Devil's bargain? Energy risks and the public - Science and Technology Committee Contents


2  Nuclear energy risk perceptions

Significant nuclear incidents

7.  During and following the Second World War, nuclear research in the UK was mainly focused towards military applications. In 1947, the site of the former Sellafield ordnance factory—renamed Windscale—was announced as a new atomic energy site and in 1953, following the government announcement that the country would begin a civil nuclear power programme, construction began there. In 1956, the world's first commercial nuclear power station opened at Calder Hall on the Windscale site.[5] In October 1957, a reactor overheated and caught fire, releasing radioactive materials into surrounding areas. The Windscale fire remains the most severe nuclear accident in UK history and led to the 1959 Nuclear Installations Act. This required that civil nuclear power stations which were then under construction and those planned for the future be licensed by the newly formed Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII); a regulator whose sole responsibility would be safety.[6] The NII's functions are today carried out by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), an agency of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

8.  Three incidents at nuclear power stations in other countries have had a particular impact on public and political discourse in the UK. In 1979, a cooling malfunction caused part of a reactor core to melt at the Three Mile Island site in the USA. Radioactive gas was released, but investigations concluded that "in spite of serious damage to the reactor, most of the radiation was contained and that the actual release had negligible effects on the physical health of individuals or the environment".[7] However, the incident at Three Mile Island was accompanied by communications problems that led to conflicting information being made available to the public, contributing to public fears.[8] As a result, "public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in [the] USA, declined sharply following the incident".[9] Echoing the aftermath of the Windscale fire, nuclear regulation in the USA became more robust after the Three Mile Island incident.[10]

9.  The world's worst nuclear accident occurred in 1986 at the Chernobyl plant in the Ukraine. A sudden surge of power destroyed the nuclear reactor and the explosion released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment, causing severe radiation effects almost immediately.[11] Major releases of radioactive material continued for ten days and contaminated more than 200,000 square kilometres in Europe.[12] A 2005 United Nations (UN) report estimated that a total of up to 4,000 people could eventually die of radiation exposure from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.[13] There was "initial secrecy and confusion about the accident" and "the people living in the affected areas learned about the event mainly from hearsay rather than from authoritative reporting".[14] After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, "there was a very high level of opposition to nuclear energy in many countries across the globe".[15] Professor Nick Pidgeon, Director of the Understanding Risk Programme, Cardiff University, noted that "if you went back 20 years and asked people whether they thought nuclear power had benefits, you would get a uniform 'no' after Chernobyl".[16]

10.  In March 2011, Japan suffered its worst recorded earthquake, known as the Tohoku event. The epicentre was 110 miles offshore from the site of the Fukushima Daiichi power station. Reactor units 1, 2 and 3 on this site were operating before the event and shut down safely on detection of the earthquake (reactor units 4, 5 and 6 were not operating). On-site power was initially used to provide essential cooling, but an hour after shutdown a massive tsunami from the earthquake swamped the site, taking out electrical power capability, and alternative back-up cooling was lost. With the loss of cooling systems, Reactor Units 1 to 3 overheated as did a spent fuel pond[17] in building of Reactor Unit 4. This resulted in several explosions. Major releases of radioactivity occurred, "initially by air but later by leakage to sea".[18] It was "the first time that a natural disaster had caused a nuclear accident".[19] Although tens of thousands died as a result of the earthquake and tsunami, to date nobody has died, or received a life-threatening dose of radiation, from the Fukushima nuclear accident and no one is expected to.[20] Decontamination efforts continue.

11.  In the UK, the Government requested a report on the implications of Fukushima for the UK nuclear industry. The investigation was led by Dr Mike Weightman, HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations and Head of the ONR. The report was produced in September 2011 (an interim report was published in May 2011).[21]

Support for nuclear energy

12.  The Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) stated that "in 2010 nuclear energy had its highest support in over a decade. Favourability fell following the accident at Fukushima, but is now again rising towards 2010 levels".[22] Recent polls show that "support for nuclear power in Britain has risen over the past year, despite the events at Fukushima".[23] A YouGov poll conducted on behalf of EDF Energy found that:

despite Fukushima, 61% of the public believe nuclear should be part of the energy mix. In fact, the results show that support for nuclear new build has broadly held up, with 47% supporting new nuclear power stations to replace ones that are being retired (and 28% against). This compares with 52% a year ago [2010], and 46% in March [2011].[24]

13.  However, Professor Pidgeon cautioned: "it is too early to reliably judge the full impacts of the Fukushima Disaster on public perceptions in the UK or internationally".[25] He considered it to be "genuinely puzzling that in the UK (and the USA) there remain as many people in favour as are opposed to nuclear power in such polls" and surmised "this may be due to Fukushima's spatial distance, and/or because people here attribute the primary cause to an overwhelming natural disaster, or because climate change and energy security discourses remain important for British people".[26] Dr Mark Henderson, former Science Editor at The Times, suggested that the best explanation might be "that a natural disaster of biblical proportions had thrown everything it had against a 40-year-old power station and nobody died".[27] Nevertheless, major nuclear accidents can have profound, long-term impacts on public concerns about risk. Professor Tom Horlick-Jones, University of Cardiff, stated that "despite the many gains associated with nuclear power, the accidents at Three Mile island and Chernobyl, and the associations with nuclear weapons arguabl[y] continue to resonate in the public imagination".[28] The British Geological Survey stated that public concerns were "confirmed and reinforced" by such incidents.[29]

14.  Public support for nuclear energy in the UK is shown by opinion polls and surveys, although such information may not explain the reasons for such support. Social scientists have been researching public attitudes towards nuclear power for many years in the UK. Professor Horlick-Jones cautioned that while polls are "good at gathering large amounts of data on things with which people have some familiarity", they are "not so good when people do not understand the issue in question, or perhaps have mixed feelings about it".[30] Delving further to understand why people are opposed to or support nuclear energy reveals how people might balance various personal concerns. Professor Horlick-Jones suggested that pragmatic support for nuclear power technologies might be "grounded in the everyday practical experience of [...] rising energy bills and [people's] worries about energy security".[31] The Applied Policy Sciences Unit, University of Central Lancashire, considered that the perceived risks of climate change "have undoubtedly influenced public opinion at the national level".[32] Professor Pidgeon stated that "a large proportion of recent support remain[s] conditional - a 'reluctant acceptance' at best" and added that "while many more in Britain have indeed come to support nuclear power over the past decade they do so while viewing it only as a 'devil's bargain', a choice of last resort in the face of the threat of climate change".[33] He concluded that, given the choice, "individuals still show very clear preferences for renewable electricity generation".[34]

15.  People living in the vicinity of nuclear power stations and waste facilities additionally balance the risks with benefits to their community, such as jobs and improved transport infrastructure. These issues are explored in more detail in chapter 3.

International differences

16.  Since Fukushima, polling internationally has shown large declines in support in countries including Germany, France and Japan.[35] Sense About Science highlighted an Ipsos survey showing that "three in five global citizens (62%) oppose the use of nuclear energy and that a quarter (26%) of those have been influenced by the recent nuclear disaster in Fukushima".[36] Some countries such as Germany, Italy and Switzerland have decided to phase out nuclear power whereas others, such as France, Finland, China, the USA and the UK, continue to hold the view that nuclear energy should be part of the energy mix.[37]

17.  As part of our inquiry we visited Germany, which provided a useful case study for comparison with the UK. Opposition to nuclear energy has historically been stronger in Germany than in the UK. The anti-nuclear sentiment had started and grown during the Cold War, driven in part by the fear of nuclear missiles stationed in Germany. Professor Allison, Emeritus Professor of Physics at Oxford University, stated that Germany "suffered from being on both sides of the front line in the Cold War, so fear of radiation is deeply [i]ngrained".[38] In 2000, the German Government established timetables for phase-out of existing nuclear power stations but in 2010, made the decision to prolong the life of existing nuclear power stations—this was the first U-turn in nuclear energy policy.[39] While meeting with Professor Ortwin Renn, Member of Germany's Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, we heard that pre-Fukushima, around 65% of the German public had been in favour of phasing out nuclear power. Professor Renn explained that the German Government's decision to prolong the life of existing plants had been achieved with difficulty, but that many had appreciated the benefits of slower phase-out in order to develop renewable energy sources. However, after the reaction to Fukushima, which he described as "a slap in the face" for the German Government, the decision was made to withdraw from the nuclear programme, representing the second policy U-turn (often referred to as the "Energie Wende", or energy turnaround). The Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply was established on 22 March 2011 by Chancellor Angela Merkel to consider the technical and ethical aspects of nuclear energy, pave the way for a social consensus on phasing out nuclear energy and consider proposals for a transition to renewable energies. In May 2011, the Ethics Commission produced a report that stated "the risks of nuclear energy have not changed since Fukushima, but the perception of the risks has".[40]

The science of risk perception

18.  An understanding of the factors that affect risk perceptions is crucial for anyone who communicates risks to the public or engages in risk dialogue. It is sometimes the case that public acceptability does not correspond with the objective risks as understood by scientists and engineers. In fact, perceptions of risk can be remarkably inaccurate when compared to the objective risks, even when uncertainty is taken into account. As the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee noted in 2000, "when science and society cross swords, it is often over the question of risk".[41]

OBJECTIVE RISK

19.  It is worth giving some examples that illustrate the objective risks of nuclear energy. A technical note from the ONR contains a comparison of risk data from different energy sources which shows that nuclear power has statistically been the safest form of energy generation in terms of immediate deaths from major accidents.Table 1: Comparison of Major Accident Risk Data from a Range of Energy Sources[42]
Energy Chain OECD Nations[43]

(Fatalities/GWy[44])

Non-OECD Nations

(Fatalities/GWy)

Coal (inc. China) - 6.169
Coal (except China) - 0.597
Coal (total) 0.157 0.597[45]
Oil 0.132 0.897
Natural Gas 0.085 0.111
LPG[46] 1.957 14.896
Hydro 0.003 10.285
Nuclear - 0.048

However, such data does not capture the latent health and environmental effects of nuclear accidents, which are difficult to quantify[47]—long term effects of exposure to radiation can be a source of anxiety.[48] Other energy sources can also pose long-term health risks, for example, from particulates released by coal combustion. The ONR's technical note highlighted OECD data suggesting that "pollution from fine dust particles may kill as many as 960,000 people a year worldwide [...] of which around 30% derives from energy production".[49] This means that "latent deaths worldwide from normal operations at combustion power stations each year are many times larger than the latent deaths from the Chernobyl accident (around 290,000 every year versus between 9,000 and 33,000 over 70 years)".[50]

20.  Risk comparisons are a popular way of explaining the magnitudes of risks objectively, and nuclear radiation is often compared to other sources of radiation such as naturally occurring, or background, radiation. The ONR states, for example, that:

Though [the Chernobyl accident led to] a very large release, with serious local consequences in Belarus and Ukraine, it equates to only 5% of the annual dose the world's population receives from natural background radiation each year. Over [...] 70 years [...] the additional radiation from Chernobyl will add just 0.06% to humanity's collective dose.[51]

21.  Comparisons are often made with radiation exposure from flying and medical applications. Professor David Spiegelhalter, Royal Statistical Society, noted that "in Fukushima, the analogy [...] is that there was a bigger radiation dose as a result of people evacuating [by air] from Tokyo than if they had just stayed there".[52] Public concerns about the radiation risks from nuclear power generation primarily relate to major accidents, but also extend to concerns over the day-to-day risks from radioactive emissions and discharges.[53] In the UK, the legal limit for radiation exposure from sources such as nuclear plants for members of the public is 1 millisievert (mSv) a year, based on recommendations from the International Commission on Radiological Protection.[54] Professor Allison stated "the public welcome moderate radiation levels [...] for medical imaging [...] with a single acute dose of about 5-10 millisievert",[55] whereas public exposure to levels from routine operations of nuclear sites are significantly less than one mSv per year—the highest UK level is calculated to be 0.38 mSv per year, near Sellafield.[56]

FRIGHT FACTORS

22.  Faced with such facts, it is tempting to characterise perceptions that nuclear energy is dangerous as irrational or a result of poor scientific understanding. However, Martin J Goodfellow and Adisa Azapagic, researchers at the University of Manchester, cautioned:

there is a real danger in believing that people simply need to be 'shown the truth', or convinced that their perception of risk is incorrect, either through provision of facts or persuasive argument. Many perceptions of risk are based on distorted or inflated views of real risks. In some circumstances presenting facts in a simple, clear and logical way can assist in reducing such distortions or inflations; but in other circumstances this may be ineffective.[57]

23.  Our 2011 report Scientific advice and evidence in emergencies explored public risk communication and factors that affect risk perceptions. During that inquiry, we found the Department of Health's 1997 guidance Communicating risks to public health: pointers to good practice[58] to be particularly informative. The guidance explains that public perceptions of risk are influenced by "fright factors", meaning that some risks trigger more alarm than others.[59] In addition to fright factors for health risk perceptions, Professor Pidgeon provided additional factors affecting public concerns about technological and environmental risks.[60] In summary, the factors influencing risk perceptions and acceptability of risk include:

a)  Level of individual control and choice: whether a risk is seen as uncontrollable, involuntarily imposed, inescapable by taking personal precautions or inequitably distributed (some benefit while others suffer the consequences);

b)  Characteristics of the hazard: for example the perceived nature of "worse case" accidents, whether the hazard is from man-made, unfamiliar or novel sources, threatens a form of death, illness or injury arousing particular dread, poses danger to small children, pregnant women or future generations; causes hidden and irreversible damage (for example through onset of illness many years after exposure) or promotes a general feeling of insecurity or fear;

c)  Scientific understanding: how well the risk is understood by science (including knowledge about future impacts) and whether unintended consequences of complex and rapidly moving scientific enterprises will be controlled; and

d)  Risk governance: transparency, whether the responsible decision maker and/or regulation is competent, fair and caring; whether the risk is subject to contradictory statements from information sources (or, even worse, from the same source), the historical context within which a hazard arises (for example, links between civilian nuclear technology and its military uses) and the social commitments that a technology entails (the form of society and organisation required to keep a technology safe).[61]

24.  The fright factors provide a logic for why people are more accepting of some risks than others. They explain, for example, why someone may choose to smoke cigarettes and thus live with an increased risk of developing cancer, but be unhappy about a nuclear power station being built near their home, because that person chooses to be exposed to the former risk but not necessarily the latter. Looking at these factors it is clear that nuclear energy provides a good case study for examining risk perceptions because it "ticks most of the boxes for 'fright factors' that influence risk perception".[62] Essentially, "the public fears nuclear energy because of what the radiation might do".[63] Linking to the fright factors, this may be, for example, because "radiation is feared and unknown, appears out of personal control, affects the vulnerable and unborn, is complex and the information sources may be untrustworthy".[64] Germany's Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply identified significant factors for the change in German risk perceptions, including:

a)  the fact that the reactor disaster occurred in a high-tech country like Japan which caused people to lose faith that such an event could not happen in Germany;

b)  the sustained inability for weeks after the accident to see an end to the catastrophe, to come to a final estimate on the damage, or to specify a definitive geographical boundary for the affected area;

c)  the concept that the extent of damage from accidents was limited and could be sufficiently ascertained, enabling damage to be compared with the disadvantages of other energy sources in a scientifically-based assessment process, lost a considerable amount of its persuasive power; and

d)  the fact that the disaster was triggered by a process that the nuclear reactors were not "designed" to withstand. These circumstances shed light on the limitations of the technical risk assessments.[65]

TRUST

25.  When we asked Professor Pidgeon what the most significant factors affecting the public perception of nuclear power in the UK were, he responded that "the most important thing is distrust".[66] He explained that "if you do not trust the parties who manage the risk, you are not likely to have confidence that the risk is being safely managed".[67] Amongst other things, trust is subject to perceptions of competency (whether risk managers have sufficient expertise), and impartiality (in whose interests a risk manager or communicator is acting).[68] Greenpeace explained that:

People are, quite reasonably, much more wary of risks that are uncertain, intergenerational, involuntary and indiscernible though conventional senses. Under these circumstances people have no choice but to rely on the institutions that create and govern them. If these institutions are seen to be [...] unreliable, secretive and not to be acting in the public interest then the public would, frankly, be irrational not to be risk-averse.[69]

26.  Who do the public trust? Various views were offered to us, and some common themes emerged. It appears that the Government and nuclear industry are generally less trusted by the public because their impartiality is in question. When Government works with the nuclear industry it may be perceived as collusion and therefore "it is very difficult for the Government to present risk information to the public and be trusted (by many) to be impartial".[70] Public distrust of governments as providers of risk information is evident across Europe.[71] Collaboration with the nuclear industry also affected risk perceptions in Germany, where we noticed that researchers with links to the energy industry suffered strong distrust from members of the public. Conversely, public trust in scientists is relatively higher, depending on their perceived impartiality and independence. Professor Pidgeon summarised the situation:

When you ask who people trust, it is independent scientists. If it is an environmental question, it would be environmental organisations; it may be consumer organisations; and friends and family. Government scientists tend to be in the middle. Industry tends to be towards the bottom. [...] politicians are seen as representing various interests, whereas scientists are seen as more independent.[72]

27.  Charles Hendry MP, Minister of State for Energy, stated clearly that "there is an important role for new nuclear in our [energy] mix going forward. We want to see that happen and we want to facilitate it".[73] He stated that the Government needed "to work closely with industry" and create the right environment for investment, adding "if people want us to deliver on [nuclear energy] policy, they would expect us to have a close working relationship with industry".[74] He was aware that independent experts enjoyed a greater degree of public confidence and added "much as we would like as politicians to believe that we are right up there at the same level, realistically we accept that we are probably not".[75] The Minister emphasised that "the security and safety standards, the assessment of the new reactors and the generic design assessment programme should be carried out at arm's length from us as a Department so that it can never be suggested that the people who are regulating have a vested interest in the outcome".[76] He added that "in the aftermath of Fukushima, everything that we have done [...] has been guided by scientific evidence".[77] The Minister stated:

We have very clearly separated out the scientific advice from Government and industry advice, where people would understandably believe that we have an agenda, whereas they accept that somebody of the level of Mike Weightman, with his professional standing, and our own chief scientist are people who are not part of that agenda. They are there because of their scientific credibility.[78]

28.  Media sources and campaigning organisations are an influential source of information for the public. Professor Pidgeon stated that "environmental organisations, rightly or wrongly—they have a stake as well—are seen in relative terms as working in the environment's interests, which people value".[79] The Royal Society of Chemistry had a slightly different explanation for high levels of trust in campaigning organisations and stated that they were "often perceived to be more trustworthy than Government because they often disseminate simplistic explanations that are conceptually easy to understand".[80] On trust in the media, we heard from Dr Mark Henderson, former Science Editor at The Times, that "it is [...] interesting that people say in every survey they do not trust the media but trust family and friends. From where do they think their family and friends get their information in the first place?"[81] Dr Henderson explained that information from the media communicated to family and friends "then acquires trust by being transmitted through a trust figure".[82] We explore the role of the media further in para 52.

29.  We were interested in the position that regulators would occupy on the scale of public trust. Dr Andrew Bloodworth, British Geological Survey, considered that "the regulators are nowhere on this [the issue of trust]; the public are not aware they even exist".[83] However, Fiona Fox, Director of the Science Media Centre, told us that these "arm's length, trusted experts" were seen by the media as independent,[84] an important precursor for trust. Professor Pidgeon explained his research on the profile of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE):

a few years ago we did work on how people viewed [the HSE]. It was very interesting. They were quite well known. People did think they worked in people's interests and were experts in health and safety at work. It was also because they had observed inspectors over many years in the workplace coming in to sort things out and do things; so there was a track record. [...] competence, care and track record are all really important.[85]

We asked some of the regulators about public awareness of their work. Dr Paul Leinster, Chief Executive of the Environment Agency stated "it depends on which bit of the public you are talking about".[86] He continued: "if you are talking about the community around Hinkley where there is now talk about the construction of a new facility, the awareness of the relative roles of the different organisations is much greater, but, in general, if you went out on the street and asked people, unprompted, most probably they would not say our names".[87] Geoffrey Podger, Chief Executive of the HSE considered that "what HSE does in the high hazard industries is well known, not simply to those who work in them but also to public bodies who have an interest in and around them".[88] However he added "conversely, at the lower hazard end, where we share our responsibilities with local authorities, there is no doubt that the public often have great difficulty in working out who is responsible for what".[89] Dr Mike Weightman, Head of the ONR (an agency of the HSE), stated "we are not well known to the general public".[90]

Conclusions

30.  When public risk perceptions diverge from the scientifically objective risks it should not necessarily be characterised as irrational or anti-scientific. Public concerns may be influenced by the level of scientific understanding, but are also likely to be influenced by other affective (that is, feeling or emotion-based) factors that may not be changed by explaining risk in scientific terms.

31.  It is possible for some of the fright factors affecting risk perceptions to be mitigated, for example by building public trust, communicating effectively, improving risk governance and operating in a transparent manner. We make further recommendations on how risk communication should be coordinated in the next chapter.

32.  The Government considers nuclear power to be an essential part of the UK's energy mix. The evidence shows that around half of the population support this, even though it may be a reluctant support for the least worst option. The Government's position as an advocate for nuclear power makes it difficult for the public to trust it as an impartial source of information. In our view, this perceived lack of impartiality further emphasises the importance of Government demonstrating that all energy policies are strongly based on rigorous scientific evidence.

33.  We have summarised the complex social issues governing risk perceptions briefly in this chapter. The next chapter focuses on risk communication and dialogue.


5   "Nuclear development in the United Kingdom", World Nuclear Association, March 2012, world-nuclear.org Back

6   "The History of the HSE", Health and Safety Executive, hse.gov.uk Back

7   "Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident", United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2011, nrc.gov Back

8   "Three Mile Island Accident", World Nuclear Association, January 2012, world-nuclear.org Back

9   "Three Mile Island Accident", World Nuclear Association, January 2012, world-nuclear.org Back

10   "Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident", United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2011, nrc.gov Back

11   "Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident", United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 2012, nrc.gov Back

12   "Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident", World Health Organization, September 2005, who.int Back

13   "Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident", World Health Organization, September 2005, who.int Back

14   "Chernobyl - Ten years after", IAEA BULLETIN, March 1996, iaea.org Back

15   Q 13 [Professor Nick Pidgeon] Back

16   Q 7 Back

17   Spent fuel ponds are storage pools for spent fuel from nuclear reactors. Spent fuel may be radioactive and produce heat, requiring active cooling.  Back

18   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Final Report, September 2011  Back

19   "Fukushima nuclear accident: one year on", World Nuclear Association, world-nuclear.org Back

20   "Fukushima nuclear accident: one year on", World Nuclear Association, world-nuclear.org Back

21   "Fukushima and the UK nuclear industry", Health and Safety Executive, hse.gov.uk Back

22   Ev w23 Back

23   Ev 45 [Department of Energy and Climate Change], para 7 Back

24   Ev 56, para 19 Back

25   Ev 68, para 17 Back

26   Ev 68, para 17 Back

27   Q 50 Back

28   Ev w18, para 3.3 Back

29   Ev 49, para 2 Back

30   Ev w18, para 3.4 Back

31   Ev w19, para 4.2 Back

32   Ev 59, para 19 Back

33   Ev 67, para 11 Back

34   Ev 67, para 11 Back

35   Ev 68 [Professor Nick Pidgeon], para 17 Back

36   Ev 66, para 4.5 Back

37   Ev 45 [Department of Energy and Climate Change], para 6 Back

38   Ev w12, para 7.3.1 Back

39   Ethics Commission on a Safe Energy Supply on behalf of Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel, Germany's Energy transition - A collective project for the future, 30 May 2011 Back

40   Ethics Commission on a Safe Energy Supply on behalf of Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel, Germany's Energy transition - A collective project for the future, 30 May 2011 Back

41   House of Lords, Science and Society, Third Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology, Session 1999-2000, HL Paper 38 para 4.2 Back

42   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 5; a hyphen (-) indicates there is no available data (or in a few instances, the data is not considered credible) Back

43   There are 14 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Back

44   GWy, or GigaWatt year, is a measure of electricity production.  Back

45   Data for "coal (inc China)" is not included in this figure  Back

46   Liquefied petroleum gas Back

47   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011 Back

48   Ev 49 [British Geological Survey], para 2 Back

49   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 11 Back

50   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 11 Back

51   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 8 Back

52   Q 25 Back

53   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 11 Back

54   "Q&A: Health effects of radiation exposure", BBC News, 21 July 2011, bbc.co.uk/news/health Back

55   Ev w10, para 3.1 Back

56   Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Technical Note: A Comparison of Risk Levels for Different Sources of Energy, 22 June 2011, page 11 Back

57   Ev w16, para 16 Back

58   Department of Health, Communicating about risks to public health: pointers to good practice, 1 January 1997 Back

59   Department of Health, Communicating about risks to public health: pointers to good practice, 1 January 1997 Back

60   Ev 67, para 7 Back

61   Ev 67 [Professor Nick Pidgeon], para 7; Department of Health, Communicating about risks to public health: pointers to good practice, 1 January 1997 Back

62   Ev 51 [Royal Statistical Society], para 4 Back

63   Ev w9 [Professor Wade Allison] Back

64   Ev 51 [Royal Statistical Society], para 4 Back

65   Ethics Commission on a Safe Energy Supply on behalf of Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel, Germany's Energy transition - A collective project for the future, 30 May 2011 Back

66   Q 7 Back

67   Q 7 Back

68   Q 30 [Professor Nick Pidgeon] Back

69   Ev w30  Back

70   Ev w17 [Martin J Goodfellow and Adisa Azapagic], paras 21-22 Back

71   Ev w17 [Martin J Goodfellow and Adisa Azapagic], paras 21-22 Back

72   Q 30 Back

73   Q 137 Back

74   Q 137 Back

75   Q 135 Back

76   Q 138 Back

77   Q 137 Back

78   Q 137 Back

79   Q 30 Back

80   Ev w8, para 3 Back

81   Q 42 Back

82   Q 49 Back

83   Q 10 Back

84   Q 61 Back

85   Q 30 Back

86   Q 103 Back

87   Q 103 Back

88   Q 103 Back

89   Q 103 Back

90   Q 103 Back


 
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Prepared 9 July 2012