The Committees' 2010 Quarter 4 (October - December)
questions and the Government's answers
Bahrain:
For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently
been revoked?
Anti-armour ammunition, components for launching/handling/control
equipment for munitions, components for military training aircraft,
equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment
for munitions equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun silencers,
launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, small arms
ammunition, sporting guns
Of the licences issued in Q4, licences for the
following goods have been revoked:
components for launching/handling/control equipment
for munitions, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, small arms
ammunition.
In addition, for which of the items approved for
temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have
all of these items been returned to the UK? If so, when, in each
case, did this take place?
Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights,
imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment,
weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight
mounts.
We revoked a temporary SIEL for equipment for
the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military
infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights,
weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts that had been originally
issued in Q4 2010. It should be noted that for temporary SIELs
exporters are obliged to return the goods within 12 months from
the date of issue of the licence and they should contact us to
inform us when the goods have been returned. It is not our practice
to revoke temporary licences, as this potentially removes the
obligation to return the goods to the UK, however in the case
referred to above circumstances allowed us to do so.
Have either of the two OIELs granted during this
period been revoked? If so, please specify which ones and why
the decision was taken.
Neither of the two OIELs issued during this period
have been revoked.
Belarus: Why was a SIEL
granted for imaging cameras, rather than (as were other items
applied for during this period) refused under the terms of either
or both Criteria 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The equipment in question was rated as dual-use
and the licence was approved in January 2011. The stated end-user
was a municipal fire department and the stated end-use was fire
fighting for civilian use. The Government was satisfied that
this was the intended purpose.
Chad: Given the human
rights situation in Chad and neighbouring countries, why was an
OITCL granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection,
rather than refused under the terms of any, all or some of Criteria
2, 3 and 4 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The vehicle and components were to be used for
protection of staff of an international organisation. After considering
all the information available, we judged the risk threshold under
criterions 2, 3 and 4 was not met.
China: Given the human
rights record of the Chinese Government, why was a SIEL granted
for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms
of either the EU Arms Embargo or Criteria 2 of the Consolidated
Criteria?
The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition
for a sporting end-use. Approval of this application was consistent
with our previous advice and interpretation that sporting ammunition
is not caught under the EU Arms Embargo. No clear risks were identified
to suggest such sporting-gun ammunition would raise Criteria 2
concerns.
Djibouti: Given the human
rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted
for assault rifles, gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small
arms ammunition and sniper rifles, rather than refused under the
terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
These goods are for use by private security companies
who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial
shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. We therefore
judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used
in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the
armed forces or internal security forces of Djibouti.
Egypt:
For which of the items approved for export
below have SIELs subsequently been revoked?
Body armour, components for military electronic equipment,
components for military radars, components for optical target
acquisition equipment, components for optical target surveillance
equipment, military helmets and imaging cameras
None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt
during this quarter have been revoked.
In addition, for which of the items approved for
temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have
all of these items been returned to the UK?
Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights,
imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment,
weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight
mounts.
None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt
during this quarter have been revoked.
Hong Kong: Given the human
rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about
diversion under Criteria 7 - and then by extension, Criteria 2
-- of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs
granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour,
components for machine guns, machine guns, pistols and imaging
cameras?
Criterion Two and Criterion Seven are criteria
of concern for licence applications for Hong Kong but for the
SIELs referenced we were satisfied that the applications did not
breach the Consolidated Criteria for the following reasons:
a and b) The imaging cameras were for cameras
for use at university and their proposed end use raised no criteria
concerns.
c) The body armour and related equipment were
to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative
Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central
Government on matters of public order, including policing and
correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear
risk that the export would contravene the criteria.
d) This application for assault rifles was for
out of service ex-Russian military equipment for use in the film
industry. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that
the export would contravene the criteria.
e) This application was for body armour and related
equipment to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative
Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central
Government on matters of public order, including policing and
correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear
risk that the export would contravene the criteria.
f) This application was for the demonstration
and onward sale of imaging cameras for the municipal fire and
rescue services. There had been previous exports of this equipment
direct to the Chinese fire services.
Israel: Given the actions
of the Government of Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories
in recent years, the Committees would be grateful for further
information regarding the following SIELs that were granted during
this period: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection,
components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/handling/control/support
equipment for unmanned air vehicles, military utility vehicles,
small arms ammunition.
Applications included:
a) These goods were components for unmanned air
vehicles for use in a UK military programme. Therefore we had
no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted.
b) This small arms ammunition was for use by
athletes for training and competitions at national and international
level. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and
the licence was granted.
c) These all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic
protection were to be used for the protection and safety of staff
of an international media organisation. Therefore we had no Consolidated
Criteria concerns And the licence was granted.
d) This military utility vehicle was a concept
model for demonstration purposes only. Therefore we had no Consolidated
Criteria concerns and the licence was granted.
Jordan: Given that there
have been pro-democracy protests in Jordan since the beginning
of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for further information
about how end-use is being monitored regarding the following SIELs
that were granted during this period: assault rifles, components
for assault rifles, components for combat aircraft, components
for military combat vehicles, components for military support
aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components
for military utility vehicles, military combat vehicles, pistols,
small arms ammunition and technology for the use of military combat
vehicles.
The best means of ensuring that goods are not
misused is to conduct a rigorous assessment at the licence application
stage. This includes careful examination of the information on
the proposed end use and end user of the goods.
The primary purpose of any monitoring of equipment
once it has left the UK is to generate information to assist the
risk assessment of other current or future similar
applications. UK Overseas Posts have standing instructions to
report misuse of UK-origin defence equipment.
We also take account of a variety of different
reporting on end-use which includes reports coming from NGOs,
human rights organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence
reports. Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any
misuse of UK-supplied equipment.
Kazakhstan: Given the
human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why was a
SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under
the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition
intended for sporting end-use by civilian end-users. As such
the proposed export did not raise Criterion 2 concerns.
Kenya: Given that many
observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence
in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were
SIELs granted for air guns, components for military support vehicles,
components for military training aircraft, components for pistols,
components for rifles, military support vehicles, pistols, rifles,
small arms ammunition, weapon sights, rather than refused under
the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In asking
this question, the Committees note that SIELs for components for
semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic
pistols and technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols were
refused on precisely these grounds.
For the same reason, the Committees would be grateful
for further information about why SITCLs for bombs, components
for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition
were granted during this period.
All applications are assessed on a case-by-case
basis against the Consolidated Criteria. Consideration of the
prevailing circumstances in the country, the human rights records
of the end user and the risk of internal repression (Criterion
2) are prevalent in our assessments. But for the SIELs referenced
below the decision to issue the licences (except for two licences
referred to in the question that were refused) were reached after
concluding that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and
that none of the other Criteria were engaged.
a) We received an application for military support
vehicles intended for end use by an international organisation.
There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the application was therefore
approved.
b) We received an application for components for
repairing ex-military vehicles for civil end use by a private
company in the tourism industry. There were no Criterion 2 concerns
and the application was therefore approved.
c-f) We received several applications for rifles,
pistols and small arms ammunition that were for private individuals
and intended for their own end use. There were no Criterion 2
concerns and the applications were therefore approved.
g) We received an application for components for
training Aircraft for end use by the Air Force. There was no clear
risk under the Criteria for this end use or end user. The application
was therefore approved.
h) We received an application for air guns and
pistols for onward sale to police and military officers and other
individuals authorised to possess firearms. The application was
refused in part (pistols) under Criterion 2 because we judged
that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used in
internal repression if supplied to the Kenyan Police.
The application was issued in part for air guns
as there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 for use by private
individuals for sporting purposes.
i) We received an application for pistols for
onward sale to police and military officers and other individuals
authorised to possess firearms. The application was refused under
Criterion 2 because we judged that there was a clear risk that
these goods might be used in internal repression if supplied to
the Kenyan Police.
Why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface
rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during
this period.
This was a single licence for assorted
types of ammunition intended for use by the military. There is
no evidence of such goods being used against the civilian population
and no clear risk identified under Criterion 2.
Libya: For which of the
items approved for permanent export below have SIELs subsequently
been revoked?
Body armour components for combat aircraft military
equipment for initiating explosives cryptographic software, equipment
employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing
cryptography, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the
use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights,
weapon night sights weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
All licences issued for body armour, components
for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives,
direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon
sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights
weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were subsequently revoked.
Some licences for cryptographic software, equipment employing
cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
remain extant as they were issued to civil end users for civil
end use and raised no Consolidated Criteria concerns when all
extant Libya licences were reviewed in Q1 2011.
In addition, for which of the items approved for
temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have
all of these items been returned to the UK?
Anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components
for assault rifles, components for automatic piloting systems
for parachuted loads, components for gun mountings, components
for machine guns, components for military improvised explosive
device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components
for military parachutes, gun mountings, inert chaff, inert decoy
flares, inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters,
inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inert thunderflashes,
machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications
equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming
equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment,
military utility vehicles, semi-automatic pistols, sniper rifles,
sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as forward
observer/target recognition training equipment, software for software
for the simulation of military operation scenarios, training small
arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights, equipment
employing cryptography, imaging cameras, cryptographic software,
equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras,
military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights,
weapon sight mounts.
The licences referred to were for temporary export
for exhibition at the LibDex Exhibition which took place in Tripoli
in November 2010 and was a trade show for the safety and security
industry.
All the above licences were either revoked or
surrendered. All but one exporter has assured us that the
goods have been returned. This exporter has been unable
to confirm the current location of the equipment they exported
for the exhibition.
The Committees would also be grateful to know whether
the OIEL granted during this period been revoked.
The OIEL issued during this period has not been
revoked. This OIEL was for cryptographic software, equipment
employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic
software and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.
It was decided not to remove Libya from this OIEL (other destinations
were covered by the licence) as the goods were dual-use products
for onward supply to civilian and business end users.
Mozambique: Given that
the capital, Maputo, saw riots in September 2010 in which a number
of civilians were shot dead, why was a SIEL granted for body armour
and components for body armour, rather than refused under Criteria
2 of the Consolidated Criteria?
The stated end user on this application was an
organisation specialising in the clearing of land mines. The Government
considered that as the goods would be used for humanitarian purposes
the proposed export did not raise concerns under the Criteria.
Oman: Given that there
was some unrest in Oman during the first quarter of 2011, the
Committees would be grateful for more information about why none
of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as
part of the Government's review of arms sales to the Middle East
and North Africa. How strong are the assurances received regarding
end-use?
Components for weapon sight mounts; components for
weapon sights; equipment for the use of sniper rifles; gun mountings;
gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition,
sniper rifles sniper rifles, technology for sniper rifles.
The Committees raise the same issues with regard
to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the
following items:
Components for gun laying equipment, components for
military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night
sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of
weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier
equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of
weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment,
technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment,
technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for
the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon
sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
The Committees raise the same issues with regard
to the SITCL granted during this period for components for assault
rifles.
We examined all extant export licences for Oman
following the limited unrest in the country, and were satisfied
that all licences granted for Oman remained, and continue to remain,
consistent with the Criteria. In line with normal practice, export
licences are kept under review and scrutinised in light of changing
facts on the ground.
Saudi Arabia: Given that
there was some unrest in Saudi Arabia during the first quarter
of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information
about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been
revoked as part of the Government's review of arms sales to the
Middle East and North Africa. Why does the UK believe that the
assurances relating to end-use will not be breached?
Components for military combat vehicles, components
for military communications equipment, components for military
helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging
equipment, equipment for the use of bombs, equipment for the use
of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military
communications equipment , military communications equipment,
software for military communications equipment, technology for
bombs, weapon night sights, imaging cameras
The Committees raise the same issues with regard
to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the
following items:
Components for gun laying equipment, components for
military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night
sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of
weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier
equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of
weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment,
technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment,
technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for
the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon
sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
We examined all extant export licences for Saudi
Arabia during the spring, and were satisfied that all licences
granted for Saudi Arabia remained, and continue to remain, consistent
with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied
equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia,
or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations
as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request
of the Bahraini Government. In line with normal practice, export
licences are reviewed when there has been a significant change
of circumstances on the ground.
Sudan: The Committees
would be grateful for further information about how the SIEL granted
for military equipment for initiating explosives is consistent
with the arms trade sanctions currently in place.
The Committees raise the same issue regarding the
OITCL granted for:
Promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting
the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays
for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot
devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection
and promoting the supply of tear gas/riot-control agents
This SIEL was for military equipment for initiating
explosives.
As they are non-lethal items for humanitarian
use they fall under the exemption set out in paragraph 9 of UNSCR
1556 (2004) which states that the arms embargo shall not apply
to 'Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely
for humanitarian, human rights monitoring or protective use, and
related technical training and assistance'.
The OITCL was approved for the insurance of de-mining
equipment for an NGO operating in Sudan.
Tunisia: The Committees
would be grateful for information about why two SIELs for equipment
employing cryptography were granted.
Both licences were granted for supply to commercial
entities for civil end use and did not raise any concerns under
the Criteria.
United States: The Committees
would be grateful for further information about the OIEL granted
for toxins.
We approved two OIELs with a stated civil end-use.
We had no Criterion 1 concerns about these applications.
Zimbabwe: The Committees
note that this country entry appears to be missing from the pivot
report. They would be grateful to receive this information and
ask that the report be duly corrected.
Unfortunately there was an error in the published
report, for which we apologise. We are working to correct the
error. However, the correct data may be obtained by creating
a bespoke report from the searchable database.
Finally, with regard to Open General Export Licences
(OGLs), as per the table on pages 9-10 of the pivot report,
please provide more information about the OGL named 'X', for which
there were two registrations during this period; and give explanations
for why a number of OGLs were revoked in full during this period.
The OGEL 'X' allows the export of certain dual-use
items to certain destinations, subject to the terms and conditions
set out in the licence. Information about the licence and a copy
of the licence is available on the export control pages of the
BusinessLink website.[353]
The Table shows all Open General Licences in full,
including those that have been revoked. The appearance of a revoked
licence in this Table does not indicate that the licence was revoked
in this period. We would welcome the Committees' views as to
whether fully revoked licences should be excluded from this Table
completely or whether it would be helpful to include them with
the date of revocation. Regarding the three revoked licences
the reasons for revocation are as follows:
Computers - revoked in September 2009 - this licence
authorised the export of certain high performance computers.
However, changes to the control parameters agreed in the Wassenaar
Arrangement meant that the coverage of the licence was minimal
and feedback from exporters indicated that the licence was not
used. Therefore it was revoked.
Vintage Military Vehicles - revoked November 2009
- was replaced by the Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery
Pieces OGL in order to allow the export of a wider range of goods
including artillery pieces and vehicles more than 50 years old
where they are intended for historic re-enactment or commemorative
events, private battlefield tours or private recreational purposes
to all EU Member States plus Channel Islands and Norway, and providing
they are returned to the UK within 3 calendar months.
Open General Trade Control Licence (OGTCL) - revoked
in April 2009 - replaced by the OGTCL (Category C goods) and OGTCL
(Small Arms) following the changes in the trade controls introduced
in the Export Control Order 2008.
353 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/detail?itemId=1084303254&r.l1=1079717544&r.l2=1084228483&r.l3=1084228524&r.l4=1084287557&type=RESOURCES Back
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