FCO's immediate response to the crises |
26. When protests began to take place in the
MENA region, the FCO was responsible for coordinating both the
consular and diplomatic response to the crises. The Government
told us that the Arab Spring put "significant strain"
on MENAD's resources. Before the Arab Spring, the Department had
approximately 90 staff. Between January and July 2011, over 570
staff based in London and the FCO's offices in Milton Keynes had
volunteered to assist the work of MENAD and the Consular Directorate
as they responded to the series of crises in the Arab Spring,
as well as earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand.
27. The Consular Crisis Management Department
deployed 16 Rapid Deployment Teams, totalling 90 staff overseas
to support the consular response,
and over 50 staff were deployed to the states
on an ad-hoc basis to support the response to the Arab Spring.
In April 2011, the FCO Board decided to increase staffing in MENAD
"on a more permanent and sustainable footing".
The Directorate was re-organised into five departments:
- Libya Unit
- Near East and North Africa Department
- Northern Gulf Department
- Arabian Peninsula Department
- Arab Partnership Department
The FCO told us that the new Libya Unit had approximately
25 new slots. Across the remainder of the Directorate, three slots
were upgraded and approximately 15 new slots created, including
an additional Director.
This suggests that an additional 35-40 positions have been added
to the MENA Directorate since the start of 2011, an increase in
staffing of around 40%.
The consular response in Tunisia
28. On the eve of the Arab Spring, there were
approximately 4,000 British nationals in Tunisia. The UK embassy
in Tunis was one of its smallest in the region, with approximately
65 staff. The FCO told us that it had "extensive contingency
plans for handling unexpected crises in Tunisia, including those
related to public disorder."
The FCO's travel advice for Tunisia was updated 22 times between
5 January and 4 February 2011, escalating its advice to advise
against all travel and for British nationals to leave Tunisia
between 13-15 January, at the time of ex-President Ben Ali's departure.
29. By 20 January, the FCO estimated that there
were only 300 British nationals remaining in Tunisia, most of
whom were long-term residents.
There was no need for a government-sponsored evacuation as Britons
were able to leave on commercial flights.
|Timeline: the consular response in Tunisia
|13 January||FCO advises against all but essential travel to Tunisia
|14 January||President Ben Ali departed Tunisia for Saudi Arabia
|FCO advises British nationals to "consider their need to remain in Tunisia"
|FCO staff member from Rabat arrives to support Embassy work
|Tunisian airspace briefly closed
|15 January ||FCO advises all British nationals without a pressing reason to remain to leave Tunisia by commercial means
|FCO staff member from Algiers arrives
|Non-essential FCO and British Council staff and dependents leave Tunisia
|17 January ||FCO / consular service Rapid Deployment Team arrives to help with 'assisted departure operations'
|15-20 January|| An estimated 4,000 British nationals leave Tunisia by commercial means
|4 February||FCO relaxes its travel advice for Tunisia
The consular response in Egypt
30. Cairo is one of the largest posts in the region, serving
as a regional hub with 150 staff from the FCO and other Whitehall
departments. At the
time of the revolution the Consulate-General in Alexandria accommodated
approximately 20 staff. The FCO also had Honorary Consulates in
Sharm el-Sheikh, Luxor, Suez and Hurghada.
The Government estimated the resident British community in Egypt
to be around 15,000 including dependants, concentrated mainly
in and around Cairo. Around 120,000 British nationals visited
Egypt each month, with around 20,000-25,000 in the country at
any one time. Unlike in Tunis, the FCO judged that chartered aircraft
were required to supplement commercial capacity in evacuating
British nationals from Egypt. The FCO chartered two flights which
were used by 200 British nationals and dependants who were charged
£300 per adult fare.
FCO travel advice for Egypt was updated 22 times between 26 January
and 21 February 2011.
|Timeline: the consular response in Egypt
|25 January||First major protests in Cairo
|28 January||FCO escalates its advice to advise against all but essential travel to Cairo, Alexandria, Luxor and Suez
|29 January ||FCO advises all British nationals without a pressing need to remain in the major cities of Cairo, Alexandria or Suez to leave by commercial means
|30 January||The first Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) arrives in Egypt
|31 January ||A second RDT and an Ministry of Defence planning team arrive
|3 February ||Non-core staff in the Cairo embassy are either evacuated or told not to attend work at the embassy
|First FCO chartered aircraft to supplement the commercial flight capacity departs
|5 February ||Second FCO chartered aircraft departs
|15 February ||FCO partially relaxes travel advice
|21 February ||FCO lifts all advice against non-essential travel to Egypt
31. A major point of concern for the FCO was
the advice it gave to the thousands of British nationals at the
resorts on the Red Sea. Many other states, including the US and
almost all EU countries, advised their citizens against travel
to Egypt as a whole during the uprisings. In contrast, the FCO
judged that the risk to British nationals in tourist resorts was
"significantly lower than that in the major cities"
and did not advise British travellers to leave. The FCO told us
that it deployed extra consular staff to Sharm el-Sheikh to support
the Honorary Consul and reviewed its assessment on a daily basis
in consultation with staff in Egypt.
The FCO told us that its approach in differentiating between different
parts of the country had since been praised by the Egyptian government,
UK tour operators and British travellers who were able to continue
their holidays. The Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA)
agreed and suggested that there would have been negative consequences
had a travel ban been issued "hastily and impulsively",
and it praised the FCO for recognising "geographical differences"
which ensured "orderly evacuations where necessary and the
prevention of general panic amongst UK nationals."
32. ABTA praised the FCO's Consular Services
Directorate, describing communications during the crisis in Tunisia
and Egypt as "strong, effective and constructive". ABTA
also applauded the FCO's travel advice as well-timed, balanced,
and "based on well-informed decisions".
Where ABTA did see fault, such as in an administrative error which
it said resulted in a case of unnecessary evacuation of some British
nationals, and a
problem with the visibility of consular staff at airports, it
was satisfied that the problems were quickly addressed and lessons
learned. We conclude
that the Government provided a good consular service to British
nationals in Egypt and Tunisia, providing well-judged and practical
advice. We congratulate the FCO for its decision not to advise
against travel to the Red Sea resorts.
33. ABTA warned that other states in the region
have a much higher number of British tourists that do not travel
on package holidays, for whom no airline or travel provider has
a legal obligation to support their repatriation. Should unrest
spread to these countries the evacuation of British citizens would
be more challenging. In its
response to this report the FCO should confirm that its consular
evacuation plans elsewhere in the region take into account the
much higher number of independent British travellers, who may
require more consular assistance than those on package holidays.
The consular response in Libya
34. When protests broke out in Libya on 15 February
2011, violence escalated much more quickly and severely than it
had in Egypt or Tunisia, and within a week the situation required
a major consular response and an evacuation of British nationals
from various locations in the country. There were an estimated
3,500 British nationals in Libya in February 2011.
The Embassy had approximately 80 staff, and held emergency plans
for "potential consular disasters", including plans
for evacuations by land, air and sea due to its designation as
a "medium risk" country.
35. The Government described the Libya crisis
as "the most complex FCO-led evacuation in recent years,
involving combined commercial charter and military operations."
The particular difficulties in Libya were the collapse of administration
in Tripoli; chaos and danger at the airport, with live gunfire
being used to control crowds, and few if any Libyan airport ground
staff; and the fact that UK nationals were dispersed over a vast
swathe of remote desert. In addition, the FCO was dealing with
an "unprecedented" series of crises in the first few
months of 2011, including the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and
Libya, and major earthquakes in New Zealand in February and Japan
36. In total the UK evacuated over 800 British
nationals and over 1,000 foreign nationals between 23 February
and 1 March 2011.
By 7 March, the Foreign Secretary reported to the House that the
UK was aware of only around 180 British nationals remaining in
Libya, including some journalists, some of whom had informed the
FCO of their wish to remain.
British nationals in Libya were not charged for FCO charter flights
or evacuation by military assets as there were no commercial options
available. The UK also provided humanitarian support to repatriate
12,700 foreign nationals fleeing the violence from the Libyan
borders and to evacuate 4,800 Libyans and other foreign nationals
from Misrata. A timeline
of the consular response is attached as Annex 1 to this report.
37. The Government received significant criticism
in the press for its handling of the Libya crisis.
The media reported severe delays with call handling, which the
Government has acknowledged were "unacceptably long",
and major problems in obtaining and delivering aircraft on which
to evacuate British nationals from Libya. A number of problems,
including a technical fault on the first aircraft chartered by
the FCO, meant that British citizens waited for over 48 hours
after UK commercial flights had been cancelled for Government
charter planes to evacuate them. Some of those who were in more
remote areas waited considerably longer. Conditions at Tripoli
airport and the provision of information to British nationals
were criticised, and the plight of British oil workers in more
remote parts of Libya was a particular focus of attention. In
media interviews, there was praise for the staff on the ground
but communications with London were described as a "fiasco".
Both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister delivered public
apologies for the problems and acknowledged that Britons had had
a difficult time.
38. Following the experience in Libya, the FCO
commissioned a Review of Consular Evacuation Procedures, which
was published on 4 July 2011 and updated in December 2011. The
Review details the problems encountered and the FCO's revised
structures and procedures. We note that the FCO has taken steps
to clarify decision-making structures and has introduced set triggers
to escalate call handling responses and to move more quickly to
outsourcing call handling during future crises.
Most importantly, the FCO is extending the range of possible suppliers
of charter aircraft, including by formalising arrangements with
the Ministry of Defence. The FCO's revised "decision making
matrix" now makes clear that options for chartering aircraft
should be routinely explored at early stages in "pre-crisis
planning". To guard against problems such as the technical
fault in Libya's case, the FCO will ensure that there is extra
redundancy capacity when chartering aircraft, but notes that this
will entail extra cost.
The evacuation of British
nationals exposed serious weaknesses in the FCO's emergency consular
response systems, particularly with regard to chartering flights
for evacuations. The Foreign Secretary was right to commission
a full and detailed review, and we commend the FCO for producing
detailed conclusions. While we hope that this will improve the
FCO's response, some of these new procedures are yet to be tested.
STAFFING DURING CRISES
39. In response to appeals by the Permanent Under-Secretary,
570 staff from across the FCO network in London and Milton Keynes
volunteered to work in the crisis centre and to support the response.
The Review of Consular Evacuation Procedures noted that this included
many junior A and B band staff at a time when announcements were
being made on the future of the workforce structure that particularly
affected them. The Review also notes that Rapid Deployment Teams
and Embassy teams operated in extreme conditions with minimal
support. For example, in Tripoli the Government reported chaos
and danger at the airport, with live gunfire being used to control
crowds and few if any Libyan airport ground staff. Some staff
reportedly worked shifts of more than 24 hours with little or
no rest before returning to duty. We
commend the hundreds of FCO staff who worked long hours over a
number of months during rolling crises. The staff in Libya and
the FCO's Rapid Deployment Teams deserve particular recognition
for their work to ensure British nationals reached safety.
Locally engaged staff: specific challenges
40. The Government told us that locally engaged
staff were particularly badly affected by travel restrictions
during the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, noting that on one
occasion only 40% of locally engaged staff managed to reach work
in Tunis, although where possible staff worked from home. Locally
engaged staff in Cairo who attempted to work from home were hampered
by government restrictions placed on mobile phone and internet
use. The FCO stated that this "meant the loss of valuable
expertise for both political and consular operations", and
that the loss of manpower "also presented problems for rostering
and adequately resting staff."
that the problems encountered by locally engaged staff in reaching
work during the crises, and the subsequent strain placed on remaining
staff, are of particular concern in the light of the FCO's policy
of engaging an ever greater number of locally engaged staff. We
recommend that in its response to this report the Government provide
details of how it intends to mitigate the effects of these problems
in future crises.
41. Although we have received no evidence to
suggest that locally engaged staff played a role in protests in
Tunisia, Egypt or Libya, we remind the Government of problems
experienced in 2009 when a member of locally engaged staff of
the British Embassy in Iran was arrested and detained during protests
in Tehran. The Committee's Report on the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Annual Report 2008-09 urged the Government to consider
requesting the extension of limited diplomatic immunity to some
locally-engaged staff, as permitted under the Vienna Convention.
that the Government review its policies in order to ensure that
it is satisfied it is providing the best possible level of diplomatic
protection to its locally engaged staff, and that they are aware
of the limits of this protection.
Political and diplomatic responses
in Tunisia and Egypt
42. The Government told us that when the uprisings
in Tunisia began it had had a "limited" bilateral relationship
with the Ben Ali government, and there was "no reason to
believe that the unrest would represent a serious challenge to
the survival of the Ben Ali regime."
The UK therefore focused on addressing the deterioration in the
human rights situation. The Foreign Secretary made three public
statements on 11, 14 and 15 January condemning the violence and
urging restraint and the protection of human rights. These messages
were also made public via social media and the Ambassador's blog.
The FCO worked with the EU to reinforce its message through, for
example, a meeting with EU ambassadors and the Tunisian Foreign
Minister on 13 January to express concern about the rising violence,
which the British Ambassador attended.
43. In respect of Egypt, the FCO told us that
it had believed President Mubarak did not intend to step down,
and had judged that "while it was not for the UK to decide
who governed Egypt, it was clear that stability in Egypt required
a process of political change."
The UK pursued a similar policy as it had in Tunisia of publicly
condemning the violence and calling for political reforms, and
conducted what it described as "sustained UK engagement"
with its Egyptian contactswhich were much more extensive
than those it had in Tunisiato call for an orderly transition
to a more democratic system, avoidance of violent repression,
and the lifting of restrictions on freedom of speech.
There were "at least 20" contacts by UK Cabinet ministers
in a three week period during the revolution to Egyptian interlocutors
including President Mubarak, his son Gamal Mubarak, Prime Minister
Omar Suleiman and Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit. At least two of
these calls were made by the Prime Minister.
44. The UK discussed the situation in Egypt with
US, Jordanian, Arab League and UN interlocutors, and worked with
EU Foreign Ministers and Heads of State to issue conclusions and
a statement condemning the violence and calling for a transition
to a broad-based government.
The UK Government also issued 11 public statements on the violence,
including joint statements with France, Germany, Spain and Italy,
as well as a number of media interviews and updated Parliament
three times on the MENA region between 28 January and 11 February.
45. The FCO noted that in both Egypt and Tunisia
the leaders had indicated a willingness to make limited concessions
on some of the issues, but that those concessions had been insufficient
to assuage protestors. We
conclude that the Government was right to focus on human rights
protection and to call for political reform rather than making
an explicit call for President Ben Ali or President Mubarak to
46. The issue of deposed leaders' assets is a
very sensitive one in the MENA region, particularly in Egypt where
the UK is popularly believed to have frozen and failed to return
large amounts of Egyptian assets.
47. In the case of Tunisia, the FCO told us that
it lobbied hard within the EU to ensure a rapid decision on freezing
assets belonging to President Ben Ali and his family.
The EU froze assets of the President and his wife on 31 January,
adding a further 46 allies and relatives to the freeze on 4 February.
On 7 February the Government issued a Financial Sanctions Notice
against all 48 named in the asset freeze.
48. In contrast to the Tunisia asset freezes,
which were implemented by the EU 16 days after Ben Ali's departure,
it took over six weeks to achieve an EU freeze of Mubarak's assets
from the time it was first requested. This delay caused some comment
in the press, particularly after Switzerland took steps to freeze
Mubarak's assets within days of his losing power. The Government
told us that the Egyptian Embassy in the UK submitted asset freezing
evidence to the FCO for Mubarak and family members, former ministers
and officials between 13 and 28 February and the Chancellor of
the Exchequer discussed a freeze with EU Finance Ministers on
13-14 February in Brussels. 
Yet it was not until 21 March that the EU formally imposed an
asset freeze on Hosni Mubarak and 18 of his associates, and over
£40 million of assets were frozen in the UK.
It was reported in European Voice on 21 March 2011 that
a number of EU member states had already taken steps to freeze
assets in the meantime.
We recommend that the Government
provide the Committee with an explanation of the difference between
the times taken to achieve an EU-wide asset freeze for Ex-President
Ben Ali and for Ex-President Mubarak.
Response to the Libyan uprising
49. Colonel Gaddafi's decision to respond to
the uprisings against his regime in Libya with violence and repression
resulted in a British response of a different order and scale
to that in Tunisia or Egypt. The Government noted the importance
of the defection of some army units to the opposition, but concluded
that the situation "required external intervention on a serious
scale to avoid Qadhafi crushing the voices of change."
Colonel Gaddafi's approach, including his reference to protestors
as "rats" and "cockroaches", and now-infamous
threats to "cleanse Libya house by house" galvanised
international action to protect civilians from his regime.
SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
50. The FCO states that the UK played a "key
part" in shaping the international response to Colonel Gaddafi's
attempted repression of the Libyan uprising. The UK was active
from an early stage in responding to the situation in Libya, working
with France and the US, as well as in the EU and United Nations
to achieve a unified response. It co-sponsored the UN Security
Council resolution 1970 against Gaddafi's regime, and worked with
the Arab League as it made a formal request to the UN to establish
a no-fly zone over Libya.
|UN action on Libya 2011
|26 February||UNSCR 1970Imposed arms embargo on Libya and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court and imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on some members of the regime
|17 March||UNSCR 1973Reinforced and tightened the arms embargo and asset freeze, established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace and authorised "all necessary measures [
] to protect civilians [
] while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory"
|16 September||UNSCR 2009Established the UN Support Mission in Libya and modified the asset freezes to allow some to be unfrozen
|31 October||UNSCR 2016Ended the mandate for the use of all necessary measures to protect the civilian population and lifted the no-fly zone
|UNSCR 2017Called on Libya and the international community to take steps to prevent the proliferation of arms in the region
|2 December ||UNSCR 2022Extended UNSMIL's mandate
51. Beyond the UN, the UK reaffirmed its leading
role in responding to events in Libya by holding a London Conference
on Libya with 40 countries in attendance on 29 March, and by creating
and co-chairing with Qatar the first meeting of the Libya Contact
Group on 13 April. The FCO told us that these efforts "presented
a unified international voice on Libya" and argued that this
was reinforced by a joint letter by the Prime Minister, President
Obama and President Sarkozy, which stated that Gaddafi must "go,
and go for good."
52. The UK's role in international military action,
including its legality, aims, and allegations of seeking regime
change, has been considered extensively by the Defence Committee
in its report on Operations in Libya, published earlier this year.
We also recall our earlier conclusions in our report on The Role
of the FCO in UK Government that "the Government's significant
contribution to achieving UN Security Council approval for a No-Fly
Zone over Libya prevented major loss of life in Benghazi."
We conclude that securing
a UN resolution was vital to the legitimacy of subsequent intervention
and a significant diplomatic achievement.
53. Since the end of military action, concerns
have been raised by NGOs and others about the effect of military
action on civilians in Libya. In one reported incident, NATO has
been criticised for failing to respond to distress calls and to
take action to assist a stranded boat of 72 Libyan migrants in
the Mediterranean Sea, only nine of whom survived. A report by
the Council of Europe's Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced
Persons found a "catalogue of failures", as Libyan authorities,
Italian and Maltese Maritime Coordination Centres and NATO all
failed to fulfil their responsibilities toward the vessel. The
report was particularly critical of the apparent failure of the
crews of a helicopter and naval vessel to go to the boat's assistance.
Of particular concern to our Committee was the conclusion by the
Council of Europe that:
there was a failure by NATO and individual member
States involved in planning Operation Unified Protector off the
Libyan coast. It was foreseeable that there would be an exodus
of people fleeing the country, including by the dangerous sea
UK-Libya diplomatic relations
throughout the revolution
BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONS WITH FORMER
54. The Government told us that throughout the
period of the revolution it continued to take action bilaterally
to apply pressure to the Gaddafi regime. Following the evacuation
of British nationals from Libya, British Embassy operations were
suspended and the Embassy in Tripoli closed on 26 February 2011.
The UK took a number of steps to apply diplomatic pressure, including
revoking Gaddafi's immunity as head of state so that neither he
nor his family could freely enter the UK, and expelling five members
of the Libyan Embassy on 30 March. On 30 April, the British Embassy
in Tripoli was attacked and burned following reports that a NATO
airstrike had killed one of Colonel Gaddafi's sons. The Foreign
Secretary responded by expelling the Libyan Ambassador to the
United Kingdom Omar Jelban on 1 May, and two more Libyan diplomats
were expelled on 4 May.
ESTABLISHING NEW RELATIONS
55. As it sought to increase the pressure on
the Gaddafi regime, the FCO also looked to increase the UK's contacts
with the leadership of the opposition, the National Transitional
Council (NTC). The FCO's first efforts to re-establish a presence
in Libya at the start of March 2011 ended in disaster after the
UK sent a "small British diplomatic team" to eastern
Libya to "build on initial contacts and to assess the scope
for closer diplomatic contact." The team was withdrawn after
what the FCO termed "a serious misunderstanding about its
role." The eight members of the team, six of whom were reportedly
members of the SAS, were detained and disarmed by guards after
landing by helicopter on farmland near Benghazi, then handed to
British diplomatic efforts to have the team released included
a phone call from UK Ambassador to Tripoli Richard Northern, a
recording of which was leaked to Libyan television channels. The
team was released and left the country on 6 March 2011, but the
incident was labelled an embarrassing fiasco in media reports.
The Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House on the events
and accepted responsibility for the mission.
Later in March, the FCO succeeded in establishing relations with
the NTC and a British diplomatic mission was established in Benghazi.
The UK built on this by sending military advisers to Libya to
help the NTC improve organisation and communications (though not
to train or arm, which would be against UN sanctions).
56. Although not as fast as France, the UK moved
relatively quickly to recognise the rebels.
When the Prime Minister received NTC Chairman Abdul Jalil in London
on 12 May, he referred to him as "the legitimate political
interlocutor in Libya and Britain's primary partner there."
On 27 July, the UK announced it would recognise the NTC as the
sole governmental authority in Libya. The Prime Minister, the
Foreign Minister, and the Secretary of State for International
Development visited Libya between June and September 2011.
57. Sir John Jenkins, former Ambassador to Baghdad,
took over the UK's mission in Benghazi in September, at the same
time that a UK office was established in Tripoli. As the British
Embassy had been damaged in an attack on 30 April, the new office
operated out of a commercial hotel and included a cross-Whitehall
team. The Foreign Secretary formally re-opened the Embassy in
Tripoli on 17 October and a new Ambassador to Libya, Dominic Asquith,
took over in mid-November 2011.
58. We conclude that the Government
responded to the Libyan crisis boldly on both bilateral and multilateral
levels. The UK demonstrated leadership at the United Nations and
in the EU to achieve its desired response.
37 Ev 58 Back
Ev 59 Back
Ev 82 Back
Ev 88-93 Back
Blog post by HMA to Tunis, 20 January 2011, via FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back
Ev 82 Back
Ev 83 Back
Ev 99-104 Back
Ev 83 Back
Ev 226 Back
Ev 225 Back
Ev 226 Back
"Libya Unrest", BBC News Online, 21 February
2011, via BBC News website (www.bbc.co.uk/news) Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Review of Consular Evacuation
Procedures, 4 July 2011, p18 Back
Ev 111 Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Review of Consular Evacuation
Procedures, 4 July 2011, p.11-12 Back
Ev 109 and HC Deb, 3 March 2011, Col 35-36W Back
HC Deb, 7 March 2011, Col 644 Back
Ev 109 Back
See, for instance: "British rescue turns to farce: 500 trapped
in Libya told plane is stuck at Gatwick and warship won't dock
till it's safe", Daily Mail, 24 February 2011; "Libya-based
UK oil workers in evacuation plea", The Scotsman,
23 February 2011, via the Scotsman website (www.scotsman.com);
"Oil worker trapped in Libya 'desperate for rescue",
BBC News Online, 23 February 2011, via BBC website (www.bbc.co.uk/news). Back
"Libya unrest: David Cameron apology for UK response",
BBC News Online, 24 February 2011, via BBC website (www.bbc.co.uk/news) Back
See above, and: "Hague 'sorry' for Libya flights", BBC
News Today, 24 February 2011, via BBC website (www.bbc.co.uk/news). Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Review of Consular Evacuation
Procedures, 4 July 2011, p.5-6 Back
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Review of Consular Evacuation
Procedures, 4 July 2011, p6. This policy was put into practice
in Bahrain in March 2011, when the FCO chartered three aircraft
from Bahrain to mitigate against the risk of one failing. The
first aircraft was cancelled due to lack of demand. Back
Ev 85 Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2008-09, HC145, paras
Ev 86 Back
Ev 89 Back
Ev 95 Back
Ev 71 Back
Ev 71 and Ev 96 Back
Ev 96 and European Council Conclusions 4 February 2011, Annex
II: Declaration on Egypt and the region Back
Ev 99-104 Back
Ev 70 Back
Ev 91 Back
Ev 97 Back
Ev 71 and Ev 104. See also: HL Deb, 27 April 2011, cols 123WA. Back
"EU freezes Mubarak funds", European Voice, 21
March 2011, via website (www.europeanvoice.com) Back
Ev 107 Back
See, for example: "Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi refuses
to quit", BBC News Online, 22 February 2011. Back
Ev 109 and joint letter by US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister
David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy to The Times
of London, the International Herald Tribune, and Le
Figaro, 15 April 2011 Back
Defence Committee, Operations in Libya Back
Foreign Affairs Committee, The Role of the FCO in UK Government,
para 187 Back
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons, Lives lost in the Mediterranean
Sea: who is responsible?, 29 March 2012, para 11 Back
"Libya unrest: SAS members 'captured near Benghazi'",
BBC News Online, 6 March 2011, via BBC website (www.bbc.co.uk/news);
"SAS and MI6 officers released by Libya's rebel commanders",
Guardian, 7 March 2011, via Guardian website (www.guardian.go.uk) Back
See, for instance: "Libya: Whitehall blame game begins over
SAS fiasco", The Telegraph, 7 March 2011. Back
HC Deb, 7 March 2011, Col 648 Back
France recognised the NTC on 10 March 2011 as the 'legitimate
representative of the Libyan people'. Back
Ev 119 Back
Ev 109-110 Back