Appendix 3: Gender Recognition Bill
Letter from the Christian Institute and Opinion
from James Dingemans QC
When the Gender Recognition Bill was considered by
the House of Lords, I know that you were concerned about the Bill's
implications for religious liberty. That is why we wanted you
to see a copy of this new legal opinion. The advice is that this
legislation does put religious liberty at risk.
The enclosed opinion by James Dingemans QC concludes
that the Bill contains provisions "which are likely to infringe
the religious rights of individuals" and leaves Churches
which act in accordance with their beliefs open to litigation
which "is likely to be divisive, costly and of benefit only
to the lawyers".
The Bill provides exemptions for pension companies
and sporting bodies—but not Churches. Under the Bill normal
counselling and pastoral practice can be made a criminal offence,
in some cases punishable by a £5,000 fine.
In the rush to get this legislation onto the statute
book, it appears the Government has not considered the implications
for religious liberties. Perhaps it would have been helpful if
the Joint Committee on Human Rights had expressly considered the
position of religious organisations [para 20 of the opinion].
In your capacity as a member of the Joint Committee
on Human Rights, can I urge you to look into this issue as a matter
of great urgency? We understand that the remaining stages of the
Bill will be debated in the Commons in the next month or so.
Can I ask you, even at this late stage, to press
the Government to amend the legislation to ensure that religious
bodies are properly protected?
25 March 2004
Summary of the opinion
James Dingemans QC was asked to consider the implications
of the Bill for religious freedoms. The main conclusions are as
follows:
Disclosure
There are many legitimate circumstances [para 21]
where one Church leader would need to disclose a transsexual's
birth sex to another leader. Under the Bill this is made unlawful
unless the individual consents.
Criminalising Church leaders would 'infringe' their
religious rights and freedoms: "Their ability to project
their message about beliefs in relation to transsexualism would
be effectively removed." Under the Bill pension companies
will be protected, but religious organisations will not [para
22].
Litigation against religious bodies
Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) there is "the prospect
of divisive and costly litigation" against Churches using
the SDA [para 28].
The Human Rights Act could lead to the decisions
of C of E ministers on baptism or confirmation being brought before
the secular courts [para 29].
Ultimately although such litigation should fail,
there are lengthy court cases ahead for Churches [para 30] and
the Bill gives scope for litigation against individual Churches
which "is likely to be divisive, costly and of benefit only
to the lawyers." [para 32]
Marriage
The Bill permits a member of the Church of England
clergy to refuse to conduct a marriage involving a transsexual.
There is some legal controversy as to whether a person residing
in a parish can insist on having a marriage celebrated in the
parish Church. There could therefore be complicated legal arguments
in court if a C of E parish Church did not want to hold a transsexual
wedding [paras 25-26].
Article 9
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998, provides for
an unqualified right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
ECHR law establishes the following principles:
1. Religious rights have a 'primordial place'
in democratic society and the 'pluralism indissociable' from democratic
society depends on religious rights [para 17.1];
2. there is an increasing burden on Parliament
to protect religious views [para 17.2];
3. any State interference with the right of freedom
of association for religion would be difficult to justify [para
17.3].
Christian opposition to transsexual lifestyles, cogently
argued, is a religious belief protected by Article 9 [para 18].
Religious beliefs are already protected by exemptions from several
other pieces of legislation [paras 19.1-19.4].
ADVICE
1. I have been asked to advise in relation to
concerns about religious freedoms raised in connection with the
Gender Recognition Bill (as printed on 11 February 2004), 'the
Bill'.
2. The Bill has been produced in part response
to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin
v The United Kingdom (11 July 2002). In that case it was held
that a person who had been the subject of a sex change ought to
have the right to seek recognition in the acquired gender. The
absence of such a right violated the applicant's rights guaranteed
by articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
'ECHR', namely the right to respect for private and family life
and the right to marry.
3. The effect of the Bill is that if a gender
recognition certificate is issued to a person (who has or has
had gender dysphoria and who has lived in the acquired gender
for a period of two years) 'the person's gender becomes for all
purposes the acquired gender'. It becomes an offence, among other
things, to disclose a person's historical gender if the information
has been obtained 'in connections with the functions of ... a
voluntary organisation'. It appears from published guidance that
there are about some 5,000 persons affected in the United Kingdom.
4. I am instructed that the principal concerns
about religious freedoms relate to:
4.1 The criminalisation of persons for disclosing
a person's original gender in circumstances where the person believes
that it is necessary to do so to act consistently with their religious
beliefs;
4.2 That religious bodies might be the subject
of litigation by transsexuals or trans persons (I have used the
term 'trans person' in this Advice—reflecting the terminology
in recent cases and articles) asserting a right to marry;
4.3 That the Bill will increase the prospect
of litigation against religious bodies.
THE RELIGIOUS BELIEF
5. There are religious organisations whose beliefs
on transsexualism are summarised in the document 'Christian beliefs
on transsexualism', Christian Institute, March 2004. In the document
reference is made to passages from the bible and to the works
of Christian theologians to support the propositions that: 'the
body determines personhood, not just the mind'; and that 'Biblical
Christians hold that sex change' surgery desecrates a body made
in the image of God. And the Bible teaches that the State should
validate what is right and not what is wrong'. For these reasons
individual Churches wish to be free to decide such matters as
who should join or lead ladies' prayer meetings, who should use
ladies' lavatories and who should be entitled to receive Holy
Communion.
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
6. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 'ECHR', scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998, provides
for an unqualified right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion and a further right to manifest religion, or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. This further right
is subject to the right of States to limit the right so long as
the limitations are prescribed by law, and are necessary in a
democratic society. Religious rights are also protected by article
10 (freedom of expression), article 11 (freedom of peaceful assembly)
and article 2 of the first protocol (State to respect the rights
of parents to ensure education in conformity with their own religious
and philosophical convictions).
7. The European Court of Human Rights has considered
religious rights in a number of decisions. In Kokkinakis v
Greece 1993 17 EHRR 397 it was said (at paragraph 31) that
'freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations
of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the Convention.
It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements
that go to make up the identity of believers and of their conception
of life ... the pluralism indissociable from a democratic society,
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. While
religious freedom is primarily a matter of conscience, it also
implies, inter alia, freedom to 'manifest [one's] religion'. Bearing
witness in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious
convictions'. In that case reference was made to the report in
1956 drawn up under the auspices of the World Council of Churches
which recognised that bearing Christian witness was a responsibility
of every Christian and every Church'. In Kokkinakis a law
under which a Jehovah's Witness had been prosecuted for bearing
witness (to the wife of a Greek Orthodox minister) was said in
that case to have infringed the religious rights of the Jehovah's
Witness.
8. In Otto-Preminger v Austria 1994 EHRR 34
in which the actions of the Austrian State in seizing a film satirising
religious beliefs was upheld, the statements made in Kokkinakis
were repeated. It was also said (at paragraph 47) 'those who choose
to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective
of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a
minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism.
They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious
beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile
to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs
and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage
the responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to
ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guarantee under article
9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme
cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying
religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such
beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them'.
9. In Wingrove v United Kingdom 1996 24 EHRR
1 a case upholding a refusal to classify a film which infringed
the laws of blasphemy, it was said by the Commission (at page
18, paragraph 52) that 'the Court has emphasised the primordial
place in a democratic society of freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, safeguarded by article 9 of the Convention'.
10. As part of religious freedom it has been
held that religious organisations must be able to choose with
whom to associate. As was pointed out in X v Denmark 1976 5
DR 157 'a Church is an organised religious community based
on identical or at least substantially similar views. Through
the rights granted to its members under article 9, the church
itself is protected in its right to manifest its religion, to
organise and carry out worship, teaching practice and observance,
and it is free to act out and enforce uniformity in these matters'.
11. This approach was reaffirmed in Hasan
v Bulgaria 2002 EHRR 1339. In that case the State had recognised
one individual, but not another, as leader of the Muslim community.
In that case the European Court of Human Rights (at paragraphs
60 to 62) stated 'While religious freedom is primarily a matter
of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom
to manifest one's religion, alone and in private, or in community
with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith
one shares ... The Court recalls that religious communities traditionally
and universally exist in the form of organised structures. They
abide by rules which are often seen by followers as being of a
divine origin ... Where the organisation of the religious community
is at issue, article 9 must be interpreted in the light of article
11 of the Convention which safeguards associative life against
unjustified State interference. Seen in this perspective, the
believer's right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation
that the community will be allowed to function peacefully free
from arbitrary State intervention. Indeed the autonomous existence
of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic
society and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection
which article 9 affords.' The Court specifically rejected (at
paragraph 81) a Government argument that nothing prevented the
applicant and others from organising meetings stating 'it cannot
seriously be maintained that any State action short of restricting
the freedom of assembly could not amount to an interference with
the rights protected by article 9 of the Convention even though
it adversely affected the internal life of the religious community'.
12. Other jurisdictions have recognised that
the State should not be entitled to force an organisation to accept
persons whose lifestyle is inconsistent with the values which
the organisation seeks to promote. In Boy Scouts of America
v Dale 2000 8 BHRR 535 the United States Supreme Court noted
that the presence of a homosexual scout master in the scouts 'would,
at the very least, force the organisation to send a message, both
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behaviour'. This was
contrary to the message which the Boy Scouts wanted to promote.
It was noted that the acceptance of homosexual behaviour had become
more widespread and that the views of the Boy Scouts might be
considered to be increasingly out of step with the views of society
as a whole. It was noted that this factor did not diminish the
rights of the Boy Scouts to protection.
13. It is plain that the manifestation of religious
beliefs in spheres beyond the religious organisations can cause
all sorts of problems for society. This was a point made by Rix
LJ in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and
Employment 2003 QB 1300 at paragraph 95. The ECHR expressly
permits limits to be imposed on such manifestations of religious
beliefs. Areas of conflict have included refusals to work on certain
days of the week, see Kottinnen v Finland 87-A DR 68 and
Stedman v United Kingdom 1997 EHRR CD 168. The wearing
of religious headscarves in secular universities has been said
to be legitimately prevented, see Karaduman v Turkey 74 DR
93. An individual cannot refuse to pay that portion of tax
which is used to support the armed forces despite religious objections,
see C v UK 1983 37 DR 142. Indeed the right of secular
authorities to collect taxes has been the subject of religious
discussion over the centuries.
14. It is also clear that it is not for the State,
or for Courts, to judge religious beliefs. The reason for this
was explained in Dale at page 541. In that case a lower
Court had examined the Scouts' literature and concluded that excluding
homosexuals was inconsistent with its overarching objectives.
The majority of the Court said our cases reject this sort of inquiry;
it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed
values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent'. The majority also cited a case in which it was
said religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent,
or comprehensible to others to merit First Amendment protection'.
15. In R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann
1992 1 WLR 1036 Simon Brown J (now Lord Brown) noted 'the
Court is hardly in a position to regulate what is essentially
a religious function—the determination whether someone is
morally and religiously fit to carry out the spiritual and pastoral
duties of his office. The Court must inevitably be wary of entering
so self-evidently sensitive an area, straying across the well-recognised
divide between Church and State'. In Williamson Arden LJ
recorded (at paragraphs 251 and 252) the proper approach to the
assertion of religious beliefs saying 'In my judgment, it is a
mixed question of fact and law whether a person has a religious
belief for the purpose of article 9. Thus the first step is for
the Judge to make findings on the evidence as to what are the
actual beliefs of the complainant, so far as relevant ... the
second step is for the judge to decide whether those beliefs constitute
religious beliefs for the purposes of the Convention. The latter
is principally a question of law … Religious texts often
form the basis from which adherents develop specific beliefs.
It is not the Court's function to judge whether those beliefs
are fairly based on the passages said to support them. Its function
at the fact-finding stage is to decide what the beliefs are and
whether they are genuinely held by the complainant. The fact that
the beliefs are based on religious texts may help the Court reach
its decision on this factual issue'.
16. For similar reasons, when legislating in
areas of religious beliefs, the legislature must not itself decide
what religious views are, or are not, worthy of recognition. In
his article 'A Reconstruction of Religious Freedom and Equality:
Gay, Lesbian and De Facto Rights and the Religious Schools in
Queensland' Reid Mortensen, senior lecturer in law at the University
of Queensland, Australia noted when reporting on a debate about
the proper ambit of discrimination laws (at page 11) 'a surprising
number of Christians in the Government presented theologically
informed reasons for the application of sexuality and marital
status discrimination laws to employment decisions in religious
schools. They appealed to the principles of tolerance taught by
Christ, the place of free will in the biblical tradition, the
moral insignificance of sexual conduct, the malleability of Christian
morals, and the need for Churches to modernise. These may well
be good and true principles, but if parliamentarians want their
churches, or church schools, to exemplify them then they should
take efforts to do so through the appropriate Synod, congregational
meeting or school council. It is not proper for Christian parliamentarians,
inactive or uninfluential in their own churches' forums, to exploit
the privileged position they have in Parliament, and try to realise
their religious beliefs by use of the coercive powers of government'.
17. In these circumstances it seems to me that
it is possible to identify the following principles:
17.1 Religious rights have a 'primordial place'
in a democratic society and the pluralism indissociable' from
a democratic society depends on religious rights;
17.2 It is not the function of the Courts (or
the legislature) to judge the acceptability of the religious views
(even if the Judge or the members of Parliament are members of
the same religion) if the religious views have attained a sufficient
level of cogency. Indeed, as the views become less accepted by
modern society as a whole, the greater becomes the burden on the
Courts and legislature to protect them;
17.3 Religious rights which have been held to
be of particular importance are the rights to bear witness and
the rights 'to act and enforce uniformity' in the organisations.
Any threatened interference with these rights by others will engage
the responsibility of the State. Any threatened interference with
these rights by the State is unlikely to be capable of justification.
RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PROTECTION
18. It seems to me that the religious beliefs
of those religious organisations who hold views summarised in
the document 'Christian beliefs on transsexualism' have acquired
sufficient cogency (whether or not they are considered to be right
or wrong) to attract protection under article 9 of the ECHR. This
view is part supported by sections 19(3) and (4) of the Sex Discrimination
Act which permitted discrimination by an organised religion on
the grounds that a person had not undergone any gender reassignment.
19. There are a variety of statutory provisions
which provide some measures to protect religious freedoms. These
include:
19.1 The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, as amended.
Section 19 provides that for the purposes of an organised religion
requirements that a person be of a certain sex, or has not undergone
any gender reassignment, are permitted for the purposes of the
doctrines of the religion;
19.2 the School Standards and Framework Act 1998
which provides, at sections 58 to 60, for discrimination in favour
of those holding religious opinions in accordance with the tenets
of the religion or religious denomination specified in relation
to the school;
19.3 the Employment (Religion and Belief) Regulations
2003. These prevent discrimination against persons in relation
to employment on the grounds of their religion or belief. It is
permitted to discriminate on the grounds of religion and belief
where the ethos of the organisation requires a person to be of
a certain religion or belief;
19.4 the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation)
Regulations 2003. These prevent discrimination against persons
in relation to employment on the grounds of sexual orientation
but do provide exemptions for genuine occupational requirements
(under regulation 7(2)) and for organised religions where a requirement
has been applied to comply with the doctrines of religion or to
avoid conflicting with strongly held religious convictions of
a significant number of the religion's followers. These exemptions
are the subject of a challenge brought on behalf of 7 trades unions.
CARE, The Evangelical Alliance and the Christian Schools Trust
have all intervened to make submissions in support of the exemptions
on the basis that they are necessary to protect their religious
rights and freedoms. Counsel for the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry adopted the analysis of religious rights and freedoms
advanced on behalf of the Interveners. Richards J reserved judgment
on Friday 19 March 2004.
DISCLOSURE
20. In the draft Bill provision was made permitting
disclosure 'in the course of official duties'. The Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the Department of Constitutional
Affairs both considered that this was too uncertain to be an interference
which was 'in accordance with law'. This is almost certainly right.
However the provision was removed. No attempt was made to define
the circumstances the provision might be properly used. It does
not appear that the Joint Committee expressly considered the position
of religious organisations.
21. A number of examples where if a disclosure
was made it would be criminal have been set out in appendix 1
of the email sent to me on 15 March 2004. These include a Roman
Catholic priest who is unable to disclose to his Bishop (both
of whom hold the religious beliefs set out in paragraph 5 above)
that a male candidate for ordination is a female to male trans
person; a vicar who is about to perform a marriage by a female
member of his congregation (who holds the religious beliefs set
out in paragraph 5 above) to a person who he knows (from his work)
to be a female to male trans person; a curate who discovers (from
his work) that a marriage candidate is a trans person and that
the vicar (who holds the religious beliefs set out in paragraph
5 above) is about to perform the marriage; one elder of a Church
(which has collectively declared itself to hold the religious
beliefs set out in paragraph 5 above) discovers that a member
of the congregation is a trans person and wants to discuss the
appropriate response with fellow elders.
22. It seems to me that criminalising disclosures
made in these circumstances would infringe the rights and freedoms
of the individuals concerned. The religious organisations would
lose the right to act and enforce uniformity. Their ability to
project their message about beliefs in relation to transsexualism
would be effectively removed. It is obviously necessary to protect
the private lives of trans persons. However it is also necessary
to protect the rights of religious organisations. It seems to
me that, in circumstances where the Bill criminalises disclosures
made by members of voluntary organisations, the Bill must (in
order to protect the religious rights engaged) permit disclosures
necessary to allow the religious organisations to regulate themselves
in accordance with their beliefs. There does not appear to be
any pressing reason why such limited disclosures ought not to
be made. I note that where money is concerned (in the form of
pension schemes) disclosure is permitted, see section 22(4)(h).
The protection of money (and property rights in general) is less
important in a democratic society than the protection of religious
freedoms, see generally Grape Bay v Attorney General of Bermuda
2000 1 WLR 574.
23. Although a defence pursuant to Human Rights
Act 1998 would be available in any criminal proceedings brought
against persons making disclosures it is obviously desirable to
avoid unnecessary litigation. Any such litigation would be unlikely
to foster the main aims of the Bill.
MARRIAGE
24. The Bill provides, at section 11 and schedule
4, for amendments to the Marriage Act 1949. Section SB will provide
that 'A clergyman is not obliged to solemnise the marriage of
a person if the clergyman reasonably believes that the person's
gender has become the acquired gender under the Gender Recognition
Act 2004. A clerk in Holy Orders of the Church in Wales is not
obliged to permit the marriage of a person to be solemnised in
the church or chapel of which the clerk is minister if the clerk
reasonably believes that the person's gender has become the acquired
gender under that Act'.
25. This provision will mean that ministers of
the Church of England and Church of Wales will not be required
to solemnise the marriage of trans persons (again this supports
the analysis that the religious beliefs in this area are entitled
to protection). Ministers in the Church of Wales do not have to
permit their Church or chapel to be used for such a service. There
is some legal controversy about whether or not a person residing
in a parish can insist on having a marriage celebrated in the
parish Church, see Michael Smith at 5 Ecclesiastical Law
Journal 34.
26. The provision permitting a Minister from
refusing to allow the Church of which he is a minister to be used
does not extend to the Church of England. It appears that this
is because the Church of England has not asked for this provision
to apply. Although the absence of such a provision may well infringe
the religious views of a Minister of the Church of England (and
their respective congregations) it does seem to me that the legislature
is entitled to rely on the views expressed by the leaders of the
Church of England in this respect. Part of the right to organise
themselves as a religion means that ministers of a Church have
to accept the rulings from the governing authorities of the Church
(see paragraph 17.3 above). It does not seem to me that it is
for the legislature to determine whether or not the leaders of
the Church of England have authority to agree to such a provision.
Assuming that the leaders of the Church of England have not asked
for such a provision it does not seem to me that individual Ministers
of the Church of England will be able to assert any claim under
the Human Rights Act if such a marriage does take place in the
Church of which they are Minister. This would still leave open
the issue about whether or not a person residing in a parish can
insist on having a marriage celebrated referred to in paragraph
25 above.
27. It does not seem to me that a trans person
could insist on having a marriage service carried out in a non-established
Church pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998. This is because
such a Church would not be a public authority for such purposes,
see Hautaniemi v Sweden Appl No. 24019/94 and Aston Cantlow v
Wallbank 2003 3 WLR 283. Further it seems to me that, even if
the Church was considered to be a public authority within the
meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998, it does not seem to me that
the trans persons' demands to respect for their private lives
and rights to marry would trump the rights of the Minister to
religious freedom.
LITIGATION
28. However there are other arguments which could
be relied on by the trans person in litigation against Churches.
In particular the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 might provide a
means for such litigation. In P v S and Cornwall County Council
1996 ECR 1-2143 the European Court of Justice stated that
'sex discrimination cannot be confined to discrimination based
on the fact that a person is of one or other sex, but that it
includes discrimination which arises as a result of the gender
reassignment of the person concerned'. In KB v NHS Pensions
Agency Case C-117/01 the European Court of Justice noted the
'unshakeable belief of transsexuals that they must obtain recognition'.
In this respect it is to be noted that some Members of Parliament
when discussing the Gender Recognition Bill in the House of Commons
Standing Committee A (pt 3) have expressed the view that the Sex
Discrimination Act will extend into these situations. The interrelationship
of the wording of section 19 of the Sex Discrimination Act (referred
to in paragraph 19.1 above) and section 9 of the Bill ('the person's
gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender') seems to
me to permit of argument. It is possible to submit that if a person's
gender has become for all purposes the acquired gender it cannot
be said that the person has 'undergone gender reassignment'. This
does not seem to me to be the intention of those drafting the
Bill, see the letter dated 8 February 2004 from Lord Filkin. However
it does raise the prospect of divisive and costly litigation.
29. Further possibilities exist for challenge.
Ministers of the Church of England, when performing baptisms or
confirmations, might be carrying out a public function within
the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998. The possibility of litigation
between the trans persons and the Churches then becomes more likely.
In Parry v Vine Christian Centre Cardiff County Court 15 February
2002 proceedings were brought against the Vine Christian Centre
by a trans person in relation to a refusal to permit her to continue
as a member of the Church and to use the female lavatory. The
case was summarily dismissed but it illustrates, even before the
enhanced protections available under the Gender Recognition Bill,
that legal challenges were made.
30. It appears from reports of debates that the
Government view is that such challenges should fail. Although,
for the reasons given above, it seems to me that should be the
result, the cases are likely to occupy considerable time and divert
the resources of the Churches into litigation. A closely drawn
exemption designed to preserve both the rights of trans persons
and the religious rights engaged by this Bill seems to me the
best way to avoid unnecessary, costly and divisive litigation.
CONCLUSION
31. It seems to me that the religious beliefs
relating to trans persons set out in the document 'Christian beliefs
on transsexualism' are (whether one considers them to be right
or wrong) entitled to protection pursuant to the provisions of
the ECHR. Similarly it seems to me that individual Churches are
entitled to organise themselves so that they can act in accordance
with their religious beliefs in their dealings with trans persons.
32. The Bill contains provisions which would
criminalise disclosures made for religious purposes which are
likely to infringe the religious rights of individuals. Further
the Bill, in its current form, gives scope for litigation against
individual Churches seeking to act in accordance with their religious
beliefs. Such litigation is likely to be divisive, costly and
of benefit only to the lawyers.
23 March 2004
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