3 Trade and geopolitics |
37. There are significant threats to the supply
of strategic metals. The report on Materials Scarcity by
the Resource Efficiency Knowledge Transfer Network (REKTN, now
the Environmental Sustainability Knowledge Transfer NetworkESKTN)
identified the following eight threats to assess the security
of supply of a material:
i. Global consumption levels
ii. Lack of substitutability
iii. Global warming potential
iv. Total material requirement (how much material
is dug from the ground to produce a given quantity of metal)
vi. Monopoly supply
vii. Political instability in key supplying regions
viii. Vulnerability of key supplying regions
to climate change.
38. It was the view of Wolf Minerals Ltd, a mining
company developing a tungsten reserve in Devon, that for the supply
of strategic metals "the UK economy has relied for decades
on the laissez-faire concept that other nations will provide".
Some concerns have been expressed about this attitude: for example,
Nicholas Morley, Director of Sustainable Innovation at the sustainability
consultancy, Oakdene Hollins, attributed supply issues of some
strategic metals to "what might now be seen in hindsight
as a naïve belief in the permanency of free markets for [businesses]
39. Free markets are markets in which goods and
services are exchanged at a price agreed mutually by the producer
and consumer. In a free market, changes in supply and demand result
in a change in the prices of goods and services. Supply and demand
are therefore important factors in the trading of strategic metals,
and we investigate them in this chapter. However, the trade in
strategic metals is affected by other factorsfor example
legislationthat we also discuss.
ARE METALS RUNNING OUT?
40. Key to the operation of the market is supply.
As we have noted, metals naturally occur in minerals within the
Earth's crust. Minerals are extracted from the ground and processed
to purify the desired metal. A metal "resource" is the
total amount of a metal in the Earth's crust, while a metal "reserve"
is the metal present in minerals with sufficient metal concentrations
that make it economically viable to extract.
Metal reserves are distributed unevenly across the world.
41. The estimated reserves of strategic metals
vary. For example, at current consumption rates, indium reserves
will last for 13 years and platinum will last for 360 years.
However, in its written submission, the Royal Society of Chemistry
(RSC) explained that despite the removal of vast quantities of
metals from the ground over the past 50 years, "reserve levels
have remained largely unchanged" due to improved technology,
the discovery of new reserves and price increases leading to the
exploitation of lower grade minerals.
Research Councils UK stated that "much of the concern over
physical exhaustion of geological reserves of strategically important
metals is likely to be misplaced, though there are no grounds
42. This view was supported by Anthony Lipmann,
Managing Director of Lipmann Walton & Co Ltd and former Chairman
of the Minor Metals Trade Association (MMTA). When asked whether
he thought there was a shortage of strategic metals he said "no.
I do not [...] in practice, you just dig deeper". 
Mr Lipmann's view was that dwindling supplies resulted in increased
prices, which in turn facilitated the extraction of metals from
previously uneconomic resources (lower grade minerals). Higher
energy costs are a particularly significant factor in the exploitation
of lower grade minerals to extract a metal,
and thus in their financial viability. The corollary is that the
supply of metal is vulnerable to increases in energy costs.
43. Digging deeper will also come with a higher
environmental impact. Higher environmental impacts and energy
use are in themselves undesirable and Mr Morley pointed out that
"the increasing environmental impact of mining, extraction
and purification [are] likely to lead to limits in production
before absolute scarcity became significant".
The desirable improvements in social and environmental standards
of mining activity will also lead to an increase in the price
of a metal. Social
and environmental impacts are discussed in detail in chapter 4.
44. Most strategic metal reserves
are unlikely to run out over the coming decades. In practice,
improved technology, the use of alternative materials and the
discovery of new reserves are likely to ensure that strategic
metals are accessible. There will, however, be significant environmental
and monetary cost associated with the exploitation of lower grade
45. To achieve efficient resource use, a principle
of free market economics is that there are a number of producers
competing to supply consumers; this sets a market led price. However,
where monopolies (supply controlled by a single company or nation)
and oligopolies (supply controlled by a small number of entities)
dominate a market place, they can distort the market price to
benefit themselves. The RSC pointed out that:
Metal deposits are unevenly distributed across the
globe [...] this is of particular concern for the UK, as only
5% of the known worldwide metal reserves are found in Europe.
46. The uneven distribution of metal resources
favours the emergence of supply monopolies and oligopolies as
some metal reserves are found in only a few countries.
There are a number of national monopolies and oligopolies in metals
markets, for example: China produces over 97% of the world's rare
earth elements; Brazil
accounts for 92% of niobium extraction;
62% of chromium is extracted in South Africa and Kazakhstan;
and cobalt production is dominated by the Democratic Republic
47. It is not just the geographical distribution
of reserves that can cause supply monopolies and oligopolies.
They also arise because of economic and political factors. Differences
in comparative advantage, and regulatory frameworks, between countries
with metal reserves mean that production costs can vary significantly.
Consumers of strategic metals tend to buy from the nation offering
the lowest price, which can lead to the reduced economic viability
of metal production in nations with higher production costs.
Production can then become highly concentrated in the single nation
with the lowest costs.
48. The ESKTN explained the problems posed by
monopolies and oligopolies in supply and trade:
UK manufacturers would like equal access to metals.
If this is the case then, even if the price is high, availability
is roughly equal for all users and so there is fair competition.
However if the supply of a particular mineral or metal is controlled
by a small number of entities (be they countries or companies)
there is a risk that they may exploit their monopoly/oligopoly
to control the market or favour certain clients.
49. In a free and competitive market, the location
of reserves overseas should of itself pose no threat to the UK.
However, monopolies and oligopolies inhibit competition, reducing
the benefits of free trade and leaving the market open to higher
prices and unpredictable changes in price.
China and the rare earth elements
50. In any discussion of monopolies and oligopolies
in the metals markets, China and its control of rare earth element
(REE) supplies is frequently cited. The Geological Society of
London stated that "global production of REEs is located
at a small number of mines in China, although there are known
reserves elsewhere, and every prospect of finding more".
The Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining (IOM3) were of
the opinion that there were some "mines [outside China] that
were recently closed because of low cost competition from China".
51. As China currently supplies over 97% of the
world's REE raw material, Chinese export quotas are the dominant
limitation to supply of REE raw material around the world. However,
the amounts of REE raw material that come directly from China
to the UK are not large. We heard that a company called Less Common
Metals are the only UK based user of REEs in their raw form.
52. REE use in the UK was described by Dr Gareth
Hatch, Founding Principal of Technology Metals Research:
very little REE raw material is presently used to
produce components in the UK. It is in the use of semi-finished
and finished goods such as permanent magnets and other components,
and the devices and systems created from them, that companies
in the UK generally interact with the rare-earths supply chain.
REE products are also used in oil refining and Dr
Mike Pitts, from the Industry Technology Division of the RSC,
told us that "they are used in about every consumer product
you can think of in electronic equipment. You are all carrying
some around in your briefcases, I assure you".
China does not, however, dominate, nor restrict, supply of downstream
goods which incorporate REEs.
Dr Hatch noted that, in terms of trade, the use of REEs in finished
goods was less problematic than using them in their raw form because
Chinese export quotas do not apply to semi-finished or finished
goods that are produced in China.
53. Rt Hon David Willetts MP, Minister of State
for Universities and Science, confirmed that, because the UK was
not a primary manufacturer of goods requiring raw REEs, the UK
was in a better position than, for example, Japan:
at the moment we tend to be rather further down the
chain than Japan. We tend to buy and import products, which can
be components that we are doing further work on, but we tend to
import products and components where an intermediary country has
itself bought the Rare Earths and done the first set of work on
it. So we are in a slightly different relationship to the supply
chain than Japan is.
54. There are international forums where pressure
can be applied to nations to remove impediments to free trade,
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the G-20 and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Indeed, the Minister stated that "there is currently an investigation
of the [
] case involving Chinese export quotas [on REEs]
there are [also] issues here that could well come up in a WTO
55. One problem arising from the monopoly of
supplies by a single nationhighlighted by the Government
in its written submissionis that "emerging economies
are aiming at reserving their resource base for their exclusive
use". Dr Jonathan
Di John, Lecturer in Political Economy at the School of Oriental
and African Studies, considered the REE export quota reduction
a part of standard industrialisation policy by China. He explained
that many countries use this to fuel their transition to a developed
One of the reasons why, [...] and they might disguise
it in the form of environmental concerns and smuggling concerns,
is that they would like [...] to force, or at least provide a
lot of incentives, for firms to locate in China [
a foreign direct investment strategy and an industrial strategy.
Every country that is wealthy today has done it in the past [...]
this is something that is part of an historical continuity of
countries trying to catch up.
56. Charles Emmerson, Senior Fellow at Chatham
House, agreed with Dr Di John's analysis:
China is industrialising rapidly and it has a strong
domestic demand for many of these minerals. It may be that [...]
rather than politics or any broader strategic intent, which is
behind conceivable curtailment of supplies to countries such as
the UK and, indeed, other advanced economies in the future.
57. However, Dr Hatch pointed out that industrial
policy was not the reason given by China for their export restriction:
"ostensibly these [quotas] were put in place by the authorities
to allow for the shut-down of inefficient, polluting mines and
to allow for environmental remediation".
58. We do not, however, ignore or wish to devalue
the environmental impact of the mining of strategic metals. Differences
in national social and environmental legislation are one of the
reasons why there are large differences in the production costs
of certain strategic metals.
Levelling the global playing field of social and environmental
legislation might stimulate competition and prevent national monopolies
developing by narrowing the global range of production costs.
It was recognised by the Minister that environmental impacts in
China were significant and that "mining [REEs] is a nasty,
dirty and environmentally risky business and the environmental
regulations in China may be less onerous than in many other countries".
We will return to the subject of environmental impact in chapter
59. Monopolies and oligopolies
in strategic metals distort the market. They can arise because
of a variety of reasons, including economic, political, geographic
and environmental issues. China's reduction in export quotas of
rare earth element raw materials is an example of this and restricts
a free market in metals. We invite the Government to set out in
its response the outcome of the investigation into Chinese export
quotas, as described by the Minister. We consider that, to maximise
the benefits of free trade, the Government should ensure that
restrictions in the trade of strategic metals are discussed at
an international level, through forums such as the WTO, G-20 and
Demand for metals
60. Increasing demand causes prices to increase.
In its written submission to this inquiry Research Councils UK
(RCUK) pointed out that "there is rapidly increasing demand
[for metals] from emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India
The Society for Chemical Industry noted that:
the well established major general increase in the
consumption of metals which began in the last century, shows no
sign of abating and is likely to be exacerbated by high volume
61. Demand for strategic metals is likely to
increase not only from emerging economies but also from emerging
technologies. The Government told us:
The UK operates in a global market and largely requires
the same materials as other developed economies, and as the world
economy moves towards high technology and low carbon manufacturing,
competition for strategic metals and resources in general will
62. RCUK quantified some of the increases in
demand from new technology projected for several strategic metals:
Demand for gallium in emerging technologies may increase
by a factor of more than 20 between 2006 and 2030. For indium,
germanium and neodymium, the factors are 8, 8 and 7, respectively,
over the same period.
63. The increasing global demand
for strategic metals from emerging economies and new technologies
will be a significant factor affecting their price, and therefore
availability. Assessment of future demand will be essential to
assessing the potential scarcity, risk to supply and future price
of strategic metals. Assessments of future demand should be part
of the shared database we have proposed.
64. Anthony Lipmann, of Lipmann Walton &
Co Ltd and the MMTA, gave an example of how changes in supply
and demand affected the price of rhenium, a metal essential to
the manufacture of single crystal turbine blades in jet engines.
He said that rhenium "was worth $300 a kilo in 1996"
and that in "August 2008 it reached $10,000 a kilo".
He explained that despite the increase in price there was still
sufficient supply because rhenium was used more efficiently, was
recycled and the price stimulated investment in mining activity.
Restrictions of supply or increases in demand will cause prices
to increase and are likely to stimulate investment into reserves
that are competitive at the new price. However, the view of the
Geological Society of London was that, while global metals production
levels could respond to price, "the long lead time from the
instigation of an exploration programme by a company to mine productiontypically
at least 10 years (with success far from certain)severely
restricts market responsiveness".
65. Dr Pitts, RSC, pointed out that "it
takes something between six to fifteen years to either reopen
or start up a mine to produce".
The ESKTN agreed:
The supply of metallic minerals and global markets
tend to respond to the demand [...] however the processes involved
in discovering and developing a new deposit or substitute material
can take many years so there is a lag in the response to demand
which tends to result in shortages and price peaks
66. While the evidence we received showed that
there was a time lag between demand and supply and that this would
lead to price increases in the short-term, Mr Lipmann was confident
that the market would respond: "mining houses, metal merchants
and everyone involved in the cycle wants to make money and they
will invest in it. They will bring forward metals by their investments".
67. The costs of strategic metals may be only
a small fraction of the total costs of making a product and may
not be felt by a consumer in the price of end products. For example,
despite the price increase in rhenium from $300 a tonne to $10,000
a tonne over 12 years, Mr Lipmann pointed out that Rolls Royce
are still making engines.
Dr Di John, School of Oriental and African Studies, concurred:
The share of the cost that these metals constitute
in terms of the production process is much less than, say, oil
was. While there will be a lag, the effects of any dramatic increase
in price is likely to be of much less effect in terms of production
68. On the question of companies hedging against
supply risks and price increases, Charles Swindon, Chair of the
MMTA Trade and Lobby Committee, said that "prudent large
manufacturers do plan five years ahead, will pay premiums and
will pay the price for what they need".
69. Paying a premium may be an option for large
businesses but for an SME this may not be possible. While the
Minister stated that he was not aware of any resource issues facing
SMEs, the Defra report
stated that "the awareness of SMEs has not been gauged"
and that "a lack of information could leave them unprepared
for resource supply issues, potentially affecting [...] their
(see paragraph 33).
70. Changes in supply and demand
can lead to significant fluctuations in the prices of metals.
While this may not be a problem for end users or large companies
we are concerned that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could
suffer from unexpected large and rapid price increases. The Government
must ensure that mechanisms are in place to reach out to SMEs
across the country, a role previously fulfilled by the Regional
Development Agencies. We recommend that the Government consult
with SMEs using strategic metals to ascertain: (i) their awareness
of resource supply issues; (ii) how SMEs may be affected by supply
issues; and (iii) what information on resource supply SMEs need
to enable them to prepare for changes in the market and maximise
71. We heard that some companies retain stockpiles
of strategic metals to alleviate changes in the market.
Indeed, the EC report identified stockpiling of metals as one
method to mitigate supply restrictions.
The US maintains a stockpile of metals, albeit reduced in size
in recent years, that are considered critical for defence.
Japan currently maintains a stockpile of metals that are important
for manufacturing industries.
In the past the UK has maintained a stockpile of strategic metals
and Dr Chapman, former advisor to the Department for Trade and
Industry (DTI), told us:
HM Government formerly had a small stockpile of strategic
minerals. It was set up by the DTI in 1983 and its abolition was
then announced in November 1984. In fact the last sales were not
made until 1996.
72. Stockpiling, possibly at an EU level, was
presented to us as a possible option to alleviate metals supply
issues but there would be a cost both in terms of purchasing stocks
and storing them.
Dr Chapman explained that the reason for the reduced size of the
US stockpile was due to its high cost.
RCUK also drew our attention to the high cost associated with
Morley, Director of Sustainable Innovation at the sustainability
consultancy, Oakdene Hollins, stated:
stockpiling at an EU level, similar to what occurs
in Japan has been proposed, but is generally not preferred in
free market economies such as the UK. Also the timescale over
which it could operate (typically months rather than years) is
not sufficiently long to address some of the speciality metal
73. When we questioned Professor Robert Watson,
Chief Scientific Advisor to Defra, on the role of Government and
stockpiling of resources, he saw:
the Government's role is in helping to provide information.
What you are also suggesting is that the larger companies have
more the ability not only to bulk purchase but to stockpile. I
don't see that there is a role for Government in stockpiling.
74. Stockpiling is an unattractive
option because it is expensive but it may be necessary if the
market fails because of sustained market manipulation by a monopoly
supplier. The Government should keep this policy under review.
SPECULATION IN THE METAL MARKETS
75. A recent communication from the EC, Tackling
the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials,
set out the concerns that the EC had about the linkages between
financial markets and commodity markets. The communication outlined
measures, policies and directives that are coming into force.
It also described the change in commodity markets over the past
Markets are experiencing the growing impact of finance,
with a significant increase in financial investment flows into
commodity derivative markets in recent years. Between 2003 and
2008, for example, institutional investors increased their investments
in commodities markets from 13 billion euro in 2003 to between
170 and 205 billion euro in 2008 [...] While the debate on the
relative importance of the multiple factors influencing commodities
prices is still open, it is clear that price movements across
different commodity markets have become more closely related and
that commodities markets have become more closely linked to financial
76. In the UK some metals are traded on exchanges
while others are traded directly between buyer and seller.
Mr Swindon, MMTA, explained the consequences of the closer links
between financial and commodities markets:
It is well known that hedge funds have moved into
all commodities, whether it is gold or energy [...] they have
also moved not just into exchange traded instruments, as traded
on the London Metal Exchange, but there is evidence that they
have moved into more strategic metals, which are only traded between
counterparties, including Rare Earths. If it is perceived that
the rate of return over the next 10 years is going to be much
greater by investing in very small quantities of rare metals,
that is a risk.
Ian Hetherington, Director General of the British
Metals Recycling Association (BMRA) agreed that one of the reasons
for recent price volatility of copper is that hedge funds are
buying up "vast quantities".
77. Mr Emmerson, Chatham House, explained that
perceptions could drive speculation and that there has been a
"flare up in perceptions of scarcity around certain minerals".
He added that:
[Perceptions] may drive price but it is dangerous
and we have to make clear that transparency, market mechanisms
and open international frameworks are the key to building in [
long term "resilience" as opposed to risk management,
which is an approach that is often taken in this area.
78. The perception of scarcity
of certain minerals and metals may lead to increased speculation
and volatility in price and supply. There is a need for accurate
and reliable information on scarcity of metals. This concern underlines
the recommendation we have made, that the Government should establish
and regularly update a shared database to provide such information.
We are also concerned by reports of hedge funds buying up significant
quantities of strategic metals. We recommend that the Government
investigate whether there are increasing levels of speculation
in the metals markets and, if there are, their contribution to
price volatility and whether markets that allow high levels of
speculation, with associated price volatility, are an acceptable
way to deliver strategic commodities to end users.
79. We heard that there were large companies
dealing metals within the UK and an allegation was made by the
MMTA that a company through a subsidiary may be behaving in an
on the London Metal Exchange there are four very
large companies that own the very warehouses that people deliver
metal into, J.P. Morgan is one of them. They own a
company called Henry Bath. They are, therefore, a ring-dealing
member of the exchange and they also own the warehouse. That is
restrictive. They were also reported, at one point, to have had
50% of the stock of the metal on the London Metal Exchange.
80. We would be concerned if the ownership of
metals storage warehouses by a dominant dealer on the London Metals
Exchange were to be anti-competitive. We would also be concerned
if a dealer who had the resources to own over 50% of stock on
the London Metals Exchange impeded the correct functioning of
81. We use this report to bring
the alleged activities of large dealers on the London Metals Exchange
to the attention of the Office of Fair Trading. We would be concerned
if a dealer were undermining the effective functioning of the
market and we look for assurance that the market is functioning
82. The market is affected by regulation. Under
the European Council Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemical substances (REACH) regulation, an importer
or manufacturer of a chemical substance, in quantities over one
tonne, may have to register it with the European Chemicals Agency
(ECHA). The aim
of the REACH regulation is to:
improve the protection of human health and the environment
through the better and earlier identification of the intrinsic
properties of chemical substances. At the same time, REACH aims
to enhance innovation and competitiveness of the EU chemicals
83. The Cobalt Development Institute told us
that Government needed to "ensure that regulatory matters,
such as REACH, are applied in a proportional and sustainable way."
The MMTA elaborated:
In Europe at present, whilst on the one hand the
EU are looking to promote strategic raw materials in REACH they
are simultaneously creating de facto import tariffs which
are destroying the industry for strategic raw materials in Europe.
REACH [...] legislation adds bureaucratic costs to every strategically
important metal produced or imported into Europe in quantities
of over one tonne per year. REACH, unintentionally, has been a
highly destructive regulation.
84. Registration of a substance includes submitting
a dossier of information on the substance. The "de facto
import tariffs", which the MMTA refer to, are registration
fees to the ECHA and the cost of putting together the dossier
of information required under REACH.
The Government stated that the fees for a company to register
with the ECHA ranged from 120-31,000.
This registration fee does not include the cost of producing the
dossier of information on the substance.
85. Anthony Lipmann, of Lipmann Walton &
Co Ltd and the MMTA, explained what his company (an SME importer
of various strategic metals) had to register with the ECHA, in
compliance with the REACH regulation. To import a metal, his company
either had to "spend a lot of money" to join a consortium,
or purchase a letter of access (LOA).
In the case of titanium, the LOA to import up to 1,000 tonnes
cost his company 40,000.
Mr Lipmann made the point that his company only needed to import
100 tonnes of titanium but still had to pay 40,000 and that
"if you translate that across the 20 elements that I trade,
it is untenable".
Mr Lipmann considered that the REACH regulation "creates
monopolies, which in turn create manipulation, which create high
86. There is a trade off between the social and
environmental benefits of the REACH regulation and its impact
on free trade through a potential reduction of competition in
the metals markets. Mr Swindon, from the MMTA, said that there
was a need for information to be more accessible.
87. The Minister's view was:
that the REACH regulations are, on balance, helpful
[...] The regulations provide a common framework across a whole
range of potentially hazardous materials applied consistently
across Europe. We think that it is in the best interests of British
industry to have one consistent framework.
88. The Government explained how importers could
join together in registering substances with the ECHA:
REACH provides for manufacturers and importers of
a substance to join together in Substance Information Exchange
Forums in order to share data, avoid duplication of any new testing,
and prepare a joint registration. However, in addition manufacturers
of some substances have set up consortia to manage the data gathering,
although these are not a requirement of REACH. Letters of access
to unofficial consortia cannot be policed by REACH although they
would, of course, be subject to competition law.
The Government added that "letters of access
[...] are a commercial matter between those in the consortia who
have had to incur costs in generating the data and those seeking
to use the data for their own products/purposes. Such arrangements
[...] could be investigated if there was sufficient evidence of
89. It appears that, if a company is not prepared
or able to register a substance with the ECHA directly, it should
join a Substance Information Exchange Forums, to register a substance.
However, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) publication, REACHThe
Basics, explains that importers importing a chemical substance
in quantities of less than 1,000 tonnes need not register until
90. It appears that there may
be, amongst some small companies, a misunderstanding of the REACH
regulations and that consortia are being used to register metals
when this may not be required. We recommend that the Government
reassess the information and advice available to small companies
about REACH regulations, in particular information about the most
cost-effective means of registering strategic metals. We also
recommend that the Government examine whether these regulations
have become an unnecessary expensive burden inhibiting the market
in strategically important metals.
47 Oakdene Hollins, Resource Efficiency KTN, Material
Security: Ensuring Resource Availability for the UK Economy,
March 2008, p 20 Back
Ev w18, para A2.3 Back
Ev w2, para 1.5 Back
Ev 52, para 6 Back
"Earth's Natural Wealth: An Audit", New Scientist,
23 May 2007 Back
Ev 58, para 8 Back
Ev w28 Back
Qq 71-72 Back
Ev 46, para 2 [Environmental Sustainability Knowledge Transfer
Ev w4, para 6 Back
Q 21 [Dr Pitts] Back
Ev 58, para 10 Back
Ev w23, para 9 [Natural History Museum] Back
Ev w39, para 15 [Dr Hatch] Back
Ev w23, para 9 [Natural History Museum] Back
Ev w10, para 2.1 [Aerospace and Defence Knowledge Transfer Network,
Materials and Structures National Technical Committee] Back
Ev w11, para 2.2 [Aerospace and Defence Knowledge Transfer Network,
Materials and Structures National Technical Committee] Back
Judith Chegwidden, POST seminar, Critical minerals: Rare earth
metals and beyond, 12 January 2011 Back
Ev 46, para 3 Back
Ev 52, para 7 Back
Ev 44, para 2.2.2 Back
Q 82 [Mr Lipmann] Back
Ev w39, para 13 Back
Q 9 Back
Rare Earth Metals, POSTnote 368, Parliamentary Office
of Science and Technology, January 2011 Back
Ev w40, para 18 Back
Q 157 Back
Qq 82,135 [Mr Swindon, Professor Clary] Back
Q 171 Back
Ev 39, para 6 [BIS] Back
Q 85 Back
Q 74 Back
Ev w40, para 16 Back
POST seminar, Critical minerals: Rare earth metals and beyond,
12 January 2011 Back
Q 169 Back
Ev w30, para 15 Back
Ev w19, para 3 Back
Ev 39, para 1 [BIS] Back
Ev w29, para 6 Back
Q 75 Back
As above Back
Ev 52, para 7 Back
Q 7 Back
Ev 46, para 1 Back
Q 80 Back
Q 75 Back
Q 80 Back
Q 82 Back
Q 155 Back
AEA Technology, Defra, Review of the Future Resource Risks
Faced by UK Business and an Assessment of Future Viability,
January 2011, p 11 Back
Ev w31, para 24 [Research Councils UK] Back
EC Raw Materials Supply Group, Critical Raw Materials for
the EU, July 2010 Back
Ev w1, para 2.1 [Dr Chapman]; Q 35 [Tony Hartwell] Back
Q 35 [Tony Hartwell] Back
Ev w1, para 2.2 Back
Ev w41, para 29 [Dr Hatch] Back
Ev w1, para 2.1 Back
Ev w31, para 24 Back
Ev w2, para 2.2 Back
Q 128 Back
European Commission Communication, COM(2011) 25 Back
As above Back
Q 74 Back
As above Back
Q 37 Back
Q 85 Back
Q 81 [Mr Lipmann] Back
UK REACH Competent Authority, REACH-The Basics, January
"REACH", European Commission webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm/ Back
Ev w37, para 2 Back
Ev 69, para 1 Back
Ev 43 [Defra supplementary evidence] Back
As above Back
Q 107 [Mr Lipmann] Back
Q 73 [Mr Lipmann] Back
As above Back
As above Back
Q 103 Back
Qq 159-160 [Mr Willetts] Back
Ev 44 [Defra supplementary evidence] Back
Ev 74, para 5 [BIS supplementary evidence] Back
UK REACH Competent Authority, REACH-The Basics, January