Joint Committee On Human Rights Eighteenth Report


The Joint Committee on Human Rights has agreed to the following Report:



1. We have previously stated our intention to report on all Bills presented to Parliament in respect of their compatibility with Convention rights as defined by the Human Rights Act 1998, and other human rights instruments. We have produced, in total, fourteen reports on Bills before both Houses in this session.[1] We set out how we intend to proceed with our scrutiny in our Fourteenth Report.[2] In that report, published on 6 March, we summarised the progress that we had made in scrutinising Private Members' Bills and Private Bills. In our Ninth Report, published on 19 December 2001, we reported on the progress of our scrutiny of Government Bills. In our Sixteenth Report, published on 7 May, we again summarised our progress in scrutinising Government and Private Members' Bills. This report updates those earlier progress reports.

Government Bills

2. Since our Sixteenth Report we have considered the following newly-introduced Government Bills.


3. This Bill seeks to implement part of the Chancellor's Budget proposals of 17 April 2002. Clauses 1-3 of the Bill would authorise the collection of an additional rate of National Insurance Contributions (1 per cent above the basic rate) in respect of earnings from employment or profits or gains exceeding a primary threshold but not exceeding an upper limit. Clauses 4 and 5 would require the whole of the product of the additional rate to be allocated towards the cost of the National Health Service in Great Britain and Northern Ireland respectively.

The Human Rights Implications

4. Like any imposition of tax, the Bill would interfere with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of people's possessions. It would accordingly engage the right arising under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. (Although the second paragraph of Article 1 allows the State 'to enforce such laws as it deems necessary ... to secure payment of taxes or other contributions', the Article may still control the imposition of liabilities.) The interference would be justifiable under Article 1 standing alone, because it would be in the general interest and would be held to represent a fair balance between the general interest and the rights of people who pay National Insurance contributions. (The European Court of Human Rights has said that it will defer to the legislature's assessment of appropriate tax liabilities unless it is 'devoid of reasonable foundation'.[3])

5. The imposition of liability to the additional rate may discriminate (or aggravate existing discrimination) on the ground of sex, as men would be subject to the additional rate to the age of 65, whereas women would be subject to it only to the age of 60.[4] This might engage the right to be free from discrimination in the enjoyment of other Convention rights, conferred by ECHR Article 14. In principle, treating men and women differently for national insurance contribution purposes is capable of violating Article 14 (taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1) unless there is an objective and rational justification for the difference, so that men and women are not in relevantly comparable situations.[5] The onus is on the Government to explain and justify the difference in treatment. If men were more likely to benefit, or were entitled to greater benefits, than women from a contributory scheme, it might justify requiring men to make larger contributions. The European Court of Justice has also held, on related considerations, that differential national insurance contributions might be objectively and rationally justified where the difference was necessary in order to maintain the financial stability of the national insurance fund.[6]

6. We asked the Chancellor for his reasons for thinking that the differential treatment of men and women under the Bill would be compatible with Article 14 of the ECHR taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taking account of the fact that the product of the additional rate would be allocated to the National Health Service. The Paymaster General replied, in a letter of 11 June 2002 (reproduced as an annex to this Report).[7] The Government accepts that the differential treatment of men and women engages Article 14 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, but argues that there is a rational and objective justification for it, because—

-  the link between national insurance contributions and state retirement ages has been in place since the scheme was introduced in the 1940s, as has the arrangement whereby a proportion of the revenue from contributions is allocated to the National Health Service;

-  Parliament decided in 1995 that the difference between the retirement age for men and that for women should be phased out over a long period (ending in 2020), and the levying of public revenue is an area in which courts give the greatest deference to the legislature;

-  in the Government's judgment, the national insurance contribution system is the best means of raising money for the National Health Service; and

-  the inequality of treatment between men and women will resolve itself progressively over the next few years.

7. We accept that these considerations mean that the provisions of the Bill can properly be considered to be pursuing a legitimate public interest and to be rationally related to that objective, and that the difference of treatment between men and women can properly be regarded as not being disproportionate in the light of the objective and the limited time period for which the inequality can be expected to continue.

8. A similar point arises in relation to the right to be free of discrimination in relation to social security contributions under the Social Security Directive (Council Directive 79/7 EC). The Directive applies the principle of equal treatment to social security systems.[8] Article 4(1) of the Directive provides (inter alia) that—

   'the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on the ground of sex either directly, or indirectly[9] by reference to in particular to marital or family status, in particular as concerns:

(a) the scope of the schemes and the conditions of access thereto, the obligation to contribute and the calculation of contributions ... '[10]

This is wide enough to prohibit unequal treatment in relation to the payment of contributions under the national insurance system.

9. However, because a number of Member States had state pension and other social security systems which relied on men becoming entitled to retirement benefits at a different age from women, the Directive permits the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security to be the subject of progressive, rather than immediate, implementation. The United Kingdom intends to move progressively to a retirement age of 65 for both men and women between 2010 and 2020.[11] While Member States are in the process of moving towards the full implementation of equal treatment in this field, inequality of treatment may be justified if it falls within one of the exceptions, which are interpreted restrictively by the Court of Justice.

10. The exception relevant to the United Kingdom's system of national insurance contributions is found in Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive:[12]

'the determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old age and retirement pensions and the possible consequences thereof for other benefits.'

11. The Court of Justice[13] held that obligations of men and women respectively to contribute to pension provision to different ages, and their rights to benefit at different ages, could be justified under Article 7 of the Social Security Directive if the different treatment were necessary to maintain the financial stability of the scheme. Much of the yield of national insurance contributions is allocated to the payment of social security benefits. Some of it has for many years been allocated to the National Health Service for many years, but it has never previously been possible to identify particular payments as being directed away from the social security system so as to establish that they fall outside the justification for unequal treatment under Article 7 of the Directive. The National Insurance Contributions Bill would change this. It would therefore be possible to say that any payment or non-payment of additional rate contributions would have no effect on the financial stability of the social security system. Differential treatment of men and women for the purposes of additional rate contributions might, therefore, require fresh justification in terms of Article 7 of the Social Security Directive.

12. We therefore asked the Chancellor whether, in his view, the National Health Service is covered by the Social Security Directive, and, if so, on what grounds the differential treatment of men and women was justifiable under Article 7. The response from the Paymaster General was that the Government does not consider that the National Health is a statutory scheme to which the Directive applies. No further explanation was offered for this view, but in the light of it the Government took the view that our further questions did not need to be addressed.

13. We find the Government's view that the Directive is not applicable somewhat surprising. Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive provides that it is applicable to, among other things, statutory schemes which provide protection against sickness, invalidity, accidents at work and occupational diseases. The National Health Service operates on a statutory basis, and forms part of the mechanism by which the State provides protection against those risks. We therefore remain to be convinced that the Directive is inapplicable. As the Government has not been prepared to explain its view as to the justification for differential treatment of men and women under the Bill in the event that the Directive applies, we are not in a position to assess the reasonableness of its position.

14. We draw this matter to the attention of each House.


15. The Mobile Telephones (Re-Programming) Bill is a Government Bill which received its first reading on 2 May 2002. The Minister in charge of the Bill, Lord Rooker, has made a statement of compatibility under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

16. The Bill seeks to combat the theft and re-selling of mobile telephones by making it a criminal offence to re-programme or to interfere with the unique International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number on a handset without the manufacturer's authority. It would also become an offence to possess equipment for the purpose of unlawfully changing or interfering with the IMEI number on the handset.

17. This engages the right to enjoy one's possessions (ECHR Protocol No.1, Article1), since the offences apply whether or not the defendant was lawfully in possession of the handset. However, there can be no doubt that the interference would be justified under the terms of the Protocol. The restriction on the rights of the owners would advance a legitimate public interest. As there is no reason for an owner to re-programme or interfere with the IMEI number without the manufacturer's authority, the Bill appears to be in no danger of failing to strike a fair balance between the rights of owners and the general interest. We do not think it is necessary to draw the Bill to the attention of either House.


18. A letter from the Chairman to the Home Secretary raising a number of questions about the human rights implications of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill was published as an annex to our Sixteenth Report.[14] The reply from the Home Office was received on 30 May 2002.

19. We have reported on the Bill separately in our Seventeenth Report.[15]

Bills previously reported on

20. The Committee has previously announced its willingness to return to Bills as they pass through either House, according to further developments or submissions. The following Bills have been previously reported on.[16]


21. The Committee has considered this Bill on a number of occasions. We reported on it first in the light of a memorandum by the President of Employment Tribunals for England and Wales, suggesting that clauses 31 and 33 (now 32) of the Bill as originally drafted authorised interferences with people's right of access to employment tribunals to ventilate their grievances, and restricted their rights to compensation, in ways which might give rise to violations of the right to have access to an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of civil rights and obligations under ECHR Article 6(1). In correspondence with the Chair, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry explained that the object was to reduce the number of unnecessary tribunal applications begun before any attempt had been made in the workplace to resolve the dispute. The Secretary of State referred to a study by Earnshaw et al. in this connection.

22. In the light of this, we reported our view that clauses 31 and 33 (now 32) of the Bill, as amended on Report in the House of Commons, served a legitimate purpose, and were capable of being implemented in ways which would be compatible with the Convention rights. We concluded that the clauses did not need to be drawn to the attention of each House on human rights grounds.[17]

23. Subsequently, a letter from Lord Wedderburn of Charlton and others cast doubt on the Secretary of State's interpretation of the Survey of Employment Tribunal Applications (SETA) by Earnshaw et al., on which she had appeared to rely in her earlier response to the Committee. The Chair wrote again to the Secretary of State. In her reply, the Secretary of State explained that the studies in question were not the only, or main, basis on which the policy underlying the clauses had been based. She referred to support which she derived from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. The Secretary of State's letter was put into the public domain. Lord Wedderburn of Charlton wrote again to the Chair giving his views. The correspondence is published as an annex to this Report.[18] Subsequently, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton discussed the human rights implications of the Bill in the House of Lords.[19]

24. Having considered all the correspondence and examined the studies which were the subject of the exchanges, we remain satisfied that, as we said in our Twelfth Report, clauses 31 and 32 (previously 33) of the Bill serve a legitimate objective. None the less, we feel some concern about the impact on employees of the burdens imposed by clauses 31 and 32 in combination. The additional procedural hurdles which an employee must overcome, and the risk of losing all or part of any compensation to which he or she might otherwise have been entitled if the proper procedures have not been followed, may in some cases create a significant obstacle to employees' ability to vindicate their rights under contracts of employment by applying to an employment tribunal. Our concern is not entirely set at rest by the most recent letter from the Secretary of State, in view of the fact that at least one study suggests that employees are not particularly more likely than employers to be responsible for a failure to try to resolve disputes in the workplace before resorting to a tribunal.[20]

25. When faced with a conflict between different assessments of the implications of social scientific evidence as providing a statistical basis for a policy judgment, we cannot say that one view is so clearly more persuasive than the other as to lead us to the conclusion that the interference with the right to have access to a tribunal is disproportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued, and hence likely to violate rights under ECHR Article 6(1) in practice. We are concerned only with the human rights implications of the decision. We are concerned to establish the nature of the Government's policy objective in introducing the clauses in question, and, where they interfere with a human right, to establish and put in the public domain the material on which the Government relies to establish the legitimacy of the aim and the proportionality of the response. This we have now done. Where, as here, the Secretary of State's judgment cannot be said to be untenable on the evidence, we do not seek to exercise the judicial, rather than parliamentary, function of adjudicating on the compatibility of proposed legislation with Convention rights. We merely draw any concerns and the relevant evidence to the attention of each House so that the Bill can be properly scrutinized during its passage through Parliament.

26. Accordingly, we conclude that clauses 31 and 32 (formerly 33) of the Bill would be capable of being implemented compatibly with Convention rights. We draw the attention of each House to the disagreement over the interpretation of the results of potentially relevant social scientific studies to which we have referred, and we recommend that copies of the SETA study by Earnshaw et al., the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, and the Research Study No. 10 by Burgess et al., should be placed in the Library of each House to inform further debate on the Bill.


27. In our Sixteenth Report, we reported that we took—

... the preliminary view that, so far as the Bill engages human rights (for example, the right to the enjoyment of property, the right to be free of coerced self-incrimination, and the right to respect for private life and correspondence) it contains adequate safeguards against violations of the rights. The Committee will, however, be writing to the Secretary of State seeking clarification of the criteria to be applied (under clauses 233 and 234) when a public authority is deciding whether to exercise the power to make a disclosure of confidential information about a person or business to an overseas authority.[21]

28. In accordance with our usual practice, interested people and groups in civil society were also invited to comment on the Bill.

29. The Secretary of State has provided a copy of the draft criteria, which are printed as an annex to this Report. They seem to us to show that the Government is properly considering the implications of human rights provisions, including the Data Protection Act 1998, for overseas disclosures. Furthermore, her letter makes it clear that the draft criteria will be reconsidered in the light of consultation.

30. The CBI have raised a number of issues relating to the Bill. Their submissions are published as an annex to this Report.[22] Some of the points do not seem to us to involve human rights issues. The CBI suggests that powers for the Office of Fair Trading to make references to the Competition Commission under clause 123 of the Bill would be insufficiently specific, and that the powers under clause 184 to disqualify directors of companies which have committed breaches of competition law could operate unfairly if the director had not been personally at fault. In our view, it would be for the courts to decide whether, in a particular case, any unfairness reached a level at which it violated Convention rights; there is no human right not to be held vicariously responsible for a body corporate of which one is a director. The CBI also suggests that investigative powers under clause 184, including the power to require people to provide information, do not adequately protect Convention rights. However, in our view the rights of suspects, including the privilege against self-incrimination, are adequately protected, particularly by clauses 187 and 188 of the Bill, which protect items subject to legal professional privilege and prevent information being used in criminal proceedings against the person who is forced to disclose it.

31. We have considered the provisions of Part 6 of the Bill, which would create a kind of offence known as a 'cartel offence', and would confer powers on the OFT when investigating such an offence which would have implications for the privilege against self-incrimination and legal professional privilege. In particular, clauses 183, 184, 185 and 190 would give the OFT access to powers of intrusive surveillance in relation to the investigation of cartel offences. The Government had accepted that these powers would engage rights under Article 8 of the ECHR, but considered that they would be compatible with the rights.[23] We agree with their assessment, in view of the fact that the safeguards contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 would apply to such surveillance. Generally, these seem to us to offer adequate protection for human rights.

32. In individual cases the protection under the 2000 Act might not be sufficient. For example, it does not expressly protect confidential communications from interception unless they are subject to legal privilege. However, the Codes of Practice under the Act require the confidential nature of communications and information to be taken into account when deciding whether to authorise or carry out surveillance and interceptions.[24] If this were not done properly, it could form the basis for an application to the Tribunal established under the 2000 Act. In the light of this, it seems to us that there are sufficient statutory safeguards in place to ensure that the powers would be exercised compatibly with human rights, and that there would be an effective remedy for any violation of Convention rights in an individual case.

33. The CBI has drawn attention to the way in which certain consumer protection legislation is being enforced. In particular, it expresses concern about 'Stop Now Orders'. The use of these orders would be extended by Part 8 of the Bill. A court would be able to make an 'interim enforcement order', sometimes without the person affected having been given notice of the application. The order could stop the person trading immediately if the court is satisfied that the person is alleged to have committed an infringement of domestic or European Community consumer protection law, that an application for a permanent enforcement order is likely to be successful, that is expedient to prevent or stop the conduct immediately, and that (if no notice has been given to the person) it is appropriate to make the order without notice.[25]

34. The interim enforcement order, by preventing a person from trading, is likely to engage the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under ECHR Protocol No. 1, Article 1. An interference with the right is justifiable under that Article if it is undertaken in the general interest, and strikes a fair balance between the interests of the public and the rights of the person affected. This requires consideration of the purpose for which the interference takes place, and the proportionality of any interference with the right.

35. Protecting consumers against rogue traders and dangerous goods is a legitimate purpose for the State to pursue, and there is a strong public interest in it. In individual cases, the protection of the public may demand that a person's activities be stopped with a minimum of delay. However, the power effectively to deprive someone of his or her livelihood (albeit temporarily), sometimes without first giving him or her a hearing, needs to be conferred with extreme care. The Bill does not expressly require the enforcement authority to show that it has reasonable grounds for suspecting the person of an offence, or of a particularly serious offence, before applying under clause 206 applies for an order. There is usually a requirement under clause 205(1) for the enforcer to have engaged in a consultation process with the person before launching an application for an enforcement order, but under clause 205(3) this can be dispensed with if the enforcer thinks that urgent action is needed. It is intended to provide safeguards in a Code of Practice, but these will not be fully enforceable, and will not form part of the primary legislation.

36. In these circumstances, we entertain doubts as to whether the provisions on interim enforcement orders can be reliably expected to ensure that a fair balance will be struck in practice between the rights of people to conduct their trades under ECHR Protocol No. 1, Article 1, and the general interest in protecting consumers. In our view, the safeguards should be enhanced to ensure that the legislation will be reliably capable of being implemented compatibly with Convention rights. The Bill should include on its face a requirement for an enforcer to have reasonable grounds before making an application to a court, and before deciding to dispense with the consultation process; and the court should be explicitly required to consider the rights and interests of the person against whom an interim order is sought before making one, particularly if the order is made in the person's absence and without him or her having been given notice of the application. We draw these matters to the attention of each House.

37. Both the CBI and JUSTICE (whose submission is also printed as an annex to this Report) raised concerns about the powers of public authorities under clauses 232-234 to disclose information which it receives from people to other bodies, including bodies outside the United Kingdom. The provisions engage the right to respect for private life under ECHR Article 8. As noted above, we consider that the draft criteria for making such disclosures, provided by the Secretary of State, show that the Government is properly considering these issues, and intends to put appropriate safeguards in place. However, in our view the safeguards in the Bill are not wholly satisfactory, for three reasons.

—  Like JUSTICE,[26] we consider that the criteria for making disclosures are important elements in the safeguards for Article 8 rights which ensure that any interference with the rights will be in accordance with the law and proportionate to a pressing social need, as required if it is to be justifiable under ECHR Article 8(2). They should be accessible and should have full legal force. As such, they should be contained in the primary legislation which confers the disclosure powers, not left to be promulgated later in a relatively informal form.

—  We consider that, to comply with the requirements of ECHR Article 8, the draft criteria should place a good deal more emphasis on the need to assess whether, in each case, the disclosure being contemplated would be proportionate to a pressing social need which the disclosure is intended to address. Decision-makers need to be made aware that this assessment is central to the legality of their disclosure decisions, and will be open to challenge in litigation in the United Kingdom under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The guidance on making the assessment should be informative and, as far as possible, unambiguous.

—  Like JUSTICE, we wish to see the criteria for making disclosures, and particularly the treatment of proportionality issues under the criteria, emphasise the distinction between making disclosures for the purpose of an ongoing investigation where there is already evidence that an offence has been committed, and disclosures for the purpose of deciding whether to initiate an investigation. When a disclosure is sought for the latter purpose, the person deciding whether to make the disclosure will need to be satisfied that there are particularly strong grounds for conducting a speculative inquiry, which might sometimes be little more than a 'fishing expedition', if he or she is to avoid making a disclosure which is not proportionate to any demonstrated pressing social need, and thus unlawful by virtue of section 6 of, and Article 8 of Schedule 1 to, the Human Rights Act 1998.

We draw these matters to the attention of each House.

Private Members' Bills

38. The Committee's approach to the scrutiny of Private Members' Bills differs to that of Government Bills, as explained in our Fourteenth Report.[27]


39. Since our Sixteenth Report, we have considered the following Private Members' Bills, none of which we consider raise serious issues of compatibility which require to be drawn to the attention of each House.

Area Child Protection Committees [House of Commons Bill 142]

Borough Freedom (Family Succession) [House of Lords Bill 68]

Computer Misuse (Amendment) [House of Lords Bill 79]

European Parliamentary Elections [House of Lords Bill 12]

Finance [House of Commons Bill 125]

Fixed-term Parliaments [House of Commons Bill 134]

Litter and Fouling of Land by Dogs [House of Commons Bill 53]

Patents Act 1977 (Amendment)(No.2) [House of Commons Bill 126]

Waste [House of Commons Bill 21]

40. We comment further on one Bill that raises questions relating to human rights, but which we do not consider need to be further pursued.


41. The Age Discrimination (No. 2) Bill, is a Private Members' Bill introduced by Ms Candy Atherton MP and others, and therefore does not carry a statement of compatibility under section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Bill would impose a general duty on public authorities to promote age equality, equivalent to that imposed in relation to race by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000; make it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of age in relation to employment and related matters, and the provision of goods and services; and provide for the establishment of an Age Equality Commission.

42. The Bill would potentially enhance the protection of human rights. However, we note that it covers part of the ground for which legislation will be needed to implement the EC Framework Directive covering religion and sexual orientation as well as age. The Government is likely to want to keep control of legislation on this subject, and has already announced its intention to bring forward proposals for legislation for consultation. The provision for a new Commission is also unlikely to find favour with the Government in view of its recently announced review of the equality commissions. These are matters which we ourselves are considering in the context of our inquiry into the case for a human rights commission.

1   First Report, Session 2001-02 Homelessness Bill, HLP 30/HCP 314; Second Report, Session 2001-02, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, HLP 37/HCP 372; Third Report, Session 2001-02, Proceeds of Crime Bill, HLP 43/HCP 405; Fourth Report, Session 2001-02, Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill, HLP 44/HCP 406; Fifth Report, Session 2001-02, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Further Report, HLP 51/HCP 420; Eighth Report, Session 2001-02, Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill, HLP 59/HCP 474; Ninth Report, Session 2001-02 Scrutiny of Bills: Progress Report, HLP 60/HCP 475; Tenth Report, Session 2001-02, Animal Health Bill, HLP 67/HCP 542; Eleventh Report, Session 2001-02, Proceeds of Crime Bill, HLP 75/HCP 596; Twelfth Report, Session 2001-02, Employment Bill, HLP 85/HCP 645; Thirteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Police Reform Bill, HLP 85/HCP 645; Fourteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Private Members' Bills and Private Bills, HLP 93/HCP 674; Fifteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Police Reform Bill: Further Report, HLP 98/HCP 706; Sixteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Further Progress Report, HLP 113/HCP 805 Back

2   Fourteenth Report Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Private Members' Bills and Private Bills HLP 93/HCP 674 Back

3   Gasus Dösier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403 at § 60 of the Judgment Back

4   The previous Government announced its intention to phase in a retirement age of 65 for both men and women between 2010 and 2020: Equality in State Pension Age, Cm. 2420, 1993 Back

5   See, mutatis mutandis, Van Raalte v. Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 503 Back

6   Case C-9/91, R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] I-ECR 4297 Back

7   See p Ev 3 Back

8   See Evelyn Ellis, EC Sex Equality Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), ch 4, pp 276-290 Back

9   But Directive 97/80, defining indirect discrimination, does not apply to the Social Security Directive Back

10   See Ellis, op cit, pp 290-304 Back

11   Equality in State Pension Age, Cm. 2420, 1993 Back

12   See Ellis, op cit, pp 309-320 Back

13   In Case C-9/91, R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] I-ECR 4297, para 4 and Appendix 1 Back

14   op cit, pp Ev 3-Ev 11 Back

15   Seventeenth Report, Session 2001-02, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill, HL Paper 132/HC 961 Back

16   Twelfth Report, Session 2001-02, Employment Bill, HL Paper 86/HC 646; Sixteenth Report, Session 2001-02, Scrutiny of Bills: Further Progress Report, HL Paper 113/HC 805 Back

17   Twelfth Report. op cit Back

18   See pp Ev 4-Ev 9 Back

19   HL Deb., 11 June 2002, cc 134-206 and 223-252 Back

20   Contrast the study by Earnshaw et al, on which the Secretary of State relied to some extent, with that of Burgess, Propper and Waldon, Research Study No. 10, 1997 Back

21   Sixteenth Report, op cit, para 4 Back

22   See pp Ev 12-Ev 14 Back

23   Explanatory Notes, para. 763 Back

24   See eg Interception of Communications Code of Practice (issued pursuant to s. 71 of the Act), paras. 3.9-3.11 Back

25   See clause 209 Back

26   See para.12 of the JUSTICE submission p Ev 15 Back

27   Fourteenth Report, op cit, paras. 3-6 Back

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