1 Introduction
1. The Arab Spring is a term used to describe
a wave of popular uprisings that began in Tunisia in December
2010 and swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region in the first half of 2011, astonishing observers and succeeding
in overthrowing decades-old authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt
and Libya, and posing a challenge to undemocratic governments
in Bahrain, Syria and elsewhere. It has variously been described
as the biggest geopolitical event since the end of the Cold War;
"already set to overtake the 2008 financial crisis and 9/11
as the most important development of the early 21st century";[1]
and in the words of our own Prime Minister: "a precious moment
of opportunity for this region".[2]
2. The term 'Arab Spring' is considered by some
to be misleading, suggesting a pan-Arab movement and conferring
positive connotations. The use of the term 'Spring' also became
more problematic as the uprisings and transitions continued and
lengthened, and it is now over 18 months since they began. Some
observers, including the FCO, prefer the term 'Arab Awakening'.
We have used 'Arab Spring' in this report because it is the most
commonly used and understood term for the uprisings and their
aftermath.
3. The Arab Spring arguably represents the greatest
foreign policy challenge for our own Government to date. The region
is vital to the UK's commercial, energy, and security interests,
and the changes wrought by the Arab Spring revolutions have enormous
implications for Britain and British foreign policy. In its early
days, the Arab Spring presented a practical, consular challenge
to ensure the safety of tens of thousands of British nationals
abroad, as well as a diplomatic challenge as the Government sought
to engage constructively with the old regimes as they reacted
and then crumbled, and new leaders as they emerged in each state.
In Libya, as Colonel Gaddafi[3]
threatened to react to the uprisings with military force, the
UK was among the countries leading diplomatic condemnation of
violence and was in the forefront of a military intervention to
protect civilians. UK foreign policy must adjust to the loss of
old strategic partners such as former Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak; do what it can to guard against the risk of instability
and economic collapse in the region; and support what it is hoped
will be the emergence of new democratic states, with all of the
stabilisation, development, and support for democratisation that
the transitions entail.
4. The Arab Spring today is far from complete
and events are moving quickly. At the time of publication of this
report, the three states that are the subject of our inquiry—Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya—have entered transitional periods but have
yet to agree new constitutions; Libya is yet to hold parliamentary
elections and Egyptian authorities have recently dissolved the
democratically elected parliament. Each state is experiencing
some form of continuing unrest, and recent developments in Egypt,
whose army has announced new powers for itself and limited those
of the new president, have thrown the democratic transition into
confusion. The new Egyptian president, Muslim Brotherhood member
Dr Mohamed Mursi, will take up his role in the absence of
either a parliament or a constitution. Other governments in the
region may yet be challenged further by uprisings, and some have
begun a reform process in their own states. This report will be
published in the midst of events and will inevitably be overtaken
by further developments. It should be read as a report on the
interim period, not the transitions as a whole.
5. We launched our inquiry into the implications
for British foreign policy of the Arab Spring in July 2011. We
chose to look in particular at the contribution the UK can make
to reform and reconstruction in Arab countries. Our initial focus
was on Egypt and Tunisia, as these two countries appeared to have
moved into a post-revolution transition period. The inquiry set
out to answer the following questions:
- What forces are driving the
movement for reform and reconstruction in Egypt and Tunisia, and
to what extent are they paralleled elsewhere in the Arab world?
- Could the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
realistically have done more to anticipate the 'Arab Spring'?
Did FCO staff in Egypt and Tunisia have the right level and mix
of skills, including linguistic skills? Was there too much focus
on contact with the previous regime rather than tracking popular,
oppositional or youth opinion? Was policy overly dominated by
considerations of regional stability and counter-terrorist co-operation?
What contingency plans were in place for a change of regime in
either country? Are there lessons to be learned in terms of intelligence
gathering and strategic planning?
- How well did the FCO perform in providing consular
assistance to British citizens at the time of the political upheavals
in Egypt and Tunisia?
- What specific assistance can the British Government
give to help Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries build the
institutions of democracy and civil society, and revive their
economies? Does the FCO have the right resources in place to deliver
its objectives in the region? What role can the BBC World Service
and the British Council play? How can the British Government best
work with allies and through international institutions to support
reform in Egypt and Tunisia?
- What are the prospects for establishing stable
multi-party democracy and a human rights culture in Egypt, Tunisia
and elsewhere?
- What will be the future role of Islamist movements
in the region and what should be the British Government's stance
towards them?
- What are the implications of the 'Arab Spring'
for Egyptian/Israeli relations and regional security?
- To what extent can Egypt and Tunisia function
as role models for the wider Arab world?
- Bearing in mind the Prime Minister's comments
in Kuwait in February 2011 about potential conflict between British
"interests" and "values", do recent events
in Egypt and Tunisia, and in the 'Arab Spring' generally, necessitate
a radical reappraisal of UK policy towards the Middle East and
North Africa?
In November 2011, once military action in Libya had
ceased, we announced that our inquiry would be extended to cover
Libya.
6. We received 33 written submissions of evidence
and took oral evidence from Intissar Kherigi, Dr Eugene Rogan,
Dr Claire Spencer, Robin Lamb, Lord Malloch-Brown, Alistair Burt
MP (the FCO Minister with responsibility for the Middle East and
North Africa), Dr Christian Turner and Jon Davies. A full
list of witnesses is on page 90. As part of the inquiry we undertook
a visit to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya at the end of February / early
March 2012, during which we met government ministers, electoral
candidates, new political parties, civil society representatives
and activists. We also held an informal meeting with Egyptian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Kamal Amr, in London in February
2012. We took the opportunity to question the Foreign Secretary
on the Arab Spring when he gave evidence on developments in UK
foreign policy in September 2011. Our report also draws on the
Defence Committee's report on the UK's military operations in
Libya.[4]
1 Foreign Secretary speech to the Times CEO Summit
Africa, 22 March 2011, via the FCO website (www.fco.gov.uk) Back
2
Prime Minister speech to the National Assembly in Kuwait, 22 February
2011, via Number 10 website (www.numberten.gov.uk) Back
3
The surname is spelled in a number of different ways. Here we
have chosen to follow the spelling used in Hansard. Other sources,
including the FCO, have used alternative spellings such as 'Qadhafi'.
Where quotations used in this report have used alternative spellings
we have allowed them to stand. Back
4
Defence Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, Operations
in Libya, HC 950 Back
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