Fixing LIBOR: some preliminary findings - Treasury Contents

6  The resignations

Barclays' initial reaction to the Final Notice

160. The FSA Final Notice was published on 27 June 2012. That same day, Barclays put out a statement, Barclays Bank PLC Settlement with Authorities. The statement noted that the settlement was "part of an industry-wide investigation into the setting of interbank offered rates across a range of currencies" and that the bank had "received credit from the Authorities for its extensive co-operation, as well the actions it has taken to enhance its systems and controls in response to the identification of the past issues giving rise to these resolutions". The statement contained quotes from Mr Diamond and Marcus Agius. Mr Diamond said:

    The events which gave rise to today's resolutions relate to past actions which fell well short of the standards to which Barclays aspires in the conduct of its business. When we identified those issues, we took prompt action to fix them and co-operated extensively and proactively with the Authorities. Nothing is more important to me than having a strong culture at Barclays; I am sorry that some people acted in a manner not consistent with our culture and values.

    Mr Agius stated:

    The Board takes the issues underlying today's announcement extremely seriously and views them with the utmost regret. Since these issues were identified, the Authorities acknowledge that Barclays management has co-operated fully with their investigations and taken, and continues to take, prompt and decisive action to correct them.

161. In the statement, Mr Diamond announced that "to reflect our collective responsibility as leaders, Chris Lucas, Jerry del Missier, Rich Ricci and I have voluntarily agreed with the Board to forgo any consideration for an annual bonus this year."[246] This gesture was welcomed by Mr Agius, who stated that "the Board welcomes the example set by Bob Diamond, Chris Lucas, Jerry del Missier and Rich Ricci in recognising their collective responsibility as leaders of Barclays."[247]

162. The decision by just four Barclays executives to "forgo any consideration for an annual bonus this year" was widely seen as an insufficient response by Barclays given the scale and gravity of the misdemeanours. In the days that followed the publication of the Final Notice there was much commentary in the media that the waiving of bonuses was not enough. For example, the Guardian wrote that "The outside world will want to know why no director of Barclays has offered his resignation - a voluntary waiving of boardroom bonuses is woefully inadequate [248] Barclays itself came to realise that it had misread the public mood.

Resignation of Mr Agius

163. On 2 July 2012 Barclays announced Marcus Agius' intention to resign as Chairman of Barclays, a post that he had held since 1 September 2007.[249] The resignation statement published by Barclays stated that:

    Barclays today announces the resignation of its Chairman, Marcus Agius. The search for a successor both from within the existing Board members and from outside will be led by Sir John Sunderland and will commence today. Mr Agius will remain in post until an orderly succession is assured and Sir Michael Rake has been appointed Deputy Chairman.

The statement also outlined Mr Agius' own reasons for resignation:

    last week's events—evidencing as they do unacceptable standards of behaviour within the bank—have dealt a devastating blow to Barclays reputation. As Chairman, I am the ultimate guardian of the bank's reputation. Accordingly, the buck stops with me and I must acknowledge responsibility by standing aside.[250]

Mr Agius stood down at the same time as Chairman of the British Bankers Association.

164. On the same day as Mr Agius' resignation, Mr Diamond wrote a letter to all Barclays staff. In the letter he announced that the Barclays board had "agreed to launch an audit of our business practices" to be "led by an independent third party reporting to Sir Michael Rake and a panel of Non-Executive Directors". The audit was to have three objectives:

·  To undertake a root and branch review of all of the past practices that have been revealed as flawed since the credit crisis started and identify implications for our business practices and culture going forward;

·  To publish a public report of its findings, and

·  To produce a new, mandatory code of conduct that will be applied across Barclays.

The letter went on to say that "we will use the output of that review to adjust our HR processes so that the standards that emerge play a material role in hiring and induction; assessment and development; and reward. That will start with Executive Management." Mr Diamond ended his letter by stating that "I am committed to ensuring that the recommendations from this review are implemented in full".[251]

165. However, on the following day, 3 July 2012, Barclays announced Mr Diamond's resignation as well as the fact that Marcus Agius was not resigning at once after all and would instead "become full-time Chairman" and "lead the search for a new Chief Executive" before leaving Barclays. Mr Agius would also "chair the Barclays Executive Committee pending the appointment of a new Chief Executive" and would "be supported in discharging these responsibilities by Sir Michael Rake, Deputy Chairman". The reason given for this decision in Mr Diamond's resignation statement was as follows:

    I joined Barclays 16 years ago because I saw an opportunity to build a business out of almost nothing. Since then, I have had the privilege of working with some of the most talented, client-focused and diligent people that I have ever come across. We built world class businesses together and added our own distinctive chapter to the long and proud history of Barclays.

    My motivation has always been to do what I believed to be in the best interests of Barclays. No decision over that period was as hard as the one that I make now to stand down as Chief Executive. The external pressure has reached a level that risks damaging the franchise. I cannot let that happen.[252]

Mr Jerry del Missier, Chief Operating Officer, resigned at the same time as Mr Diamond.[253]

166. We questioned both Mr Diamond and Mr Agius on the course of events which had led first Mr Agius and then Mr Diamond to resign. Marcus Agius told us that when the board met to discuss the FSA Final Notice, it "differentiated between culpability and responsibility".[254] He explained that what the board had taken "more than comfort from":

    was the fact that the FSA did not find against—if that is the right expression; forgive me if I am using loose language—Bob Diamond or any of the other senior management of the business in terms of culpability.

However, Mr Agius added that:

    you cannot see a settlement like that without recognising that responsibility is required, and the solution we devised was that the four senior executive officers who were on the deck when these matters occurred should recognise their responsibility by forgoing their bonuses.[255]

Mr Agius went on to tell us that the board "hoped" that the measures they were taking "would be deemed to be proportionate in the circumstances". He concluded that "evidently we were wrong, because the public outcry afterwards was extraordinarily great".[256]

167. Mr Agius told us that the board met again on Friday 29 June to "take stock" of where they were. Mr Agius went on to say that it was clear to the board "that the public clamour had been extraordinarily great", that the "reputational damage" was far greater than the board "had anticipated", and that "there was a requirement for some further action from the bank":

    that is why I felt, as the ultimate person responsible for the reputation of the bank, that I should resign. I made that decision personally on Saturday night and I conveyed it to the board on Sunday; it was announced on Monday morning.[257]

When pressed as to why he rather than Mr Diamond had initially resigned, Mr Agius explained that the board had taken "stock of how the news had been received, not just in the political world and not just in the media world, but amongst our customers, amongst our employers and amongst our shareholders". The message he told us that the board "received in strong terms from the market":

    the one outcome that the shareholders did not want to see was the removal of Bob Diamond. That was the outcome they did not want to see, as they believed in him as a very effective Chief Executive.[258]

168. We asked how the board had gauged the views of shareholders and come to the conclusion that there was strong support for Mr Diamond. Mr Agius told us that this view "was fed back to us through our stockbroker on Friday".[259] He ended by telling us that "if we do not listen to the views of our shareholders, then we are not doing our job as a board".[260] When challenged as to whether the corporate stockbroker had canvassed the views of shareholders, Mr Agius merely told us that they "were expressing an informed view". He explained that their opinion was important because "The job of a corporate stockbroker is to be close enough, both to the company and to its principal shareholders, that they understand how the shareholders view the company at any point in time".[261]

The resignation of Mr Diamond

169. We asked Mr Agius why, in that case, Mr Diamond subsequently resigned. He told us that it was "because it became clear that he had lost the support of his regulators".[262] When asked why Mr Diamond rather than Mr Agius had not initially resigned, Mr Agius replied that:

    At that point, the alternative of seeking the resignation of Bob Diamond was something that our shareholders did not want to see, and we believed at that time that Bob Diamond continued to have the support of his regulators.[263]

170. Mr Diamond confirmed to us that the lack of regulator support was one of the key reasons behind his subsequent decision to resign. He told us that:

    Let me explain why I changed my mind ... It was not over the weekend because we worked over the weekend on a communication to our colleagues internally. We did that knowing we had the support of the board and the support of our shareholders, with whom we had been working from the announcement toward the end of the week, of our colleagues, clients, customers and regulators. It was clear to me on Monday that that support wasn't as strong, and that I needed to take this step in this bridge. The support from the regulators was not as strong as it had been and I needed to take this step.

171. We examined how Mr Diamond had come to the conclusion that he had lost the support of the regulators. [264] Mr Diamond replied "I don't know", when asked whether Mr Agius had spoken to the regulators on this subject.[265] When asked whether Marcus Agius had discussed regulator support with him, Mr Diamond told us "that is probably a question for Marcus". Our further attempts to elicit a clear answer were unsuccessful:

    Chair: I am asking you to tell me what he would have told you in that conversation. You would have had a conversation with your chairman about this, and about the sustainability of your continued role as chief executive.

    Bob Diamond: I would say broadly speaking it was just as I said. With the focus of intensity on my leadership, it was better for me to step down.

    Chair: Why are you so reluctant to tell us what may have transpired with those regulators over the weekend? We are going to have them before us.

    Bob Diamond: I am trying to think if I had any conversations with regulators over the weekend.

    Chair: You didn't but Marcus Agius did, didn't he?

    Bob Diamond: Chairman, I think it is as simple as this. If Marcus had conversations with regulators, that is a conversation for him to have with you. I did not discuss that with him; I just discussed my reasons.[266]

172. Mr Agius subsequently confirmed to us that he had indeed spoken to the Governor of the Bank of England about Mr Diamond's position, albeit on Monday 2 July and not during the weekend of 30 June.[267] The conversation between the two men took place because, on the morning of Monday July 2—the day on which Mr Agius' own resignation was announced—Mr Agius received a notification that the Governor wished to see him and Sir Mike Rake, the senior independent director at Barclays, that evening at six o' clock.[268] Mr Agius outlined the ensuing discussion between the three men:

    it was made very plain to us that Bob Diamond no longer enjoyed the support of his regulators. The Governor was very careful to say that he had no power to direct us, but he felt that this was sufficiently important, as indeed it was, for us to be told in absolute terms what the situation was.

Mr Agius said the Governor's statement came as "a shock". This he explained was "because only two working days beforehand we had released the announcement following the settlement with the three agencies, one of whom was the FSA, where the FSA had said nothing about the suitability or the unsuitability of Bob Diamond as Chief Executive, or indeed any of the other senior executives". He expressed puzzlement that:

    we went from Wednesday, when Bob Diamond had the support of the regulators, to Monday night, when we were told in no uncertain terms that he did not have support of the regulators.[269]

We asked Mr Agius what he thought had changed between the Wednesday and Sunday. He replied that "clearly the public outcry had been far greater than we had thought" and that his own resignation:

    which I had sought to offer in order to alleviate some of the pressure, was inadequate and, clearly, the regulators decided more was necessary.[270]

173. Mr Agius told us that he then had a further "conversation" with the non-executive directors of the Barclays board. At this stage, Mr Agius told us, the non-executive members of the board "concluded that we had no choice but to call for his [Mr Diamond's] resignation".[271]

174. Strangely, Mr Agius failed to disclose to us that he had in fact spoken to Lord Turner on the afternoon of Friday 29 June about Mr Diamond's future as Barclays Chief Executive. This only came to light subsequently, when Lord Turner confirmed to us that such a conversation had indeed taken place.[272] Lord Turner told us that the discussion he had with Mr Agius "was about the position of Bob Diamond" before outlining the exact message he conveyed to Mr Agius. He told Mr Agius—"Let me be clear. We have not found anything against Bob Diamond, so we are not in a position to give, and we are not giving, any instruction or direction that we do not consider him fit and proper or appropriate to do this job". Lord Turner then went on to warn Mr Agius that he:

    had to think very seriously about the scale of change that Barclays had to make, in a substantive sense but also, as had then developed, regarding the need for them to have a leadership that could convince the external world that they had changed culturally and had addressed these issues. I said, "You have got to think about whether that is possible with Bob Diamond or whether it is simply impossible".[273]

Lord Turner reiterated that "it was absolutely clear we were talking about the role of Bob Diamond".[274] Indeed Lord Turner appeared so confident that Mr Diamond would resign following the discussion with Marcus Agius that he rang his colleague Andrew Bailey after the discussion with Mr Agius and told him "Look, I would be quite surprised if the net effect is not that Bob Diamond resigns".[275] When asked whether there was "any scope at all for a reasonable man to misunderstand what you were saying", Lord Turner replied "no". He added "that we were talking about Bob Diamond was absolutely clear":

    I can remember one thing I said, which stuck in my mind. I said, "One thing you'll have to think about is whether Bob as a brand is just holed below the water." I don't know whether I used the phrase "holed below the water", but I basically said "whether Bob the brand is now something which isn't going to work." [276]

175. Lord Turner told us that he was therefore "surprised" when he subsequently learnt (on the following Monday) that it was Mr Agius, and not Mr Diamond, who had resigned.[277] When asked about his reaction on hearing that Mr Agius and not Mr Diamond had resigned, Lord Turner said:

    I think that was an honourable thing to do. I think Mr Agius thought it was the right thing to do. It was not what I was expecting him to do, and I have to be blunt: I did not think it was the most sensible decision in the circumstances. But we were not informed beforehand of his intention to do that.[278]

176. We asked Lord Turner and the Governor of the Bank of England why the Governor then became directly involved. He met with Marcus Agius and Sir Mike Rake on Monday 2 2012. Lord Turner told us that he and the Governor spoke on Monday 2 July and that the Governor "was of the opinion that he should also have a meeting with Mr Agius" and reiterate the message Lord Turner had delivered to Marcus Agius on the previous Friday. Lord Turner stressed that it was "completely appropriate" for the Governor to meet with Marcus Agius and Sir Mike Rake:

    I do not see a problem with the Governor of the Bank of England choosing to see the chairman and chief executive, if they want, or the chairman in this case, in order to express a point of view—a point of view which we had discussed in the course of the afternoon and were fully agreed on.

    I think this should fall between the FSA and the Bank of England. And a thing I would stress is that the fact that the FSA became the regulator in 1997 did not change the legitimate role of the Governor of the Bank of England in having a point of view on the confidence of the Bank—the Bank of England—in the leadership of the major banks, given, crucially that the Bank of England has to decide whether it is willing to provide liquidity support for banks. That should be something where a measure of confidence is required.[279]

177. The Governor defended the decision for him to meet Marcus Agius and Sir Mike Rake. He told us that Lord Turner and Andrew Bailey had both shared with him "for many months their concerns about Barclays" (discussed in detail in section 5 of this Report). Indeed, we learnt from Lord Turner that he had sent a copy of the letter written to Marcus Agius after their bilateral meeting in April 2012, which expressed the regulator's deep concern at developments in Barclays, to the Governor.[280]

178. The Governor explained that "the point of my meeting with them was to say, "Look you really need to understand the depths of the concerns that the regulators have about the executive management. I want you to go away and reflect on that". He told us that "all of us involved":

    had built up a genuine concern that it is possible to sail close to the wind once; you can sail close to the wind twice—maybe even three times—but when it gets to four or five times and becomes a regular pattern of behaviour, you have to ask questions about the navigational skills of the captain on the bridge".[281]

However, he added that Mr Agius' resignation signalled to him that "the board as a whole had not fully understood the nature of the concerns" and as a result "I thought it would be helpful to play a role in making sure that it did understand".[282] The Governor told us that the Barclays board—even in his 2 July 2012 meeting with Marcus Agius and Sir Mike—"was deeply reluctant to face up to [the regulators] concerns". He believed the Barclays board still thought "it might be able to tough it out", before adding:

    It was not convinced that the regulators had lost confidence. I put it to it very clearly and the senior independent director said to me, "Until today, we had not, and I, as senior independent director, had not been fully aware of the loss of confidence of the regulators in the executive management."[283]

The Governor told us that he did not deliver an ultimatum, but rather:

    The question was left absolutely with them. I made it very clear and finished the meeting by saying, "I would like you to make clear to the board that the regulators have expressed these concerns. The board as a whole needs to know that they are very concerned and have lost confidence in the executive management." I did not know what the outcome of that meeting would be. It was left to them to discuss it with their board.[284]

179. When challenged whether it was appropriate for him to play this role, given that the Bank of England currently lacks statutory responsibility in this area, the Governor replied:

    What has changed is that in the past 18 months, the regulatory part of FSA has worked very closely with me and others in the Bank to move towards a new regulatory framework so that we are already involved. Prior to 2010, I would not have felt able to carry out this conversation, because I would have known nothing about the letter that Lord Turner sent, the conversation that Andrew Bailey had, or, indeed, their concerns that had been building up, and I would have had no basis of information on which to carry out that conversation.[285]

180. We went on to examine how the initial FSA decision to tell Barclays that Mr Diamond had lost the support of the regulatory authorities was arrived at. Lord Turner told us that "it was entirely based on conversations between myself and Andrew Bailey" and that it was not the result of a meeting of a sub-committee of the FSA board.[286] Lord Turner attempted, once again, to differentiate between the use of a formal power of direction and delivering a message. He acknowledged that in the case of the former "it would have been essential to have a formal process set down, with an executive committee", but denied this was necessary in the latter instance. The Governor of the Bank of England was also asked whom he had consulted at the Bank or what processes were in place. The Governor rejected the assertion that he should have consulted with the Chairman of the Court and said he "could not discuss it with my two deputy governors, as I would usually do". This was because, as the Governor explained, "it would have compromised Mr Tucker because of the nature of the allegations that had been made".[287] Instead the Governor told us that he spoke to the Bank's chief legal advisor "to find out very carefully what I could and could not say" as well as Lord Turner and Mr Andrew Bailey.[288]

181. We asked Lord Turner whether it was appropriate for the regulatory authorities to use their informal influence effectively to dismiss CEOs. His initial response was to say that "part of the appropriate challenge to that is precisely what is going on here. It is the role of your Committee. If that occurs, you have an absolute right to ask searching questions about it".[289] However, Lord Turner did then go on to acknowledge that the manner in which Mr Diamond had eventually resigned did raise important governance and accountability questions:

    Chair: ... I'm talking about what the consequences of this case will be for the future and for precedent. You are agreeing with me that this is something that needs to be thought through and addressed?

    Lord Turner: Yes, I think I can agree with you that this does raise some issues about the future governance of these sorts of situation. It is of the nature of this that when you end up in these sorts of situation and you haven't written down a clear governance process in the past, you make sensible judgments about what you think is appropriate in the circumstances.[290]

The role of shareholders

182. As discussed previously, a major factor in the reluctance of the Barclays board to remove Mr Diamond was the perception—conveyed by Barclays corporate stockbroker, Credit Suisse First Boston on Friday 29 June 2012—that Mr Diamond enjoyed strong shareholder support.[291] Given this backdrop, we questioned Lord Turner whether it was appropriate for the regulatory authorities to take the action they did, when it appeared to go against the views of institutional investors in Barclays. Lord Turner's defence was that "there was almost certainly a change in shareholder attitude as the debates developed over the weekend". However, he then went on to suggest that the action taken by himself and the Governor was actually in the interests of shareholders:

    We were certainly aware that we would not want a degree of destabilisation which was harmful to the shareholders. Indeed, that was one of the things which the board needed to think about. Realistically, if Bob Diamond had stayed on, and given the extensiveness of the calls for his resignation from politicians and press, I strongly suspect that that would have been to the disadvantage of the shareholders as well.[292]

Non-executive directors

183. As of 27 June 2012 the Barclays board consisted of two executive directors—Mr Diamond and Chris Lucas, Finance Director—and ten non-executive directors. Mr Agius, the Chairman of the board, has subsequently announced his intention to resign once a successor is in post. Ms Alison Carnwath, Chair of the Remuneration Committee, resigned on 25 July 2012 citing "personal reasons".[293]

184. That leaves in post a number of long-serving non-executive directors who would have been in post through all or most of the period of LIBOR manipulation and who, in some instances, held key positions on audit and risk committees through this period. For example, David Booth joined the Barclays Board on 1st May 2007. Fulvio Conti joined the Barclays Board on 1st May 2006 and has been a member of the Board Audit Committee since September 2006.. Sir Andrew Likierman joined the Barclays Board on 1st May 2004. Sir Andrew has been a member of the Board Audit Committee since September 2004 and a member of the Board Risk Committee since September 2004. Sir John Sunderland joined the Barclays Board on 1st June 2005. Sir John has been a member of the Board Citizenship Committee since August 2011.

Conclusions on resignations

185. Barclays' initial response to the publication of the FSA Final Notice was to announce that four senior executives would waive their bonus for one year. This proved to be a wholly inadequate response to the scale and severity of the wrongdoing discovered by the regulatory authorities. Barclays itself acknowledged that its response to the FSA Final Notice was inadequate and, as Mr Agius told us, "there was a requirement for some further action from the bank".

186. Both the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chairman of the FSA have stressed that they did not demand Mr Diamond's resignation, but instead pointed out the difficulties of Mr Diamond continuing in post and left the final decision to the Barclays board. However, both the Governor and Lord Turner must have been aware that it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Mr Diamond to stay in post after having lost the confidence and support of the regulatory authorities. Therefore, Mr Diamond's resignation as Barclays CEO was a fait accompli once both men intervened.

187. The FSA did not intervene with respect to Mr Diamond's future as Barclays CEO prior to, or on Wednesday 27 June 2012, when the FSA Final Notice was published. Indeed, the FSA only appears to have intervened on Friday 29 June, two days after the publication of the Final Notice. This perplexed Marcus Agius who told us "we went from Wednesday, [27 June] when Bob Diamond had the support of the regulators, to Monday night [2 July], when we were told in no uncertain terms that he did not have the support of the regulators". This about-turn by the FSA appears to have been the result of the vociferous public and media reaction in the days following the publication of the Final Notice. If this is indeed the case, then what many would consider the right decision was taken for the wrong reasons.

188. Neither the FSA or the Bank of England should intervene to remove senior bank executives to placate public, media and Parliamentary opinion. There will be circumstances in the future where they will need to act, but without the force of public opinion to support them. On other occasions the regulatory authorities will need to stand firm and not intervene despite public and political pressure for them to do so.

189. Lord Turner attempted to convince Marcus Agius that the Barclays board needed to give serious thought to whether Mr Diamond was the right person to lead Barclays in the future. Lord Turner appeared to come away from his discussion with Mr Agius confident that Mr Diamond would resign. However, Mr Agius then proceeded to resign himself in what we can only conclude was a last ditch attempt to keep Mr Diamond in post. Therefore, either Lord Turner's message to Mr Agius was not clear or forceful enough or Marcus Agius was deaf to Lord Turner's message. It then took the intervention of the Governor of the Bank of England before the Barclays board became convinced that Mr Diamond had to go. The Governor's involvement is difficult to justify. The Governor defends his involvement by pointing out that the Bank of England will soon have regulatory responsibility for the prudential supervision of banks. However, the Bank does not, at present, have regulatory responsibility for the banking system. Any attempt to discuss Mr Diamond's future as Barclays CEO should have come from the FSA and not the Governor of the Bank of England. The Governor's involvement is particularly surprising given that he has told the Treasury Committee in the past that he has been unable to act because the Bank did not have responsibility for this, or that, particular area of policy. Indeed, this is the very defence he and Mr Tucker have used when explaining why they did not intervene in LIBOR, despite suspecting problems.

190. Whatever the merits of the action taken by the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chairman of the FSA—and this Committee has sympathy with the conclusions they had drawn about the leadership of Barclays—the action they took has exposed implicit, and potentially arbitrary, power to force out senior figures in the financial services industry. The return of the 'Governor's eyebrows'—which many will welcome on this occasion—comes with the need for corporate governance safeguards.

191. In this case, the Governor of the Bank of England and senior FSA staff did discuss the issue and acted in concert. There was, as a result, some minimal check and balance. However, once the Bank of England assumes full responsibility for financial stability and micro-prudential supervision, even this minimal check and balance will disappear. The Governor of the Bank of England will stand all-powerful and able, by dint of raising his eyebrows, effectively to dismiss senior banking executives without discussing it with, or consulting, anyone. This is unsatisfactory. As the Treasury Committee has repeatedly stated, a much stronger governance framework is needed. Among other things this can ensure that the regulatory authorities are unable to remove senior bank executives arbitrarily or without just cause. We welcome the fact that the Chairman of the FSA agrees with us that governance processes must be put in place to ensure accountability and transparency for the process of removing senior bank executives in whom the regulators have lost confidence.

192. According to the Chairman of Barclays, Mr Diamond continued to enjoy strong shareholder support. If this is indeed the case, then the actions taken by the Governor and the Chairman of the FSA were in opposition to the position of major Barclays shareholders. Although Lord Turner asserts that support for Mr Diamond had fallen away over the course of the weekend of 30 June 2012, there was no strong public clamour from institutional investors for the removal of Mr Diamond. The regulatory authorities need to possess the ability to remove senior executives, but when they exercise this power, they should recognise their duty of care to shareholders. This issue should be examined by the Bank of England, the FSA and its successor bodies.

193. The UK Corporate Governance Code is clear that "the board should set the company's values and standards". However, the misconduct of LIBOR and breakdown of trust with the regulatory authorities has demonstrated that the Barclays board has presided over a deeply flawed culture.

246   Chris Lucas is the Finance Director at Barclays and along with Mr Diamond one of only two executives to sit on the main board. Rich Ricci is Chief Executive of Corporate and Investment Banking and a member of Barclays Executive Committee Back

247   Barclays Announcement, Barclays Bank PLC Settlement with Authorities, 27 June 2012 Back

248   'Can Bob Diamond hang on after Barclays Libor scandal?', the Guardian, 27 June 2012 Back

249   Mr Agius had been a member of the Barclays board since 1 September 2006 and became Chairman on 1 January 2007 Back

250   Barclays Announcement, Board Changes, 2 July 2012 Back

251   Subsequently, on the 24 July 2012, Barclays announced further details of what it termed an "independent review of its business practices". They said that the review would be led by Anthony Salz. Mr Salz is currently Executive Vice Chairman of Rothschild and the Barclays announcement stated that "his appointment is in a personal capacity and Mr Salz will continue his role with Rothschild". Barclays also announced that the review would report to Deputy Chairman, Sir Michael Rake, and a sub-committee of the Barclays Board. Back

252   Barclays PLC, Board changes, 3 July 2012 Back

253   Barclays PLC, Board changes, 3 July 2012 Back

254   Q 541 Back

255   Q 541 Back

256   Q 541 Back

257   Q 541 Back

258   Q 541 Back

259   Barclays corporate stockbroker was Credit Suisse First Boston Back

260   Q 653 Back

261   Q 714 Back

262   Q 611 Back

263   Q 612 Back

264   Qq 2-7 Back

265   Q 3 Back

266   Qq 3-7 Back

267   Q 633 Back

268   Qq 633-634. Sir Mike Rake was appointed deputy chairman upon Marcus Agius' resignation on Monday 2nd July 2012 Back

269   Q 635 Back

270   Q 636 Back

271   Qq 637-639 Back

272   Q 1205 Back

273   Q 1205 Back

274   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 1  Back

275   HC (2012-13) 534, Q 4 Back

276   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 2 Back

277   HC (2012-13) 535, Q1 Back

278   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 6 Back

279   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 10 Back

280   Q 1074 Back

281   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 39 Back

282   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 38 Back

283   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 39 Back

284   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 36 Back

285   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 16 Back

286   HC (2012-13) 535, Q 17-19 Back

287   HC (2012-13) 535, Qq 31-34 Back

288   HC (2012-13) 535, Qq 31, 37 Back

289   Q 22 Back

290   Q 25 Back

291   Qq 653, 714 Back

292   Q 26 Back

293   Barclays Announcement, 'Barclays announces Board change', 25 Jul 2012  Back

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© Parliamentary copyright 2012
Prepared 18 August 2012