Joint Committee On Human Rights Third Report


THIRD REPORT


The Joint Committee on Human Rights has agreed to the following Report:

SCRUTINY OF BILLS: FURTHER PROGRESS REPORT

Summary

This Report considers the human rights implications of the Bills mentioned below. In relation to Government Bills, the Committee draws attention to a number of issues, and in particular reports—

— in respect of the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill, that the latest guidance from the Lord Chancellor's Department on explanations of human rights implications of Bills in Explanatory Notes should be followed; that further requirements should be imposed to secure sufficient safeguards for rights under ECHR Article 8 (respect for private life) in the provisions relating to customer information orders and account monitoring orders; and that it should not be accepted, in relation to the proposed power for investigators from other Schengen states to conduct surveillance operations in the UK for up to five hours without authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the arguments for compatibility with ECHR Article 8 advanced by the Government;

— in respect of the Hunting Bill, that further attention should be paid to the issue of compensation for economic loss through prohibition of hunting where there are subsisting contracts for providing hunting facilities;

— in respect of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill, that the Explanatory Notes do not explain why the Bill is thought to be compatible;

— in respect of the Community Care (Delayed Discharges) Bill, that it publishes correspondence with Mr. Paul Burstow MP;

— in respect of the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill, that the Government should provide information to each House about the training to be given to civilian support officers before they begin to exercise police powers.

In relation to Private Members' Bills, it reports—

— in respect of the Public Services (Disruption) Bill, correspondence with Lord Campbell of Alloway about the possibility that the Bill might discriminate against trade unions and their members, potentially engaging Article 11 and Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 2.2 and Article 8.1 of the ICESCR;

— in respect of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (Repeal) Bill, that no human rights matters require to be drawn to the attention of either House at this time.

In relation to Private Bills it reports—

In respect of the Nottingham City Council Bill, correspondence with the agents for Nottingham City Council about the adequacy of the safeguards for confidentiality in provisions of the Bill which confer powers of seizure and inspection of documents, and related matters.

In other respects, the Committee reports that, in its view at the present time, the above Bills have no implications for human rights requiring to be drawn to the attention of either House.

Introduction

1. The Committee has considered a number of Bills, and now reports its views on their human rights implications. They include the following Government Bills currently before the House of Commons—

  • Hunting Bill

  • Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill

together with further consideration of the Community Care (Delayed Discharges) Bill in the light of correspondence with Mr. Paul Burstow MP.

The Committee has also considered the following Government Bill currently before the House of Lords—

  • Police (Northern Ireland) Bill.

In addition, the Committee reports on its consideration of two Private Members' Bills currently before the House of Lords—

  • Public Services (Disruption) Bill

  • Greater London Authority Act 1999 (Repeal) Bill

and one Private Bill, the Nottingham City Council Bill.

2. Except for any reservations expressed subsequently in this Report, and summarized in paragraph 77 below, we consider that the provisions in these Bills are generally unlikely to give rise to a risk of incompatibility with human rights.

Government Bills in the House of Commons

CRIME (INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION) BILL

3. In our First Report of 2002-03, we reported on our initial consideration of this Bill, and on the letter sent to the Home Office raising a number of matters—

  • the compatibility of provisions for Customer Information Orders and Account Monitoring Orders with the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8; and

  • the adequacy of safeguards for human rights, particularly the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, in provisions to allow cross-border surveillance by police from other jurisdictions (clause 83).

The Home Office replied in a letter to our Chair from Lord Filkin, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, dated 16 December 2002. In a further letter dated 8 January 2003, Lord Filkin informed our Chair that the Government intended to introduce amendments to the Bill to permit the mutual recognition of orders freezing property representing proceeds of terrorism or assets for use for terrorist purposes. We publish the Minister's letters as appendices to this Report.[1] We now assess those aspects of the Bill and the proposals for amendments in the light of them.

Unhelpfulness of the Explanatory Notes

4. In the first paragraph of his letter, Lord Filkin writes—

I am sorry you found the reference to ECHR issues in the Explanatory Notes unhelpful, but I trust I can answer the Committee's questions now.

The remainder of the letter acknowledges that the Bill engages Convention rights. It is, in our view, regrettable that the Explanatory Notes failed to acknowledge the fact, and to explain (even in outline) the Government's reasons for thinking that the Bill as introduced to the House of Commons is compatible with Convention rights. A little over a year ago, the Lord Chancellor's Department circulated advice to Departments about Explanatory Notes, indicating that they should identify the main ways in which Convention rights are thought to be engaged and explaining briefly why the Department considers that the measures in the Bill are compatible with the rights. This was intended to mark an advance on the earlier guidance given by the Cabinet Office to Departments[2] about the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on legislation. The Cabinet Office advised that Departments, Bill teams and drafters have a discretion as to whether, and if so how, to acknowledge in Explanatory Notes that Convention rights are engaged. Since the Lord Chancellor's Department issued its more recent guidance, an up-dated version of the relevant paragraph has been made available on the Internet separately from the original guidance,[3] and might have been missed by some Departments. We draw the attention of each House to the terms of the Lord Chancellor's Department's guidance, which is reproduced in an Appendix to this Report. In our view, the Lord Chancellor's Department's guidance represents good practice in relation to human rights matters, and can avoid the expenditure of unnecessary time and resources by Bill teams and ourselves on raising and answering questions which could have already been adequately answered in Explanatory Notes.

Customer information orders and account monitoring orders

5. Chapter 4 of the Bill deals with investigators' access to information about banking transactions. Clauses 32 and 33 would allow a judge, on an application by a senior police officer acting on a direction from the Secretary of State following a request from another State, to apply for a customer information order. Such an order would require a financial institution to disclose any customer information[4] it holds relating to a specified customer. Equivalent provision for Scotland is made in clauses 37 and 38. The judge would have a discretion to make the order, and would exercise the discretion only if satisfied that—

  • the person specified in the application is subject to an investigation in the other country concerning conduct which is serious criminal conduct[5] and would constitute an offence in the part of the United Kingdom where the application is made; and

  • the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation.[6]

6. Clauses 35 and 36 would allow a judge to make an order requiring a financial institution to disclose, over a specified period, specified information about accounts held by a specified individual. Clauses 40 and 41 make equivalent provision for Scotland. The conditions for making such orders are less demanding than those for making customer information orders: a judge would be allowed to make an account monitoring order if he or she is satisfied that—

  • there is an investigation in the country in question into any criminal conduct, whether serious or not, and whether or not it would constitute an offence under the law of the part of the United Kingdom where the application is made; and

  • the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation.[7]

7. These provisions plainly engage the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8.1. To be justifiable under Article 8.2, an interference with the right must be in accordance with the law, and necessary in a democratic society for one of the legitimate purposes listed in Article 8.2. We accept that the Bill would provide a sufficient legal basis to allow any interference to be regarded as being in accordance with the law, and that the measures would be for the legitimate aims of preventing of crime and protecting the rights and freedoms of others. However, the test necessity in a democratic society gives rise to more difficulty. As interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, it requires the public authority interfering with a right under Article 8.1 to show that there is a pressing social need for the interference, that it is no more extensive than necessary to achieve the legitimate aim, and that the nature and extent of the interference is proportionate to its legitimate objective. When scrutinizing Bills, we have to examine these requirements on two levels.

8. At the more general level, we ask whether the measures authorised by the Bill could, on the language used on the face of the Bill, be applied in circumstances which would not self-evidently satisfy the tests. If the answer is 'No', the measure would clearly be justified under Article 8.2. However, in the case of the provisions being examined here, the answer seems to us to be 'Yes'. The powers relate to information about customers and their accounts which most people would regard as personal, confidential, and in some cases commercially sensitive. Orders would require financial institutions to reveal the information to authorities in this country for transmission to authorities overseas. The offences in respect of which an order could be made could be serious, but might not be particularly serious: the category of 'serious offences' for the purposes of the legislation is very wide, and an account monitoring order could be made whether the offence was serious or not, and whether or not the conduct would constitute an offence in the United Kingdom. It is therefore not self-evident that the measures would be capable of being used only in circumstances meeting the 'necessary in a democratic society' tests.

9. That being so, we go on to ask whether adequate safeguards are in place to satisfy us that the power would be used, in individual cases, only if and to the extent that an order would meet the 'necessary in a democratic society' requirements. There are some safeguards. As the Minister points out in his letter, the order would be made by a judge, who would be required by section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act in a manner compatible with Convention rights. The Minister suggests that the safeguards of the 1998 Act do not need to be repeated in subsequent legislation, because the 1998 Act applies to powers under subsequent legislation. There is a concern that expressing a requirement to comply with Convention rights in some statutory provisions might be taken as implying that Convention rights are not intended to apply where statutes do not expressly mention them.

10. As a general rule, we have regularly expressed reservations about those arguments. In many situations, the practical problem of ensuring that a power is exercised or a duty is performed in a manner compatible with Convention rights can most easily be approached by providing officials of public authorities with clear guidance as to the factors relevant to establishing pressing social need for particular action, and the proportionality of the action, in particular social or administrative contexts. Sometimes, securing compatibility with a Convention right would necessitate compliance with additional conditions or procedural safeguards which could be applied reliably and consistently only if contained in the legislation (or, perhaps, in subordinate legislation or Codes of Practice). What is more, the principle of legality, forming an important part of the ideal of the Rule of Law and of the underpinnings of Convention and other human rights, demands that the conditions under which a power can be exercised should be reasonably predictable and accessible. All these considerations militate in favour of including appropriate safeguards in Bills.

11. In the case of these particular provisions, we accept the significance of the fact that the discretion to make an order would be exercised by a judge who could be expected to understand his or her duties under the 1998 Act. On the other hand, a judge would face difficulties when dealing with applications such as these. He or she would be entirely dependent on the information put forward by the applicant. The person subject to the investigation would have no notice of the application, and so would be unable to oppose it or challenge the applicant's account. Once an order is made, it would be an offence for anyone to disclose (to the person subject to the investigation or to anyone else) that an order has been sought or made, making it impossible to challenge the order by judicial review.

12. We are also concerned that the provisions have elements which might be taken (by judges and others) to imply that the Convention rights are not to apply fully in relation to these orders. In particular, clauses 32(7), 35(6), 37(7) and 40(6) provide that orders are to have effect in spite of any restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed). This seems, on the face of it, to contemplate the possibility of an order being made which would contravene ECHR Article 8, and to make such an order effective. In the light of this, it seems at least possible that a court would regard itself as freed from the duty to act compatibly with Convention rights, notwithstanding section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The duty to comply with Convention rights is not simply superimposed on all other legislation regardless of the terms of that legislation. In some circumstances, the duty can be overridden.[8] Section 6(2) of the 1998 Act provides—

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if—

(a) as a result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could not have acted differently, or

(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.

An order for disclosure made pursuant to clause 32(7), 35(6), 37(7) or 40(6) in violation of Article 8 might be saved by section 6(2)(b) of the 1998 Act, since it could be difficult to interpret the express terms of the clauses as being subject to a duty to comply with Article 8, and the judge would be acting to give effect to the clear terms of the clause.

13. The Minister, in his letter, points out that customer information orders and account monitoring orders were established in national law by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and that the clauses providing that orders are to have effect in spite of any restriction on disclosure, however imposed, follow the drafting of sections 368, 374, 402 and 407 of that Act. However, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 contains on its face additional safeguards against abuse of Article 8 rights. For example, section 365 imposes the following requirements for the making of a customer information order—

365.—(1) These are the requirements for the making of a customer information order.

(2) In the case of a confiscation investigation, there must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person specified in the application for the order has benefited from his criminal conduct.

(3) In the case of a civil recovery investigation, there must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that­

(a) the property specified in the application for the order is recoverable property or associated property;

(b) the person specified in the application holds all or some of the property.

(4) In the case of a money laundering investigation, there must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person specified in the application for the order has committed a money laundering offence.

(5) In the case of any investigation, there must be reasonable grounds for believing that customer information which may be provided in compliance with the order is likely to be of substantial value (whether or not by itself) to the investigation for the purposes of which the order is sought.

(6) In the case of any investigation, there must be reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the customer information to be provided, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the information is obtained.

These protections for Article 8 rights are absent from the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill. The whole of section 365 of the 2002 Act (particularly subsection (6)) provides a good precedent for including on the face of legislation not simply a restatement of the terms of Convention rights, but a statement of the principles and procedural requirements which are to operate in order to safeguard people against abuses of powers that infringe Convention rights.

14. We are also conscious that orders would be directed to financial institutions which would not themselves be public authorities, and so would not be subject to the duty (by virtue of section 6 of the 1998 Act) to make their own assessment of the compatibility of the order with Convention rights.

15. In the light of these considerations, we consider that there is a need for additional safeguards in the Bill in order to ensure compatibility with ECHR Article 8.

  • There should be an express requirement for the applicant to disclose to the judge information relevant to the application, including the information which weakens the case for the order, except for information about the identity of confidential sources and information that would endanger lives or national security. Unlike the position in ex parte applications for injunctions, where claimants have a duty of comprehensive disclosure, judges have not required full disclosure of all material available to investigators under legislation under which orders for access to or production of sensitive material can be ordered without an inter partes hearing.[9] They might well adopt the same approach in relation to applications under this Bill. But the position is more difficult where, as under this Bill, the applicant is acting on behalf of a foreign police force, than where the applicant is likely to have personal access to the necessary information from his or her own force. Whilst recognising the need to make arrangements for speedy dispatch of these applications, we consider that the legislation should include an express requirement of disclosure, both to alert the applicant police officer to the need to make thorough inquiries of the foreign police force and to alert the judge to the need for caution in performing his or her responsibility for protecting the human rights of those who would be affected by an order. The Government introduced an amendment of this kind to the Enterprise Bill in the 2001-02 session to cater for similar concerns expressed by the Committee about human rights safeguards in respect of interim enforcement orders under that Bill.[10] We regard the Government's decision in that case as representing good human rights practice.

  • There should be an express requirement for judges to include among the terms of a customer information order or an account monitoring order any restrictions which the judge thinks necessary to ensure that action under the order would be compatible with ECHR Article 8.2. This would help to avoid problems arising from the potential for orders to be made which require disclosures violating Article 8 rights. As noted above, the financial institutions to which orders would be directed are not likely to be public authorities within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998, section 6. They would therefore be under no obligation themselves to act compatibly with Convention rights, and are unlikely to be very familiar with the requirements of those rights. It is therefore important to include in the terms of the order the restrictions needed to ensure that disclosures are 'necessary in a democratic society'.

Cross-border surveillance by police officers from other jurisdictions

16. We raised with the Home Office a concern about the proposed new section 76A to be inserted into the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by clause 83 of the Bill. The proposed new section would allow a foreign police or customs officer lawfully to conduct, without authorisation and for a period of up to five hours, directed or intrusive surveillance (within the meaning of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) in the UK which would normally require authorisation to be granted under the 2000 Act. The range of crimes, in relation to which surveillance would be lawful, would be extensive, and open to extension by order. While the conditions laid down for the lawfulness of the surveillance (under proposed new section 76A(1) and (4)) would go some way towards protecting ECHR Article 8 rights, the proposed new section seemed to us not to import the safeguards of the 2000 Act and the associated Code of Practice. We were concerned that this could give rise to a weakness in the protective arrangements for ECHR Article 8 rights. Directed and, particularly, intrusive surveillance represent significant intrusions on the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8.1, and it is not clear that the nature of the offences being investigated, or the grounds for suspecting the person under surveillance, would be sufficient to establish that the interference is proportionate to a pressing social need to advance the legitimate aim of prevention of crime under Article 8.2.

17. In his response, the Minister argues—

As all Schengen states are signatories to the ECHR, surveillance, in order to be lawful in any of those states, would have to be proportionate under the ECHR.

As this argument is often used both by the Government when introducing legislation to implement legal requirements under EC and EU law, and by the European institutions, it requires careful consideration. In our view, this argument is based on simplistic assumptions, and is misleading for two reasons.

18. First, the argument assumes that in all Schengen states the ECHR forms part of national law. In many states, it does so, either by automatic incorporation of reciprocal treaty obligations (in states with constitutions adopting a monist approach to the relationship between national and international law, such as France) or by way of specific legislation (as in the United Kingdom). However, there remain some states (for example, Ireland[11]) which have not made the ECHR fully part of national law, and other states (such as the United Kingdom) which have not made all the rights under the Convention part of municipal law (see, for example, the absence of ECHR Article 13 from the Human Rights Act 1998) or ratified all the rights under the various Protocols to the Convention.

19. Even where the ECHR forms part of national law, the effect of ECHR standards on the lawfulness of police conduct depends on two matters settled by national law: the position of ECHR standards in the hierarchy of legal norms under the national constitution; and the extent to which municipal law allows legislation to confer powers which could be lawfully exercised in a manner incompatible with Convention rights.

20. If the law conferring the power of surveillance is hierarchically inferior to, and so automatically limited by, the law embodying the ECHR in municipal law, it will be unlawful to exercise the surveillance power in a manner incompatible with Convention rights. However, legislation incorporating Convention rights might not be hierarchically superior to the legislation conferring powers on investigators. For example, in the United Kingdom the Human Rights Act 1998 is, for this purpose, probably best regarded as a statute with the same level of hierarchical priority as other statutes. Even where the ECHR is embodied in a municipal law which is hierarchically superior to the legislation conferring the investigative power, it might be possible under municipal law for legislation to confer, in particular cases, a power which is incompatible with rights under the ECHR. For example, in the United Kingdom the Human Rights Act 1998 preserves parliamentary sovereignty, so it is possible for Parliament (and sometimes other bodies) to confer powers or impose duties to act incompatibly with Convention rights but none the less lawfully. The United Kingdom has also asserted the freedom to derogate from Convention rights for particular purposes: note, for example, the derogation order made under the 1998 Act in respect of the power to detain suspected international terrorists indefinitely under Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. It follows that it is impossible to accept the Minister's argument as a general proposition without qualification. One needs to examine the constitutional law of each Schengen state individually to establish whether the assertion can be sustained in relation to that state.[12]

21. Secondly, even if the proposition is correct in relation to a particular state, there is a further problem about the extent of a foreign state's responsibility under the ECHR for extra-territorial action by its officials. The responsibility of a state under the ECHR is set out in Article 1: 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.' To put it at its lowest, it is not clear that, for example, France would be responsible for actions by its officials in the United Kingdom which violate the rights of individuals who are in the United Kingdom. Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights establish that—

  • a state will not be regarded as responsible for action affecting people outside its territorial jurisdiction unless the state is able to assert effective control over the territory where the people are;[13] and

  • courts in one state would be entitled to rely on the doctrine of sovereign immunity to decline jurisdiction in a case brought against a foreign sovereign state for a violation of human rights.[14]

22. For these reasons, we are wholly unable to accept as a general proposition the Minister's argument that surveillance, to be lawful, would have to be proportionate under the ECHR in all Schengen states.

23. However, the Minister makes a number of other points which require to be taken into account. He draws attention to the following matters.

  • The automatic authorisation of surveillance under the Bill would apply only 'where it is not reasonably practicable for the foreign officers to request in advance that the surveillance is taken over by UK officers.'

  • The Government proposes to make an order under proposed new section 76A(4) obliging the foreign officer to contact a UK police officer immediately on arrival in the UK. The UK officer, being a public authority subject to section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, would then order the foreign officers to stop the surveillance immediately if it does not meet the test of proportionality.

  • It would not be permissible for the foreign officers to conduct surveillance in residential premises, because (although no such limitation is contained on the face of the legislation) the Government proposes to make an order under proposed new section 76A(4) to 'make surveillance under section 76A conditional on the foreign officers not entering private homes and places inaccessible to the public.'

  • Proposed amendments[15] to the powers of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal under section 65 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 would make it possible for a person aggrieved by allegedly unlawful surveillance by a foreign officer to complain to the Tribunal.

  • The Government envisages that the powers will only rarely be used, as the United Kingdom's island situation will mean that cross-border surveillance operations will normally be planned in advance.

24. These are useful clarifications, and help to assess the adequacy of safeguards for human rights. The conditions which are intended to be included in subordinate legislation would be useful (although one may carry out intrusive surveillance without going into a residential dwelling, for example by placing a listening device on the outside of the residence). Nevertheless, the importance of the conditions to establishing proportionality under ECHR Article 8.2 is so substantial that we consider that the provisions should be included on the face of the primary legislation. Without that, it is hard for Parliament to assess whether the safeguards against abuse of the proposed new section 76A are adequate. We draw this to the attention of each House.

Mutual recognition of orders freezing assets related to terrorism

25. In a letter dated 8 January 2003, Lord Filkin explained that the Government intended to table amendments, for debate towards the end of Committee stage in the House of Commons, to allow mutual recognition of freezing orders made by courts in respect of terrorist assets. The amendments have now been tabled. They would amend Schedule 4 to the Terrorism Act 2000—

  • to allow courts in the United Kingdom to give effect to orders made in other EU countries and transmitted to the United Kingdom under the Framework Decision.

26. The amendments engage the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR (hereafter 'P1/1'), and the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8. The Minister in his letter explains that the purpose of the amendments is to limit the capacity of terrorist organisations, and that it has proved to be an effective weapon in destabilising terrorist organisations and preventing groups from profiting from terrorist activity. The courts would not be required to give effect to a freezing order made in another Member State if doing so would be incompatible with a Convention right. For these reasons, the Minister believes that the amendments would be compatible with Convention rights.

27. We accept this. It seems to us that the courts, as public authorities under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, would act unlawfully if they were to give effect to an order in circumstances that would result in an incompatibility with a Convention right. The reasons supporting the proposed Government amendments seem to us to be sufficient to justify the interference with Convention rights and the safeguards seem sufficient to make a violation unlikely. We welcome the Government's decision to introduce the new powers through primary legislation, rather than by exercising the powers (provided by the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) to give effect to the Framework Decision by way of Order in Council.


1   Ev 2-5 Back

2   Ev 1-2 Back

3   2nd ed., February 2000, now available on the Internet at http://www.humanrights.gov.uk/guidance.htm, para. 39 Back

4   'Customer information' is defined in s. 364 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, excepting subsections (2)(f) and (3)(i): clause 32(6). So far as applicable, section 364 defines 'customer information as follows: 364(1) 'Customer information', in relation to a person and a financial institution, is information whether the person holds, or has held, an account or accounts at the financial institution (whether solely or jointly with another) and (if so) information as to-(a) the matters specified in subsection (2) if the person is an individual; (b) the matters specified in subsection (3) if the person is a company or limited liability partnership or a similar body incorporated or otherwise established outside the United Kingdom. (2) The matters referred to in subsection (1)(a) are-(a) the account number or numbers; (b) the person's full name; (c) his date of birth; (d) his most recent address and any previous addresses; (e) the date or dates on which he began to hold the account or accounts and, if he has ceased to hold the account or any of the accounts, the date or dates on which he did so; ... (g) the full name, date of birth and most recent address, and any previous addresses, of any person who holds, or has held, an account at the financial institution jointly with him; (h) the account number or numbers of any other account or accounts held at the financial institution to which he is a signatory and details of the person holding the other account or accounts. (3) The matters referred to in subsection (1)(b) are-(a) the account number or numbers; (b) the person's full name; (c) a description of any business which the person carries on; (d) the country or territory in which it is incorporated or otherwise established and any number allocated to it under the Companies Act 1985 (c. 6) or the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/ 1032 (N.I. 6)) or corresponding legislation of any country or territory outside the United Kingdom; (e) any number assigned to it for the purposes of value added tax in the United Kingdom; (f) its registered office, and any previous registered offices, under the Companies Act 1985 or the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986/1032 (N.I. 6)) or anything similar under corresponding legislation of any country or territory outside the United Kingdom; (g) its registered office, and any previous registered offices, under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (c. 12) or anything similar under corresponding legislation of any country or territory outside Great Britain; (h) the date or dates on which it began to hold the account or accounts and, if it has ceased to hold the account or any of the accounts, the date or dates on which it did so; ... (j) the full name, date of birth and most recent address and any previous addresses of any person who is a signatory to the account or any of the accounts. (4) The Secretary of State may by order provide for information of a description specified in the order-(a) to be customer information, or (b) no longer to be customer information. Back

5   This is defined in clauses 46(3) and 52(1) by reference to offences under para. 3 of Art. 1 of the 2001 Protocol to the Mutual Legal Assistance Convention of 2000, and offences specified in orders made by the Secretary of State to give effect to any decision of the EU Council under para. 6 of Art. 1 of the 2001 Protocol.  Back

6   Clauses 33(1), 38(1) Back

7   Clauses 36(1), 41(1) Back

8   Were that the case, there would be no need for section 3 of the 1998 Act to impose a duty to read and give effect to legislation in a compatible manner only 'so far as it is possible to do so', and there would be no need for the courts to be able to make declarations of incompatibility under section 4 in respect of legislation. Back

9   See e.g. R. v. Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court, ex parte Salinger [1993] QB 564, DC, in relation to an application under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 Back

10   See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-sixth Report of 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Final Progress Report, HL Paper 182, HC 1295, pp. 5-6, para. 3 Back

11   The Irish Constitution may provide strong protection for privacy rights, but other rights might be less strongly protected by the Constitution than by the Convention. Back

12   For a good and reasonably up-to-date source of state-by-state information, see Raymond Blackburn and Jörg Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States, 1950-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Back

13   See Bankovic v. Belgium App. No. 52207/99, admissibility decision of 12 December 2001, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Sarah Williams and Sangeeta Shah' Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 othe r contracting states' [2002] EHRLR 775-781. Back

14   See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, judgment of 21 November 2001, Eur. Ct. H.R. Back

15   See para. 71 of Sched. 4 to the Bill Back

16   The Minister contemplates further legislation in due course to give effect to other aspects of the Framework Decision Back


 
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