



House of Commons  
Transport Committee

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# Land transport security – scope for further EU involvement?

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**Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13**

***Volume II***

*Additional written evidence*

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## The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its Associate Public Bodies.

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The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at <http://www.parliament.uk/transcom>. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume.

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### Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Farrah Bhatti (Second Clerk), Richard Jeremy (Committee Specialist), Adrian Hitchins (Senior Committee Assistant), Eldon Gallagher (Committee Assistant), Nyree Barratt-Hendricks (Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer).

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## Written Evidence From The British Transport Police (LTS 03)

### REFERENCES

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- B. EC (2012) *Commission Staff Working Document on Transport Security*, dated 31 May (SWD(2012) 143 final) <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/security/doc/2012-05-31-swd-transport-security.pdf>
- C. Cabinet Office (2012) *National Risk Register of civil emergencies*. London: HMSO
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- E. ECMT (2006) *An International Transport Forum: A declaration adopted by the ECMT Council of Ministers in Dublin*, dated 1 June <http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/about/pdf/CM200602Fe.pdf>
- F. HoC (2012) Eighth report of session 2012–13. *European Scrutiny Committee*, dated 11 July (HC 86-viii) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-viii/86viii.pdf>
- G. HoC (2007) Transport security: Travelling without fear. *House of Commons Transport Committee* (HC 191)
- H. Fuchs-Drapier, M (2011) The European Union's Solidarity Clause in the event of a terrorist attack. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 19 (4): 184–197

### BACKGROUND

1. British Transport Police is the national police service for the railways providing a policing service on the railway network throughout England, Wales and Scotland, the London Underground system, Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway. BTP also polices two tram systems, Midland Metro, Croydon Tramlink and the Channel Tunnel international passenger and freight services.

2. As the specialist police force serving the passengers, staff and management of the railway industry its jurisdiction extends across the whole of the railway infrastructure. BTP undertakes public duty policing as an integral part of the policing structure in Britain working closely with local police forces. Its national structure reflects the policing and security needs of a national network where the majority of crime and other policing problems are transient and the security threat is largely consistent with national threat levels.

3. BTP does not regulate, supervise or otherwise assume responsibility for rail security. That role is performed by Department for Transport (DfT). BTP does work exceptionally closely with rail operators and DfT to ensure policing and security initiatives work in concert. Proven arrangements are in place to improve the likelihood that the combined product is a risk based, pragmatic, proportionate, sustainable and effective response to the challenges identified—whether from criminal endeavours or the evolving threat associated with terrorism. In the absence of specific intelligence, such initiatives are prioritised against a process of risk assessment (integral to which is the issue of *plausibility*).

4. BTP is aware that DfT and the *Association of Train Operating Companies* (ATOC) and *Network Rail* (NR) have each responded to Reference A. This submission is not a duplicate of that work (of which BTP is broadly supportive). It is intended to inject an operational and complementary perspective which, it is hoped, the Committee will find useful. BTP is most happy to expand further on any of the issues raised.

### ISSUES OF INTEREST IDENTIFIED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE<sup>1</sup>

Question 1. *What are the strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK?*

#### Strengths

1. BTP considers the role of DfT (the security regulator) as invaluable in setting the minimum standards for rail security. Its risk based approach differentiating between assets of low and high vulnerability represents a pragmatic position. From the policing perspective, it also represents a coherent response to the type of low-probability/high-impact scenarios associated with terrorism (Reference C). The existence of the national Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST—Reference D) is also seen as vital in coordinating policing and security initiatives across central and local government and industry.

2. The tripartite relationship between operator, regulator and the specialist police force for the railway is seen as a particular strength—and addresses many of the “gaps” identified at Reference B.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Reference B, page 1.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Reference B (Para. 4.1.5) highlights the need for governments to validate security technologies. In the UK this function is extant and performed by CAST and DSTL.

3. The role of DfT as the security regulator in sharing relevant intelligence with Industry partners ensures that all partners are aware of threats and can work seamlessly to mitigate risks.

4. BTP is funded directly by the Train Operating Companies and Network Rail with limited direct government funding through the Department for Transport (DfT). The BTP national structure and remit provides a coherent and consistent national focus on the issues affecting the railways that would otherwise be ignored by local police forces.

#### Weaknesses

1. The arrangements for the funding of security measures (ie, placing significant financial responsibilities on operators: while the benefits of their investment play *directly* into *National* security enhancements);

2. When different *Threat Levels* apply to different modes (and hence different security requirements) within the same multi-modal transport hubs.

3. The challenge, despite the work of the rail industry, DfT as the security regulator and the National Rail Security Plan requirements, to ensure that all rail staff have a consistent level of staff awareness training and an understanding of the threat, risk and preventative measures adopted.

Question 2. *Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?*

1. This question is perhaps answered most authoritatively by DfT. BTP is concerned that any attempt to formulate legislation based upon aggregation of the security priorities of individual Member States may prove counter-productive. Specifically, European Union (EU)-wide legislation may decouple security requirements from the prevailing risks and threats relevant to individual Member States. Patterns of crime (including terrorism) are not consistent across geographic international boundaries: legislation may set the bar *too high* for some, yet *not high enough* for others. At a tactical level it could risk setting standards for passenger screening that would cause unacceptable disruption to rail travel in the UK.

2. BTP is very supportive of European Commission (EC) proposals to further develop formal (and effective) means of sharing identified security challenges—and the requisite strategic countermeasures. This context-specific activity may be achievable through the development of a security-specific body, akin to the *European Conference of Ministers of Transport* (now the *International Transport Forum*<sup>3</sup>—Reference D). Security considerations must be considered within the commercial realities of railway *businesses*.

Question 3. *What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?*

1. Reference B (Section 4) identifies the potential benefits of information sharing between EU States and their respective law enforcement organisations (Para. 4.1.7.) BTP perceives this as a positive development in addressing the established (and growing) problem of criminals moving, in effect “anonymously”, between Member States.

2. The desire to “improve” rail security is commendable, but Reference B does not adequately address the cost/benefit debate. There also appears, in places, to be an assumption that standards of security required at airports are naturally transferable (desirable?) with respect to other modes. (The *desirability* of aviation-style security is also apparent within Reference F; although it has previously been dismissed in evidence to other Committees—Reference G.<sup>4</sup>) Any promotion of the threats to “transport”<sup>5</sup> as a *homogenous* entity may have a detrimental effect on perceptions of risk and attitudes towards risk tolerance. In particular, proposals of the type outlined at 4.2 (*Where other modes can lead by example*) are likely to create unnecessary bureaucracy; but are unlikely to add value to the type of audit and control measures practicable with the open mass transit rail environment.

Question 4. *Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?*

1. This issue has already been touched upon at Para. 5b. above. The comments at Reference B, page 7, encapsulate the issue succinctly: “...today’s systems of communication are still overly dependent on personal networks that rely on the professionalism of individuals who are willing to provide information.” A Europe-wide means of reporting major incidents in *quick-time* (against a defined reporting format) would be most helpful.<sup>6</sup> BTP’s experience of information sharing information through the “voluntary” network created by Railpol provides evidence of the need for such reporting.

<sup>3</sup> ???

<sup>4</sup> Eg, the evidence given by Sir Richard Mottram (3 May, 2006)

<sup>5</sup> ie, irrespective of mode—Reference B addresses: rail; road; and inland waterways.

<sup>6</sup> This is, perhaps most relevant to terrorism-related incidents (real, hoax and false) but could apply equally to developments and trends within other forms of criminality. This is envisaged as a form of routine updating —rather than the type of process associated with “ARGUS”, “ATLAS” the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) or Europol initiatives (as summarised at Reference H)

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## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. BTP welcomes moves by the European Commission to improve risk communication within the EU and enhance land transport security. It is, however, doubtful that general legislation represents a unifying approach. In particular, Reference B provides insufficient evidence to support the proposition (at Section 5) that "... benefits could include simplification for transport operators by having common security requirements—with consequential cost savings".

8 January 2013

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### Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (LTS 06)

1. The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK ("the Institute") is a professional institution embracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for both passengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government and administration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principal concerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far as possible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widely disseminated and adopted.

2. The Institute has a specialist Passenger Transport Security Forum which developed the following response. While the subject of land transport security raises numerous concerns the forum would like to draw the specific issue raised below to the Committee's attention.

3. Our submission relates to para 6.4 in the European Scrutiny Committee, 8th Report Session 2012–13 and is in relation to "Land Transport" and concerns security programmes for buses and coaches.

4. There have been previous terrorist incidents involving buses, in London for example in the early 1990s when a bomb detonated on a bus at Aldwych and in the 7/7 incidents when a bomb detonated on a bus near Tavistock Square.

5. Whilst immediately following these related incidents security was heightened and programmes issued from Transec for the Rail and Air sectors there does not appear to be any separate security programme issued for bus and coach companies.

6. We believe that one could be developed to provide a basic security programme which would include:

- Searching at start and end of each journey.
- Receipt of threat and risk information.
- How to deal with left luggage (is it a suspect packages).
- Staff being trained for security awareness and crisis response.

7. Because of the complexities due to the large and diverse number of bus and coach companies could each Local Authority in conjunction with the local Traffic Commissioners be tasked to address some of the above in order to have a more consistent approach across the country?

8. Likewise it would allow the Local Authority to better coordinate security responses in their areas which could include road closures, diversions etc

7 January 2013

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### Written evidence from ITS (UK) (LTS 07)

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Transport Committee launched its inquiry on land transport security to seek views on the European Commission's Staff Working Document on transport security, which was published on 31 May 2012. This document complements the White Paper, "Roadmap to a Single European Area—towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system". and is principally concerned with extending the Commission's involvement in transport security matters from the aviation and maritime sectors to land transport. The Commission does not bring forward any legislative proposals, but it does suggest areas for consideration, some of which could lead to recommendations for legislation at a later stage. The Inquiry's Terms of Reference and Call for Evidence invite organisations to respond to a series of questions as set out below:

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of current land transport security arrangements in the UK?
- Is there a need for further EU involvement in land transport security issues, as set out in the working document?
- What would be the positive and negative impacts of potential proposals arising from the working document?

- Beyond the areas considered in the working document, are there other ways in which land transport security, both in the UK and across Europe, should be improved?

1.2 ITS United Kingdom, referred to hereafter as ITS (UK), is a “not-for-profit” public/private sector association financed by members’ subscriptions providing a forum for all organisations concerned with ITS. The Society works to bring the advantages that ITS can offer in terms of economic efficiency, transport safety, and environmental benefits to the United Kingdom—and at the same time expand the ITS market. Membership, over 150 UK organisations, comprises Government Departments, Local Authorities, Police Forces, consultancies, manufacturing and service companies, and academic and research institutions. ITS United Kingdom encourages discussion on issues such as public/private co-operation, standards, legislation, information provision and new technology. ITS (UK) was a key contributor to the Parliamentary POSTNote 322 “Intelligent Transport Systems” published in Jan 2009.

1.3 Intelligent Transport Systems, “ITS”, is the term used to describe combinations of sensors, telecoms, information processing and location referencing to deliver improved transport systems and services including information before and during a trip for travellers by all modes. Some examples—ITS can improve the efficiency of transport through traffic control and enforcement of traffic regulations and enhance road safety through in-vehicle systems for collision avoidance and better lane keeping. Many commercial organisations use ITS to manage vehicle fleets, both freight and passenger, through the provision of real-time information and two way communication between manager and driver. Electronic ticketing (by means of Smartcards, for example) enables faster, easier travel by public transport. In addition Intelligent Transport Systems have beneficial effects on the environment by reducing air and noise pollution on highways and by helping to create traffic free zones in cities.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee has noted the Government’s reservations regarding the requirement for a similar activity to that of the European Commission on land transport security and, acknowledging the future possibility of legislation regarding land transport security, it has considered it appropriate that the Transport Select Committee be invited to offer an Opinion on the document after seeking the views of both the Government and the industry as to what might be acceptable at EU level.

2.2 Land transport security, as considered by the EU, covers, due to its broad and complex nature, not only public transport, but also supply chain movements across several modes including inland waterways. The Commission has set out a number of matters on which work might be taken forward across the transport modes, as follows:

- better integration of security at airport railway stations and airport car parks for example, which are not covered by EU aviation security requirements;
- incorporating infrastructure;
- mandatory training of land transport security staff;
- cross border security contingency plans and recovery plans;
- basic crisis management training for public transport staff;
- common standards and certification processes for security equipment;
- a mechanism for exchange of threat and risk information for land transport, as;
- currently occurs with air cargo;
- security of the supply chain, with an EU “quality standard” for end-to-end security;
- secure lorry parking and an EU eCall system to enable enhanced security for lorry drivers and road transport freight;
- extension of aviation security rules to apply to inbound flights into the EU; and
- developing the EU “Horizon 2020” Framework for Research and Innovation to include specific policy-based transport security research.

## 3.0 THE GOVERNMENT’S VIEW

3.1 The Minister of State for the Department for Transport stated that the Government agrees with the Commission that it is important that passengers enjoy appropriate levels of protection in land transport but continued, in the context of subsidiarity, that:

- the Government does not see a need for common standards of security in relation to land transport, nor for legislative proposals in this area; and
- this document does not contain any legislative proposals and therefore does not as such give rise to immediate issues concerning the principle of subsidiarity.

The Minister indicated that there are no immediate implications for the UK arising from the document however commented that the justification for further EU intervention in terms of land transport is not clear particularly in respect of inland waterways, and the Government would therefore seek to limit the scope of any

such initiatives and any action in the area of transport security would need to be based upon a proper threat and risk assessment.

#### 4.0 SECURITY—DEFINITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

4.1 Prior to addressing the questions poised by the Inquiry there is value in considering the definition of security and what that may mean to different people, organisations, groups and nations. The Oxford English Dictionary defines security as:

- the state of being free from danger or threat;
- the safety of a state or organisation against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage;
- procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or organisation; and
- the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety.

An alternative description suggests that security (*as a condition*) is the degree of resistance to, or protection from, harm. It applies to any vulnerable and valuable asset, such as a person, dwelling, community, nation, or organisation. Establishing or maintaining a sufficient degree of protection is the primary aim of the work, structures, and processes called “security.” As noted by the Institute for Security and Open Methodologies security provides “a form of protection where a separation is created between the assets and the threat.” These separations are generically called “controls”, and sometimes include changes to the asset or the threat.

4.2 Security also has several closely related concepts: safety, continuity and reliability. Each of these are critical reassurance factors that encourage travellers to resume using a transport system after an incident has occurred. As an example the rapid return of travellers to the London underground and bus services post 7th July 2005 was an indication that the security measures were robust and that there was no evident likelihood of a repeat attack. Even after the subsequent attack two weeks later on 21st July this justification was not shaken or undermined. Both terrorist attacks were perceived to isolated, but related, breaches of an otherwise safe and secure transport network. Lord John Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, had given warning in the News of the World on 6th March 2005 that as many as two hundred Al Qaeda-trained terrorists may be in the UK; adding that although security measures were robust it was highly likely that a terrorist plot would “slip the surveillance net” resulting in a successful attack in the future. Sadly he was proved correct several months later. Two decades earlier the Irish Republican Army had almost succeeded in murdering Margaret Thatcher in the Brighton hotel bombing; they were subsequently attributed to commenting on the UK’s security preventative measures and inherent vulnerabilities as follows—“You have to be lucky every day—we only have to be lucky once”. Perceptions of security can also increase objective security when it affects or deters malicious behaviour, as with visual signs of security protections, such as video surveillance, alarm systems in a home, anti-theft vehicle systems, property tracking systems or visual warning notices.

#### 5.0 INQUIRY QUESTIONS

5.1 The implications of the EU and the Government documents suggest that the land security arrangements are concentrated on the options to counter terrorism; therefore it is a fair assumption that the general focus of this Inquiry follows a similar focus. However it should be borne in mind that individual travellers’ fears for their safety and security is an extremely complex equation and they also have gender, location, time and other relationships that can alter quite rapidly dependent on the circumstances. What this means is that the fear of terrorism ranks very low on individuals’ personal scale—that is until an atrocity takes place and it is brought to the forefront—ie “out of sight and out of mind”. This is a quite appropriate state—otherwise the population would live in perpetual terror. Furthermore the nature of terrorist organisations and their attack methods varies quite markedly across the EU and can be attributed more closely to individual Member States social and political conditions. So varied are these that it appears extremely difficult to devise a “one size fits all” policy approach. The various EU projects are testament to that—in isolation these projects are well-founded with excellent intentions however the likelihood is that the issues and obstacles surrounding pan-European implementation and adoption probably forego any realistic opportunity in doing so.

5.2 Security categorisation is extremely complex as, in most security systems, the “weakest link in the chain” becomes the most important. The situation is asymmetric since the “defender” must cover all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a single weak point upon which to concentrate. At the highest tier political measures need to be in place to provide protection and assurance on Homeland Security, personal and public security, international security and national security. Notwithstanding this attacks against infrastructure (including public transport) are most common and they require rigorous and costly security measures in airports, ports and transport and interchange hubs (which are frequently co-located and closely integrated with shopping centres). Personal security and the “fear of crime” are important criteria and need to be taken in to account when considering land transport security measures. More recently, since most physical structures have been “target hardened”, terrorist groups have concentrated their disruption efforts elsewhere and there is an increasing frequency of cyber-threats/attacks to IT systems. These necessitate a number of applications, computing, data, information and network counter-measures to protect these invaluable assets. Regardless of the nature of security threat certain concepts are common to all—ie

“Assurance”—the level of guarantee that a security system will behave as expected,

“Countermeasures”—ways to stop a threat from triggering a risk event,



- “Defence in depth”—not be exclusively reliant on one single security measure alone,
- “Exploit”—negate a vulnerability that has been triggered by a threat,
- “Risk”—possible event which could cause a loss,
- “Threat”—method of triggering a risk event that is dangerous,
- “Vulnerability”—actual/perceived weakness in a target that can be potentially exploited by a security threat.

5.3 During the last four decades the UK has endured terrorist campaigns from diverse terrorist groups—ie Irish Republican Army, Animal Liberation Front, other independence oriented domestic terrorist groups and in recent years fundamental Islamist groups. As a result the intelligence agencies and the security forces have accrued hard-won active and ongoing operational expertise and experience as each group has emerged. This has, and continues to pose, substantial challenges to how and where they focus their activities lie. The majority of terrorists have undergone training in Middle East or Far Eastern terrorist training camps before returning to routine domestic UK lives whilst they plan and prepare for an attack. This “sleeper lifestyle” provides unlimited opportunities to reconnoitre and plan the nature of the target and also when and where an attack will be conducted. The UK benefits from an unfettered right to travel freely with only minimal restrictions being imposed. Safety and security are in a “dynamic balance” by ensuring discreet, non-intrusive measures are in place whilst providing the essential protection that does not unnecessarily inhibit individuals’ freedom to travel. However this inherent right also provides innumerable opportunities that terrorist groups might wish to exploit in pursuance of their aims. The London Games 2012 was an excellent example of how the strengths and weaknesses of security measures can be assessed. As an evident strength the security measures proved to be extremely successful as reported attacks were made on any of the multiplicity of modes providing personal transport/goods to/from any of the venues located around the UK. Terrorist groups always regard transport modes as legitimate targets (if only for propaganda purposes) and, globally, this was the highest profile possible. However a weakness of this overarching security blanket is that it cannot be maintained indefinitely. The public understood the short-term reasons behind them and willingly confirmed to the restrictions however ongoing restrictions on daily routines or lifestyles would not be tolerated indefinitely without just cause.

5.4 Security means different things to different people and because of this there are many differences between what the EU Member States require. The EU document provides an overarching ethos for the management of security threats and suggests that there is a sufficiency of policies and procedures already in place. The list of the various EU projects also indicates that there is a wide array of research activity in progress, and although these will have future benefit they do not necessarily represent a comprehensive action plan to counter current threats. A general observation is that this is a very generic plan and does not address specifics that are of paramount importance to individual nations. It should be noted that there is an extensive diversity of academic research and projects in the UK solutions relating to security related issues (many of which include ITS solutions). Without a closer analysis of the list of projects contained in the EU Working Document it would be a fair presumption that UK academia is integral to many; in addition to these there will be an equally wide range of other projects that have a specific UK orientation. In general terms the UK’s land transport is defined by our coastlines therefore the extensive security measures conform to those requirements however consideration needs to be given to the UK’s international extensions of its land transport infrastructure that incorporates international ports, cross-channel ferries and Eurostar rail services all of which provide tangible and continuous links with mainland Europe and other continents. One potential danger therefore from adopting a pan-European only perspective towards security examination and investment would be to adopt an “inward-looking” focus rather than addressing the wider global threat/risks that terrorist organisations adopt potentially from other areas of the globe. ITS technologies are global and there is considerable scope to use these as they readily encompass the UK, European and global requirements.

## 6.0 INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

6.1 Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) are specifically mentioned in the European Commission’s Staff Working Document on transport security in two instances: a) “eCall” and b) “Truck Parking Information” and “Truck Parking Reservation”. Both constitute two of the six Priority Actions of the recently ratified EU ITS Directive.

6.2 “eCall” is an in-vehicle safety system intended to reduce road casualties. It can be crudely described as an automated “999/112” telephone call, initiated by in-vehicle sensors, that alerts the emergency services of a collision and its location. This is especially important when the driver and/or occupants are rendered unconscious and enables emergency service control room operators to make informed decision on dispatching appropriate resources. As a personal safety and security measure there is an evident benefit however it is questionable that there is an immediate connection to land transport security issues. Current DfT advice states that the UK would not currently adopt “eCall” as policy however it would not obstruct OEMs or other organisations that were keen on establishing an “eCall” network at their own expense.

6.3 “Truck Parking Information” and “Truck Parking Reservation” are two separate aspects of the relevant Priority Actions. Although they appear to the same there is a large differentiation between “back-office” data information and secure physical parking facilities that is associated with the latter requirement. As above the main focus of this Priority Action is not to interrupt terrorist activity but to prevent the theft of lorries and/or

their cargoes. Although there is a minimal terrorist potential this is not considered a fundamental requirement of the Priority Action. At this stage there is a general lack of co-ordination throughout the Member States in developing the above; furthermore the UK's Truck Park operators do not envisage that the development of truck information/reservations is a great advantage/benefit to their commercial operations; consequently there is little motivation for them to adopt the principles of the Priority Action at this stage. The large percentage of the UK's 280 lorry parking sites are located predominately in the South East/West Midlands/East England regions which cater for international cargo transit requirements. Given the above status the UK DfT has adopted a pragmatic and supportive response and is awaiting a suitable business model that truck park operators will consider sufficiently valid for them to participate in. Although an electronic ITS reservation system, linked to mobile technology, is available there is little scope that that, or other ITS systems, are being devised or adopted whilst EU policy directive is pending.

6.4 However it should be emphasised that ITS extends far beyond the specific technologies identified in those two examples. ITS is "embedded" in most transport modal operations and is integral to operating systems and/or in the transport vehicles themselves (ie in cars, vans and lorries and public transport—ie buses, trams, underground/metro/light rail, heavy rail and, to a lesser extent, maritime). ITS is an essential element of smart ticketing and because of the increasing relationship and reliance to/with "Smartphone" technologies they are providing invaluable enhanced benefits to travellers who recognise the advantages that travel related "Apps" bring. A wide range of ITS technologies such as "real-time" timetabling, "count down" displays at bus stops, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust "Travel London Safely" App, and "one-stop-shop" public information booths that are connected to operators at termini help address travellers' fears by offering reassurance and information and also minimising the period when they feel exposed to danger either en-route or waiting for their transport mode to arrive. Supporting these systems are mobile and fixed CCTV systems, many of which are directly inter-linked, and are an established feature on most public transport modes. However, as mentioned previously, the benefits that these systems offer can potentially also render them vulnerable to "cyber-attacks"; as a result large transport organisations need to make considerable investments in secure safety "firewalls" to protect their resources and assets. Those "firewalls" protect valuable data and in turn allow organisations to play a significant role in the prompt restoration of normal service following any incident, safeguarding personal data and information and offering critical intelligence and forensic evidence where applicable—whilst simultaneously delivering safety and protection. Also mentioned previously the perceived threat to individuals' safety and security is far greater than the reality and as a consequence the importance that these ITS interventions play in helping influence modal acceptance cannot be underestimated.

## 7.0 SUMMARY

7.1 Public transport presupposes that people travel in a cooperative manner, and, provided everyone does so, individuals should have few fears or concerns for their safety. However as insecurities are introduced and the "status-quo" is undermined concerns are introduced—such as unfamiliar locations, gender, language, time and day, or current circumstance (eg terrorist, crime or public disorder incidents). This necessitates that authorities take action to provide reassurance through preventative or remedial processes, ie security measures and enforcement action. Technological interventions that supplement human resources are the most efficient and economic means to reassure travellers whilst simultaneously preventing, deterring and detecting offenders. A general awareness of overt and covert detection systems is a major contributor to deterring all but the most determined or reckless offenders forcing those who are insistent in causing disruption to take elaborate counter-measures to evade detection. In doing so they often expose themselves vulnerable to other detection means; conversely public disorder offenders often renders themselves readily identifiable as they fail to hide or adopt a disguise due either to their belligerent attitude, arrogance or drunken ignorance. ITS systems have a role to play in this perpetual struggle and need to be acknowledged and incorporated into future planning criteria.

7.2 The Government's overall approach has been to influence proposals that the Commission wishes to bring forward with the objective of trying to ensure security measures are proportionate to the evolving security risks. Closer alignment between transport security policy and the sizeable sums currently spent on EU research programmes are welcomed however this needs to be guided by a clear assessment of the risk. Establishing the Advisory Group on Land Transport Security could be a useful forum to discuss security matters with the Commission and other Member States—the Government's approach will be to actively participate and influence the discussions of this group and any recommendations that come out of it. Developing security systems and structures is an ever-evolving issue however by necessity it is determined by the innovative trends and activities that terrorist groups introduce when exploiting infrastructure weaknesses. The struggle to "stay one step ahead" pervades all security considerations and every security effort is devoted to minimising those "chinks in the armour" by providing robust systems, infrastructures and specialist expertise to thwart speculative attacks. This submission supports the Government's comment that cross-modal initiatives will be very difficult to apply given their diversity and that they would most likely result in an additional cost to industry. Discreet multi-purpose ITS systems can help overcome those issues as they are already proving their worth in enhancing the efficiency and commercial capabilities of the UK's transport systems whilst simultaneously protecting the assets that they are supporting. ITS systems are in wide use in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world and there

are numerous international ITS relationships, data sharing structure and protocols that deliver “best practice” enabling the UK to benefit from, and further develop, its already mature ITS industry.

7 January 2013

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**Written evidence from the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) (LTS 08)**

1. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) is the UK’s largest train drivers’ union representing approximately 18,000 members in train operating companies and freight companies as well as London Underground and light rail systems.

2. ASLEF welcomes this opportunity to give evidence to the Transport Committee regarding security. The security of employees and passengers should be an ongoing priority for every stakeholder in the transport industry. There are always ways to improve security and it is important that these issues are constantly considered and kept under review

3. The union has two main concerns with regard to security in the rail industry at present. Firstly, there is the problem of trains not being fully checked before they go to depot which can lead to passengers being over-carried and can allow significant breaches of security. Secondly, there is a lack of standard identification for access to “airside” areas on the railway which can lead to safety issues and potentially lead to dangerous security breaches.

4. It is self-evident that following the termination of a train, all passengers must disembark for security reasons. This has previously been ensured by a member of staff walking through the train to check that all passengers had disembarked. However as the number of station staff decreases, such steps inevitably occur less frequently. This can lead to a great number of security risks. A good example of this is the Bakerloo Line on London Underground where following the removal of detainment staff at the end of 2011, incidence of “passenger overcarry” increased enormously. In fact, in 2010–11 there were nine such incidents rising dramatically to 1053 in 2011–12. While this figure appears to be dropping down from this peak, it remains far high than previous years before these staff were removed. This has already led to one train operator assault. ASLEF believes that without action it is only a matter of time before there is another incident.

5. Trains which have been in use will usually be sent to depot or occasionally remain in station overnight. There are obvious security risks that derive from any passengers being left in these areas. This could be intentional, with the potential threat of deliberate sabotage, or an accident with a member of the public falling asleep or being incapacitated which may create a health hazard to themselves or others.

6. ASLEF believes that over carrying remains one of the key potential security risks on the railway. The problem can be resolved by undertaking more staff checks.

7. The other key potential risk in relation to security is the lack of central identification for railway staff. ASLEF believes that a standard central database should be kept and identification should be issued for all staff that have access to non-public areas on the railway. Currently staff receive identification from only their employer so station checks can therefore involve all manner of TOCs or Network Rail with the result that it can prove difficult to check which staff have got the right to be in certain areas. Such fragmented security arrangements would be completely unacceptable in airports, yet there is the same potential for serious damage and loss of life on the railway. Whilst many staff are required to have various police security checks to get jobs, this is of little use if these individuals are difficult to identify.

8. The overall security situation on the network is another example of the consequences of a fragmented railway. The union believes that a standardised badge containing relevant information for all railway staff would make identifying those who are in areas to which they should not have access far easier. These passes could have additional benefits. For example they could contain details of the travel facilities that staff have. This would cut down on the costs of administering staff travel.

9. We are living in an era where security measures have to be increasingly considered. Travel by rail is already one of the safest forms of transport available. We must ensure this continues to be the case with rail authorities knowing exactly who has access to what operational areas at stations and depots and ensuring that those who should not have access are not able to slip through the net. Relatively minor changes such as more vigorous checks to trains following their final destination and a centralised security pass could have the effect of saving lives as well as ensuring that confidence in rail travel remains high. Such changes would therefore be a small price to pay.

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**Further written evidence from ASLEF (LTS 08A)**

Following our submission to the committee's enquiry on security, ASLEF has received updated statistics on overcarried passengers on London Underground.

Each of these figures represents the number of incidents of overcarry in 2012, not the number individuals who were overcarried. This figure would be far higher.

Count of Incident Ownership	
Incident Ownership	Total
Bakerloo Line	3,362
Central Line	16
Circle & Hammersmith Line	6
District Line	20
Jubilee Line	18
Metropolitan Line	6
Northern Line	7
Piccadilly Line	14
Victoria Line	6
Waterloo & City Line	1
Grand Total	3,456

The Bakerloo Line is the only line on the underground to have removed detainment staff. The effect of this is clear. As are the potential risks.

*15 January 2013*

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