Conclusions and recommendations
Strategy and threats
1. The UK has a strategic
requirement for maritime surveillance as an important enabler
to operations to protect UK home waters and UK global interests
and commitments in both the military and non-military arenas.
This requirement has developed to meet the evolution of greater
non-military threats such as counter-terrorism, border control
and non-state threats. This evolution is illustrated by events
such as the terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26 November 2008 which
was launched from the sea. We note witnesses' suggestions that
the difficulty of restricting movements at sea had not gone unnoticed
by the UK's potential enemies. The Government must ensure that
the requirement for maritime surveillance is an integral part
of the assessment of progress on the National Security Tasks in
the National Security Strategy and the Military Tasks in the Strategic
Defence and Security Review. This continuous assessment is essential
as UK Armed Forces evolve towards Future Force 2020. (Paragraph
19)
2. We note that due to the broadness of the
areas covered by maritime surveillance there is currently no one
individual within the MoD who is responsible for this capability.
We feel that this is a weakness which should be rectified. The
new Joint Forces Command (JFC) has been established to strengthen
the focus on joint enablers and on joint warfare development with
a key role of being responsible for Information, Surveillance,
Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and for Command,
Control, Communications and Computers which are key elements of
maritime surveillance. The JFC should play an important role in
coordinating, strengthening and delivering maritime surveillance
capabilities. We welcome the intent of this improved focus that
the JFC is intended to bring, but will seek assurance as the JFC
develops that it is delivering the necessary coordinated output
and that appropriate safeguards are in place. In response to our
Report, the MoD should set out how it will assess the progress
of the JFC in delivering the tasks set for it, particularly in
terms of maritime surveillance. (Paragraph 21)
Capability gaps
3. The MoD has stated that it regrets cancelling
the Nimrod MRA4 programme and that in an ideal world it would
have preferred to acquire a maritime patrol aircraft. We repeat
the serious concerns raised in our Report on the National Security
Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
regarding the capability gaps that the Nimrod MRA4 decision has
created in the UK's ability to undertake the military tasks envisaged
in the SDSR and remain unconvinced that UK Armed Forces can manage
this capability gap within existing resources. The MoD told us
that its intention was to mitigate the impact of the Nimrod cancellation
by the use of other military assets on a case by case basis, but
acknowledged that there was currently no single asset or collection
of assets that offset the resulting capability gap. We agree with
the National Audit Office's (NAO) assessment that using other
existing assets would provide a reduced capability and diverting
resources from other tasks would have wider implications for defence.
Indeed in the MoD's own assessment in the NAO Report there would
be significant shortfalls without significant investment, and
the coordination of such assets at the right place and the right
time might prove very risky. (Paragraph 31)
4. We note that
no option appears to have been considered for either a sponsored
or a volunteer reserve element within the crews for the
new commercial arrangement [for search and rescue provision],
despite the fact, that at least initially, it is widely expected
that most of the pilots will be ex-Armed Forces. (Paragraph 36)
5. We note the impact of the Nimrod MRA4 decision
on the UK search and rescue capability. While we accept that the
UK remains committed to the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue and that no bilateral arrangements are required,
we are surprised that the Government has not discussed the impact
of the Nimrod MRA4 decision with European neighbours. It would
seem prudent to do so to ensure that cooperation is maximised.
(Paragraph 37)
6. We will monitor the planned changes in
the provision of UK search and rescue to a new civilian-led capability
and expect Ministers to play a central role in its delivery, settling
disputes and ensuring coordination between departments. The Government
should guard against the loss of the valuable experience that
exists within the Armed Forces and we request that the Government
detail the measures it has taken to prevent this. We believe that
this should include considering options for retaining expertise
through some form of reserve service for the pilots employed.
Another concern is the impact on the provision of search and rescue
for the Falkland Islands. We may wish to return to this in future
years. (Paragraph 38)
7. We repeat the concerns expressed in our
Report on Operations in Libya regarding the Royal Navy's ability
to continue to deliver the required high levels of standing maritime
commitments with fewer platforms. It is likely that risk taking
will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented
and the smaller number of available assets is stretched more thinly.
We note that the Minister asserted that the Royal Navy was not
abandoning any of its tasks. However he also accepted that the
Navy is undergoing a "lean period", being heavily used
and accepting a degree of risk. Maritime surveillance assets are
an essential component of maritime security and these additional
requirements such as Libya and the Olympics pose a potential risk
to maritime security due to this overstretch and possible competing
demands for those assets. This is illustrated by the UK not contributing
any vessels this year to the international counter-piracy missions
and the necessity to use assets and personnel between operations
in the Gulf or Afghanistan for the London Olympics. (Paragraph
46)
Future maritime surveillance and regeneration
8. We note that the MoD asserted it has robust
risk assessment and management procedures in place to spot any
risk escalation in the maritime surveillance area. However, in
practice the robustness of these procedures cannot be proven until
such risks materialise and are identified and dealt with or are
missed with potentially disastrous consequences. We are also less
sanguine than the Minister that if an urgent need to regenerate
the maritime surveillance capability arose this could be achieved
quickly. We accept that regenerating the complex capabilities
of the Nimrod MRA4 would be more difficult and take longer than
purchasing a platform off the shelf or putting something together
that could perform an urgent maritime surveillance function. However,
as the MoD has admitted in evidence that it is not currently considering
the rapid regeneration of any maritime patrol aircraft platform
and that it is not in discussion with industry about the regeneration
of specific maritime surveillance capabilities, and given the
complexities and testing required of maritime patrol aircraft
platforms, we require further evidence that a sufficient level
of capability could be regenerated as quickly as the Minister
suggests. (Paragraph 49)
9. The provision of maritime surveillance
should be considered as a whole taking into account the different,
competing requirements and the risks associated with gaps and
non-provision in the capability. Capability and platform decisions
must be coherent and informed. We are aware that the capability
gaps that exist in maritime surveillance are not limited to a
maritime patrol aircraft, and include, for example, the withdrawal
of Sentinel and the loss of the four Broadsword-class Type 22
Frigates' information and intelligence gathering capabilities
and towed array sonar. We also note that there is the potential
for other capability gaps to occur, such as when the Sea King
(SKASaC) helicopter is withdrawn in 2016 to be replaced by Project
CROWSNEST operating from the Merlin Mk 2. In response to our Report,
the MoD should set out how it intends to deal with the increased
risk caused by these emerging capability gaps. (Paragraph 53)
10. We remain concerned
about the MoD's capacity to manage the risk created by the capability
gap in maritime surveillance and about its ability to react to
demand in the short and medium term. (Paragraph 54)
11. While we commend the MoD for undertaking
studies that will help inform future decisions on the provision
of maritime surveillance, we believe it would have been beneficial
if these studies had been undertaken before or as part of the
SDSR especially given that the MoD has admitted that the Nimrod
MRA4 decision was primarily financially driven and in the short
to medium term a maritime patrol aircraft would be the solution
for maritime surveillance requirements. (Paragraph 58)
12. Given that the MoD described the Nimrod
MRA4 decision as the most difficult in the SDSR, it is unacceptable
that the MoD did not think it appropriate to inform us that it
was undertaking long term capability investigations into areas
directly related to the UK's maritime surveillance capabilities
whilst we were undertaking our inquiry into the National Security
Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Our concerns
were not limited to what the MoD was currently doing to mitigate
the capability gap as we asked the Government to outline its plans
for the regeneration of this capability. These studies would have
been relevant to that. Indeed, the MoD told us in evidence that
when responding to the concerns on Nimrod in our SDSR and NSS
Report it would have been helpful if it had thought more broadly
about that particular topic. Parliamentary scrutiny is not an
optional extra. We are concerned that had parliamentary questions
not revealed the existence of the Wide Area Maritime Underwater
Search (WAMUS) study we could have remained in ignorance of it.
We expect the MoD to be more proactive and forthcoming in its
provision of information to us. (Paragraph 61)
13. We note the 2010 SDSR's acknowledgement
of the importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence,
Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
and that UK maritime capabilities will include ISTAR based on
network-enabled warships, submarines and aircraft. The capability
studies already undertaken by the MoD are a good starting point
and we welcome the commitment to an ISTAR work stream for the
next SDSR. However, given the Secretary of State for Defence's
statement that there will be a decision to be made in the next
SDSR about the capability gap in maritime patrol aircraft, we
recommend that work on the next SDSR should include a specific
maritime surveillance work stream, involving all those, military
and non-military, who make use of these assets. (Paragraph 64)
14. We are encouraged by the rigour expected
to be applied to the spending of the £8 billion unallocated
reserve that was announced by the Secretary of State on 14 May
2012. However, we are disappointed by the MoD's assertion that
there is no requirement to buy maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
at present and that it is not currently funded in the programme.
We are concerned that the MoD has not decided whether to fill
the capability gap especially as the Chief of the Defence Staff
has stated it was a capability that MoD wanted to have and it
is still its view that a MPA is the solution for the next 20 years.
(Paragraph 72)
15. We are worried about how ISTAR capabilities
will be funded after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, in particular
ISTAR provided under Urgent Operational Requirements, and how
this will be incorporated into the core programme. We recommend
that the MoD consider this matter urgently and, in response to
our Report, provide details of the investment decisions on the
unallocated £8 billion announced by the Secretary of State
for Defence that were due to be made in July. (Paragraph 73)
16. We note that the Minister does not think
it is an essential prerequisite for maritime surveillance and
the attack prosecution capability to be delivered by the same
asset. In response to our Report the MoD should set out the supporting
evidence and likely costs of this split assets approach. (Paragraph
79)
17. We support the principle of the MoD's
Seedcorn initiative as an attempt to maintain the ability to sustain
both the capability to operate high level fixed-winged maritime
patrol aircraft and the skills of its crews. This is an important
initiative given the MoD's statement that in the medium term another
model of maritime patrol aircraft will be required to fill the
capability gap left by the Nimrod MRA4. However, we doubt that
the Seedcorn initiative is sustainable as far as 2019, let alone
to 2030, given the continued uncertainty over the long term plans
for a fixed-wing MPA. The MoD should explain what work it has
done to identify the point at which this initiative will no longer
be effective in sustaining the ability to regenerate the capability.
We recommend that the MoD undertake a lessons learned exercise
for sustaining the ability to regenerate other capabilities in
the future. (Paragraph 83)
18. We welcome the Minister's statement that
the MoD intends to explore fully all options and alternatives
for providing maritime surveillance. We agree that in the longer
term unmanned systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and lighter-than-air
vehicles may well be a way forward, but also note the reported
concerns regarding the limitations of using satellite technology.
There are several obstacles to overcome and the MoD should keep
us informed of progress on this. (Paragraph 90)
19. We note the MoD's confirmation that the
requirements for unmanned aerial systems were taken into account
prior to the decision to revert to a STOVL system on the new carriers
and that the capability to undertake maritime surveillance using
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from carriers would not
be affected by this decision. We also note the concerns expressed
to us on the limited number of UAVs that can operate in a STOVL
manner and expect the MoD to keep this under review particularly
if it becomes a requirement for future carrier launched UAVs undertaking
maritime surveillance to have a weapons capability. We expect
the MoD to keep us informed on progress of the possible use of
carrier based UAVs for maritime surveillance. (Paragraph 94)
20. We note the MoD's acceptance that since
the SDSR the Department's reliance on allies to provide maritime
surveillance has increased, though because of the range of capabilities
and sources of information still available to the Department it
had not done so markedly, and that the withdrawal of Nimrod had
required greater reliance on other nations to provide maritime
patrol aircraft (MPA) cover. We are concerned that the Government
has not thought it necessary to try to secure any additional agreements
to ensure the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities.
Part of the MoD's examination of future maritime surveillance
requirements should include an examination of those areas where
a sovereign capability would be desirable and this should feed
into the Department's consideration of a new MPA and the investigation
of other options such as UAVs. We support the UK's participation
in the NATO Tier Two proposal for maritime surveillance and expect
to be regularly updated on its progress. (Paragraph 99)
Cross-Government cooperation
21. We commend the Government for the establishment
of the Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG) and the National
Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) which have improved cross-government
cooperation on maritime surveillance issues. The MSOG's work on
the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security is
an important piece of work that should be prioritised across Government.
In response to our Report the Government should provide us with
an update on this work and its planned timetable for it being
brought to a conclusion. It must not become a stop-start endeavour.
We endorse the work of NMIC as a valuable element in enhancing
the national security of the UK. We will take a close interest
in its work and how it develops in the future. We are not currently
persuaded by the suggestion that NMIC could evolve to become a
decision making centre. This would represent a considerable change
in the way Government undertakes maritime security and safety
operations particularly at a time of major change in the defence
arena. (Paragraph 115)
22. We believe that there is room for further
improvement in cross-government cooperation in maritime matters.
We are not convinced that an "informal group of Ministers"
is the appropriate forum for taking forward the debate on maritime
surveillance issues. Although decisions may ultimately be made
in Cabinet or the National Security Council, we recommend that
there should be a greater level of ministerial involvement in
maritime surveillance as an issue particularly given the number
of cross-government interests involved and as a way of arbitrating
disputes between departments and ensuring that the differing interests
are focusing on the right areas at the appropriate time. In response
to our Report the Government should also provide us with an update
on progress on the Maritime Security Oversight Group's work towards
a single air surveillance contract. This should include the alternative
options that the Government is considering as a potential model
for the UK in this area. (Paragraph 116)
Conclusions
23. We agree with our witnesses that there
is a risk associated with the capability gap in maritime surveillance.
We acknowledge that the Government accept this and we welcome
the work being undertaken to investigate how to mitigate the risks
inherent in the gap and ensure the longer term provision of maritime
surveillance. The MoD asserts that it has robust risk assessment
and management procedures in place to spot any risk escalation
in the maritime surveillance arena, but we remain unconvinced
it has the capacity to respond to any sudden escalation in that
risk. Furthermore we believe the risk is likely to worsen in the
medium term as further maritime surveillance capabilities are
withdrawn or not yet filled. The UK's maritime flank is likely
to be increasingly exposed: this risk must be kept under close
and continuous review, and we will continue to take a close interest
in the MoD's work in this area. (Paragraph 117)
24. The MoD has acknowledged that there is
a strategic and national security requirement for maritime surveillance.
We are concerned that the MoD is sending mixed messages in respect
of the need for a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). On one hand
it says that there is no requirement for such an aircraft and
that it is not funded or in the programme but on the other hand
it acknowledges that its absence is a risk and something may need
to be done. The MoD must explain why it is satisfactory to wait
until 2015 or beyond before deciding how to close the capability
gap in maritime surveillance particularly as the MoD acknowledge
that a MPA is the solution in the short to medium term. We commend
the work that the MoD is undertaking to explore the wide range
of possibilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, lighter-than-air
vehicles and space technology, for the future long-term provision
of maritime surveillance capabilities. This work must not be allowed
to lose momentum, particularly as no one individual is responsible
for maritime surveillance in the MoD. (Paragraph 118)
25. There is a wide demand across Government
departments and agencies for maritime surveillance capabilities.
The establishment of the Maritime Security Oversight Group and
the National Maritime Information Centre are welcome first steps
towards a more strategic and coordinated output and as a way of
mitigating some of the capability gaps. The challenge is to develop
these further and we are keen to see a more prominent ministerial
role particularly given the number of cross-government interests
involved and as a way of arbitrating disputes between departments
and ensuring that the differing interests are focusing on the
right areas at the appropriate time. (Paragraph 119)
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