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Committee of Public Accounts

Inspection in home affairs and justice

Fifty-third Report of Session 2014–15

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

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Committee of Public Accounts

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Inspectorates need to be, and be seen to be, independent. However, in our view the existing arrangements for appointing Chief Inspectors do not adequately secure, or guard against potential threats to, genuine independence. For example, the appointment of Chief Inspectors is subject to approval by the Secretary of State who is responsible for the same bodies to be inspected, and departments control the budgets available to inspect the same bodies for which they are accountable. There are also inconsistencies in current arrangements for publishing inspectorates’ reports, and conflicts of interest can easily arise when making appointments or towards the end of an inspector’s tenure; these also contribute to a sense that independence may be compromised. We recognise that the prospect of regular inspections and the existence of inspection standards is a strong cultural driver to maintaining and improving performance of inspected bodies. But the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office do not hold inspectorates properly to account for their impact. We also welcome the acknowledgement by the inspectorates that they need to do more to maximise the benefits of their work and exploit their findings, by identifying and disseminating common lessons and good practice, and doing more to tackle cross-departmental issues through joint inspection.
Introduction

Inspection plays an important role in providing objective information about performance and people’s experience of public services. It can provide independent assurance on the delivery of public services and identify where service performance is at risk of failing or could be improved. In the home affairs and justice sector there are five main inspectorates, together employing around 370 staff, with a combined annual spend of around £35 million: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (both sponsored by the Home Office); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (both sponsored by the Ministry of Justice); and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (sponsored by the Attorney General’s Office). In total, around £20 billion of public money is spent each year on the areas these five inspectorates examine.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **There is a risk that the independence of the inspectorates is undermined by the current arrangements for appointing Chief Inspectors and setting their budgets.** Chief Inspectors were clear that the independence of how they conducted inspections was not in doubt. However, decisions on the appointment of Chief Inspectors, the length of their tenure, and the size of their budgets, are taken by the relevant secretaries of state responsible for the sectors under inspection, rather than by bodies independent of that responsibility, such as the Cabinet Office or Parliament. Current arrangements potentially pose a significant threat to inspectorate independence. For example, although Chief Inspectors considered that the departments had made sufficient resources available to provide effective inspection, departments could potentially use their control over inspectorate budgets as a lever to influence Chief Inspectors. Similarly, the requirement to re-apply for their posts towards the end of their tenure created a clear conflict of interest for Chief Inspectors, while a short tenure could allow Ministers not to re-appoint a Chief Inspector they did not like.

**Recommendation:** The Cabinet Office should conduct a full review of the appointment, budget allocation and reporting arrangements for Chief Inspectors. It should address specifically whether inspectorates’ independence would be best served by independent appointment and sponsorship arrangements, and a measure of direct reporting to Parliament such as annual reports taken by the appropriate select committees.

2. **Changes made by the Home Office to the publication arrangements for reports by the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration undermine his independence and have delayed publication of his reports.** The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration is in a unique position amongst home affairs and justice inspectorates of directly inspecting his own sponsoring department, the Home Office. The
independence of the inspectorate relies on the actions of the Chief Inspector, principally through preparation of well-evidenced and thorough reports. But this independence is undermined by current arrangements whereby the Home Secretary now decides when to publish his reports. Since the inspectorate was established in 2008, the Chief Inspector decided when to publish his own reports, but this changed from January 2014 to the Home Secretary in the light of legal advice sought by the Home Office on how to interpret the UK Borders Act 2007. Contrary legal advice suggests that the Home Office’s interpretation is neither the obvious nor the only interpretation. Since the Home Secretary took control of publishing the Chief Inspector’s reports, significant delays—up to 163 days—have resulted, which can blunt impact. The Home Office has now made a commitment to publishing his reports within eight weeks of receipt, and we will hold them to account for that, but this is still a longer timeframe than the four weeks which it previously took for reports to be published.

**Recommendation:** The Home Office should bring reporting practice for the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration into line with the arrangements for other inspectorates. In the meantime, the Home Office needs to stick to the eight week publication timescale it has agreed for the Chief Inspector’s reports.

3. **The Ministry of Justice mishandled an entirely foreseeable conflict of interest in its appointment of HM Chief Inspector of Probation.** The former HM Chief Inspector of Probation took up post in February 2014 and resigned in February 2015. A conflict of interest was apparent during his recruitment because his wife held the position of Deputy Managing Director at Sodexo Justice Services. Sodexo bid for, and subsequently won 6 out of 21, probation contracts from the Ministry of Justice. Leading up to this, the Ministry’s handling of the potential conflict of interest was not sufficiently transparent. The design of the new probation system had been established well before the Chief Inspector’s appointment and it was always foreseeable that Sodexo was likely to win some of the contracts for the new probation system. Once Sodexo was awarded contracts, the arrangements the Ministry had made to handle the conflict of interest were unsustainable, with the result that the Chief Inspector resigned. We were shocked that the Ministry stood by its view that nothing went wrong in its handling of the conflict of interest, despite it failing to keep Parliament adequately informed as the conflict developed. The Ministry did, however, accept that changes to ensure that Parliament was notified earlier of potential conflicts of interests would be helpful. We should make clear that our criticism is directed at the Ministry, not at the former Chief Inspector himself. The Ministry has assured us that he was completely transparent with it from the start of the recruitment process.

**Recommendation:** The Ministry of Justice should write to us setting out what guidance it applied, and how it has changed its procedures in the light of lessons from this situation, in order to be fully transparent in future with Parliament about potential conflicts of interest in cases like these.
4. Neither the Home Office nor the Ministry of Justice have adequate mechanisms to hold inspectors to account for their impact. The departments have set out no formal requirements for inspectorates to demonstrate their impact, nor have they carried out their own assessments. They claimed that it is too difficult to measure and evaluate the impact of inspections. Yet, at the same time the departments told us that practical and significant improvements had been made that they could attribute directly to the inspectorates’ work. The Chief Inspectors themselves were able to tell us about some of the key system weaknesses they had uncovered, and some of the important improvements introduced as a result of their inspections. We therefore find it difficult to understand the departments’ resistance to measuring the impact and, in turn, value for money of the inspectorates.

Recommendation: The Home Office and the Ministry of Justice should set out how they will measure and hold the inspectorates to account for their performance and impact.

5. There is no consistency in the way in which inspectorates review implementation of recommendations and amplify learning from inspection findings. The Chief Inspectors accepted that they needed to do more to follow-up and make sure their recommendations were implemented by inspected bodies. They also accepted that they needed to do more to exploit their findings, by identifying and disseminating common lessons and good practice. For example, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons was keen to exploit his findings on prisons such as Oakwood and Thamesmead, so that other new prisons could get up to speed more quickly and avoid the same problems. More impetus would be given to the implementation of inspectors’ recommendations if departments’ audit and risk committees were more involved in monitoring implementation and invited inspectors to report progress to them.

Recommendation: Inspectorates, with departments, need to build a more consistent approach to learning from inspection findings, including identifying what works best, and improving how recommendations are implemented and followed-up.

6. Inspectorates are not yet working together effectively to tackle serious and complex issues of common interest across departments. Issues such as sex crime, rape, reoffending and trafficking for sexual exploitation are relevant to all five inspectorates and the sectors they inspect. We recognise the importance of a coherent approach to independent scrutiny, and the challenges of working across large numbers of bodies with different roles in, for example, prevention or punishment. But we were not convinced that the inspectorates were yet working together effectively when dealing with issues of common interest. Both the Ministry of Justice and Home Office considered that the work of the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection Group had been valuable and had led to genuine change, for example, in tackling the sexual exploitation of children. However the impact of the joint inspection group was not immediately clear to us. HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, as the newly appointed lead for the Criminal Justice Joint Chief
Inspectors Group, accepted inspectorates needed to do more to learn from each other, share good practice and joint training, and minimise the burden on inspected bodies by improving communication between inspectorates over the timing of their inspection visits.

**Recommendation:** The Criminal Justice Joint Inspectors Group should set out how it will develop its identification of multi-agency issues that require scrutiny, and how it will demonstrate the impact of inspectorates working together more effectively.
1 Securing independence of inspectorates

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry), Her Majesty's Chief Inspectors of Constabulary and Prisons, and the former Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration.1 Broadly, all of these inspectorates focus on performance improvement and transparency, with Her Majesty's Inspector of Prisons also having a human rights focus, to report on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons.2

2. In the home affairs and justice sector there are five main inspectorates, together employing around 370 staff. They have a combined annual spend of around £35 million, made up as follows (figures are in order of 2014–15 budgets). Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (£21.4 million); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (£4.5 million); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (£3.4 million); Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (£3 million); and The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (£2.4 million). In total, around £20 billion of public money is spent each year on the areas these five inspectorates examine.3

3. Departments can exert considerable influence on the strategic direction of inspectorates through their control of the process for appointing Chief Inspectors and for setting the inspectorates’ budgets. We therefore asked the Chief Inspectors whether the current appointment, accountability and budgetary arrangements allowed them to be truly independent.4

4. By statute, the decision as to who to appoint as Chief Inspector and the length of their appointment effectively rests with the relevant Secretary of State.5 The Chief Inspectors assured us that, despite this, relations with the relevant departments had been good and the conduct and content of their inspections had been independent.6 However, they agreed that the inspection regime would be stronger and be seen to be more independent if there was a greater element of independence within the appointment and accountability arrangements.7

5. In the period between December 2014 and July 2015, four [of the five] Chief Inspectors operating across the home affairs and justice will have left their post or be due to go as the end of their period of office is imminent.8 We found a lack of consistency in the length of

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2 Q 38, C&AG’s Report para 3.2
3 C&AG’s Report para 4 and Figure 1
4 Q 1; C&AG’s Report, para 15
5 Qq 3, 30, 31, 43, 57, 69; C&AG’s report, para 3.3 and Figure 13
6 Qq 4, 32, 36, 39, 42, 50, 51, 106
7 Qq 32, 35, 46, 51, 52
8 C&AG’s report, Figures 1 and 13
tenure chosen by the departments for their successors. According to the Home Office, it appointed a new Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration in February 2015 for a fixed period of only two years due to the close proximity of the appointment to the general election in May. In contrast, in December 2014, it chose to extend the tenure of the current HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary by five years, moving the start date to fit with the parliamentary cycle and take him through most of the next Parliament. In February 2015, in response to the resignation of HM Chief Inspector of Probation, the Ministry appointed an interim chief inspector for six months while it advertises for a permanent successor, and has decided that the successor to the current HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, whose five year tenure is due to end in July 2015, will only be appointed for a period of three years.9

6. In the opinion of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, short tenures, such as this, were the worst of all possible worlds as it would take his successor a year or so to get up to speed, by which time their tenure would be coming to an end and they would either not want to re-apply or be ‘looking over their shoulder’ asking whether the Secretary of State liked them or not.10 The Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments has issued guidance that it expects people to re-apply for their appointment as they near the end of their tenure, rather than for these people to simply be appointed. This creates a tension for chief inspectors as there is a clear conflict of interest while their application for re-appointment is being considered. It was for this reason that HM Chief Inspector of Prisons has chosen not to re-apply for his position.11

7. The spending on four of the five inspectorates has on average reduced by 9% between 2010–11 and 2014–15. In contrast, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary’s annual budget has increased by 66% over the same period to fund its programme of annual ‘PEEL’ (police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy) inspections of police forces. Despite the budget reductions, the Chief Inspectors considered that the departments had made sufficient resources available to them to provide for effective inspection.12 They acknowledged that departments could potentially use their control over inspectorate budgets as a lever to influence chief inspectors, although did not consider this had happened to date. According to the Ministry, it had reduced the budgets of its inspectorates by less than it had reduced its own budget so that their independence could be maintained.13

8. Since the UK Border Agency was abolished in March 2013, responsibility for the delivery of borders and immigration policy rests with the Home Office itself.14 The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration is therefore unique in the home affairs and justice sector in that he directly inspects the sponsor department which controls his budget, the Home Office. His reports, for example on immigration, have a direct impact on the Home Office, and it is the Home Office which has to respond to his work. However, the Home Office.
Office is also the inspectorate’s sponsor and controls its budget. We therefore asked the former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration about the impact of this on his independence. He stated that, as the office of Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration was only established in 2008, there was no tradition of inspection in this area of public policy and he had been keen to establish his independence from the very start, principally through preparation of well-evidenced and thorough reports. Although he had not had anything other than a constructive relationship with the Home Office, the relationship had to be at a distance in order to maintain his independence.

9. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration is also unique in that he is the only one of the five chief inspectors who does not publish his own reports. Since January 2014, it has been the Home Secretary who has decided when reports should be laid before Parliament and published. Previously and since the inspectorate was first established in 2008, it had been the Chief Inspector who had done this. In our view, this change in reporting arrangements could undermine the Chief Inspector’s independence. We therefore asked the Home Office why it had introduced the changes. It stated that it had done this in the light of legal advice it had sought which stated that, under the UK Borders Act 2007 which established the inspectorate, it should be the Home Secretary who laid reports before Parliament and published them. However, legal advice obtained by the Chief Inspector, from Treasury Solicitors, concluded that the Home Office’s interpretation of the legislation was neither the obvious nor the only interpretation of the law, and that his view that he should continue to publish his own reports was therefore also valid.

10. Since the Home Secretary took control of publishing the Chief Inspector’s reports in January 2014, there have been significant delays, of up to 163 days, between the reports’ submission to the Home Secretary and their being laid in Parliament and published. According to the former Chief Inspector, lengthy delays in publishing reports risked reducing the effectiveness of independent inspection, which depended to a large extent on timely publication of findings as reports were based on evidence which degraded over time. Delays also contributed to a sense that the independence of the Chief Inspector’s role was being compromised.

11. We asked the Home Office why it had taken so long to publish the Chief Inspector’s reports. It explained that the delays arose, in part, because of the need to comply with the parliamentary calendar and with general government management of when information is released. The Home Office has now agreed to publish reports within eight weeks of receipt. The former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration considered that eight
12. In February 2015, the former HM Chief Inspector of Probation, Paul McDowell, resigned after only taking up post in February 2014. He resigned after Sodexo Justice Services, where his wife held the position of Deputy Managing Director and then, recently, Managing Director, won six out of the 21 contracts for the Community Rehabilitation Companies, the providers of adult probation services since June 2014. Sodexo had won these contracts in partnership with Nacro where Mr McDowell had previously been Chief Executive Officer. According to the Ministry, Mr McDowell had been selected for interview in August 2013 and had been completely transparent with it from the start about his relationship with Nacro and his wife’s position at a company that would be interested in justice business.

13. We asked why the Ministry had proceeded with Mr McDowell’s appointment, given that it had already decided at this point to put the contracts for the Community Rehabilitation Companies out to tender, and that it was always foreseeable that Sodexo was likely to win a substantial number of these. According to the Ministry, the conflict of interest had emerged over 12 months, and there was uncertainty for much of this period as to what would happen with regard to the competition for the contracts and the position of Mr McDowell’s wife at Sodexo. The Ministry argued that both these things could have gone in either direction, which would have resulted in no conflict arising. The competition for the contracts was lengthy and, at the time Mr McDowell was interviewed and then appointed, the Ministry had not yet reached the stage of identifying which of those firms which had expressed an interest in the contracts had qualified to submit a bid. The Ministry therefore argued that it did not know at that point whether Sodexo would qualify, whether it would then be successful as a preferred bidder, or how many contracts it might then go on to win. His wife’s role in any Sodexo bid was also not clear at that time.

14. On being informed of the potential conflict of interest, the Ministry told us that it had obtained legal advice on how the appointment process for Chief Inspector should proceed when the wife of one of the applicants worked for a company that might conceivably bid for work which would be subject to inspection. The advice suggested that it was very important that the Ministry’s actions with regard to the appointment of the Chief Inspector avoided any suggestion that a bid from Sodexo for the Community Rehabilitation Companies contracts was likely to be successful. The Ministry concluded that it would
have been improper to exclude Mr McDowell on the basis that his wife’s company might conceivably qualify to submit a bid, and then might go on to win some work. As the competition for the contracts progressed and Sodexo was identified as one of the preferred bidders, the Ministry agreed arrangements with HM Chief Inspector of Probation whereby, if Sodexo did win some work, he would exclude himself from any inspection of that work. When it became clear that Sodexo had won a significant number of contracts and that his wife had been promoted, it became clear that these arrangements would not be sufficient to address such a significant conflict of interest, and Mr McDowell resigned.30

15. We asked the Ministry why the Justice Select Committee had not been informed of the potential conflict of interest at Mr McDowell’s pre-appointment hearing. According to the Ministry, at the time of this hearing, the protocol governing such hearings had not required it to supply such information. The Ministry told us it had subsequently informed the Justice Select Committee when it became apparent that, because of the scale of business won by Sodexo, the arrangements for handling the conflicts of interest would not be sustainable.31 According to the Ministry, the protocol for pre-appointment hearings has since been changed to require departments to reveal conflicts of interest at these hearings, but it had abided by the regime it had in place at the time. It did not consider that there was anything wrong in the process that it had followed. It considered that the changes to the protocol would be helpful in ensuring that Parliament was notified earlier of potential conflicts.32

2 Maximising impact from inspection

16. We asked the Chief Inspectors what needed to happen to secure improvements in their respective sectors and to get greater impact out of the recommendations made in their reports. Inspectors pointed to the impact of their reports through putting information into the public domain, for example, enabling police and crime commissioners and public opinion to apply pressure on the police to make improvements. Each Chief Inspector provided examples of where their work had had impact. For instance, recommendations from an investigation into border controls by the former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration led to much greater consistency of checking at the border.33 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons pointed to the profound cultural impact of regular inspection, establishments knowing they will be visited again and again, and the application of a consistent set of inspection standards. He credited impacts achieved to staff on the ground, for example in prisons making real improvements to address points identified in inspections.34 However, the National Audit Office found that inspectorates made only limited assessments of their impact. Inspectorates’ annual reports summarised findings

30 Qq 76, 88
31 Qq 78–80, 84, 85, 97, 101
32 Qq 79, 95–97, 98
33 Q 108–109, 112–113
34 Q 112, 127
from their inspections in their annual reports, but none included detailed examples of how their work had led to better performance, and they did not collate systematic evidence of their impact.\textsuperscript{35}

17. The Home Office pointed to significant improvements that had been made that it could attribute directly to the work of the former Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration and his inspectorate. It also recognised the powerful lever of public scrutiny as an impact enabled by inspection.\textsuperscript{36} The Ministry told us that the most valuable thing about inspection of prisons was that something practical happened as a result of inspections.\textsuperscript{37} Nevertheless, neither the Home Office nor the Ministry of Justice measured the impact of the work their inspectorates have on the bodies they are inspecting.\textsuperscript{38} The Ministry of Justice told us that it was difficult to determine whether improvements in inspected bodies were the result of inspection. The Home Office did not consider that assessing the separate impact of inspections would be useful.\textsuperscript{39} The Home Office had not made a separate value for money assessment in respect of increasing the budget of HMI Constabulary. Rather, it had looked at the expected impact of an increased budget in terms of better public reassurance, and more detailed inspection of police forces. The Home Office told us it would reflect on how it could assess the value for money of inspectorates.\textsuperscript{40}

18. We identified a varying standard of implementing recommendations and lessons arising from inspection reports. There were inconsistencies across the five inspectorates in terms of review and approval of implementation plans, and in terms of sharing good practice and extracting learning from inspection reports about what works best.\textsuperscript{41} For borders and immigration we were told far more concentration was needed on consistently getting the basics right. Greater oversight and synergies were required within the three immigration directorates within the Home Office, with much more quality assurance by managers of what was happening.\textsuperscript{42} HM Chief Inspector of Prisons told us of his frustration that opportunities were being missed to apply learning from new prisons, which took too long to get up to speed and working properly. He referred to learning lessons from what happened at prisons such as Oakwood, Thamesmead and Isis when they opened. He also felt he could do more to use the depth of knowledge that inspectors had built up, to spread good practice and draw lessons together. He also considered greater use of sector knowledge and experience could lead to savings.\textsuperscript{43}

19. The National Audit Office found that inspectorates’ analysis of inspection reports was extremely limited, and that inspectorates did not generally link findings and

\textsuperscript{35} C&AG’s Report, paras 14 and 2.18  
\textsuperscript{36} Q 125, 128  
\textsuperscript{37} Q 55  
\textsuperscript{38} Q 115, C&AG’s Report, para 2.20  
\textsuperscript{39} Qq 117, 121, 123, 126  
\textsuperscript{40} Q 122, 123  
\textsuperscript{41} Q 129  
\textsuperscript{42} Q 109  
\textsuperscript{43} Q 112
recommendations across their reports. The Home Office told us that while it focussed on the impact of implementing inspectors’ recommendations such as the increase in the quality and quantity of checks at the border as a result of inspection, it nonetheless agreed that it needed to do more to learn from inspection reports about what works best. The Ministry acknowledged that it too needed to do more to exploit learning and good practice across the inspectorates. It told us it would extend its system for following up HMI Prisons’ recommendations to having its audit committee look at them and ask how many were outstanding and why.

20. The five inspectorates carry out joint work with each other and with other partners, for example, in the case of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, with Ofsted and the Care Quality Commission. We challenged whether inspectorates were working together effectively enough, identifying issues such as sex crime, rape, reoffending and trafficking for sexual exploitation as relevant across all five inspectorates. We asked the departments about the role of inspection in improvement and how it could be used to improve agencies working together.

21. The Criminal Justice Joint Inspection group, led by the Chief Inspectors, includes four of the inspectorates and complemented the inspection of individual delivery bodies by the individual inspectorates. It enables inspectorates to examine thematic issues across the justice system and end-to-end processes that involve more than one criminal justice agency. In its report, the National Audit Office found that the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection regime had struggled to make joint inspection work effectively and to maximise its impact. The departments valued the inspection work done by the joint group so far; for example, a report on multi-agency public protection agreements had led to changes in the Ministry’s work in that area. We were told that Ministers discussed proposed thematic work with the chief inspectors, but the National Audit Office found no overall accountability for the impact of the joint programme, and a lack of clarity among inspectorates and departments about how to track and follow up its recommendations. The impact of the joint programme was also not immediately clear to us. The Home Office acknowledged the policy challenges to make connections between different parts of the criminal justice system and beyond into education and local government. It told us it needed to address the issue of coherent independent scrutiny across the system.

22. Sir Thomas Winsor, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, has recently been appointed chairman of the Criminal Justice Joint Chief Inspectors’ group. He told us that inspectorates could do more to learn from each other. He explained plans to establish a

44 C&AG’s Report, paras 13, 2.16
45 Q 123, 129
46 Q 130
47 Q 130–132
48 Q 131; C&AG’s Report, para 4.16
49 C&AG’s Report, paras 21, 4.20
50 Q 131; C&AG’s Report, para 21; C&AG’s Report, paras 21, 4.20
51 Q 131, 132
common web portal accessible to staff so that sharing of work programmes and inspection schedules between inspectorates was clearer, with the benefit of minimising inspection burden. The group had established a common methodology and was developing standard approaches to inspection in some areas. It was committed to sharing good practice and having joint training.52
Monday 23 March 2015

Members present:

Mrs Margaret Hodge, in the Chair

Mr Richard Bacon
Mr David Burrowes
Stephen Hammond
Chris Heaton Harris
Meg Hillier

Stewart Jackson
Dame Anne McGuire
Austin Mitchell
Nick Smith

Draft Report (Inspection in home affairs and justice), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 22 read and agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fifty-third Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned]
Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee's inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/pac.

Monday 23 February 2015

Mark Sedwill CMG, Permanent Secretary, Home Office; Dame Ursula Brennan, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Sir Thomas Winsor, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary; Nick Hardwick CBE, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons; and John Vine, former Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee’s inquiry web page at www.parliament.uk/pac. INS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1. HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (INS0002)
2. Home Office (INS0003)
3. Professor Rod Morgan And Professor Stephen Shute (INS0001)
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee’s website at www.parliament.uk/xxx.

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2014–15

First Report  Personal Independence Payment  HC 280
Second Report  Help to Buy equity loans  HC 281
Third Report  Tax reliefs  HC 282
Fourth Report  Monitor: regulating NHS Foundation Trusts  HC 407
Fifth Report  Infrastructure investment: impact on consumer bills  HC 406
Sixth Report  Adult social care in England  HC 518
Seventh Report  Managing debt owed to central government  HC 555
Eighth Report  Crossrail  HC 574
Ninth Report  Whistleblowing  HC 593
Tenth Report  Major Projects Authority  HC 147
Eleventh Report  Army 2020  HC 104
Twelfth Report  Update on preparations for smart metering  HC 103
Thirteenth Report  Local government funding: assurance to Parliament  HC 456
Fourteenth Report  DEFRA: oversight of three PFI waste projects  HC 106
Fifteenth Report  Maintaining strategic infrastructure: roads  HC 105
Sixteenth Report  Early contracts for renewable electricity  HC 454
Seventeenth Report  Child maintenance 2012 scheme: early progress  HC 455
Nineteenth Report  The centre of government  HC 107
Twentieth Report  Reforming the UK Border and Immigration System  HC 584
Twenty First Report  The Work Programme  HC 457
Twenty Second Report  Out-of-hours GP services in England  HC 583
Twenty Third Report  Transforming contract management  HC 585
Twenty Fourth Report  Procuring new trains  HC 674
Twenty Fifth Report  Funding healthcare: making allocations to local areas  HC 676
Twenty Sixth Report  Whole of government accounts 2012–13  HC 678
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