4 Support for democratic transitions |
Progress in democratic transitions to
After the fall of President Ben Ali, an interim government
was formed headed by Mohamed Ghannouchi,to oversee the transition.
Following a slightly rocky start, in which protestors criticised
Ghannouchi and other ministers' links to the old regime, new ministers
were appointed and the interim authorities oversaw elections for
a constitutional assembly in October 2011 that were considered
free and fair by international observers. The moderate Islamist
party Ennahda won the most seats (41%), with the centre-left secular
Congress for the Republic Party (CPR) coming second with 14% and
centre-left secular Ettakatol in third place with almost 10%.
Representatives of 25 other parties won seats, with the secular
centrist Progressive Democratic Party as the largest opposition
party. A coalition government was formed by the three largest
parties. The constitutional assembly took up its role in November
2011, with the dual task of acting as a legislative assembly and
as a constitution-drafting committee, and an agreement to take
no longer than 18 months to draft a constitution and hold elections
to the new legislative bodies.
Egypt has experienced a far more turbulent transitional
period than that in Tunisia. Following the departure of President
Mubarak the Supreme Council of the Allied Forces (SCAF) took executive
control, promising to oversee a transition to democratic elections.
Despite the surge in popularity of the army following its announcement
that it would not fire on protestors during the revolution, concern
quickly mounted about the SCAF's control of power and its lengthy
timetable for the elections, The SCAF's first suggested timetable
for the transition foresaw the transition lasting until late 2012
/ early 2013, and prompted major protests. The arrests of protestors
and trials of civilians in military courts, also caused outcry.
Major street protests took place in October and November against
SCAF rule, during which accounts emerged of police and security
forces' abuse of protestors, including women. Following a revised
timetable, parliamentary elections took place in three stages
between November 2011-January 2012, resulting in a landslide win
for the Muslim Brotherhood's party, which won 47%, and the conservative
Islamist Salafist Party, with 24%. Liberal and secular parties
won fewer seats, prompting comment that the revolution had been
"taken over" by Islamist groups from the young, liberal
activists who took part in the Tahrir Square protests. This was
of particular concern in relation to the Parliament's decision
to appoint a 100-member assembly dominated by Islamist members
to write the new constitution. A court subsequently dissolved
the Assembly before it had begun work.
Presidential elections, which were originally planned
to complete the transition, took place in June 2012 against a
background of confusion as to the rules on who could run and the
nature of the new President's role. Only four weeks before the
first round of voting, the electoral commission barred 10 candidates
from standing, including a number of front runners. Liberal and
secular candidates did not perform well in the first round, and
the presidential race was narrowed down to a rather polarised
choice between the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party
candidate Mohamed Mursi and former Prime Minister and retired
air force general Ahmed Shafik. Relations between the Muslim Brotherhood
and SCAF deteriorated even further with each accusing the other
of attempting to distort the progress of the revolution. The Muslim
Brotherhood characterised Shafik as a counter-revolutionary member
of the 'old guard', while others expressed concern that the Muslim
Brotherhood would become too powerful if it held both the parliament
and presidency, and could control the constitution drafting process.
Four days before the Presidential election was due to take place,
a court ruled that the Egyptian Parliament was to be dissolved
and new elections held, prompting public outcry. In a further
surprise move, on the eve of elections the SCAF announced a 'constitutional
declaration', which gave the army powers over legislation and
budget, removed the army from legislative oversight and gave it
a veto over the decision to go to war. This has widely been interpreted
as an attempt to strip the presidency of its power and remove
the SCAF from parliamentary oversight. Both candidates initially
claimed victory in the Presidential election, but after some delay
Dr Mohamed Mursi was announced as the winner on 24 June 2011.
The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) was
established during the uprising and recognised by a number of
foreign countries, including the UK, as the legitimate governing
authority of Libya. In August 2011 it issued a constitutional
declaration outlining a roadmap for a transition to a democratic
government, including the election of a constituent assembly to
draft a new constitution and holding of free and fair electons.
The NTC announced Libya's liberation on 23 October 2011 and became
a caretaker government, headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil as Prime
Minister. The NTC has since struggled to impose its authority
across the country. It has proved difficult to bring the militias
that fought against Colonel Gaddafi under government control,
and there have been sporadic battles between rival militias, as
well as a refusal to hand over prisoners to a central authority.
Security and stability remain major concerns, and there have been
a number of attacks on government, and foreign embassies and aid
organisations, some of which have been blamed upon radical Islamist
groups. In addition, leaders in the eastern part of the country,
including Benghazi, have suggested that it could be run as a separate
federal state. Progress towards elections has also been slow,
in part because Libya had fewer established institutions than
Egypt and Libya, and infrastructure was damaged during the conflict
in 2011. Elections to a constitutional assembly were scheduled
to take place in June 2012 but have been delayed until 7 July
59. In March 2011 the Foreign Secretary spoke
about the need for a major international response to the Arab
It is a historic shift of massive importance, presenting
the international community as a whole with an immense opportunity.
We believe that the international response to these events must
be commensurately generous, bold and ambitious.
In its submission, the FCO identified a number of
"key principles" that have informed the UK's response
to the Arab Spring; including the adoption of a "values based"
approach, the recognition that "each country is different
and has the right to develop its own political model", and
support for the transitions in Arab Spring countries on both a
bilateral and multilateral basis. We will examine each of these
elements in turn below.
Legacy of UK involvement in MENA
60. Witnesses and written evidence voiced diverse
and significant criticism of the UK's previous foreign policy
approach to the MENA region. A number of submissions referred
to the widespread belief that "For many decades Western governments
favoured stable military dictatorships over democratically elected
civilian rule", and that the UK had accepted authoritarian
governments as "guarantors of 'stability' and dedicated opponents
of 'Islamic fundamentalism'".
Dr Spencer, from Chatham House, characterised the UK's approach
as being "dominated by an obsession with controlling terrorism
and a secondary obsession with controlling migration."
Amnesty International and PLATFORM, a research organization that
monitors the impacts of British oil exploration, both suggested
that "commercial considerations, particularly regarding arms
also significant, and PLATFORM argued that the UK's foreign policy
toward Gaddafi had been particularly misguided with regard to
the UK's encouragement of British oil companies in Libya, on the
basis that the revenues were an "important source of funding"
for the Gaddafi regime, making the British companies "complicit
in its abuses".
Perhaps most damningly, Intissar Kherigi told us that "There
has been a perception that there is a gulf between the UK's values
and its external practices, and this is a very widespread perception
in the region."
61. Amnesty International acknowledged that the
UK's foreign policy toward the region had not been "monolithic"
and had varied between states, but concluded that:
the UK Government's failure to be more outspoken
about human rights violations in countries which were seen as
strategically important for counter-terrorism operations was an
error of judgement which has been borne out in the popular uprisings
of the 'Arab Spring'. A consequence is that the credibility of
the UK government is now damaged in the eyes of many people who
have deposed leaders previously supported by the UK Government."
The UK's continued support for Bahrain despite clear
evidence of human rights violations in 2011 has been cited as
an example of such an error of judgement. We look at this in more
detail at paragraph 179.
62. The Henry Jackson Society acknowledged the
problems of the UK's foreign policy, but noted that the application
of coercive pressure to oppressive regimes is extremely difficult
without sanction from the international community. The Minister
told us that the UK "maintains, and has maintained, relationships
with states whose values may not be ours. This has been in the
United Kingdom's strategic interest." He noted that the UK's
engagement had also provided opportunities to raise governance
and human rights issues, adding: "So our engagement neither
implies total acceptance of the system of government of another
state, nor complete rejection, except in the most extreme circumstances."
Lord Malloch-Brown agreed, stating that: "I don't think that
we should be whipping ourselves too severely for dealing with
the regimes that were in place." He added:
ultimately, the balance was wrong, but my point is
that, anyway, the impetus for change was always going to come
from within these societies and not from our external pressure.
We should self-critique ourselves, in that we could have done
better, managed more balanced relationships or pressed for change,
but we should not go on from that to say that, if Britain had
broken earlier with Mubarak and Tunisia, the regime change would
have come sooner. That overstates our influence.
63. We conclude that the UK's
policy of engaging with autocratic powers in the MENA region while
remaining relatively quiet in public on human rights and political
reform has linked us in the eyes of many people with those deposed
and discredited governments. However, even if the UK had applied
more pressure to the previous autocratic governments on human
rights and democratic reforms, it would have been unlikely to
have brought forward the revolutions. Yet an approach that more
consistently advocated the need for human rights and democratic
reforms might have helped to improve the human rights situation
in each of these states, as well as having a positive impact on
the public perception of the UK in the region today.
A values-based approach
64. The FCO told us that it has adopted a "values-based
approach" to the Arab Spring, as set out in the Prime Minister's
speech to the Kuwait National Parliament in February 2011. In
this speech the Prime Minister spoke about previous UK foreign
policy and the Government's new approach:
For decades, some have argued that stability required
highly controlling regimes, and that reform and openness would
put that stability at risk. So, the argument went, countries like
Britain faced a choice between our interests and our values. And
to be honest, we should acknowledge that sometimes we have made
such calculations in the past. But I say that is a false choice.
As recent events have confirmed, denying people their
basic rights does not preserve stability, rather the reverse.
Our interests lie in upholding our valuesin insisting on
the right to peaceful protest, in freedom of speech and the internet,
in freedom of assembly and the rule of law. But these are
not just our values, but the entitlement of people everywhere;
of people in Tahrir Square as much as Trafalgar Square.
The Prime Minister went on to offer "a new chapter
in Britain's long partnership with our friends in this region"
that embraced political and economic reform, while emphasising
that the UK would respect different cultures and not dictate how
each state should achieve such reform.
The FCO's submission supported the Prime Minister's statement,
"judging that the UK's long term national interests in security
and prosperity in the region are best served if we are dealing
with governments with legitimacy built on the consent and participation
of their people."
65. Some witnesses welcomed the Government's
commitment to upholding UK values in its foreign policy, with
Christian Aid agreeing that "when we consider how best to
assure our long-term interests, we can do so most effectively
by consistently aiming to uphold our values."
The Henry Jackson Society said that the Prime Minister was "absolutely
right" and agreed that the belief that the UK could choose
to advance either its values or its interests was a "false
66. Other submissions to this inquiry cautiously
questioned whether it would always be possible to avoid a conflict
between perceived interests and values. Robin Lamb, Director of
the Libyan British Business Council (LBBC), was supportive of
an approach which recognised that "our values must also be
counted among our interests." However, he concludes:
it will generally be possible to uphold both our
values and our material interests. But when there is a perceived
potential conflict between them, the government's responsibility
to its people will require a public interest test around whether
giving our moral interests superior weight would cause significant
damage to our material interests. The latter should prevail.
PLATFORM has criticised the LBBC for this position,
stating that it should be regarded "with most anxious scrutiny".
67. Dr Eugene Rogan was also sceptical that this
approach was practicable in the long term, stating:
It would be ideal to try to square national interests
with national values, but the real interests that Britain holds
in the region have to do with energy security and markets. Those
realities are not going to go away because it happens to be a
However, Dr Rogan suggested that by clearly advocating
its values during the transition period and forming good ties
with the new governments, the UK Government could gain advantages
for its interests in the region in the long term.
68. Amnesty International also anticipated that
the Government would have to make choices:
The UK Government's approach to the MENA region is
that such values and interests are mutually reinforcingin
our view, however, this will not always be the case and clearly
has not always been the case. There are occasions when in their
diplomatic and other relationships the UK Government will have
to make choices.
However, Amnesty concluded that in such circumstances,
values "must and do come first."
that it is right to place democratic values at the heart of the
UK's response to the Arab Spring. The Government is right to consider
interests and values as connected, although we share our witnesses'
doubts that they will always be in such clear alignment.
69. Bell Pottinger commented on what it considered
to be a lacklustre public response in the region to the Prime
Minister's Kuwait speech, stating: "all communications attributed
by the local audience to the British Government will be viewed
with a significant degree of scepticism or indifference by the
majority. Regional responses to the Prime Minister's keynote Kuwait
speech and to most HMG-attributed comment since consistently display
70. Middle East Monitor (MEMO) warned that "Public
declarations of support for such aspirations could backfire if
they are not backed by action and achieved."
But Christian Aid also offered a way forward, recognising
that "The UK should recognise the often limited options available
for action", and considered that by seeking to act in partnership
with others, the UK could "minimise the potential gaps between
values-based policy raising expectations and being able to implement
71. The Government must be sensitive
to the scepticism with which British statements on human rights
and freedom are met in the region. We recommend that the Government
avoid discrediting its 'values based' approach by promising more
than it can deliver.
TRADE PROMOTION AND ARMS SALES
72. The MENA region is a primary market for British
arms sales, with the region accounting for over 50% of all UK
defence sales by value in the past 10 years.
A number of our witnesses questioned whether the UK's stated aims
of a "values-based" approach and human rights promotion
are compatible with its arms sales to illiberal regimes. The Henry
Jackson Society called for the UK to "fundamentally reappraise
its policy of selling arms to undemocratic regimes", and
warned that the UK should recognise "how quickly situations
can develop where those arms are used not to deter foreign aggression
but to quell internal dissent."
Amnesty International was even stronger in its criticism, asserting
that "the UK's focus on arms sales to the MENA region both
now and in recent years is completely at odds with its stated
aim of upholding human rights."
73. When we put these concerns to the Minister
he told us that:
We do make no secret of the fact that the entitlement
of people to defend themselves in a volatile region, and other
places, is extremely important. This country sells arms to other
people. It is legal; it is known, and it is covered by some of
the most severe rules that, we think, exist anywhere in the free
The Minister later added that "We have the tightest
rules we can, to ensure that the United Kingdom does not engage
in selling things to those who would use them to further regional
conflicts or to oppress their own people."
He argued that by providing proper training, the UK can do positive
good by being engaged, arguing that "where people have been
poorly trained in the past you get a much higher degree of violence,
risk of death and the like."
74. The issue of British arms sales became particularly
controversial during the Arab Spring. The Government revoked a
number of export licences to Libya and Bahrain, and allegations
were made that equipment sold by the UK was used by Saudi Arabia
in dealing with protests in Bahrain.
The Minister stated that he had seen no evidence to support this.
In its latest report, the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)
concluded that "whilst the Government's revocation of an
unprecedented number of 158 arms export licences following the
Arab Spring is welcome, the scale of the revocations is demonstrable
evidence that the initial judgements to approve the applications
were flawed." CAEC recommended that the Government state
whether it remains satisfied that none of the extant UK arms export
licences to states in the region, including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia (among others) contravenes the Government's
stated policy not to issue licences where it judges that there
is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong
regional conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal
75. Dr Eugene Rogan commented on the anger that
was directed at the USA after the Egyptian security forces used
US-made gas canisters in Tahrir Square, labelling it a "disaster
scenario" and stating:
That kind of perception should be avoided at all
costs. There should be sympathetic engagement, and nothing made
in Britain that brings harm to the people. Then when the transition
comes, the markets will all still be there for the interests,
but you will be doing so with friendships that are based on having
respect and values.
Dr Rogan also warned that, at the current time, he
would urge "particular caution" with regard to the arms
trade and the monarchies in the Gulf Cooperation Council. He viewed
these states as highly likely to encounter protests in future,
and considered that "the need not to be seen to be bolstering
autocracy against demands for change at this moment will serve
your long term better interests."
that arms sales to the MENA region have been a source of concern
for a number of years. In calculating whether to award export
licences, the Government should also consider the effect on the
public perception of the UK in the region.
PRIME MINISTER'S TRADE DELEGATION,
76. The Prime Minister's Kuwait speech was made
during a three-day visit the Gulf aimed at promoting trade ties,
on 20-23 February 2011. In response to the success of the revolution
in Egypt, a stopover was arranged so that the Prime Minister could
visit Cairo on 21 February before starting the Gulf trip. Several
witnesses to our inquiry commented on the inclusion of seven defence
industry representatives in the Prime Minister's delegation during
the Gulf leg of the visit. Intissar Kherigi argued that this played
into old stereotypes of the UK, noting that people felt:
a sense of déjà vu when David
Cameron first visited the region and it emerged that the vast
majority of his delegation were in fact defence companies and
arms traders. I think that sent a mixed signal to the region in
terms of whether the UK had really changed its thinking or whether
it was just on the level of rhetoric.
77. Dr Rogan told us he would have liked to see
the Prime Minister accompanied by a more sensitive delegation
of "wise women and men" who could offer assistance to
Egypt and Tunisia as they move from an autocracy to an open political
system, rather than defence representatives in the Gulf.
that the goodwill that could have been generated by a Prime Ministerial
visit to the region at such a critical time was somewhat squandered
by the Government's misjudgement in including members of the British
arms trade in the delegation to the Gulf, as indeed it has been
damaged by decades of arms sales to repressive governments. Regardless
of its legality, it was a mistake for the Prime Minister to be
seen to be promoting the UK's arms trade on a visit to a region
undergoing uprisings in which some authoritarian regimes had used
force against their own people.
Accepting new partners: Islamist
78. Although Islamist groups did not play a leading
role at the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, they have since
emerged as the dominating political force in the region and have
won striking successes wherever elections have been held so far.
Dr Rogan explained the popularity of Islamist parties, noting
that while other parties have been discredited:
The people who have filled the gap, who have been
eloquent in expressing opposition and who have shown the courage
of their convictions by taking on the regimes for the past 20
to 30 years have all been Islamists. They are organised, and they
are omnipresent in providing for social needswelfare and
A recent paper by the Carnegie Middle East Centre
noted that many of the current leaders of Islamist movements have
experienced long periods of repression under the previous regimes
and have personally experienced imprisonment:
For example, in Egypt, Khairat al-Shater, deputy
chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood, was imprisoned for a total
of more than twelve years between 1992 and 2011, while FJP vice
chairman Essam el-Erian spent the equivalent of eight years in
jail between 1981 and 2010. In Tunisia, the current prime minister,
Hamadi Jebali, spent a total of sixteen years in jail after 1990,
ten of them in solitary confinement. Ennahda Chairman Rached Ghannouchi
was imprisoned in 1981 and again in 1987 for a total of four years,
spending another twenty-two years in exile.
79. There is a broad spectrum of Islamist parties
across the region, many of which had been banned under the previous
regimes. The Ennahda party in Tunisia is often described as 'moderate';
having accepted a requirement to alternate male and female candidates
on the electoral lists in Tunisia, it has governed in coalition
with secular centre-left parties for the last eight months. The
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was founded in the 1920s and is the
largest Islamic organisation in Egypt. One of its stated aims
has been to create an Islamic state based on Sharia, although
the Freedom and Justice Party has more recently referred to an
Islamic "frame of reference" and has stated that it
will not impose Islamic dress codes, for example. For some, the
political success of the more conservative Salafist El Nour party
in Egypt was a new and more worrying development. Salafism refers
to an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith
and practice to the way they existed at the time of Muhammad and
the early generations of his followers, and considers that the
only valid system of rule for Muslims is based on Sharia law.
Although electorally unsuccessful in Tunisia, Salafist groups
have staged a number of protests including, for example, occupying
a university in protest against men and women being taught together.
The success of these Islamist groups after decades of repression
by authoritarian leaders has required many Western states, including
the UK, to adjust their foreign policies to begin engaging with
the new political leadership.
80. Several witnesses have called for the West
to exercise greater discernment in its approach to Islamist groups,
noting that the term "Islamist" is unhelpfully applied
to parties across the spectrum, from moderate to extreme. Intissar
Kherigi explained that:
There is a disconnect between what the term means
in the West and what it means in the Muslim world. In the Muslim
world, it seems to mean any Muslim who enters the political arena
using their faith as a frame of reference, whereas in the West
it has increasingly come to mean those of a Muslim background
who take up violence as an end and means of political change.
Dr Claire Spencer agreed that "far too often,
we have assumed that the word 'Islamism' covers everything on
a spectrum from 'moderate and engaged in democracy' to 'radical'".
Intissar Kherigi further stated that Islamist parties have existed
since the 1920s and "have increasingly embraced democratic
pluralism and the concept of equal citizenship". However,
she noted that different Islamist parties in the region have "very
different visions, different views."
81. Although there has been a great deal of concern
expressed by commentators both within and outside these countries
about the commitment of Islamist parties to democratic freedoms
and human rights, there was overwhelming support among our witnesses
and submissions for the UK to accept and engage with Islamist
movements that operate within democratic systems. MEMO, for example,
argued that Islam is part of the Middle East's identity and culture,
and stated that "To try to negate reality would be self defeating.
Let the people choose who they trust."
The FCO's policy is now clear: "We will interact with parties
which are committed to the democratic process, operate within
the law of their country and reject violence."
ISLAMIST PARTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
82. For some witnesses the success of Islamist
movements is an ominous development that threatens to hijack the
revolutions and take them in an anti-democratic direction. Religious
minority groups and women's rights organisations have registered
particular concern that their rights and access to public life
may suffer if conservative Islamist groups seek to impose strict
religious laws and culture upon the new state structures. Some
groups have reported growing discrimination, and there have been
instances of sectarian violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt.
Amnesty International has registered concern that women are being
shut out of the political process in Egypt and Libya, and a Salafist
occupation of university campuses in Tunisia, in support of the
demand that women wear headscarves, has surprised and concerned
observers in a state that has been known for its relatively advanced
approach to women's rights.
83. Partly in response to these concerns, the
UK Government revised its National Action Plan on United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1325 Women, Peace and Security in
February 2012 to include a Middle East and North Africa component.
The review registers concern that the role of women in the revolutions
and improvements to women's education in the region "is not
translating into political and economic opportunities for women,"
and sets out the Government's "emerging thinking" on
the topic. A further plan will be submitted in June and a full
plan developed by September 2012.
Amnesty International has called on the UK to ensure that there
is a "clear gender component" to the Arab Partnership
Initiative and to require that women are not discriminated against
in the provision of development assistance and in the process
of economic reform.
We recommend that the Government
prioritise the particular concerns of women and religious minorities
as it pursues closer relations with new Islamist governments.
UK bilateral support for democratic
84. From a small pilot project launched at the
end of 2010 with four staff and a £5 million fund, the FCO's
Arab Partnership initiative expanded to become a full FCO department
by May 2011, alongside a joint fund with DfID totalling £110
million. The Arab Partnership Team's work is now the top priority
on the MENA Directorate Business Plan to 2015.
The amounts of money involved in the project are extremely small
relative to the size of the states and their political importance,
but the FCO argued that it would provide a "targeted, high-impact
UK-led bilateral programme of support for reformers in the region
through the Arab Partnership Fund".
85. The FCO states that the over-arching objective
of the Arab Partnership is "Politically and economically
open and inclusive societies in the MENA region."
Arab Partnership funding is available for programmes in 19 MENA
countries. The FCO has defined seven as priorities: Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Syria.
86. In 2011 the FCO's Arab Partnership Participation
Fund (APPF) spent £5.27m million.
It expects to increase these allocations to around £10m in
2012, but states that it is limited by a lack of recipient capacity;
the risk of duplicating efforts (noting that the US has spent
significant funds on their Economic Governance and Egyptian Government
and Democracy Fund); and its desire not to "exacerbate existing
tensions about international interference."
87. The FCO told us that its 2011/12 APPF programme
for Egypt was the "largest and most challenging", spending
£1.4m. This comprised five projects relating to political
participation, two media projects linked to the parliamentary
elections, and two projects on countering corruption and promoting
transparency and integrity, as well as a series of smaller initiatives,
including visits between the UK and Egypt, and supported British
Council work. The APPF spent £1.2m in Tunisia on 12 projects
on electoral assistance, public voice, countering corruption and
economic reform. APPF assistance to Libya in 2011/12 was limited
to a project that worked with local television broadcasters to
develop 'Question Time' style programmes. The FCO is developing
a full programme in Libya for 2012/13 and expects to spend around
88. DfID did not have programmes based in the
MENA region prior to the Arab Spring, due to their status as middle
income countries. The DfID-led Arab Partnership Economic Facility
(APEF) was established in May 2012, and the first round of APEF
programmes worth just over £13m was approved toward the end
of the 2011/12 financial year and three further programmes worth
£14.8m were approved in April/May 2012. The APEF programmes
place strong emphasis on working with International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) to leverage funding and expertise for projects,
and has so far funded projects with the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), the African Development Bank, the World
Bank and International Finance Corporation.
89. We welcome the Arab Partnership
programme as a tool to promote political and economic reform in
the region and a demonstration of the UK's support for reform
and commitment to the region. The FCO should provide us with an
annual report on the spending and achievements of the Arab Partnership.
90. We recommend that the UK
be bold in seeking new partners for Arab Partnership funds. In
its response to this report the FCO should set out the steps it
is taking to improve its communication with alternative organisations
that could bid for funding, and to raise public awareness of the
programmes it funds in each country.
BRITISH COUNCIL AND BBC WORLD SERVICE
91. As part of its response to the Arab Spring,
the FCO told us that it had sought to deepen its relations with
"strategic partners", including the British Council
and World Service.
While not part of the UK's formal diplomatic mission, these organisations
help to represent British arts and culture abroad, and are vital
tools for the UK's projection of 'soft power'.
92. The British Council is long-established in
the MENA region, operating in Egypt since 1938 and in Tunisia
since 1962. It re-opened its offices in Libya in 2006 following
a 30 year break. Its aim is to build the UK's cultural relations
with other states via the English language, education and skills,
the arts, and youth leadership and networks. The British Council
states that there is "endless demand" in these areas,
noting that the region's population is getting bigger and younger,
further increasing the already substantial demand for English.
Existing British Council programmes in the region include English
for the Future, supporting the development of national policies
for English language teaching; Skills for Employability,
which helps to provide work skills directly linked to local industry
and business needs; and Global Changemakers, a youth engagement
programme that works with social activists and young entrepreneurs.
93. The British Council argues that its long
history of work has enabled it to build a "legacy of trust"
that will be "crucial" to the UK's engagement with the
region in the future, stating that "in the post-revolutionary
period the British Council is still trusted and wanted".
With the help of Arab Partnership funds, it has expanded its programmes
in Tunisia and Egypt and expects to work with government ministries
responsible for education and vocational training in Tunisia and
to establish a Centre for English education reform in Egypt. It
has also introduced new youth engagement and arts programmes in
Tunisia and Egypt, some of which engage directly with the Arab
94. The British Council's work in Libya is more
limited than in Egypt and Tunisia, both because of its shorter
history in the country and the suspension of its work between
February and September 2011. It was officially re-launched in
December 2011 and expects to bring further UK-appointed staff
to Libya in the near future. The National Transitional Council
has requested that the British Council continue its work in Libya
and the Council expects to resume and expand its English and vocational
training programmes, as well as youth engagement and civil society
95. The British Council's long history of providing
education and vocational training, as well as its work with youth
networks, makes it ideally placed to respond to the Arab Spring
revolutions that were led by young people in part as a response
to a lack of employment and opportunities. We
conclude that at a time when soft power and public diplomacy is
more needed than ever, the British Council programmes are vital
in generating goodwill and promoting Britain and British education
in the region. We particularly commend the British Council's youth
engagement work, including its Global Changemakers programme.
BBC World Service
96. The BBC World Service also has a long history
in the MENA region and is a leading international broadcaster
in the Middle East. BBC World Service radio is available throughout
the MENA region in English and Arabic, BBC Arabic TV was launched
in 2008 and the English-language BBC World News television service
is also available throughout the region. The World Service told
us that BBC Arabic offered uninterrupted coverage during the height
of the protests and reaches an audience of 22 million, while its
online audience grew by 300% during protests in Egypt, adding
that "the World Service's strong reputation meant that audiences
turned to the BBC for accurate news and information they could
trust during the upheavals." As proof of its impact, the
World Service drew attention to "reports of crowds gathering
around huge screens in Tahrir Square in Egypt, and other major
cities in the region, showing BBC Arabic TV".
97. The BBC told us that its well-established
reputation for providing a "uniquely thorough, balanced and
independent perspective" gives the UK an "exceptional
advantage" in the region that is admired by other states.
In addition to its news and information services, BBC Arabic broadcasts
a range of political, social and other content including discussions
and interactive programmes such as Question Time, "which
expose Arab audiences to a unique range of views on current topics
and debates." The BBC World Service Trust, an international
charity that trains journalists and supports local independent
media outlets, is also active in the region and has a number of
ongoing and new programmes to support the development of national
and independent media in the region, including through a programme
funded by the Arab Partnership to transform the Tunisian national
television station into a public service broadcaster.
98. On 16 January 2011, the Government announced
cuts to the BBC World Service as part of its implementation of
the Spending Review 2010. The Arabic Service was scheduled to
lose 60 jobs in 2010/11, the single largest concentration of job
losses in the World Service. In our report on The Implications
of cuts of the BBC World Service we concluded that the events
in the Arab Spring required that the World Service reconsider
its announced changes and instead commit itself to providing enhanced
resources to BBC Arabic.
The Government did not immediately come forward with additional
funding, and on 19 May 2011 we instigated a Backbench Business
debate in the House on the BBC World Service, in which members
of the Committee questioned whether the planned cuts to the BBC
Arabic Service were in the nation's interest. In response,
the Minister (Rt Hon David Lidington MP) acknowledged that "even
before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the decision to curtail
Arabic broadcasting was somewhat surprising". The Minister
argued that there was a need for spending cuts and "hard
decisions" in both the FCO and World Service, but also referred
to efforts to find "potential sources of additional money
for the World Service".
On 22 June 2011, the Foreign Secretary announced additional funding
for the World Service of £2.2m to enable the current level
of investment into the BBC Arabic Service.
99. We conclude that the Arab
Spring further highlighted the importance of the BBC World Service
in providing a vital independent news service to the world and
in enhancing the UK's reputation in the region. We welcome the
Government's belated move to secure funds for the BBC Arabic Service,
and hope the Government's funding will not prove to be a one-off
commitment, but rather a sustained investment. However, we remain
concerned that cuts made elsewhere in the World Service will prove
detrimental to the UK's national interests. We stand by our previous
conclusions that funding for the World Service must be protected
and maintained as responsibility for funding transfers from the
FCO to the BBC.
Multilateral support: a 'Marshall
Plan' for the region?
100. It has been widely recognised that the new
economies of Tunisia, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Libya will
need significant support and extensive reform. Economic problems
such as unemployment, income inequality, rising food prices and
corruption all contributed to inspiring the revolutions, which
were themselves responsible for a precipitous drop in tourism
income in Egypt and Tunisia and a temporary halt to oil production
in Libya, further damaging the economy of each. Egypt and Libya
both experienced lower GDP growth than in 2010, and Tunisia's
GDP fell in 2011. Egyptian and Tunisian government reserves have
declined and unemployment has also significantly worsened since
101. Witnesses agreed on the need for a "massive
effort" to support the economies and put in place necessary
economic reforms, with Dr Claire Spencer stating that "the
worst case scenario is continued attrition in the economies".
Lord Malloch-Brown spoke about what he said he reluctantly termed
"a kind of Marshall Plan for the region", drawing a
comparison to the US programme to provide financial and economic
support to its post-war allies in Europe in the 1940s.
102. The international community, including the
UK, has recognised the need for substantial economic assistance
to the region to be coordinated and supplied multi-laterally.
The UK is involved in the large-scale EU and G8 responses to the
Arab Spring countries, which are able to facilitate greater funding
lines than the UK could achieve alone.
G8 DEAUVILLE PARTNERSHIP
103. The G8 "Deauville Partnership"
was announced at the G8 summit in Deauville in May 2011 to act
as an umbrella for reform-related assistance in the MENA region
by G8 partners. The Partnership committed to support MENA countries
and encourage them to put in place economic and social reforms
through a two-track process involving the states' Foreign and
Finance Ministers. The partnership was targeted initially at Egypt
and Tunisia but is also open to other MENA countries that are
engaging in reform.
G8 Deauville Partnership
Partnership countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco,
G8 countries (UK, US, France, Germany, Italy, Canada,
Japan and Russia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Turkey
The International Financial Institutions include:
The African Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank,
the Islamic Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation,
the International Monetary Fund, the OPEC Fund for International
Development, and the World Bank. The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development is also a Partnership member.
104. The Deauville Partners identified up to
$38 billion of support available to countries in the region in
a combination of loans, grants, budget support, and technical
reports in the press in October 2011 claimed that little of these
promised funds had actually been disbursed in the region.
Lord Malloch-Brown echoed these concerns in January 2012 when
he told us that "the large amounts of international public
assistance promised in the early days have frankly not got there."
He suggested that the most evident reason for this failure was
that Western countries were struggling for funds during the economic
crisis, and he highlighted the need for regional partners to be
105. When asked why the promised funds had reportedly
failed to materialise, the Minister denied that there was a problem
in terms of the commitment to release funds and suggested that
"the reason for the hold-up of the transfer of funds is purely
that you have got to get the right projects in place". He
said that among EU and G8 countries there was "a recognition
that unless the economies of these countries are supported, the
impact on the European Union will be very severe. It is not in
our interests to promise and not deliver."
106. It is important that the
UK and its Deauville Partners are seen to be keeping their promises
to states in the MENA region. The UK should make the Deauville
Partnership a priority of its G8 presidency in 2013. The Government
should set out in its response to this report more information
on the use of the UK's contribution to the $38 billion identified
International Financial Institutions
107. Much of the funding identified by the Deauville
Partnership is expected to come from International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. Several of our witnesses commented on the poor reputation
these institutions have in the MENA region because of their associations
with the former authoritarian regimes, and that IFIs are now suffering
from a "massive backlash" against them.
Lord Malloch-Brown told us that this was particularly true in
Egypt, where the fact that a former Egyptian Finance Minister
now holds a senior position at the World Bank has furthered the
sense that the World Bank was "completely in bed with the
Dr Claire Spencer told us that when the outside world "applauded"
Tunisia before the revolution for its liberal economic reforms,
"most people in Tunisia knew that the money was not coming
to them, and it was not creating sustainable employment."
Christine Lagarde, Director of the International Monetary Fund,
acknowledged some of these criticisms in a speech in December
speaking for the IMF, while we certainly warned about
the ticking time bomb of high youth unemployment in the region,
we did not fully anticipate the consequences of unequal access
to opportunities. Let me be frank: we were not paying enough attention
to how the fruits of economic growth were being shared.
108. Another witness stated that a key problem
for IFIs in the region is "a belief that the liberal recipes,
if you likethe Washington consensus of opening up the economy
to trade liberalisation and the private sectorled directly
to the kind of corruption against which the protestors went to
Lord Malloch-Brown agreed that "poorly considered privatisation"
by the former governments under pressure from IFIs to produce
greater liberalisation had resulted in "almost a fire sale
of state assets", which the people had seen as deeply unfair.
109. While Tunisia has agreed international assistance
packages with the World Bank, African Development Bank and European
Investment Bank, 
Egypt was noted for having rejected World Bank and IMF funding
last year. Egypt's economy is now widely recognised as the most
vulnerable economy in the short term, having experienced credit-rating
downgrades and capital outflows, as well as a major fall in its
international reserves leading to fears of devaluation.
We heard several reasons for Egypt's refusal to accept funding,
including its resentment of IFIs, domestic political considerations,
and a reluctance to make major decisions in a transitional period.
The Minister expressed "frustration on behalf of the UK and
the international community at the fact that we believe well-intentioned
and good measures that would assist the Egyptian economy were
not picked up at an earlier stage."
He accepted that transparency and governance conditionality had
been attached to the rejected loans, and that it is a "fine
judgement" to make, but argued that this is "a pretty
important principle to establish at an early instance."
Mr Burt pointed out that the Egyptian government has since resumed
negotiations. Following the election of Dr Mohamed Mursi as president,
media reports described his office as "upbeat" about
the prospects for agreeing a loan with the IMF, noting that he
had spoken to IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde but an IMF
staff visit had yet to be arranged.
We share the Government's
frustration that Egypt did not accept international funding last
year. The UK, as a key member of the international financial organisations,
should engage with the new loan negotiations to ensure that they
result in an offer of funds that is acceptable to Egypt.
THE EUROPEAN UNION: GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
110. The Government has been clear in its position
that changes to the European Union's approach to the MENA region
were required in response to the Arab Spring. The Foreign Secretary
told the House in March 2011 that the UK "would urge the
European Union to change radically its thinking about the neighbourhood
] it is time for European nations to be bold and ambitious."
He said that the EU must "give every incentive to countries
in the region to make decisions that bring freedom and prosperity"
and stated that at the upcoming meeting of the European Council,
"the Prime Minister will call for Europe to set out a programme
to bring down trade barriers, to establish clearer conditions
for the help that it provides, and to marshal its resources to
act as a magnet for positive change in the region."
The European Union first responded to the Arab Spring by issuing
a joint communication on 8 March 2011 titled A partnership
for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.
In it, the EU expressed its intention "to support wholeheartedly
the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same
freedoms that we take as our right" and highlighted its own
"proud tradition" of supporting countries in transition
from autocratic regimes to democracies in southern and in central
and eastern Europe. The Communication outlined a new "incentive-based
approach based on more differentiation ('more for more')"
for its partners in the region, promising that "those that
go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater
support from the EU."
111. In May 2011 the European Commission produced
the results of its year-long review of its European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP), the instrument by which it conducts relations with
states to its east and south, including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.
The review extended what the FCO described as "an ambitious
offer to the EU's reforming neighbours: a new partnership with
the EU based on greater economic integration, trade and increased
funding for the Southern neighbourhood."
As part of this offer, the EU allocated an extra 1.24 billion
in funding for the region, on top of 11.5 billion already
allocated for the period 2007-13. It also announced that the European
Investment Bank had been authorised to increase its lending by
1 billion for Mediterranean countries undertaking political
reform, as well as the creation of several funding tools, including
a European Endowment for Democracy, a Civil Society Facility,
and a 26 million 'umbrella' programme named SPRING to supplement
reform efforts in existing country programmes in the region.
112. The Government told us that it was "broadly
happy" with the EU's review and that the UK, "with like-minded
partners such as the Germans, had argued strongly for the EU to
make a bold and ambitious offer to the southern neighbours".
Lord Malloch-Brown was more critical, suggesting that instead
of the major new initiative that is required, "we have seen
each institution try and re-jig its old programme for new leaders".
113. The European Council for Foreign Relations
has called for a "bolder EU approach", suggesting that
the EU has "struggled to achieve influence" in Egypt
and that the EU "could and now should do more" to respond
to the revolutions.
Lord Malloch-Brown agreed, describing the EU's response to the
Arab Spring as "disappointing", and stating that it
had been "quite unable to assert itself as a real strategic
partner of economic and political change in the way it did in
central and Eastern Europe." He added:
This is meant to be all the things that Europe claims
it is supposed to be good at. Its own neighbourhood, and soft
power, not military power projection, is what is needed, but it
is missing in action.
PROGRESS SO FAR
114. A further joint communication entitled Delivering
on a New European Neighbourhood Policy was issued in May 2012
and provides details of the ENP's progress. The Commission highlighted
some key innovations, including the appointment of an EU Special
Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region and the extension
of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development's mandate.
It described progress as "rapid but uneven". Tunisia
appears to have benefited from the 'more for more' approach, as
the EU's financial assistance has doubled from 80 million
in 2010 to 160 million in 2011, to reflect the "decisive
steps" made in its democratic transition. The Commission
has reported "substantial progress" in its partnership
dialogue with Tunisia to negotiate a 'mobility partnership', which
would ease migration, visa and asylum issues between Tunisia and
the EU, and the Council has also agreed for the Commission to
open negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
(DCFTA) which would allow Tunisia greater integration with the
EU single market. The Commission has also re-launched discussions
on the EU-Tunisia Agriculture Agreement.
115. The Commission's review of Egypt was less
positive, stating that ongoing political uncertainty and reluctance
among the interim authority to engage on long term objectives
had meant that "few advances were made". Unlike in Tunisia,
Egypt's interim authorities were "not ready to engage"
with preliminary negotiations with the EU for a DCFTA, and they
had declined the EU's offer to start a dialogue with the aim of
concluding a mobility partnership.
116. Although a member of the EU's southern neighbourhood,
Libya does not have a partnership agreement with the EU. The Commission's
review of the ENP states that it is "supporting the transition
progress" in Libya and is "ready to engage in negotiations
with the new Libyan Administration for a contractual agreement
and, in that context, discuss Libya's participation in the ENP
based on shared commitment to the values of democracy, the rule
of law and respect for human rights."
117. We conclude that the EU's
response to the Arab Spring has been somewhat mixed. We welcome
the EU's stated commitment to a new approach, but there have so
far been limited results. We recognise the difficulties in engaging
with countries that are undergoing transitions but are disappointed
that the EU has yet to engage with Egypt during a critical period
for that country.
118. We further conclude that
the number of separate EU funding programmes contributes to a
lack of transparency about where and how money is spent. We regret
that this inhibits proper parliamentary scrutiny in this area.
119. The FCO told us that it had argued strongly
for "clearer conditionality" to be attached to EU aid
to the MENA region in the wake of the Arab Spring.
At a press conference in Qatar in February 2011, the Prime Minister
I've been very clearincluding at the last
European Union Councilthat Europe has given a huge amount
of aid to these countries, and while it has signed so-called association
agreements it hasn't really insisted on proper conditions for
this money, and we've seen far too much money disappear down a
great big black hole in some of these countries, not actually
helping them to develop their democracy, to develop their systems.
And I think we should insist on much greater conditionality in
120. Witnesses to our inquiry shared the Prime
Minister's assessment that in the past the EU had failed to insist
on reforms in exchange for its aid. Intissar Kherigi described
the EU's relationship with Tunisia as "all carrots and no
sticks" and told us that:
at the height of the crackdown on political opposition
in the 1990s, when Ben Ali put 30,000 members of opposition parties
in prison, the EU entered an association agreement with him. At
the height of corruption in the decade leading up to the uprising,
when corruption was reaching its worst levels, the EU was in advanced
negotiations for advanced status.
121. Lord Malloch-Brown indicated that the situation
was similar in Egypt, describing the EU-Mediterranean strategy,
"which celebrated Mubarak and others long after that stuff
should have been handled much more austerely," as "particularly
122. The FCO told us that it had "lobbied
hard" in the EU to ensure that the Tunisian proposal for
'Advanced Status' with the EU "was linked to specific and
measurable steps on human rights to deliver real reform in Tunisia."
However, Intissar Kherigi commented that Tunisians believe that
while others are not responsible for human rights abuses under
President Ben Ali, "there has been complicity in the sense
that the UK and EU have not done enough to condemn them and have
actually facilitated them by giving millions of pounds and Euros
123. The Government claimed that, partly as a
result of UK lobbying, strengthened conditionality is now a key
feature of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Government has
hailed this as a success. However, some observers have noted that
the imposition of stronger conditionality rules on new governments
struggling to transition to a more democratic situation could
be seen as double standards. Dr Claire Spencer described the reaction
of Tunisian and Egyptian youths to being assured that conditionality
would now apply, who reportedly responded: "Where were you
in December 2010? Why should we believe you? We don't want your
conditionality. We want you to listen to us".
Similarly, Intissar Kherigi commented that:
conditionality of aid is something that civil society
activists have long campaigned for. It is something that, unfortunately,
was not seen under the previous EU policy. [
] now that Tunisia
has elected a democratic representative body and will have a democratic
government, for the EU to come in and say, "Now we will place
conditions on our engagement with you," might send the wrong
signals. So it depends on how the message is delivered.
124. The Minister defended the Government's policy,
stating that it shows that "lessons have been learned."
The Henry Jackson Society agreed with the application of greater
conditionality, believing that "the UK should not be in the
business of providing unconditional aid to undemocratic or oppressive
125. We conclude that for many
years the UK did not do enough to prevent, or apply conditions
to, the EU's provision of support to authoritarian governments
in Egypt and Tunisia before the revolutions and that this has
consequences for attempts to do so now. It is right that there
be a relationship between aid and improvements in human rights,
but this should be done sensitively and in a phased manner, with
conditionality increasing gradually rather than being imposed
immediately on struggling and fragile democracies.
89 Foreign Secretary speech to the Times CEO Summit
Africa, 22 March 2011, via the FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back
Ev 174 [Middle East Monitor], Ev 166 [Amnesty International],
Ev 142 [Professor Caroline Rooney] Back
Q 56 Back
Ev 166 and Ev 180 Back
Ev 181 Back
Q 17 Back
Ev 166 Back
Q 147 Back
Q 107 and Q 109 Back
Prime Minister speech to the National Assembly in Kuwait, 22 February
2011, via Number 10 website (www.numberten.gov.uk) Back
Ev 62 Back
Ev 149 Back
Ev 190 and Ev 197 Back
Ev 106. See also Ev 123-124 [supplementary evidence from Robin
Ev 182 Back
Q 29 Back
Ev 170 Back
Ev 208 Back
Ev 174 Back
Ev 150 Back
Ev 63 Back
Ev 198 Back
Ev 167 Back
Q 147 Back
Q 149 Back
Q 151 Back
See, for example, evidence given to this Committee by Amnesty
International as part of its Human Rights report. Foreign Affairs
Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2010-12,The FCO's Human
Rights Work 2010-11, HC 964, Ev 9-10 Back
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2012-13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December
2010 and January to September 2011, the Government's Review of
arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms
control issues, HC 419, p.6-7 Back
Q 29 Back
Q 30 Back
Q 13 Back
Q 31 Back
Q 27 Back
Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, "Islamist Parties in Power:
A Work in Progress", Carnegie Middle East Center,
23 May 2012, www.carnegie-mec.org Back
Jonathan Brown, "Salafis and Sufis in Egypt", The Carnegie
Endowment, December 2011, www.carnegieendowment.org Back
Q 12 Back
Q 51. See also Ev 202 [Royal African Society and Libya-analysis.com]. Back
Ev 175 Back
Ev 62 Back
See Ev 176-179 [Barnabas Fund], which notes that the Foreign Secretary,
warned that "the unleashing of sectarian divisions"
was one of the biggest risks of the Arab Spring. Back
See Ev 165-170 and Ev 213 [Amnesty International], Ev 177-9 [Barnabas
Fund] and Ev 183-185 [Human Rights Watch] Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Government National Action
Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security, November 2010
to November 2013, February 2012 Revision Back
Ev 165 Back
Ev 66 Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The Arab Partnership
Strategy", FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back
The fund is also open to programmes in Mauritania, the Palestinian
Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Bahrain, UAE, Yemen and Iran. Back
Ev 127 Back
Ev 72. For projected spending, see Ev 127-134, and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, "The Arab Partnership Strategy",
FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk). Back
Ev 133 Back
Ev 134-141 Back
Ev 66 Back
Ev 151 Back
Ev 150 and Ev 153 Back
Ev 186-189 Back
Ev 186 and Ev 223 Back
Ev 75-82 Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, The
Implications of cuts of the BBC World Service, HC 849,
paras 49-50 Back
HC Deb, 19 May 2011, Col 550-556 Back
HC Deb, 22 June 2011, Col 15WS Back
International Monetary Fund, "Middle East and North Africa:
Historic Transitions under Strain", 20 April 2012,
via IMF website (www.imf.org) Back
Q 113 [Lord Malloch-Brown] and Q 58 [Dr Claire Spencer] Back
Q 113 Back
HC Deb, 17 October 2011, col 618W Back
"The economics of the Arab spring", Financial Times,
9 October 2011, via website (www.ft.com) Back
Q 113. See also: Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt
Hon George Osborne MP, to the EBRD 21st Annual Board of Governors
meeting, 18 May 2012, via the Treasury website (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk). Back
Q 158 Back
Q 113 and Ev 148 [Christian Aid] Back
Q 113 Back
Q 42 Back
Speech by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, "The
Arab Spring, One Year On", 6 December 2011, via IMF website
Q 158 Back
Q 103 Back
Ev 71 Back
International Monetary Fund, "Middle East and North Africa:
Historic Transitions under Strain", 20 April 2012,
via IMF website (www.imf.org) Back
Q 177 Back
Q 179 Back
"Egypt upbeat on IMF loan agreement", Financial
Times, 1 July 2012, via FT website (www.ft.com) Back
HC Deb, 7 March 2011, Col 644 Back
European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Affairs Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, A partnership for democracy
and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, 8 March
Ev 75 Back
"Statement by President Barroso: a concrete response to the
Arab Spring and the aspirations of our Eastern Partners",
European Commission, 25 March 2011 Back
Ev 75 Back
Q 113 Back
Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Nick Witney, Egypt's Hybrid
Revolution: A bolder EU approach, European Council on Foreign
Relations, May 2011 Back
Q 114 Back
European Commission, Joint Communication, Delivering on a new
European Neighbourhood Policy, 15 May 2012 Back
Ev 75 Back
Transcript of press conference with the Prime Minister of Qatar,
23 February 2011, via No 10 website (www.numberten.gov.uk) Back
Q 15 Back
Q 109 Back
Ev 66 Back
Q 17 Back
Q 61 Back
Q 15 Back
Ev 190 Back