Government response
Introduction
Recommendation 1. We welcome the Minister's decision
to extend the consultation on the modernisation of the Coastguard
until after this Committee has reported. It is encouraging that
the Department for Transport recognises that proper parliamentary
scrutiny can improve the quality of ministerial decision-making.
For something as important as the reorganisation of the Coastguard—where
lives are potentially at risk—it is imperative that any
proposals are thoroughly scrutinised before implementation. (Paragraph
4)
DfT Response: The Government,
the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency
(MCA) have been fully committed to an open consultation process
and have welcomed the opportunity to listen to the views of the
public, the maritime community and staff on this important matter.
The Government has also welcomed the attention paid to these
issues by the Transport Select Committee and purposely awaited
its formal report before making decisions about the next stage
in the modernisation programme.
Recommendation 2. We were extremely disappointed
that the Minister invoked rules which normally relate to senior
civil servants to stop us from taking oral evidence from some
of the serving and volunteer coastguards who had sent us written
evidence. Regular coastguards have unique operational expertise
and we wanted to hear their views on the record. The Minister's
action was justified on the basis that "a formal public hearing,
in the full glare of the media spotlight, risks encouraging individuals
to express personal views in a way that may be at odds with their
personal obligations under their terms and conditions of employment".
In our view, the Minister should have shown more faith in the
professionalism of the coastguards and stuck by his original commitment
to the House to let them give evidence to the Committee. (Paragraph
7)
DfT Response: The Government
believes that Ministers in the Department for Transport acted
properly to protect junior civil servants in line with established
Parliamentary protocol. Ministers consistently encouraged operational
coastguards to share their views about the proposals for modernising
Her Majesty's Coastguard with the Transport Select Committee,
and the Committee consequently received written views. But the
submission of written material is very different to junior civil
servants appearing formally as witnesses before a Parliamentary
Select Committee, where their role is to speak on behalf of the
Government and their Ministers. That is a role properly reserved
for Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Chief Executives and other
senior civil servants. However, in line with the arrangements
made for all Parliamentarians during the consultation process,
the Committee was given full and unhindered access to coastguards
at any centre they asked to visit; the Committee visited Falmouth,
Clyde and Stornoway.
The Coastguard
THE CONSULTATION PROCESS
Recommendation 3. We recommend that any revised
proposals on the future of the Coastguard should be subject to
a further short period of consultation. Decisions with such significant
implications for maritime safety should not be made in haste.
We do not consider this decision to be sufficiently time-critical
to prevent further consultation on what we expect to be substantially
revised proposals from those initially put forward. (Paragraph
15)
DfT Response: The Government
announced adjustments to its proposals on coastguard modernisation
on 14 July 2011 and a second round of consultation on the changes
will run to Thursday 6 October 2011.
Recommendation 4. We have been impressed with
the quality and comprehensiveness of the alternative proposals
put forward by coastguards across the country. The willingness
of coastguards to engage thoughtfully and constructively with
both the consultation process and our inquiry is welcomed. We
expect the Government to demonstrate that the alternative proposals
put forward by coastguards have been properly considered when
revising its own plans for the future of the Coastguard. (Paragraph
16)
DfT Response: The Government
has also welcomed the input of alternative proposals into the
first round of consultation and was encouraged by the underlying
acceptance for the need for modernisation. All consultation responses,
including those alternative proposals, were reviewed by a team
of operational coastguards independent of those who put together
the proposals of 16 December 2010. The details of the 27 sets
of alternative proposals were included as an annex to the Review
Team's Report, published alongside the second consultation document
of 14 July 2011.
The main elements of those proposals were:
- a reduced number of Rescue
Co-ordination Centres (retaining between 6 and 15 centres);
- a geographic spread of stations to cover each
devolved administration, minimise staff relocation, and maintain
local knowledge;
- 24/7 operations throughout, therefore retaining
more staff;
- support for investment in an upgraded communications
network to improve national and territorial resilience;
- limited support for the two Maritime Operations
Centre (MOC) concept with concern over the lack of details about
the operation of the MOCs and their relationship with other centres;
and
- limited support for the proposed changes to the
Coastguard Rescue Service (CRS) and its revised management; also
uncertainty around its operational interface with MOCs and sub-centres.
What was also clear however was that the status quo
was not an option. With the contributions made in consultation
in mind, the Government's conclusions on revised plans for a modernised
Coastguard announced on 14 July 2011 are based on a single MOC
and retaining 24 hour operations in a greater number of sub-centres,
preserving local knowledge by retaining one station in each existing
operating pair. The consultation document on the changes to the
previous proposals also provides a description of the underlying
national infrastructure and how this will give greater technical
resilience. Supporting documents explaining how the new concept
of operation will work, including arrangements for the CRS, are
available on the MCA website. These explain how the enhanced availability
of full time officers (rising from 80 to 105) supporting the CRS
volunteers during operations and for leadership and advice during
routine activities, offers additional support for the volunteers
in their operational role, which remains unaltered.
Recommendation 5. By failing to involve serving
coastguard officers, unions, volunteers, stakeholders or the devolved
administrations in the drafting of the current proposals for the
future of the Coastguard, and by failing to publish a risk assessment
of the current plans or an impact assessment of the previous round
of closures until prompted, the MCA management has badly miscalculated.
It has mishandled the consultation and made it appear opaque rather
than clear and open-minded. It has appeared arrogant, and reluctant
to open itself to proper scrutiny in the process. The atmosphere
of disquiet and suspicion generated by this consultation process
is of the MCA's own making. (Paragraph 19)
Recommendation 6. The strength of opposition against
the proposals we have encountered is such that, if, as the Minister
has said, this is a genuine consultation, the proposals cannot
be given approval in their current form. Decisions on the future
of the Coastguard must acknowledge and draw on the wealth of expertise
of frontline officers as well as others whose contributions could
and should have strengthened the original consultation document.
(Paragraph 20)
DfT Response: The proposals
set out in December 2010 evolved from detailed discussions within
the MCA over a period of at least three years. Discussions included
nine meetings between management and the PCS Trade Union as part
of an effort to resolve the ongoing industrial dispute with the
coastguard staff. The discussions were built upon concepts first
discussed with staff at MCA Staff Conferences in October 2007
and October 2008, which were attended by staff from around the
MCA including many serving frontline coastguards. The concepts,
including the development of a nationally resilient MOC, supported
by a network of interlinked sub-centres, and the proactive monitoring
of the seas around the UK, and equalising the distribution of
work between centres, were further explored and tested during
working group meetings throughout 2009 and into 2010 involving
front line staff and PCS officials with coastguard experience.
This effort culminated in the December 2010 proposals which would
have included delivering better pay and progression for existing
coastguards. Those proposals and the further adjustments announced
on 14 July 2011 benefited from the input of staff with a wealth
of operational experience over many years, from the alternative
proposals put forward by staff in the first consultation and from
the engagement through visits and meetings to MRCCs and with MPs
by Ministers and senior MCA staff.
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE IN COASTGUARD STATIONS
Recommendation 7. A geographic information system
available to all watch-keepers across the UK network would be
desirable, but we are not convinced that a database could replace
the local knowledge of those coastguards who live and work in
the communities in which they serve. The variety of place names,
colloquialisms and local anomalies of the UK coast appear to us
well nigh impossible to collate. We have serious concerns that
insufficient local knowledge held by coastguards based in an MOC,
perhaps hundreds of miles from an incident, will, in some cases,
lead to the loss of crucial seconds and minutes during a rescue
attempt. (Paragraph 25)
Recommendation 8. It is clear from our inquiry
that 'local knowledge' has a much broader meaning than simply
possessing knowledge of local coastlines, topography and geographical
features. It also encompasses a Maritime Rescue Co-ordination
Centre's (MRCC) intimate community ties, relationship with local
emergency services and detailed knowledge of the appropriate voluntary
teams to task to an incident. The current proposals would mean
that operations room staff would largely lose situational awareness
of this kind. We have not been persuaded that this loss would
not diminish the speed and effectiveness of the Coastguard's response
to some emergencies. (Paragraph 26)
DfT Response: In the first
consultation we set out how the Maritime and Coastguard Agency
would maintain a national memory bank and use the strengthened
coastal safety management to give necessary local knowledge.
However the Government recognises the strength of concern raised
by both the Committee and those who responded to the first round
of consultation that was launched on 16 December 2010. We made
clear from the outset that we would listen carefully to all representations.
To meet concerns about the removal of ties between the MRCCs
and the local emergency services and the perceived loss of local
knowledge, the modernisation plans announced on 14 July 2011 would
see one existing centre retained in each pair of centres under
the current organisational model plus both centres at Shetland
and Stornoway. These centres would also remain open on a 24/7
basis. It is already standard practice that paired centres share
and exchange information about situational awareness and local
knowledge. The proposals to retain centres at Stornoway and at
Holyhead will address concerns about the Gaelic and Welsh languages
and more difficult place names. Although this would primarily
be a national system, the concept of operations in the new proposals
still provides as at present that distress alerts, whether from
radio or the 999 system, would be routed in the first instance
to the nearest coordination centre for handling.
VOLUNTEERS
Recommendation 9. We conclude that the MCA's current
restructuring proposals, by significantly reducing the number
of operations centres, risk placing too great a burden of responsibility
on volunteers. It would be unreasonable to draw too heavily on
volunteer coastguards for the kind of local knowledge that is
currently held by operations room staff, but which would be largely
lost under these proposals. There is a risk that excessive demands
could diminish the willingness of people to volunteer as a rescue
coastguard. (Paragraph 29)
Recommendation 10. We also conclude that the current
proposals to close MRCCs have not adequately taken into consideration
the role of the coastguard station as a recruiter and trainer
of the network of local voluntary teams. The MCA should set out
how this important function of the current MRCC structure will
be maintained following any reorganisation. (Paragraph 30)
DfT Response: The Government
is proud of the volunteers who give their time and energy to serve
their communities in the Coastguard Rescue Service. There was
never an intention that the original proposals set out on 16 December
2010 would add any burden on volunteers. In light of responses
to the first consultation, we will continue with the plan to bolster
significantly the leadership and training we give to our volunteers
by putting an additional 25 operational staff into the Coastguard
Rescue Service, organised into operational management teams that
work together in professional support of the volunteers. Keeping
more centres, operating them for 24 hours, and retaining 70 more
operational coastguards in those centres will all offer greater
reassurance to our volunteers that there is no intention to add
any burden to their existing role.
The recruitment and training of CRS volunteers is
not a current function of MRCCs and is carried out by a separate
Sector Manager structure. Under our proposals the provision of
25 additional operational staff to carry out this function in
local communities is significantly enhanced.
DAYLIGHT HOURS
Recommendation 11. We are concerned that the MCA
proposals regarding station closures and opening hours may be
based on statistics that do not tell the whole story. The published
figures show neither the seriousness nor duration of incidents.
Any decision that is based on aggregated statistics may also fail
to address regional differences. Robust empirical evidence should
be the starting-point for any proposed restructure of an emergency
service such as HM Coastguard. For the revised proposals to have
greater integrity, we recommend that the MCA publish data for
the number of staff hours per incident, disaggregated by region.
(Paragraph 34)
Recommendation 12. The period of hand over between
the sub-centre and MOC has been identified as a potential weakness
in the MCA's proposals. If the MCA remains committed to the concept
of daylight hour-only stations, it must demonstrate how the handover
could be achieved safely. (Paragraph 37)
DfT Response: This was
a strong concern from responses to the first round of consultation
and the Government understands the worries about how the concept
of operations would work in practice, particularly in relation
to the notion of daytime only centres. The Government has now
decided that all remaining centres should operate on a 24 hour
basis with staffing arrangements to facilitate that. There are
currently long established procedures that address the handing
over of an incident from one station to another. One of the key
advantages of the modernisation plan is that, with a networked
organisation, any coastguard at any location is working on the
same systems and has access to listen to all of the aerials. Thus
the situation involves less handover and more a taking of control.
This is very much like the process that occurs every day in every
centre at the change of watch. Alongside the consultation document
published on 14 July 2011, the MCA has made more information available
at http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/supporting_documentation-3.pdf
about how a Maritime Operations Centre with sub-centres would
work in practice.
Following the Westminster Hall debate on 24 March
2011, the MCA published a significant amount of additional detailed
incident data showing in detail the number and nature of incidents,
by MRCC for each of the past 5 years. This provided the base data
from which the extracts shown as graphs in the first consultation
document were drawn. However, because of ongoing industrial action
within coastguard coordination centres, information is not available
in sufficient detail to allow the publication of data for the
number of staff hours per incident, disaggregated by region.
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
Recommendation 13. It appears to us that the current
proposals pay more attention to the MCA's statutory obligations
towards the commercial shipping industry and far less to its obligations
towards leisure craft and small boat users. Accidents involving
commercial vessels represent only a small proportion of all those
that the Coastguard manage. Revised proposals must show how the
level of protection afforded to leisure users, small fishing vessels
and the like will not be reduced as a result of any reorganisation
of the Coastguard. (Paragraph 40)
DfT Response: Safety is
the Government's top priority and it is committed to maintaining
the level of service that all mariners and those using our coasts
presently receive and could expect to receive in the future.
Indeed, the proposals set out in December 2010, and adjusted in
July 2011, enhance that capability by allowing for the redistribution
of work at busy times across a national network so that a distress
call can be heard and handled by any coastguard at any centre.
Retaining additional centres and increasing to 24
hour coverage at all locations will give assurances about communication
with and the service provided to local leisure activity and fishing
communities. This was also addressed within the original proposal
by the 50% uplift in the number of professional coastguards who
will be working with volunteer coastguards based in coastal communities.
These professional coastguard will be the prime contact for local
organisations including the leisure and fishing sectors. This
represents an investment in the face to face contact and knowledge
sharing with these sectors.
Recommendation 14. The MCA's proposals rely heavily
on the use of upgraded technology in the operations rooms. In
its revised proposals, the MCA must be much clearer about the
nature and benefits of technology being proposed and how it differs
from the existing technology that is installed in the current
MRCCs. (Paragraph 41)
DfT Response: The second
consultation document includes an overview on technology and it
is accompanied by additional information provided as part of the
'supporting documentation' pack available on the MCA website.
The future design will see the same core technologies
as we use today being used, but located and configured differently.
It is proposed to connect the existing radio aerial sites to
a centralised equipment stack located across two geographically
separate locations; operator consoles at the MOC and all sub-centres
will connect to these. This means that coastguards anywhere within
the network will be able to access any of the radio aerials they
need to carry out their operational duties. In the new technical
design the national nature of the reconfigured information systems
means that any coastguard can receive and enter information, thereby
making it immediately available to all coastguards in the national
network. This facilitates information sharing rather than information
exchange. The single network approach for information systems
such as Command & Control (Vision), Geographical Information
(C-Scope) and Search Planning (SARIS) will enable all coastguards
to have access to information held in these systems whenever they
need it. More detail is contained in the Supporting Documentation
in the IT Technical Brief (pages 33 to 38) on the MCA website.
Currently coastguards act on information passed to
them which is subsequently stored within local information systems,
a design which limits access for others outside of the current
pairing structure. In the new technical design the national nature
of those information systems means that any coastguard can receive
and enter the information, making it immediately available to
all coastguards in the national network.
RESILIENCE
Recommendation 15. The MCA has not satisfactorily
explained why creating interoperability across more of the current
centres is not a better way of increasing resilience in the current
system than the wholesale change it has put forward. We recommend
that its future revised proposals demonstrate how improvements
in interoperability will add to the improvements already being
made with the updating of the Integrated Coastguard Communication
System. (Paragraph 43)
DfT Response: The current
upgrading of technology through the MCA's Radio Equipment Replacement
project does increase the interoperability between a number of
centres, but it is limited and only allows access to some systems
in up to four other locations from a single desk. This is the
limit of interoperability possible with the current systems and
is dependent on each of the 18 individual Integrated Coastguard
Communications System (ICCS) remaining operable. A fully-networked
national system as proposed, will provide full access to all information
and systems from any other location, regardless of whether the
ICCS is functioning. Only through a national network with a strategic
Maritime Operations Centre at its heart can workloads be better
managed through the redistribution of activity to cope with peaks
and troughs.
A Maritime Operations Centre differs significantly
from existing rescue coordination centres. It is the base from
which all maritime functions are overseen, principally search
and rescue coordination, counter pollution and vessel traffic
monitoring. It is not limited geographically, but instead will
be responsible for monitoring all UK maritime interests.
The MOC also exercises command and control over all
coastguard operations nationally and generates a maritime picture
using information from a variety of sources to enable the active
management of risk in the maritime environment.
The MOC detects threats to safety, the environment
and security at an early stage by comparing what is known to be
normal routine activity with the prevailing situation, using information
and intelligence. In this way the emphasis is moved to one of
proactive working whilst retaining the ability to react appropriately
to emergency situations. The MOC is sufficiently large and staffed
to manage operations for which it assumes direct control, and
actively to monitor and influence operations at other sites.
It is sufficiently resilient in terms of staffing to absorb the
very heavy initial demand that might be presented by a major incident
or civil emergency. Heavy demands can come from a disaster, natural
or man made, or a major maritime accident.
The decisions and actions taken early, if effective,
can do much to mitigate the consequences. Currently such a demand
would present itself at an MRCC that may have an inadequate watch
level to deal with the initial scale of effort required, without
ceasing other functions nor the ability to share that or existing
workloads more widely. Reinforcing it can and does take time,
many hours or even days, whereas a properly staffed MOC, supported
by a wider network, can provide the resilience to ensure that
such surge loading is managed effectively, including short term
diversion of effort and resource from non-safety and non-time
critical work. The maritime picture is also extremely useful
to other government departments with an interest in energy security,
border security, or offshore conservation or development.
The benefits will be to give greater flexibility
on the use of available resources, and provide coastguards in
coordination centres with opportunities to use their skills more
often. More detailed information about the concept of operations
for a national network and the information technology to support
that was published alongside the consultation document of 14 July
2011.
http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/supporting_documentation-3.pdf
CONCLUSIONS
Recommendation 16. The MCA's current proposals
to modernise the Coastguard, as they stand, do not provide reassurance
that the ability of the Coastguard to respond to emergencies at
sea will be maintained at current levels, let alone improved.
The evidence we have received raises serious concerns that safety
will be jeopardised if the proposals proceed in their current
form. We welcome the Minister's assurances that the final proposals
will be substantially different to those that were consulted on.
(Paragraph 44)
Recommendation 17. Our main concern about safety
is the loss of local knowledge amongst coastguard officers that
will inevitably occur under these proposals. Rationalising the
number of MRCCs so drastically, in our view, will reduce the quality
and rate of exchange of information, particularly at key points
when information needs to be passed swiftly in order to save lives.
We are not satisfied that this issue has been adequately addressed
in the MCA's proposals. (Paragraph 45)
Recommendation 18. In particular, we are not convinced
that the concept of daylight-hour stations should be proceeded
with. Whilst there is general acceptance that there is scope to
rationalise the number of MRCCs, there is a strong case for any
future re-organisation of the Coastguard to be based on 24-hour
centres in order to provide swift and expert assistance to people
on local coastlines and in local waters, whatever the time of
day. (Paragraph 46)
Recommendation 19. The Government should withdraw
its modernisation proposals for the Coastguard and consult on
revised plans that satisfactorily address the key issues we have
identified. (Paragraph 47)
DfT Response: The Government
announced modified plans for Coastguard modernisation in the light
of consultation on 14 July 2011 and is now consulting on the
changes from the previous consultation. The second consultation
document is available at http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/consultationdocument.pdf
Those revised plans provide for:-
- a single 24 hour MOC based
in the Southampton/Portsmouth area with 96 operational coastguards.
- Dover would be configured to act as a stand-by
MOC for contingency purposes with 28 staff and retaining its responsibilities
for the Channel Navigation Information Service.
- a further eight centres, In addition to the MOC
and Dover, all of which would be open 24 hours a day with a total
staffing of 23 in each based at:
- Aberdeen
- Shetland
- Stornoway
- Belfast
- Holyhead
- Milford Haven
- Falmouth
- Humber
In addition London Coastguard would be retained unchanged.
A further consultation on the changes to the previous
proposals will run until 6 October 2011. The consultation is
focused on four matters: the shift to a single MOC; the retention
of both Shetland and Stornoway with both operating 24 hours; the
retention of Holyhead rather than Liverpool; and the retention
of Milford Haven rather than Swansea.
Emergency Towing Vessels
Recommendation 20. The decision to cease the MCA's
provision of the Emergency Towing Vessels, which was made without
consultation and against the findings of an independent risk assessment,
is unwise and short-sighted. It is, quite literally, inviting
disaster. We are not convinced that anything has happened since
Lord Donaldson's report to lead to the conclusion that ETVs are
no longer required. On the contrary, we have heard of several
occasions on which the intervention of an ETV has averted a major
incident. ETVs represent a prudent, and seemingly cost-effective,
insurance policy for the British taxpayer. It would take just
one major accident and any savings that had been made by the decision
to cease the contract would be wiped out in a stroke. We urge
the Government to reverse its decision to terminate the provision
of ETVs through the MCA. (Paragraph 58)
Commercial Tugs
Recommendation 21. Our evidence strongly suggests
that there is no suitable commercial alternative to the Emergency
Towing Vessels. A harbour tug has neither the ocean towage capacity
nor the bollard pull that an ETV possesses. Unless the Government
can provide a persuasive case that such capacity exists in appropriate
form and at appropriate locations, it should recognise that the
solution it has proposed is unviable and potentially reckless.
(Paragraph 62)
Alternative Funding Sources
Recommendation 22. The Government is the guarantor
of last resort for the protection of our marine and shoreline
environment, and for the lives of those in peril on our seas.
That duty, we conclude, would be best discharged by responsibility
for the provision of Emergency Towing Vessels resting with the
state. However, we recognise that there is a strong case for finding
other sources of income to help cover their costs. We note that
the Government is brokering discussions with the ETV working group
in pursuit of a solution to this problem. But the indications
we have received are that these discussions may take some time.
It would be unacceptable for the UK shoreline to lie unprotected
if no agreement has been reached by 30 September. In such a scenario,
the Government should make exceptional provision by extending
the ETV contract over the winter, giving the ETV working group
a further six months in which to resolve the issue. (Paragraph
65)
DfT Response: The Government
recognises the Committee's concerns, but continues to believe
that responsibility for ensuring the operational safety of ships
is properly a matter for the commercial shipping industry, working
in partnership with the tug and salvage industries. The Government
has had to take difficult decisions as part of its wider strategy
to reduce the fiscal deficit, and it is simply not appropriate
for the taxpayer to underwrite a responsibility on operators.
The current contract for the provision of ETVs will
end on 30 September 2011. The MCA has been facilitating discussions
with interested parties about commercially-based arrangements
that will apply in future.
The Government is satisfied that there is sufficient
commercial tug capacity to provide an acceptable response to disabled
vessels that break down in the vicinity of the Dover Strait and
the South-West approaches. The waters off the Shetland and Orkney
Islands can be reached within reasonable time by tugs that operate
at Sullom Voe or by vessels that service the offshore industry
to the west of the Shetland Isles.
The situation in the waters off the Western Isles
is different because no suitable commercial tugs operate in the
area. A working group comprising locally interested parties has
been considering how at ETV could continue to be provided without
recourse to Government funds. The Shipping Minister, Mike Penning
MP, met the ETV Working Group at Inverness on 25 July 2011 to
discuss its work to secure funding for the continued operation
of ETVs, in particular the ETV that operates from Stornoway. During
this meeting the Minister explained that the Government would
consider extending the provision of an ETV capability in the vicinity
of Stornoway by up to six weeks beyond the determination of the
extant contract. Such extension would be subject to the working
group being able to demonstrate a certain plan for future funding
in reasonable time to allow Government to procure the necessary
short term capability. It is now for the Working Group to respond
to that challenge.
In readiness for the end of the ETV provision, the
MCA is making arrangements for shipping to be alerted in the areas
affected. The relevant coastguard coordination centres will actively
monitor shipping using the automatic identification system and
will be proactive in contacting ships that are observed to be
stopped at sea or behaving erratically. Coastguards will monitor
tug availability in the waters around the UK and will encourage
ship masters, owners and their insurers to take early action to
summon tug assistance should ships get into difficulty or become
disabled. Coastguards will also advise the principal salvage
and towage brokers about the existence of disabled vessels so
that they can match market capabilities with demand.
Separately the MCA will review and maintain the Coastguard
Agreement on Salvage and Towage - CAST. This establishes pre-agreed
terms for the hire of tugs which, subject to availability, can
be engaged to assist vessels that get into difficulty or which
are disabled. This will help to provide tug assistance of last
resort, with the cost being borne by Government. It will also
serve to provide the Secretary of State's Representative - SOSREP,
with the means to exercise his powers of direction and intervention
on maritime salvage.
Maritime Incident Response Group
Recommendation 23. Though the Maritime Incident
Response Group (MIRG) has been involved in only seven incidents,
its intervention has been significant. Our evidence suggests that
while ships' crews have some training their skills do not match
the expertise of the MIRG. It is equally clear that without MCA
funding, the MIRG will cease to operate. The operations of the
MIRG are a matter of national resilience and responsibility to
fund them should not be left to the local taxpayer. We are concerned
that, as with the Emergency Towing Vessels, the Government has
again taken a decision driven by the impetus to reduce expenditure
that runs against an independent risk assessment. We recommend
that the Government adopt a rationalised MIRG model which is better
calibrated to the risk and more cost-effective than the present
arrangement. (Paragraph 65)
DfT Response: The Government
recognises the value of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and
coastal Fire and Rescue Services working together to support firefighting
at sea. The MIRG has provided a good example by which the work
of autonomous Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) can be coordinated
and made inter-operable. In the majority of incidents when MIRG
has been deployed to ships on fire at sea the tasking has served
to exercise and demonstrate the validity of the MIRG concept for
inter-operability rather than to contain or to fight the fire.
In considering future options the MCA has consulted
the Chairs of the 15 participating Fire and Rescue Authorities.
Two have notified their decision to withdraw from the MIRG because
of their own funding pressures. The remaining thirteen have indicated
that they will not be able to maintain an inter-operable capability
if central funding was stopped although four have indicated that
it will be their intention to maintain an ad hoc capability.
The MCA has also consulted MIRG representatives to
the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA). The MCA hoped that
these discussions would provide the basis for agreement to a reduced
level of MIRG response that could be calibrated to the underlying
operational requirement and be capable of operating more cost
effectively than the current arrangements. This envisages a fire
assessment capability that could be deployed onboard ships at
sea to advise and reassure port authorities that a ship could
be safely accepted into a port so that shore based fire fighters
can attend to the fire. Such agreement has not been possible
because FRS systems of work require a minimum of 12 persons to
attend onboard, one of the reasons being that they will not deploy
fire fighters to the scene of a fire without the capability to
fight or at least contain the fire. The CFOA have determined
that the lowest acceptable level of MIRG provision would be an
organisation half the size of the current arrangements, operating
in a similar way but at approximately two thirds of the cost.
This would continue to provide the full fire containment activity
- which is seldom able to arrive on scene in time to have a material
effect on the outcome of a fire, but would not fulfil the operational
requirement to assess and provide advice about the situation.
As a result the Government intends to discontinue
the MIRG arrangements in accordance with the terms of the MIRG
MOU and to put alternative arrangements in place for fire assessment
and advice using commercial salvors.
Recommendation 24. It is regrettable that the
Department for Transport announced all three sets of maritime
proposals with no prior consultation whatsoever and did not consider
their combined impact. (Paragraph 79)
DfT Response: Announcements
in relation to the Comprehensive Spending Review were not matters
on which prior consultation was appropriate. The Government set
out its intention to Parliament on 20 October 2010. As explained
at that time, the intention to reform both the coastguard and
the Maritime Incident Response Group would then be subject to
further consultation, both of which subsequently took place.
The Government does not accept that there is a combined
impact of the three issues raised in the Committee's report. The
three areas of work each addresses a different aspect of the Maritime
and Coastguard Agency's work. Although they all take place in
the maritime environment and are safety activities, each has a
different role and the safe implementation of each does not impact
on the others.
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