than offences against the person committed by those
assisting him, in which case the assistant will be personally
liable), in the enforcement of the writ, warrant or statutory
debt concerned. The fact that steps can be taken personally against
the enforcement agent (by way of the remedies previously outlined)
should ensure that the behaviour, by both the agent and those
assisting him, is not a disproportionate interference with the
rights of debtors, their families or third parties under Article
8 ECHR and Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR.
I should add, by way of clarification, that the Bill
will regulate "enforcement agents" and not debt collectors
(you referred to 'debt recovery agencies' in question 6). Debt
collectors are already regulated under the Consumer Credit Act
1974.
7. What limitations do the Government intend to
impose on the use of enforcement powers by enforcement agents
and those who assist them? What safeguards does the Government
consider necessary to protect the right to respect for the home,
and family life and to protect individual rights to physical integrity?
Limits on the actions of enforcement agents will
be set out in regulations, and will include the following:
- certain goods will be exempt from seizure in accordance
with a prescribed list;
- there will be restrictions as to the times at which
an enforcement agent will be permitted to attend a debtor's premises;
- access to premises will be restricted to 'normal'
methods (i.e. doors or French - windows, and not, for example,
via open windows, skylights, or by putting a foot in the door);
and
- force will only be permitted in order to restrain
debtors who are actively physically obstructing or threatening
the enforcement agent or resisting the taking into control of
goods.
I believe that these restrictions will provide sufficient
protection to debtors' rights to respect for the home and family
life and to protect individual rights to physical integrity whilst
also taking into account the rights of the creditor.
8. We would be grateful if you could confirm that
any enforcement agent, or third party assistant, acting in excess
of their powers to use reasonable force against persons will be
liable for prosecution for offences against the person.
I can confirm that all enforcement agents and third
party helpers remain subject to the law when carrying out their
duties, for example, they may be prosecuted for assault.
9. We note your commitment to provide in time
for Committee stage in the House of Lords a policy statement on
how the Government intends to use the delegated powers in the
Bill (HL Deb, 29 November 2006, Col 803). We would be grateful
if a copy of this statement (or any draft statement) could be
made available to the Committee as soon as possible.
I understand that a copy of the detailed policy statement
has already been sent to the Clerk to the Committee, but I enclose
a further copy. This document has also been published on the DCA
website at: http://www.dca.gov.uk/legist/delegated-powers.pdf.
I hope that the Committee finds this helpful.
128 EN paras 153-4. Back
129
EN para. 7. Back
130
Clause 1(2)(a) and (3)(b). Back
131
EN paras 34 and 154. Back
132
EN para. 156. Back
133
Clause 12. Back
134
EN para. 157. Back
135
Fourteenth Report of Session 2002-03, Work of the Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission, HL Paper 132/HC 142. Back
136
Nineteenth Report of Session 2004-05, The Work of the Committee
in the 2001-2005 Parliament, HL Paper 112/HC 552, paras 162
to 166. Back
137
para. 14. Back
138
Clause 20(1). Back
139
Clause 20(2). Back
140
EN para. 162. Back
141
Clause 21(1). Back
142
Caluse 21(2). Back
143
Clause 21(5). Back
144
EN paras 60-61. Back
145
Clause 22(1). Back
146
Schedule 3, para. 2. Back
147
Ibid., para. 3. Back
148
EN para. 163. Back
149
Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.69(1). Back
150
Ibid, s.69(3). Back
151
Ibid, s.69(4). Back
152
Ibid, s.69(6). Back
153
HC Deb, 13 December 2006, col. 900. Back
