House of Commons - Devil's bargain? Energy risks and the public

Devil's bargain? Energy risks and the public - Science and Technology Committee Contents

3 Risk communication and dialogue

34. Risk communication is often thought of as a one-way process of disseminating information, often from experts to non-experts. However, modern definitions describe a two way process, for example, the World Health Organization (WHO) describes it as "an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion on risk among risk assessors, risk managers, and other interested parties".[91] A journal of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained the development of risk communication in nuclear technology:

Risk communication began in the late 1970s with efforts by the nuclear and chemical industries in the United States to counteract widespread public concern about those technologies. It was believed that clear, understandable information was all that was needed to make people see that the risks were lower than many feared. To this day, many still believe risk communication is just a matter of making information understandable. This is particularly true in fields like nuclear technology, strongly influenced by people with scientific and engineering backgrounds.

For decades this approach has failed, and most risk communication experts say it is inadequate. The perception of risk, and the behaviors that result, are a matter of both the facts and our feelings and instincts and personal life circumstances. Communication that offers the facts but fails to account for the affective side of our risk perceptions is simply incomplete.[92]

The Department of Health's guidance on Communicating about risks to public health: Pointers to good practice also noted a "progressive change both in the research literature and in the practice of risk communication" from "emphasis on 'public misperceptions of risk', which tended to treat all deviations from expert estimates as products of ignorance or stupidity" via "investigation of what actually does cause concern and why" to "approaches which promote risk communication as a two-way process in which both 'expert' and 'lay' perspectives should inform each other".[93]

35. Several of the written submissions we received emphasised the importance of risk communication as a two-way dialogue rather than a debate. For example, Professor Wade Allison, University of Oxford, stated that "the media and public figures speak of a 'nuclear debate' and the need to present both sides" but explained that "a dialogue between fear and science should not be described in that way. Scientific understanding is not achieved through the cut and thrust of adversarial challenge".[94] The Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) considered it important that "both Government and the industry should continue to engage, inform and discuss the issues of nuclear energy with the public in an open and honest dialogue".[95]

Risk information for the public

GOVERNMENT

36. During our inquiry on Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies, we noted that there was no lack of guidance on risk communication for Government departments, including from the Treasury, Cabinet Office and Department of Health.[96] Overall, the Government has established five principles of risk communication: (i) openness and transparency; (ii) involvement (engagement in decision processes); (iii) proportionality and consistency; (iv) evidence (basing decisions on evidence); and (v) responsibility (allocating responsibility for risk management appropriately).[97] In addition, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has sponsored research on risk communication in the workplace and on major accident hazards[98] and reviews of crises such as the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak have highlighted lessons on risk communication.[99]

37. Nonetheless, existing Government guidance drew criticisms. Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director of the Understanding Risk Programme, Cardiff University, stated that "currently there is no unified approach to risk communication either within central or local government in the UK. Efforts have tended to remain fragmented and tailored to the needs of individual Departments".[100] The Royal Statistical Society (RSS) criticised the lack of risk information available to the public from Government and the accessibility of information provided by regulators on energy risks. It considered that "the public is currently desperately ill-served by the lack of ready access to up-to-date balanced and trustworthy information on the possible risks associated with different energy sources" and added "those that exist appear to be either reassuring propaganda or are limited to a particular hazard".[101] The NIA highlighted that a key issue for public dialogue was that all energy sources involve risks[102] and the RSS highlighted the lack of information enabling comparative assessment of the magnitudes of energy risks, drawing attention to the failings of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in particular.[103]

38. In 1991, an Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA) was established with a remit to promote consistency and disseminate best practice in risk assessment in Government.[104] ILGRA produced a series of reports on risk issues identifying areas of weakness, highlighting how a more strategic and consistent approach to risk assessment could be pursued and prompting further inter-departmental activity on risk management.[105] In its third and final report, in 2002, ILGRA noted that many departments had risk frameworks, which were becoming embedded in their policy work and culture. Our predecessor Committee considered that "the replacement of ILGRA in 2002 by a high level group based in the Treasury and reporting directly to the Prime Minister could be seen as an implicit recognition that the group's useful work had not had a sufficiently strong impact across Whitehall".[106] ILGRA recommended that:

to improve risk communication across Government, a central resource is necessary to assemble registers of risk communication research and training programmes, and promote joint research to identify good risk communication practice and encourage its adoption by Departments.[107]

A decade later, there is still a demand for strategic capacity in risk communication. For example, Professor Pidgeon stated "individual proposals for a risk information centre have been raised in the past (e.g. by the Hazards Forum) but there is no one entity in the UK dedicated to research, communication and policy support for risk".[108]

39. While it is commendable that individual Departments have embedded risk frameworks, coordination of risk communication across Government is lacking. A senior individual in Government should be visibly responsible for overseeing risk communication, research and training across Government. This individual should lead a Risk Communication Strategy team, drawing together existing expertise within Departments and public bodies, which should sit at the centre of Government, either within the Cabinet Office, which houses the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Behavioural Insights team, or the Treasury, which provides cross-Government risk management guidance.

40. While comparisons of risk from different energy sources can be useful for engaging with some audiences, experience has shown that such factual information does not always change risk perceptions because they don't take the influence of "fright factors" into account. The Risk Communication Strategy team should evaluate whether it would be possible and beneficial to publish risk comparisons where fright factors have been controlled (for example, not comparing voluntary risks with involuntary risks).

REGULATORS

41. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and is responsible for all nuclear sector regulation across the UK.[109] Under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, a site cannot have a nuclear plant on it unless it has been granted a site licence by the HSE. This licensing function is administered on HSE's behalf by the ONR.[110] The Environment Agency is responsible for overseeing how UK nuclear sites dispose of their radioactive waste by granting site permits to the operators who run them. It is the Environment Agency's responsibility to "check-up on sites to ensure they're not exceeding their limits and releasing as little radioactive waste as possible into the environment".[111] Dr Paul Leinster, Chief Executive of the Environment Agency, explained that "we regulate those aspects of radioactivity that leave a site boundary: emissions to air, discharges to water, and waste when it comes outside the site boundary" and clarified that "waste on the site will be within the HSE's responsibilities".[112]

42. A key HSE document is the 1992 report on The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations, originally published in 1988 following a recommendation in the 1986 Sizewell B public inquiry, that the HSE should "formulate and publish guidelines on the tolerable levels of individual and social risk to workers and the public from nuclear power stations".[113] However, existing guidance on energy risks, such as from the ONR, was considered by the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) to be aimed at a professional or informed audience.[114] Geoffrey Podger, Chief Executive of the HSE agreed that "in communication terms, most of what HSE does is probably aimed at a relatively technical audience" and explained that this reflected demand.[115] However, Mr Podger added that the HSE did "a lot, particularly for small businesses, at an easier level of understanding", that it carried out "pioneer studies" on emerging technologies, and participated in public meetings on land use planning.[116] The HSE had also been working on updating risk communication and a review of the HSE had found that it was "good at communicating on a technical level with technical people, but there were areas where [it] had been less successful when it was necessary to communicate with a wider group of people".[117] According to the RSS, the review had "supported the HSE's 'consensual' approach to risk communication", but "suggested that in highly contested areas it could improve by being more proactive and engaging with people's concerns, exploiting wider expertise".[118] The HSE should also focus "on becoming a trusted source which is seen as understanding the social context".[119] The review also concluded that "the HSE's documents, although a clear exposition of their regulatory approach, do not provide the public with a basis for judging the risks".[120]

43. We also explored the role of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) which provides information for the public, albeit not as a regulator. The HPA is a non-departmental public body (NDBP) which will be reconstituted as part of Public Health England from April 2013.[121] Dr Jill Meara, Deputy Director of the Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards, HPA, stated that the HPA was "reasonably well known, particularly for its infectious diseases work" and added "when you ask people who have heard of us which hazards they think we cover, [...] radiation comes into it".[122] She highlighted a 2009 poll, carried out after the swine flu pandemic, that showed that "44% of people had heard of the HPA; 63% thought that its advice would be trustworthy and competent; and 88% would follow its advice".[123] The RSS stated that the HPA provided "popular, reassuring information on 'Nuclear Emergencies'".[124]

44. During the Fukushima emergency, the HPA's radiation protection experts kept the situation in Japan under close review and advised the UK Government.[125] The HPA also provided weekly statements on the results from radiation monitoring stations around the UK.[126] The emergency response involved a number of other public bodies: the Environment Agency " worked with [...] partners such as the Office for Nuclear Regulation, the Met Office and the Health Protection Agency to provide advice to Government" in order to "assist in understanding how this incident affected the UK, and how this may need to be managed".[127] It also published guidance on how to deal with items contaminated by the Fukushima incident.[128] The HSE and HPA were represented on the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), set up to provide advice to Government during the emergency.[129]

45. However, the low public profile of regulators drew criticisms from Fiona Fox, Director of the Science Media Centre (SMC), who stated:

Sadly, there were many, like the Health Protection Agency, the Met Office and the National Nuclear Laboratory, who told us they were not allowed to speak [to the media] during that phase. They were giving advice to Government but they did not want to do media interviews. There is a big lesson there about arm's length independent experts being made available to advise Government but also the media and the public.[130]

If you have any information or expertise to brief Government, do it, but also brief the media, who will brief the public [...] I would like the message to get out that we need to use our independent agencies, which are trusted and respected.[131]

Mr Podger, HSE, explained that the regulators had been heavily involved in understanding the emergency and advising the Government, adding that while "it is entirely legitimate to argue that people like us should [...] turn out quickly with the media in circumstances where there is a need to do so", some of the requests were for "sofa pundits" such as Dr Weightman, who was otherwise "engaged 24/7 in advising the Government".[132] Dr Meara, HPA, acknowledged that the HPA had been approached by the media and had "explained very carefully what we were doing and why, in the very early stages before radiation was detected in the UK, we were not putting up press spokesmen".[133] She highlighted the HPA's "regular press statements" and added that "the moment we knew radiation was detected in the UK we [...] put press spokesmen out".[134]

46. The public profile of scientific advisers to Government was a key focus of our inquiry on Scientific Advice and Evidence in Emergencies, where we noted that as experts in the scientific issues of an emergency, SAGE members had an exceptional value as public communicators.[135] When we held a follow-up evidence session in June 2011 and discussed the Fukushima emergency, we were pleased that Professor Sir John Beddington, Government Chief Scientific Adviser, stated "it was important to engage fairly quickly with the media".[136] However, even Sir John was criticised for his limited engagement with the media during Fukushima.[137] Attempting to address this issue in our previous inquiry, we recommended that a code of practice for SAGE and its members be developed, and the Government, in its response to our report, agreed to produce "Amplified Science Guidance on SAGE" by summer 2011.[138] To date, this guidance has not been published.

The Weightman review

47. Following the events at Fukushima, the UK Government responded to nuclear safety concerns by requesting that Dr Mike Weightman, HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations and Head of the ONR, examine the circumstances of the Fukushima accident to see what lessons could be learnt to enhance the safety of the UK nuclear industry.[139] DECC stated that "it was important that we established the facts before making any decisions on policy".[140] The report Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK nuclear industry (the Weightman review) was published in October 2011 and concluded that there were "no fundamental safety weaknesses in the UK's nuclear industry but [...] by learning lessons it can be made even safer".[141] The review recommended that "both the UK nuclear industry and ONR should consider ways of enhancing the drive to ensure more open, transparent and trusted communications, and relationships, with the public and other stakeholders".[142] Dr Rick Wylie, Executive Director of the Applied Policy Sciences Unit, University of Central Lancashire, commented that "the Weightman report was profound and very significant, and the role of the regulator is key" but in his view it was "a rigorous technical and scientific risk underpinning of so much of what goes on, and it is very important, but it does not address perceived risk".[143]

48. Good communication is essential for allaying public fear during an emergency, but time spent by key experts briefing the media must be balanced with the primary responsibility of producing scientific advice and advising Government. We commend the work of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser and SAGE during the Fukushima emergency and consider the UK's scientific response to have been exemplary. However, the Government should publish the long overdue "Amplified Science Guidance" on SAGE as soon as possible, which should include protocols for SAGE members' engagement with the media.

49. In principle, anyone providing scientific advice to Government during an emergency, including public bodies, should also consider adhering to media engagement protocols in the "Amplified Science Guidance" on SAGE when dealing with high profile events.

50. Not everyone is interested in understanding energy risks and the roles of various stakeholders. The Government, via the proposed Risk Communication Strategy team, should evaluate the public appetite for risk information and consider how this information would be best disseminated. We recommend that information should be disseminated using existing sources, with a focus on developing the public profile of independent regulators as trusted and authoritative information sources.

51. We consider that regulatory bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive, Environment Agency and Office for Nuclear Regulation, that are independent of Government and technically competent, are in a unique position to engender public trust and influence risk perceptions. The impact and profile of the Weightman review in the UK is a testament to the importance of independent, evidence-based evaluation of risks. In addition to providing risk information for technical audiences, regulators should also make greater efforts to communicate risk to the public and develop their role as trusted sources of information for lay people.

THE MEDIA

52. In paragraph 27 we noted that while information from media sources was often not trusted by the public, it acquired trust by being transmitted through trusted figures, such as friends and family. Risk information provided by the media formed an important part of our inquiry because of the media's influence on public opinion. Ms Fox, SMC, cited a survey carried out by MORI for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) which showed that "the media as a whole, including television, is the main source of information about science for the overwhelming majority of the population".[144] She added that "all the media have a huge influence on public opinion on science and risk".[145] Dr Henderson, former Science Editor at The Times, added more detail on the survey findings and stated:

I believe the question they asked was, "What is your main source for science in general?" About 64% said it was television and about 25% said it was newspapers. The internet was surprisingly low, including only about 2%, who said that science blogs and that kind of thing were the main source.[146]

Despite the Internet's apparent low ranking as a source of information, Tracey Brown, Managing Director, Sense About Science, stated "a new phenomenon is that in similar surveys 80% of people say they get health information on the internet", including "pull[ing] up old news stories and materials in a proactive fashion".[147] This means that "there is a circulation that continues beyond the day the newspapers are published or the programmes broadcast".[148]

Fukushima coverage

53. Unlike the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents in 1979 and 1986 respectively, a vast amount of information on the Fukushima accident was available online and people were able to seek information and actively engage in risk discussions through blogs and social networking.[149] The Internet also provided opportunities for traditional news sources, such as newspapers, to publish more information and detailed graphics.[150] Online coverage of the unfolding events at Fukushima exceeded coverage of the widespread devastation caused by the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. In April 2012 a Google search of the term "Fukushima" returned 62.7 million hits whereas the term "Tohoku Earthquake" returned 6.3 million hits. Ms Brown, Sense About Science, highlighted the same differences in newspaper coverage of events in Japan, giving the example of The Independent, which had "eight pages [...] sensationalising nuclear stories" and "not one mention in eight pages of the 20,000 people who died and the hundreds of thousands who were displaced".[151] She contrasted this with coverage in the Daily Mail where "the front page had a picture and put across a story, [...] where 20,000 people were dead or missing, with massive displacement of people from their homes, and dysentery [returning] to an industrial nation".[152]

54. We explored whether some news sources were better at communicating risks than others, and an important point was made by several witnesses: that "it is always a mistake to see the media as a whole"[153] and that "we have the worst and best of journalism within the same newspapers".[154] Different media approaches to the same issue will depend on whether the goal is to attract an audience using "a more sensational approach" or "through a reputation for trustworthiness and accuracy".[155] Even so, the Daily Mail, often accused of sensationalism, was held up as an example of balanced risk coverage of events at Fukushima.[156] Ms Fox stated that "our science, health and environment reporters in the UK are among the best journalists in the world and care passionately about accuracy and measured reporting" but highlighted the pressures put on science correspondents by editors:

One of our big problems is what happens between the article and the headline, which is usually devised by the subeditor, and the pressures from the news desk. During Fukushima we had various journalists [...] coming to [Science Media Centre] briefings with experts saying, "My editor wants a scare story." Newspaper journalists were even taken off this story because they were giving a more measured, balanced, accurate narrative than the ones the news desks wanted.[157]

Ms Fox highlighted an interesting disjuncture between what information the public desire and what the media consider to be the public appetite, stating "the media believe that the public want to be informed about every possible risk".[158] She added:

[Surveys show] quite surprisingly, that, when asked whether they would like to hear about every possible risk to the environment and health, immediately the public say they do not want to hear. They would prefer to hear about the risk when it has been proven several times and other experts have replicated those studies. There is a real disjuncture between what the news editor thinks [...] and the public's desire for the much more cautious approach.[159]

55. However, it would be simplistic solely to blame the media for reporting stories that do not accurately reflect risk. High profile figures such as politicians may also misrepresent risk and the media duly report this. For example, in the days following explosions at the Fukushima plant, Guenther Oettinger, Europe's Energy Commissioner, stated "there is talk of an apocalypse and I think the word is particularly well chosen. Practically everything is out of control. I cannot exclude the worst in the hours and days to come".[160] Ms Brown queried: "when a senior official says something really irresponsible what are the media supposed to do?"[161]

The Science Media Centre

56. Following the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee's 2000 report on Science and Society, the Science Media Centre (SMC) was created in 2002. The SMC is an independent body supported by donations capped at 5% from industry, professional organisations, media groups and individuals.[162] The SMC considers itself to be "first and foremost a press office for science when science hits the headlines" and puts journalists in contact with scientists, organises press briefings and workshops and provides media training for scientists.[163] The SMC's work was widely praised, for example the Society for Radiological Protection considered it to be "an important objectively-based way of resisting 'quackery' and providing good quality information to the media, should they choose to use it".[164] Professor Pidgeon stated that the SMC "has been a very good development in this country. They have connected the journalists with the scientists and engineers in a very effective way over many years on many issues".[165]

57. We commend the work of the Science Media Centre in connecting journalists with scientists, but consider that more could be done to improve risk communication of scientific matters in the media. The Science and Society Programme within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills was created in 2008 and includes an expert group on Science and the Media.[166] In January 2010, this expert group produced a report detailing recommendations to improve the accurate reporting of science in the media.[167] The Government should clarify what progress has been made in the consideration and implementation of the recommendations made in 2010 by its expert group on Science and the Media. We may return to this matter in the future.

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

58. A key tool for conveying the severity of nuclear accidents is the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES), which is "a worldwide tool for communicating to the public in a consistent way the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events".[168] Since 1990 the scale has been applied to classify events at nuclear power plants and by 2006, it had been adapted to meet the growing need for communication of the significance of all events "associated with the transport, storage and use of radioactive material and radiation sources"[169] Events are classified on the INES at seven levels: Levels 1-3 are called "incidents" and Levels 4-7 are "accidents". Events without safety significance are called "deviations" and are classified Below Scale/Level 0. The scale is designed so that the severity of an event is about ten times greater for each increase in level on the scale.[170] The Windscale Fire and Three Mile Island incidents are classified as a Level 5 "accidents with wider consequences" and Chernobyl is classified as a Level 7 "major accident".[171] A level 7 rating is defined as "an event resulting in an environmental release corresponding to a quantity of radioactivity radiologically equivalent to a release to the atmosphere of more than several tens of thousands of terabecquerel (TBq)[172] of Iodine-131".[173] The Fukushima accident was initially classed as a level 5 incident and later revised upwards to level 7. While the Chernobyl accident released 5.2 million TBq, it is estimated that the Fukushima accident released approximately 770 thousand TBq,[174] an order of magnitude less.

59. Dr Henderson, former Science Editor at The Times, criticised the INES scale, stating that it was "difficult for reporters to convey the nuance of what was happening at Fukushima versus what had happened previously at Chernobyl, because the scale was not fit for purpose".[175] He noted that classifying Fukushima as level 7 put it in the same category as Chernobyl, although the two were very different in scale.[176] Professor David Spiegelhalter, Royal Statistical Society, stated that "we have a scale, intended for popular use, whose technical definition has little relation to the phrase used in its media communication, and whose use has required repeated clarifications".[177] We asked Dr Weightman, Head of the ONR, whether he agreed that the INES was not fit for purpose, and he concurred.[178] He stated that "in terms of its purpose, it is there to provide clear communication to people and the media about a nuclear event [...] Did it do that? No, it did not" and explained that part of the difficulty was that Fukushima was "a long event, which meant it escalated with time" and also for Level 7 events "you can get a difference by a factor of 10 in the level of release".[179] Dr Meara, HPA, added that the INES "takes account only of the hazard—what has flown over the site boundary—and, in order to define the importance of it for the population, you have to think about the risk" because "what the public are interested in is the risk to them, not just the raw nature of the hazard that has gone from the site".[180] She also considered that the scale "does not cover enough orders of magnitude".[181]

60. The inadequacies of the INES have been recognised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "as part of its action plan post-Fukushima to review that event".[182] According to Dr Weightman, the IAEA "will also have to review the basis of it, because at the moment it is based on technical opinion about the level of defence or defeat of barriers" and "if you are trying to communicate with somebody, you have to think about whether that is the best basis on which to do it".[183] Although it is useful to have a scale to enable the public to make informed comparative assessments of risk, we agree that the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is not an adequate communication tool for conveying risks. The IAEA, in reviewing the INES, should pay particular attention to (i) the technical basis of the scale and whether it incorporates sufficient information about risk as well as hazard; (ii) how to better represent orders of magnitude; and (iii) how to make the scale comprehensible to non-technical audiences. As a member state of the IAEA, the UK Government should influence the review of the INES in this direction.

61. The IAEA and UK Government should also consider whether the INES, or its successor, should communicate the likely impacts of a nuclear accident on people and the environment, as well as quantifying the release of radioactive materials. Consideration should be given to the best method of communicating acute and chronic impacts.

Radiation exposure thresholds

62. As mentioned previously, the UK legal limit for radiation exposure from sources such as nuclear plants for members of the public is 1 millisievert (mSv) a year, based on recommendations from the International Commission on Radiological Protection.[184] Professor Allison, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of Oxford, stated:

Non-medical international safety standards have been established to appease popular concerns by specifying levels found in nature, As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) [Also referred to as ALARP - As Low As Reasonably Practical]. Modern biology has demonstrated that no harm comes to people from radiation levels up to 1,000 times higher.[185]

Tracey Brown, Sense About Science, also criticised thresholds and explained that:

there is a particular issue to do with people's perception derived from safety guidelines. Safety guidelines are necessarily very conservative about levels of exposure. What happens in a situation like the Fukushima plant in Japan is that there are very low thresholds. Japan sets the threshold for exposure through the water supply very low indeed, but then the news becomes that you have exceeded that. For example, iodine 131 levels in Tokyo's water supply were about 210 becquerels per kilo. That is more than the limit set by Japan for infant exposure but less than adult exposure. The context is that the adult exposure level set in Japan is about 10 times lower than the level worldwide set by the World Health Organisation as the point of intervention, which is 3,000 becquerels per kilo. Japan sets the adult limit at 300.

You end up with a situation where you are trying to explain to a worried population. You have media headlines saying that recommended levels have been exceeded, but there is no evidence that at that level it will cause anybody any harm or anybody will suffer from that. But, of course, it is very worrying for people. What is set out as a precautionary measure to protect the public becomes a source of concern and also a source of alarming newspaper stories.[186]

63. Ms Brown considered that "there is certainly a job to be done to explain why we set exposure thresholds for environmental hazards at a very low level, and exceeding those does not necessarily mean that people are at risk".[187] Professor Allison went further and suggested that:

the UK, through academic and other channels, should bring every influence to bear on ICRP and IAEA to ensure that internationally recommended ALARA "safety" levels are replaced by real safety levels (AHARS) without delay, so as to ensure that the world does not continue to be "spooked" by the one major energy source that could support future economic stability without damage to the environment.[188]

64. Radiation exposure thresholds based on reducing exposure to levels that are as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) should be retained, as they are key to maintaining public confidence that risks are being stringently managed. However, the Government, regulators and other information sources must emphasise that exceeding ALARP levels may not pose any risk to people or the environment, and that there is a difference between operational thresholds (which are purposely set very low) and safety thresholds (based on scientific evidence) that may allow for significantly greater radiation exposure to occur without significant risk to health or the environment.

Public engagement in planning processes

65. The final part of this chapter looks at risk dialogue as part of public engagement in planning processes.

RISK PERCEPTIONS AT EXISTING NUCLEAR SITES

66. In paragraph 22 we outlined the general factors affecting risk perceptions. Professor Pidgeon stated that "views become more complex at existing nuclear locations [...] the response of people in such communities does not always mirror that obtained from national samples".[189] EDF Energy stated that "risk perception is likely to differ between the national and local level, with the latter forming views based on local knowledge—which may be either positive or negative".[190] Sedgemoor District Council stated "in our experience local communities are more objective in their perception of risk. They perceive that there is a potentially high impact yet low likelihood of a catastrophic event at the power station".[191] Professor Pidgeon cautioned: "a common assumption is that people in these locations will be overwhelmingly positive about nuclear power, because of long-standing experience with the local station and local economic benefits" but "while it is true that surveys conducted at such locations tend to be somewhat more positive about nuclear power in aggregate compared with samples living elsewhere, detailed research again suggests a more complex picture and the need to look beyond the headline statistics".[192] He considered that geography, history and socio-economic factors were important, and that "in this respect the existing UK nuclear sites vary enormously in social, economic and historical circumstance".[193]

PLANNING PROCESSES

67. According to the British Geological Survey (BGS), planning processes have generally evolved from the "'Decide-Announce-Defend' (DAD) approach to [nuclear] site selection" which "has been used extensively in the past in France and the UK" to the "Review-Decide" pattern currently used in the UK.[194] The BGS explained that the DAD approach "has not been particularly successful in its goals and has generated considerable suspicion of the nuclear industry".[195]

68. Sedgemoor District Council, representing a local authority adjacent to the Hinkley Point nuclear power stations, stated that:

The consideration of risk and tolerability is best placed within the planning process as it is the process that is best understood and actively engaged in by communities and individuals. The placing of the consideration of risk and tolerability in the more technical and less familiar scientific processes of other regulatory considerations, does not adequately deal with legitimate community concerns.[196]

69. EDF Energy stated that "good developers would always aim to build a constructive relationship with consultees, particularly the most immediate community around the development, ahead of a planning application being submitted".[197] Richard Mayson, EDF Energy, stated "we work very hard to make sure we have a full engagement process. We fully support the massive engagement that has happened on nuclear policy over the last eight to 10 years".[198] Whereas the importance of public engagement was recognised by the nuclear industry and others, plenty of criticisms were offered in the written submissions we received. Greenpeace considered that "there are regrettably few opportunities for the public to have a say in the planning process".[199] The Applied Policy Sciences Unit (APSU) at the University of Central Lancashire expressed concerns about the nuclear industry's emphasis on quantitative risk assessments that failed to "appreciate or accommodate the constructed and contextual nature of perceived risk".[200] Academics at the University of Manchester stated that safety information provided during the Generic Design Assessment (GDA)[201] process showed transparency but considered that "it is unlikely that the public will be in a position to understand the large volumes of deeply complex technical safety documents" and "therefore, the government should think about [...] ways to provide relevant information in a format more suited for the general public".[202]

70. The balances between risk perception, trust and community benefits were highlighted and interesting difference of opinion emerged. Sedgmoor District Council defined community benefit as "the internationally accepted form of compensation paid to communities hosting large impactful infrastructure projects, particularly nuclear power stations".[203] Bob Brown, Corporate Director, Sedgemoor District Council, stated "the Government see [community benefit] as an important issue in terms of the long-term relationship and building of trust".[204] He stated that:

In Hinkley the experience of our communities is that they are more understanding; they live with it [...] they understand what would happen if there was a catastrophic event [...] but they live with the risk and understand it because of the benefits that it brings, and has brought to them, and the benefits more widely to the nation from low-carbon energy production.[205]

Similarly, in reference to the West Cumbrian community near the Sellafield site, Dr Rick Wylie, APSU, stated "I cannot stress enough that people in these communities do not support the nuclear industry or a new facility [...] because they trust the operators but because of the extrinsic benefits that the facility will bring to their community".[206]

71. During our visit to Germany, we learned that the views of the public were sought during planning processes, but this tended to happen late in the process. There was a desire to increase public participation and new "citizen partnership" models were being developed whereby communities could takes shares in new projects, for example, a community wind farm. We heard that public hearings could be viewed as insufficient as they tended to be "an orchestration of power versus disempowerment".[207]

72. The Government, working with industry, regulators, social scientists and communities, should produce guidance on best practice in risk communication for those living near existing or proposed nuclear facilities. The guidance should address how to present risk information in accessible formats and language. Complex, technical documents should continue to be available in the interests of transparency.

73. Community benefits are an important way of building trust and negotiations can enable the public to feel a greater sense of control, choice over and ownership of energy projects. We encourage the further use of current community engagement processes led by energy companies, working with local government and the public, for building trust around nuclear new build proposals.

74. We were impressed by the citizen partnership model being developed in Germany for wind farms and suggest that enabling communities to feel more ownership of local energy infrastructure by offering shares in projects could be conducive to building trust and acceptance. Partnership models could form part of community benefits discussions for new nuclear build and other energy infrastructure.

91 "Risk communication", World Health Organization, who.int/foodsafety Back

92 "Risk communication: more than facts and feelings", IAEA Bulletin, iaea.org Back

93 Department of Health, Communicating about risks to public health: pointers to good practice, 1 January 1997, p4 Back

94 Ev w11, para 7.1 Back

95 Ev w23 Back

96 Science and Technology Committee, Third Report of Session 2010-12, Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies, HC 498 Back

97 HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, Principles of Managing Risks to the Public, hm-treasury.gov.uk Back

98 Ev 69 [Professor Nick Pidgeon], para 24 Back

99 The BSE Inquiry: Findings and conclusions, October 2000, Volume 1, Chapter 14, section 1301 Back

100 Ev 69, para 24 Back

101 Ev 51, para 2a Back

102 Ev w23, para 5 Back