House of Commons - Future Maritime Surveillance

Future Maritime Surveillance - Defence Committee Contents

4 Future maritime surveillance and regeneration

Rapid regeneration of a maritime patrol aircraft capability

47. We explored how quickly the MoD and the Armed Forces could regenerate a maritime patrol aircraft capability in the event of a sudden risk escalation. Nick Harvey MP, the Minister for the Armed Forces, thought that it would "require the security assessment to deteriorate very quickly" for there to be a need to consider an urgent replacement.[69] He thought it much more likely that any deterioration in the security picture would be gradual. The next opportunity for the Government to make a fundamental assessment of this would be presented by the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The MoD confirmed that were currently no plans to regenerate specific capabilities although "as with any military capability, if current assumptions about the strategic environment and threats change significantly then consideration will be given to enhancement options".[70] When we asked the Minister if the MoD were currently looking at the possible rapid regeneration of a MPA, he told us "we are not looking at that issue now because we do not perceive any urgent need to do so".[71]

48. However, even accepting that a decision is unlikely to be required before the next SDSR, we were concerned about the lack of work being undertaken on ways rapidly to regenerate this capability, and by the Minister's willingness to postpone a decision until 2015. An essential part of any regeneration of a MPA capability would be the ability of suppliers to deliver and support it, but the MoD has not discussed the regeneration of specific maritime surveillance capabilities with industry.[72] Despite this the Minister and Air Vice-Marshal Mark Green, Director and Joint Air Capability and Transformation, MoD, were confident that rapid regeneration of a MPA platform less complex than the Nimrod was achievable at a short notice. The Minister told us:

Air Vice-Marshal Green added that the ability to regenerate a MPA capability would be dependent on the risk identified and the complexity of the platform required. Something less complex than the Nimrod MRA4 could be acquired "relatively easily because they are, effectively, on-the-shelf purchasing".[74] Another alternative was leasing options, which the MoD had adopted with C-17s.[75] We pressed the Minister on whether, if it were to be decided in 2015 that this capability was urgently required, how rapidly the capability could be procured and put in place and whether it would be expensive.[76] He responded:

[...]

49. We note that the MoD asserted it has robust risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation in the maritime surveillance area. However, in practice the robustness of these procedures cannot be proven until such risks materialise and are identified and dealt with or are missed with potentially disastrous consequences. We are also less sanguine than the Minister that if an urgent need to regenerate the maritime surveillance capability arose this could be achieved quickly. We accept that regenerating the complex capabilities of the Nimrod MRA4 would be more difficult and take longer than purchasing a platform off the shelf or putting something together that could perform an urgent maritime surveillance function. However, as the MoD has admitted in evidence that it is not currently considering the rapid regeneration of any maritime patrol aircraft platform and that it is not in discussion with industry about the regeneration of specific maritime surveillance capabilities, and given the complexities and testing required of maritime patrol aircraft platforms, we require further evidence that a sufficient level of capability could be regenerated as quickly as the Minister suggests.

Tolerable risk or gamble?

50. While the MoD acknowledged that there is a maritime surveillance capability gap, it regarded it as a tolerable risk. However other witnesses considered it a gamble.[79] Rear Admiral Tony Rix (retd.), former Chief of Staff to the NATO Maritime Headquarters in Naples, told us:

Senior UK Armed Forces personnel disagreed with Rear-Admiral Rix. Air Vice-Marshal Green said "I think that the situation that we have today is a tolerable risk".[81] Rear Admiral Ian Corder, Commander Operations Maritime, MoD, added "as the person who wears that risk most of the time, I would firmly say that it is within the bounds of tolerable risk at the moment".[82]

51. General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff, thought that the risk created by the Nimrod decision was not in the gamble category and warned that it should not be allowed to become so. He told us, in November 2010, "we must work very hard to ensure that that is the case, but it is another risk that we now have to manage. [...] The professional military now need to work actively with allies to see how we mitigate that risk".[83] Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, thought that the capability gap was a continued acknowledged risk. However he asserted that Ministers and policy makers in the MoD were kept aware of the levels of risk through established risk management processes which also covered the "longer-term strategic risk".[84] Tom McKane thought that "risk management [was] something that imbues almost everything that the Department does, and so in relation to specific operations or specific activities, there will be an examination of the risks associated with that and a plan put in place to manage that, but clearly they are not risks that one would go into in public".[85]

52. It is essential that the MoD's risk management procedures are robust enough to identify and deal with potential future capability gaps. For example the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter which has the primary roles of wide area surveillance and battlespace management across land, air and maritime domains is due to be retired from service in 2016 and replaced by Project CROWSNEST hosted by the Merlin Mk 2 aircraft.[86] These procedures should also consider the opportunities to adapt existing assets to provide a maritime surveillance capability although this is not their current role. For example the Sentinel aircraft is due to be retired from service in 2015 subject to Operation HERRICK conditions but witnesses including the MoD have identified its potential to be adapted to a maritime surveillance role.[87]

53. The provision of maritime surveillance should be considered as a whole taking into account the different, competing requirements and the risks associated with gaps and non-provision in the capability. Capability and platform decisions must be coherent and informed. We are aware that the capability gaps that exist in maritime surveillance are not limited to a maritime patrol aircraft, and include, for example, the withdrawal of Sentinel and the loss of the four Broadsword-class Type 22 Frigates' information and intelligence gathering capabilities and towed array sonar. We also note that there is the potential for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King (SKASaC) helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by Project CROWSNEST operating from the Merlin Mk 2. In response to our Report, the MoD should set out how it intends to deal with the increased risk caused by these emerging capability gaps.

54. We remain concerned about the MoD's capacity to manage the risk created by the capability gap in maritime surveillance and about its ability to react to demand in the short and medium term.

Future maritime surveillance requirements

MOD CAPABILITY INVESTIGATIONS

55. We have already discussed the possibilities for filling the immediate maritime surveillance gap. In January 2011, the Ministry of Defence began a capability investigation into its long term requirements for a Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) capability. This was completed in October 2011, but the MoD has not made its findings public.[88] During 2011, the MoD also undertook similar studies into other areas relevant to maritime surveillance.[89] All of these studies would be expected to contribute to the debate on the future provision of maritime surveillance. Air Vice-Marshal Green described the WAMUS study to us:

56. We were concerned that the WAMUS study had not been undertaken as part of the work on the 2010 SDSR. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded :

57. Air Vice-Marshal Green told us that the WAMUS study had caused the MoD to conclude that in the medium term an aircraft was likely to be the solution should it be necessary to fill the gap when Nimrod MRA4 was cancelled. In the longer term, about 20 years, technology was likely to provide the opportunity for the use of unmanned systems, especially underwater.[92] The Air Vice-Marshal confirmed to us that the WAMUS study would not have been required if the Nimrod MRA4 had been retained.[93]

58. While we commend the MoD for undertaking studies that will help inform future decisions on the provision of maritime surveillance, we believe it would have been beneficial if these studies had been undertaken before or as part of the SDSR especially given that the MoD has admitted that the Nimrod MRA4 decision was primarily financially driven and in the short to medium term a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution for maritime surveillance requirements.

59. Although these studies were taking place at the same time as our inquiry into the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the National Security Strategy (NSS), the MoD did not tell us about the studies in its oral and written evidence or in the Government's response to our Report. We asked Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, and MoD officials why we had not been informed of the WAMUS study. He replied:

[...]

60. We asked the Minister and MoD witnesses whether it would not have been helpful to mention the WAMUS study when addressing our concerns about the Nimrod MRA4 decision in the Government response to our report on the SDSR and NSS. Air Vice-Marshal Green replied "Yes, I think it probably would have been helpful if we had thought more broadly about that particular topic".[96] In written evidence, following our evidence session the MoD told us:

61. Given that the MoD described the Nimrod MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the SDSR, it is unacceptable that the MoD did not think it appropriate to inform us that it was undertaking long term capability investigations into areas directly related to the UK's maritime surveillance capabilities whilst we were undertaking our inquiry into the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Our concerns were not limited to what the MoD was currently doing to mitigate the capability gap as we asked the Government to outline its plans for the regeneration of this capability. These studies would have been relevant to that. Indeed, the MoD told us in evidence that when responding to the concerns on Nimrod in our SDSR and NSS Report it would have been helpful if it had thought more broadly about that particular topic. Parliamentary scrutiny is not an optional extra. We are concerned that had parliamentary questions not revealed the existence of the Wide Area Maritime Underwater Search (WAMUS) study we could have remained in ignorance of it. We expect the MoD to be more proactive and forthcoming in its provision of information to us.

THE NEXT SDSR

62. Looking ahead to the next SDSR, expected in 2015, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, Secretary of State for Defence, told us "we will have a big decision to make about the capability gap that we have accepted on maritime patrol aircraft".[98] In its written evidence the MoD identified the maritime surveillance challenges it expected to face in the next SDSR as including:

· the identification and assessment of future risk across the Department's primary and secondary roles;[99]

· planning for an ever increasing need for timely surveillance and targeted information through technological advancement; and

· in consultation with the UK Civil Authorities, provision for the increased responsibility of the forthcoming Exclusive Economic Zone.[100]

63. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, told us there would be a maritime work stream for the next SDSR, but was uncertain whether there would be one specifically about surveillance. Air Vice-Marshal Green added:

101

64. We note the 2010 SDSR's acknowledgement of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on network-enabled warships, submarines and aircraft. The capability studies already undertaken by the MoD are a good starting point and we welcome the commitment to an ISTAR work stream for the next SDSR. However, given the Secretary of State for Defence's statement that there will be a decision to be made in the next SDSR about the capability gap on maritime patrol aircraft, we recommend that work on the next SDSR should include a specific maritime surveillance work stream, involving all those, military and non-military, who make use of these assets.

FUNDING

65. On 14 May 2012, the Secretary of State made a statement to the House of Commons on the Defence Budget and Transformation in which he asserted that he had balanced the MoD budget. He provided information on the value of the core programme, investment decisions and an unallocated contingency. He told the House:

Balancing the budget allows me to include within that £152 billion core programme a £4 billion-plus investment in intelligence, surveillance, communications and reconnaissance assets across the Cipher, Solomon, Crowsnest, Defence Core Network Services and Falcon projects; the outright purchase of three offshore patrol vessels that are currently leased; capability enhancements to the Typhoon; and a range of simulators, basing and support equipment for the new helicopters and aircraft that we are introducing.

102

66. During questioning on his statement the Secretary of State for Defence confirmed that there was no money for maritime surveillance from conventional aircraft in the equipment programme:

103

67. We pursued the implications of the Secretary of State's statement on funding for future maritime surveillance and ISTAR in general. We asked our witnesses whether commitments in Afghanistan had led to surveillance capabilities being too land-focused and whether this was reflected in the allocation of funding for surveillance capabilities. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded that:

it must be remembered that the investment in ISTAR for Afghanistan has been through NACMO [Net Additional Cost of Military Operations], so it is additional money—

[...]

104

68. As investment in ISTAR for Afghanistan has been funded by the Treasury through NACMO, this would cease when combat operations in Afghanistan ended at the end of 2014. We were concerned about the impact on funding for ISTAR and the provision of these capabilities. Air Vice-Marshal Green confirmed that, unless there was another conflict, the MoD was assuming that the investment would be withdrawn and were considering which ISTAR platforms to bring into the MoD's core equipment programme. He told us:

105

69. We were concerned that this would mean that the funding would be taken from elsewhere in the core equipment programme or that the MoD was already using the unallocated contingency funding announced in the Secretary of State's statement. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded:

106

70. We explored the criteria for spending the unallocated £8 billion included in the Secretary of State's announcement. The MoD told us that its intention was to look at areas waiting to be incorporated into the core programme and the available resources and to use a single prioritisation methodology. Funding would be assigned quarterly. The first decision point for investment decisions expected in July 2012, but would only include areas where a decision was required to be made. If there was no requirement to make a decision or more information was required the matter would be reconsidered three months later. Money would only be committed when it was necessary and in accordance with military advice and if it could be demonstrated "it could be afforded—both the capital purchase and the support—over the 10 years of the programme".[107]

71. We were keen to establish what the military advice was in relation to ISTAR. Air Vice-Marshal Green told us "there is a planning assumption at the moment that we will allocate some of that unallocated provision, which is sufficiently high up the priority order as we sit here today, to ISTAR capability".[108] However the MoD were unable to tell us which of the ISTAR capabilities in Afghanistan it would ideally wish to bring into the core programme and how much this would cost. It added that "it is too early to define the cost of the capabilities as this is an ongoing activity as part of Annual Budget Cycle 13".[109]

72. We are encouraged by the rigour expected to be applied to the spending of the £8 billion unallocated reserve that was announced by the Secretary of State on 14 May 2012. However, we are disappointed by the MoD's assertion that there is no requirement to buy maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) at present and that it is not currently funded in the programme. We are concerned that the MoD has not decided whether to fill the capability gap especially as the Chief of the Defence Staff has stated it was a capability that MoD wanted to have and it is still its view that a MPA is the solution for the next 20 years.

73. We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular ISTAR provided under Urgent Operational Requirements, and how this will be incorporated into the core programme. We recommend that the MoD consider this matter urgently and, in response to our Report, provide details of the investment decisions on the unallocated £8 billion announced by the Secretary of State for Defence that were due to be made in July.

Possible options for future maritime surveillance

74. It is important to examine the options offered by the advance of technology, such as unmanned systems, for providing a comprehensive range of maritime surveillance capabilities in the future. The MoD's view is that in the longer term technology would offer other solutions to the provision of maritime surveillance.[110]

75. In her written evidence, Dr Sue Robertson, a former MoD consultant in this area, considered possible ways of providing a UK maritime patrol capability:

· Continued use of Merlin Helicopters and Type 23 Frigates

· Procurement of a new fleet of large manned [maritime patrol] aircraft, such as P-8 or CN-235

· Purchase of second-hand P-3 [aircraft] and upgrading them to an acceptable standard

· Procurement of smaller dedicated MPA aircraft that have been derived from commercial airframes such as DASH-8 or Gulfstream

· Use of [unmanned aerial vehicles] UAVs, such as Heron or Global Hawk

· The installation of sensors on other aircraft such as A400 and A330 so that maritime reconnaissance can be carried out as a secondary role

· Use of lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles

· Satellite Surveillance

· Use of alternative sources of information such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) data received from ships coupled with data from land-based electronic surveillance systems

· Collaborative programmes with allies to make use of their platforms in our territorial waters.[111]

76. Dr Robertson went on to give a comparative analysis of the ability of each of these to carry out tasks equivalent to those of a maritime patrol aircraft capable of wide area surveillance.[112]
Table 1

Asset

Task
Merlin New Long-
range MPA
Upgraded P-3 New Short-range MPA UAV A400
/A330
LTA Satellite

Submarine Detection Yes Yes Yes possibly No No No No

Shipping Surveillance Limited Sensors Yes Yes Limited Range Limited Sensors Yes Yes Yes

Fleet Protection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

ISTAR No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

ELINT data gathering No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Counter-terrorism / Border Protection No Yes Yes Yes No Yes? No No

Weapons deployment Yes Yes Yes No No Yes? No No

Search & Rescue Limited Range Yes Yes Limited Range No Search only No No

Emergency Comms No Yes Yes No Possible Yes No No

Overseas Maritime Patrol No Yes Yes No No No No No

Counter-pirate operations No Yes Yes No No No No No

Protection of Trident Submarines Limited Range Yes Yes Limited Range Yes No No No

77. We asked Air Vice-Marshal Green whether purchasing alternative maritime patrol aircraft such as P8s, CN-235s or second hand P-3s and upgrading them to the required standard was being considered:

113

78. We asked the Minister whether it was important, and if so how much so, for maritime surveillance assets to also have an attack prosecution capability, he told us:

114

79. We note that the Minister does not think it is an essential prerequisite for maritime surveillance and the attack prosecution capability to be delivered by the same asset. In response to our Report the MoD should set out the supporting evidence and likely costs of this split assets approach.

SEEDCORN INITIATIVE

80. As part of our inquiry we looked at the measures the MoD had in place to ensure UK Armed Forces personnel maintained the necessary skills to provide maritime surveillance capabilities. The MoD described to us the individual and collective training that was undertaken. In an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol aircraft and the skills of personnel, the MoD has also implemented the Seedcorn initiative, sending RAF personnel to train with allied Air Forces to maintain and develop their skills. Similar initiatives were in place for the Royal Navy.[115]

81. Nick Harvey MP, Minister for the Armed Forces, explained that the Seedcorn initiative was "currently planned out to 2019, but it doesn't necessarily follow that it will end in 2019. That is just as far ahead as we have planned".[116] We pressed the Minister on whether the initiative would be extended further than 2019. He responded:

117

When we asked the Minister if it would be sustainable until then, he responded "Yes".[118]

82. When we pressed our MoD witnesses on whether realistically the Seedcorn initiative would have to continue for a long period beyond 2020. Air Vice-Marshal Green responded:

119

The Minister added "that as well as the flying skills, what are being sustained are the analytical skills and the intellectual firepower to make use of the sort of information that these operations elicit".[120]

83. We support the principle of the MoD's Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain both the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime patrol aircraft and the skills of its crews. This is an important initiative given the MoD's statement that in the medium term another model of maritime patrol aircraft will be required to fill the capability gap left by the Nimrod MRA4. However, we doubt that the Seedcorn initiative is sustainable as far as 2019, let alone to 2030, given the continued uncertainty over the long term plans for a fixed-wing MPA. The MoD should explain what work it has done to identify the point at which this initiative will no longer be effective in sustaining the ability to regenerate the capability. We recommend that the MoD undertake a lessons learned exercise for sustaining the ability to regenerate other capabilities in the future.

Unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles and satellites

84. The use of unmanned systems, lighter-than-air vehicles (LTA) and satellite technology systems has been proposed as alternative or complementary platforms to manned maritime patrol aircraft. In respect of its current use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), space technology and other technology assets for maritime surveillance, the MoD told us that the UK has no unmanned aircraft system employed specifically for maritime surveillance. However it did use US satellite products and some commercial satellite services.[121] In respect of the future use of such assets for maritime surveillance the MoD added:

122

The MoD is also seeking to improve its unmanned maritime vehicle capability to assist in anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering and the provision of surveillance. DSTL is leading on the development of this programme.[123]

85. Northrop Grumman told us that UAVs played an important role in maritime surveillance and ISTAR in the US and Europe, offering an essential persistent capability for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. UAVs had transformed operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and future conflicts would see their roles expanded dramatically.[124] Northrop Grumman added:

125

86. Northrop Grumman also thought that lighter-than-air (LTA) vehicles [balloons and airships] would "bring a revolutionary capability to persistent ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] with the capability to be truly multi-mission with the inherent flexible, reconfigurable mission payloads".[126] LTAs are able to stay airborne for extended periods and have very low fuel consumption. They can provide multi-intelligence capabilities and have lower total ownership costs than traditional ISR systems. Northrop Grumman added "in addition to its persistent ISR, the LTA system can provide overland persistent ISR and also effectively support the UK's maritime operational needs with offshore surveillance or fleet support as an airborne communications node along with the traditional fleet mission needs".[127]

87. However we also heard concerns about the use of UAVs for maritime surveillance. In his written evidence Dr Willett doubted the extent to which UAVs or commercial manned aircraft could provide the aerial capability for the UK's maritime surveillance needs:

128

In his written evidence, Air Vice-Marshal Alan Roberts (retd.) was also sceptical of UAVs as a standalone alternative to a maritime patrol aircraft because of technical and cost considerations.[129]

88. On the use of space and other technology, Squadron Leader Forbes (retd.), also had concerns:

130

Rear Admiral Tony Rix (retd.), former Chief of Staff to the NATO Maritime Headquarters in Naples, was also cautious regarding the use of satellites: "the trouble with the satellite is that it cannot respond—it is less responsive than other surveillance assets—but it is all part of the mix".[131] Dr Willett added:

132

89. Air Vice-Marshal Green saw unmanned vehicles as possible long term alternatives but said a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution in the medium term:

133

90. We welcome the Minister's statement that the MoD intends to explore fully all options and alternatives for providing maritime surveillance. We agree that in the longer term unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and lighter-than-air vehicles may well be a way forward, but also note the reported concerns regarding the limitations of using satellite technology. There are several obstacles to overcome and the MoD should keep us informed of progress on this.

91. The 2010 SDSR and subsequent related decisions may affect the possibility of using UAVs from aircraft carriers. In the 2010 SDSR, the Government announced that one of the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers would be fitted with catapults and arrestor gear ('cats and traps') to enable it to operate the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.[134] On 10 May 2012, the Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons that the Government had decided not to proceed with this decision, instead reverting to the pre-SDSR decision to purchase the STOVL (short take off and vertical landing) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.[135] This decision may affect the practicability of the use of UAVs.

92. Admiral Rix thought that in future UAVs might be flown from aircraft carriers in a maritime surveillance role. He was unsure about the timescale for delivering this capability but thought that unmanned aerial vehicles from aircraft carriers could provide a level of wide area surveillance and assistance at the operational and tactical level.[136] Dr Willett expressed concern that although there were a number of UAV programmes being considered, not many operated in a STOVL way which could have implications for the use of UAVs from aircraft carriers.[137]

93. We asked the Minister and MoD officials what the implications of the carrier decision were for the use of UAVs in a maritime surveillance role, particularly given the concerns we had heard about the limited number of UAVs that could operate in a STOVL way. The Minister told us that it should not be difficult to fly surveillance UAVs off aircraft carriers without cats and traps, but would be more difficult if the UAVs carried weapons.[138] Air Vice-Marshal Green added that a demonstration programme was being looked at which involved flying a UAV off the back of a frigate.[139] The Minister told us that while there was a good chance that the new aircraft carriers would have a maritime surveillance capability this would be unlikely to happen until the next decade.[140] Following our evidence session, the MoD told us in supplementary written evidence that there was virtually no difference in the surveillance capability of the Joint Combat Aircraft STOVL variant and the carrier version and they could be employed with similar mission responsibilities.[141]

94. We note the MoD's confirmation that the requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into account prior to the decision to revert to a STOVL system on the new carriers and that the capability to undertake maritime surveillance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from carriers would not be affected by this decision. We also note the concerns expressed to us on the limited number of UAVs that can operate in a STOVL manner and expect the MoD to keep this under review particularly if it becomes a requirement for future carrier launched UAVs undertaking maritime surveillance to have a weapons capability. We expect the MoD to keep us informed on progress of the possible use of carrier based UAVs for maritime surveillance.

Cooperation with allies

95. We explored current and future collaboration with allies on maritime surveillance, particularly through NATO. The MoD emphasised that following the SDSR "strengthening our key defence alliances and partnerships has been critical in managing these changes" and also described current maritime surveillance initiatives under the 2010 UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty, the NATO Naval Armaments Working Group and the European Defence Agency.[142] The MoD said that the withdrawal of Nimrod had increased to a limited extent the department's reliance on other nations but there were "no formal, agreed criteria" for using allies' maritime surveillance capabilities.[143] The MoD added:

for training, allies will bid into the planning of an exercise in order that surveillance capabilities from that nation can be considered and used. There are several international agreements that allow Allies to contribute directly to UK surveillance tasks in support of deterrent protection and intelligence gathering.

144

96. Allies had never refused the use of their assets, but they were not always available.[145] Admiral Rix thought it was not desirable to rely on allies, either because they might have other priorities or for security reasons.[146] However the Minister did not think maritime surveillance had to be a sovereign capability:

There is a great deal we can do in cooperation with our allies and partners. There is a great deal that we do do in the way of cooperation and information sharing, and there are various new initiatives being undertaken in NATO and in the EU that would assist international cooperation in this field in the future. I would certainly accept that there will be elements that we want to keep sovereign, but the proposition that the whole piece must, of necessity, be sovereign is not an analysis I would share.

[...]

147

However the Minister did confirm to us that no new arrangements or additional agreements had been established to cover the capability gap following the Nimrod MRA4 decision.[148]

NATO SMART DEFENCE INITIATIVES

97. We also explored the NATO Smart Defence Initiatives in respect of maritime surveillance. The MoD told us that there were two initiatives:

· A Tier One proposal: led by the Germans to pool and share MPA assets that could be offset or recompensed by the UK providing C130, C17 and tanker hours. The UK is not interested in this proposal because it does not have MPA assets to pool; the nations involved (Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) that are able to provide MPA will offer aging aircraft such as the P3 Orion that does not have the requisite level of avionics or reliability to support our Deterrent and would not offer value for money in exchange for the pooling of higher grade UK capabilities. Additionally there are concerns over sovereignty (related to the Deterrent in particular) and guaranteed assurance.

· A Tier Two proposal: The NATO Naval Armaments Group (NNAG) investigation, led by the Canadians, to provide a long term solution by means of MPA procurement; this would provide a NATO capability akin to the AWACS model. The UK supports this proposal because it overcomes the sovereignty and assurance issues whilst providing a multi-national procurement option based on economy of scale.[149]

98. When we asked our MoD witnesses what was the projected timescale for the Tier Two proposal, Tom McKane, Director General for Security Policy, MoD, told us it was a longer term project:

150

99. We note the MoD's acceptance that since the SDSR the Department's reliance on allies to provide maritime surveillance has increased, though because of the range of capabilities and sources of information still available to the Department it had not done so markedly, and that the withdrawal of Nimrod had required greater reliance on other nations to provide MPA cover. We are concerned that the Government has not thought it necessary to try to secure any additional agreements to ensure the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities. Part of the MoD's examination of future maritime surveillance requirements should include an examination of those areas where a sovereign capability would be desirable and this should feed into the Department's consideration of a new MPA and the investigation of other options such as UAVs. We support the UK's participation in the NATO Tier Two proposal for maritime surveillance and expect to be regularly updated on its progress.

69 Q 205 Back

70 Ev 44 Back

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72 Ev 45 Back

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76 Central to the regeneration of this capability will be the maintenance and availability of skilled personnel. The MoD has programmes, such as the Seedcorn initiative, in place for this purpose (see paras 80-83 below). Back

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79 For example see Ev w 16 [Air Vice-Marshal Roberts] and Ev w24 [Scottish National Party]. Back

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