1. In recent years a number of non-governmental organisations
and media reports have raised concerns about the treatment of
people who are being removed from the UK on the grounds that they
had no right to remain here. These concerns grew in autumn 2010
when Mr Jimmy Mubenga died during a deportation flight from Heathrow
to Angola. The three civilian security guards accompanying Mr
Mubenga, who were employed by the private security contractor
G4S, were arrested and bailed pending further inquiries. This
case continues, and we do not intend to comment on it here, but
it was the impetus for us to start a broader inquiry into the
rules governing enforced removals from the UK, and in particular
the role of the UK Border Agency in overseeing the contractors
acting on its behalf in escorting those being removed.
2. In November 2010 we took oral evidence from the
then head of the UK Border Agency, Lin Homer, and from managers
of G4S, the contractor providing escorts for enforced removals.
We received written evidence at that time from the UK Border Agency
and G4S. We publish the written evidence and the oral evidence
from G4S with this report. Lin Homer's evidence has already been
published, with our report into The work of the UK Border Agency,
in January 2011. Several
people who had been or were still employed in the custody and
security industry expressed an interest in contributing to our
inquiry, but were unwilling to give formal evidence on the record.
In March 2011, Amnesty International UK sent to us a memorandum
which included some allegations from these 'whistleblowers'; this
memorandum has subsequently formed the basis of Amnesty International
UK's report Out of Controlthe case for a complete overhaul
of enforced removals by private contractors.
Use of force in the removals process
3. The UK Border Agency set out the consequences
when someone claiming asylum or seeking a visa to remain in the
UK has their claim or request refused. The Agency expects such
people to leave the country promptly. If they fail to do so, they
may be subject to enforcement action, including detention and
removal. Convicted foreign national criminals whose continued
stay in the UK is considered not to be conducive to the common
good similarly are subject to enforced removal. The Agency told
In the vast majority of cases where we detain and
remove individuals, they are taken to the airport by escorts,
but leave compliantly, travelling home alone. In a small number
of cases, escorts may need to travel with the detainee either
because they are unwilling to leave voluntarily, because they
are otherwise vulnerable (e.g. they have a condition which requires
the presence of a medic) or because they are being removed on
a flight chartered by the UK Border Agency. Even then, the vast
majority of these individuals leave the UK compliantly, but in
a small number of cases, escorts may need to use restraint to
ensure the individual complies with their removal.
The Agency has provided us with figures for the number
of removals over the previous three years, distinguishing between
escorted and unescorted returns, and for escorted returns showing
the number of times physical restraint was used. 
Number of removals
G4S said that since the start of its contract in
April/May 2005, it had "removed or attempted to remove"
125,462 detainees and dealt with 59,244 as 'turnarounds' at airports
(someone stopped at a port of entry, refused leave to enter and
returned from that port)a total of 184,706.
4. Operational instructions governing forced removal
of illegal immigrants provide that force can be used "to
keep a detainee in custody, to prevent violence, to prevent destruction
of property of removal centre or of others, and to prevent detainees
from seeking to prevent their removal physically or physically
interfering with the lawful removal of another detainee".
5. The death of Jimmy Mubenga was the first to occur
during enforced removal since Mrs Joy Gardner died after being
gagged and restrained by officers from the Metropolitan Police's
specialist deportation squad at her home in London in 1993. The
officers involved in Mrs Gardner's death were found not guilty
of manslaughter at a subsequent trial, but the specialist deportation
squad was disbanded and the job of carrying out forced deportations
is now contracted out by the UK Border Agency to private security
6. However, in July 2008, Birnberg Peirce & Partners
(a London firm of solicitors), Medical Justice (a charity that
campaigns for adequate healthcare provision for immigration detainees)
and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns published
a report entitled Outsourcing Abuse, which gave details
of almost 300 cases which it claimed showed evidence of abuse:
We have found an alarming and unacceptable number
of injuries have been sustained by those subject to forced removals
... In all cases in our dossier, what may have started off as
'reasonable' force turned into what we consider to be excessive
7. Dame Nuala O'Loan (now Baroness O'Loan) was appointed
by the then Home Secretary to investigate the claims made in Outsourcing
Abuse, which covered both detention prior to removal from
the country and escort during removal. In March 2010 she published
a report which:
- Rejected the claim of "systemic
abuse", saying there was no pattern of inappropriate force
by any individual.
- Criticised the UK Border Agency for failing to
investigate complaints of abusive treatment properlythree
cases had involved serious injuries including a punctured lung,
a broken finger and a dislocated knee.
- Concluded that: "Over the period under investigation
there was inadequate management of the use of force by the private
sector companies. This resulted, on occasion, in failures properly
to account for the use of force by recording fully the circumstances
and justification for the use of force."
- Concluded that: "The use of force training
which officers receive does refer to the legal obligations governing
the use of force. However this was not reflected in the bulk of
the case papers which I examined. I have therefore made recommendations
to address this issue."
- Expressed concerns in relation to the guidance,
management and training for the use of handcuffs.
8. Both G4S and the UK Border Agency assured us that
Baroness O'Loan's recommendations were being implemented, although
the Agency argued that the original Outsourcing Abuse report
had exaggerated the extent and seriousness of the problem of excessive
force. Lin Homer, Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency, told
us: "I think much of it was not capable of being evidenced
by Medical Justice or by Birnbergs, despite a very lengthy period
being provided to them to provide evidence to support that."
9. G4S told us that from April/May 2005 to November
2010 they had received 481 complaints relating to removals. Of
these, 252 involved escorting removals overseas, of which 25 (or
10%) were substantiated; and 186 alleged assault related to the
use of force on overseas escorting, of which six (or 3%) were
substantiated. The six substantiated complaints were that: a detainee's
arm was held too tightly leaving pressure marks (in 2006); a detainee
was restrained by using an inappropriate neck hold (in 2006);
a detainee was left too long in handcuffs (in 2008); a detainee
was controlled inappropriately by pulling handcuffs (in 2009);
inappropriate force (leg strikes) was used to dress a detainee
(in 2009); and an escort applied pressure to a detainee's handcuff
10. G4S argued that serious injuries to detainees
were extremely rare, even when detainees became disruptive, violent
or attempted to escape, although minor injuries were almost inevitable
where physical restraint had to be used.
There is a risk of injury to detainees involved in
the Use of Force. The response letter sent to detainees by UKBA
following an investigation by Professional Standards Unit (UKBA
body) in assault complaints almost always states that some relatively
minor injury is inevitable. In such situations, especially if
handcuffs have to be applied, the most common form of minor injury
to detainees is reddening and soreness of wrists following handcuffing
during Control and Restraint.
Occasions when detainees have been seriously injured
(broken bones, cuts requiring stitches or above) are rare.
G4S records on Use of Force (compiled from information
supplied on Use of Force Incident Reports and notified to UKBA)
note if a detainee has sustained injury. These have been examined
to identify injuries other than minor injuries and only the following
11/10/2005, Glasgow Airportdetainee with cut
head. No complaint received.
13/05/2006, Glasgow Airportdetainee with broken
bone in hand. No complaint received but investigation completed
by UKBA and no further action required.
24/01/2006, Heathrow Airportdetainee with
cut above eye. No complaint received.
01/10/2006, Heathrow Airportdetainee with
two broken bones. Complaint received. The complaint was not substantiated
29/01/2007, Heathrow Airport, detainee with dislocated
knee. Complaint received. The complaint was not substantiated
16/05/2009, Gatwick Airport, detainee lost a tooth.
No complaint received.
01 /10/2010, LHR/Lagos Flight, detainee with suspected
broken nose. No complaint received.
who have no right to remain in the UK must leave the country and,
if they refuse to do so voluntarily, they may have to be detained
for a short time, if necessary escorted throughout the flight
and, in extreme situations, may have to be restrained physically
in order to prevent greater harm. However, whenever the state
uses force to coerce a person, there need to be checks on that
force. These checks take the form of carefully constructed procedures
to limit harm, of adequate training and proper supervision of
staff, and adequate means of complaint and redress if anything
goes wrong. Where the state has contracted out responsibility
for coercion, it retains ultimate responsibility for ensuring
that all the checks are in place and working well. It is important
that this is understood within the culture of both the Agency
and that of its contractors, and not just acknowledged in formal
documents. This is one of a number of areas of activity where
there appears to be a reluctance by officials to accept constructive
criticism, and as the UK Border Agency is not an independent body,
but is in fact an integral part of the Home Office, this is a
matter that we call on the Home Secretary to require the Permanent
Secretary to address as part of the central management responsibilities
of the Department.
CONTROL AND RESTRAINT PROCEDURES
12. Contractors working for the UK Border Agency
may use only the control and restraint procedures developed and
approved by HM Prison Service.
G4S said: "As a company we cannot alter the guidance or training
methods from that approved by the relevant Government agencies."
These comprise a series of detailed procedures which are intended
to minimise the possibility of pain and injury to the detainee,
or to those required to restrain him or her. Different techniques
apply if the detainee is a minor.
G4S said that the key difference in the approaches was that juveniles
could not be subjected to methods intended to cause pain, whereas
adults could. Both
the UK Border Agency and G4S emphasised that force could lawfully
be used only as a last resort and that any use of force must be
necessary and proportionate.
13. In July 2010, the Ministry of Justice published
a document entitled 'Physical Control in Care Training Manual',
following a campaign by the families of two youths who died whilst
being held at secure training centres in 2004. The Manual warns
that certain restraint measures can cause permanent injury, and,
for example, under the heading of 'Medical Advice' warns that
the single greatest risk factor for permanent injury or death
is prolonged restraint, where the person violently resists for
an extended period of time.
G4S assured us that the changes in the treatment of minors recommended
in these guidelines had been implemented by November 2010.
14. We asked about the restraint techniques used,
in particular in the difficult and confined conditions of aircraft.
G4S said detainees might be handcuffed in aircraft, or they might
be subject to shoulder holds and arm locks to keep them seated,
or their head might be physically restrained in an upright position;
it denied that any techniques to hold the neck or keep the head
down were used. Ms
Homer said that, where there were specialised requirements not
fully covered by normal Ministry of Justice or National Offender
Management Service guidelinessuch as the problem of escorting
people in confined but public spaces such as aircraftthe
Agency tended to commission the Ministry of Justice to conduct
research on techniques and to provide advice on medical issues,
specific training, and the evaluation of techniques.
This seems to suggest that the Agencywhich, as we have
commented elsewhere, is in fact an integral part of the Home Officeshould
be commissioning work from another government department. We suggest
that this should have been referred to as work being commissioned
by the Home Office from the Ministry of Justice, and that the
lines of responsibility for such commissioning activity should
be made clear.
15. The difficulty of restraining detainees in an
aircraft seat was highlighted in July 2011, with the publication
of new research evidence, funded by the Youth Justice Board for
England and Wales, which showed that seated restraint positions
in which the person is leant forwards may increase the risk of
harm or death when they are used for prolonged periods.
Researchers noted that the level of force applied by staff carrying
out the experiment (on student volunteers) was slight compared
to what might be expected in a resisted, real-world restraint;
but volunteers nonetheless reported a feeling of being unable
to breath, and a significant reduction in lung function was measured.
In one case, the volunteer felt obliged to abort the procedure.
16. Although the Agency and its contractors deny
that head-down restraint positions are used, the O'Loan Report
noted that "under current Control and Restraint techniques
a person's head will be held down to prevent them from biting",
and Outsourcing Abuse describes several incidents in which
detainees claim to have been restrained with their heads held
down or with their bodies bent forwards.
It is difficult to believe that all these accounts are complete
17. It is sensible for a single agencyHM Prison
Serviceto take the lead in developing and evaluating safe
control and restraint procedures. However, there is the danger
that the specific needs of other agencies, including the UK Border
Agency, might be overlooked. This is particularly true of techniques
which can be used safely in the confined, crowded and public space
of an aircraft. Reports of head-down restraint positions are troubling
in the light of recent evidence which shows that the prolonged
use of such positions might carry a risk of death. Equally troubling
is the denials by G4S management that such techniques are ever
used, by which they appear to mean that staff are not trained
to use seated, head-down positions and that the use of such techniques
is not reported back to them.
18. We are not
persuaded that head-down restraint positions are never used, even
though they are not authorised. We recommend that the Home Office
issue urgent guidance to all staff involved in enforced removals
about the danger of seated restraint techniques in which the subject
is bent forwards. We also recommend that the Home Office commission
research into control and restraint techniques which are suitable
for use on an aircraft. The use by contractors of unauthorised
restraint techniques, sanctioning their use, or failing to challenge
their use, should be grounds for dismissal.
Escort to detainee ratios
19. One of the findings of the inspection reports
was that there were too many escorts on the flights. Instead of
the notional complement of around two escorts to one detainee,
there were 104 escorts accompanying 35 people on the Jamaica flight,
and on the Nigeria flight there were 131 staff for a planned total
of 59 people (though in the event only 53 people were removed).
The inspection report on the Jamaica flight recorded that the
number of staff present created unnecessary crowding at some stages
of the process, which put extras pressure on detainees.
The Chief Inspector told us that
It is a lot of people [...] and I think some of the
problems that occurred were simply because some of the escort
staff did not have anything to do, they were bored.
20. The high ratio of staff to detainees was at least
in part due to a number of those who were scheduled to be removed
dropping out of the process at a late stage, mostly due to High
21. The use
of excessive numbers of escorts, to the extent that HM Chief Inspector
of Prisons believes that escort numbers are in some cases detrimental
to the removals process, is hard to justify against a background
of reduced staffing levels across the public sector. It is a symptom
of a weakness in the contracting process that the contractor is
able to supply more staff than are required to do the job, with
costs passed on to the Home Office. When the contract for enforced
removals is next revised, it should specify precise ratios of
escorts to detainees and the contractor should be able to depart
from these only for clearly-defined, operational reasons.
THE USE OF "RESERVES"
22. In order to maximise the occupancy of seats on
charter flights, the Agency uses "reserves"detainees
who are taken to the airport in order to fill a vacant space should
another detainee's removal be blocked at a late stage in the process.
This means that in some cases, more detainees are taken to the
airport than there are available seats on the flight. Moreover,
detainees are not told that they are going as reserves. Some of
them, having prepared to return to their country of origin, are
returned to detention if no seat is available on the flight. These
people may be returned to a different immigration removal centre
from the one which they have just left.
23. The Chief Inspector describes this practice as
"objectionable and distressing", and "inhumane.
Although he has recommended that it should cease, the Home Office
continues to defend it on the grounds of efficiency.
We agree with HM Chief Inspector
of Prisons, that the use of reserves on enforced removal flights
should be discontinued.
PRACTICALITIES OF REMOVALS
24. Before any detainee is removed from the UK, a
detailed form has to be completed by Agency staff and those escorting
the detainee whichamong other thingsgives an indication
of any problems that might arise during removal and lists risk
factors, and includes a health review completed by medical staff
at the detention centre.
This assessment enables the Agency and its contractor to determine
the number of escort staff, the route, the flight to be taken,
and so on. We were
provided with a copy of this form, which is reproduced at Appendix
25. It seems
to us that the form concentrates mainly on any risk to those escorting
the detainee rather than to the detainee him/herself. Moreover,
the section on health is cramped, and it is not at all clear that
it would necessarily be completed in a way to make it immediately
comprehensible to a non-medical expert, like an escort officer:
the lack of space would tend to force the experts to make terse
notes rather than giving helpful detail. This is of special importance
if the use of someor anyrestraint techniques might
exacerbate an underlying medical condition, such as heart disease
26. While we
do not want to add to the paperwork which detention centres and
escort officers have to deal with, we consider that there is a
strong argument for providing a simple indication on the front
page of the form flagging up the fact that the detainee has a
medical condition which might lead to problems in the stressful
conditions of enforced deportation. If a possible problem is flagged
up, then the escort officers should be briefed on the practical
consequences before the removal begins.
Supervision and monitoring of
27. It is impossible for either the contractors or
the Agency to supervise all removals, so reporting and monitoring
are vital. We were told that, where this was practicable, CCTV
cameras and audio recording equipment were installed to monitor
the movement of detainees, for example in detention holding rooms
and in the vehicles used to transport detainees to airports, with
recordings being kept for three months. Moreover, on charter flights,
two medical practitioners and at least one Agency official were
28. Whenever physical restraint is used, escort officers
have to complete a detailed report explaining the circumstances
of the incident, why restraint was necessary and what was done.
These reports are made in the first place to the senior managers
of the contracting company, but are then sent at once to the Agency's
contract monitor for review.
If the contract manager considers that the use of force may have
been inappropriate, the report is passed to the Agency's Professional
Standards Unit for investigation.
In the most serious cases, the police may also be informed so
that they can investigate. However, while escorts were required
to note any minor injuries to the detainee or the fact that there
were no signs of injury, there was not an automatic medical examination
if the detainee appeared to have been injured, unless the injury
29. As far as monitoring is concerned, the Agency's
contract manager makes what the Agency describes as "ad hoc
visits" to airports to check on the procedures being used,
and HM Inspectorate of Prisons also regularly inspects and publishes
reports on all immigration detention facilities, including noting
and commenting on concerns related to the use of force during
removals. Independent Monitoring Boards at Heathrow Airport, Manchester
and in Scotland make frequent unannounced visits to detention
centres and review the care of those being escorted at the time.
30. Earlier this year, inspectors from HM Inspectorate
of Prisons observed removal flights first-hand for the first time.
Inspectors accompanied a flight to Jamaica in March and a flight
to Nigeria in April.
Some findings were positivecollection from detention centres
and transport were generally well-organised, escorts were generally
calm and professional and dealt sensitively with the inevitable
stresses and complications which arose. However, inspectors also
recorded instances of the use of racist language by some contractors:
Some officers used highly offensive and racist language
during conversations that could be overheard by detainees.
A senior officer used wholly unacceptable terms to
describe some minority groups; these included 'gippos', 'pikeys'
and 'typical Asians'. This was not in the hearing of detainees,
but it could be heard by other officers and communicated a disrespectful
and racist attitude.
31. We confirmed with HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
that the offensive language came from contractors and not from
UK Border Agency staff and that the staff knew that HMIP staff
were present when the remarks were made.
Agency staff who were present did not challenge the contractors
when they made these comments.
32. It is a
matter for serious concern that contractors should use racist
language among themselves. That they were content to do so in
front of not only UK Border Agency staff but also inspectors from
HM Inspectorate of Prisons is shocking. It is possibly the result
of a relationship between the Agency and its contractors which
had become too cosy. We recommend that the senior management of
the UK Border Agency send a clear and strong message to staff
who are involved in removals, that they have the full support
of senior management in challenging the use of racist language
by contractors, and that they are expected to do so. The contract
should be amended to include a provision which requires the contractor
to pay a financial penalty to the Home Office where there is a
proven incident of the use of racist language by its staff.
33. G4S said that every complaint of ill-treatment
by a detainee or a third party not notified directly to the UK
Border Agency was immediately forwarded to the Agency by the company.
The Agency's Professional Standards Unit would then carry out
an investigation, which it tried to complete within twelve weeks.
Where assault or other criminality was alleged, the complaint
would be automatically referred to the police at the same time.
If the complaint was substantiated, the Agency's response varied
according to the seriousness of the ill-treatment, ranging from
the provision of informal guidance by the company to the officer
concerned through to revocation of accreditation to work as an
escort. Any detainee dissatisfied with the Agency's investigation
could refer the matter to the Prisons and Probation ombudsman.
34. G4S and the Agency provided us with figures on
the number of complaints made and upheld. According to G4S, from
April 2005 to November 2010, 186 complaints were made about the
use of force during overseas escorting, of which six had been
wholly or partly substantiated.
The Agency gave figures for complaints between January 2009 and
November 2010, stating that no records of complaints were kept
centrally before January 2009. The Agency's figures are set out
in the following chart:
Complaints received by current status of investigation
35. G4S could not tell us specifically what happened
to the relevant officers as a result of the six complaints that
had been substantiated, but they did say that two people had been
dismissed during that period for inappropriate behaviour, and
one had resigned before the investigation had finished.
They later confirmed that, since 2005, twenty staff in total had
been disciplined, ranging from written and verbal warnings, additional
obligatory training to dismissal. Of these, they told us that
the majority of the actions were taken due to the company's own
internal reporting process.
36. It is impossible
to be sure whether the low number of complaints of inappropriate
use of force during removals reflects a system that basically
works well or one where potential complainants do not act because
they have been removed from the country and think it not worth
their while, or because they expect agents of the state to use
violence, or because they hope to return to the UK and do not
wish to appear to be troublemakers.
37. The number
of incidents recorded in Outsourcing Abuse, together with the
findings of the O'Loan Review, suggest that the scale of the problem
is likely to be much greater than the number of complaints would
suggest. We accept Baroness O'Loan's finding that there is no
evidence of systematic abuse rather, it suggests a significant
number of isolated incidents. As with the use of racist language,
we are concerned that this is an area where UK Border Agency staff
may not feel confident to challenge contractors when they really
should do so. The Agency cannot rely on the complaints process
to flag up recurrent problems because most people, once they have
been removed from the country, will either find it too difficult
to make a complaint, or will not see the point in doing so.
38. We have heard
concern from a range of sources about the treatment of detainees
on enforced removal flights, which is not reflected in the number
of complaints, for understandable reasons. Those who have already
been removed from the country are less likely to see the complaints
process through to its conclusion. Part of the problem, in our
view, is that the Agency's monitoring of contractors has not been
sufficiently robust. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons clearly has
a significant part to play in ensuring that high standards are
achieved and maintained, but there is a limit to the number of
inspections that the Inspectorate can undertake.
39. An important
safeguard against the ill-treatment of prisoners is the Independent
Monitoring Board, a group of independent volunteers who have unrestricted
access to the prison, who can talk to prisoners privately, away
from the hearing of staff. Board Members are able to deal with
specific problems relating to individual prisoners as well as
wider issues affecting the whole prison. Immigration removal centres
also have Independent Monitoring Boards, as do some holding facilities
at airports. It would clearly not be possible to provide Independent
Monitoring Boards with access to removals flights in exactly the
same way that they have access to prisons, but access could nonetheless
be provided. For example, it might not be possible for each Board
to monitor the removal of detainees from its own removal centre
since detainees from several centres may be removed on the same
flight, but is should be possible for a representative of one
Board to have access to each flight. An independent presence on
removals flights would be a positive influence on those conducting
the removal, as well as providing public reassurance about the
standard of care and decent treatment that is provided on flights.
40. We recommend
that members of the Independent Monitoring Boards for immigration
removal centresor a similar independent monitoring networkbe
given access to chartered removal flights. However, the main issue
is the need for better management and more confident behaviour
by staff of the Agency and this is a matter that must be addressed
by the Permanent Secretary in relation to removals as well as
to the generality of the work of this Agency which isas
we have pointed out repeatedlyan integral part of the Home
Office and not an independent or arm's-length agency.
1 Fourth Report of Session 2010-11, HC 587 In this
report, Lin Homer's evidence will be distinguished by references
in the form Q x (UKBA) Back
Published on 7 July 2011 Back
Ev 15 Back
Letter from the Chief Executive of the UK Border Agency dated
16 November 2011 (Annex A). The figures were provided with the
caveat that the information was based on local management Information
rather than published statistics and was therefore subject to
Ev 15. The figures were supplied in October 2010. Back
Report to the UK Border Agency on "Outsourcing Abuse"
by Baroness O'Loan DBE (UKBA, March 2010) Back
Birnberg Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice and the National
Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, Outsourcing Abuse,
July 2008 Back
Report to the UK Border Agency on "Outsourcing Abuse"
by Baroness O'Loan DBE (UKBA, March 2010) Back
Qq 54-56 (UKBA), see also Q4 (G4S) Back
Ev 13 Back
Q 44 (UKBA) Back
Ev 14 Back
The techniques used for minors are known as "Physical Control
in Care"; those used for adults are known as "Control
and Restraint Techniques" Back
Q 11 Back
Qq 6-7 and Ev 16 Back
Ministry of Justice, Physical Control in Care Training Manual,
July 2010, p 33 Back
Ev 15 and Qq 33-38 Back
Qq 16-21 Back
Q 58 Back
Parkes, et al, Effect of seated restraint and body size on lung
function, Medicine, Science and the Law, Vol. 51, pp. 177-181. Back
Op cit, p 51 Back
See, for example, cases B1, B5 (and F6) B7, B8, C4, C7, D4, E2,
F1, F7 and F9. Back
Qq 15-26 Back
Op. cit., pp 8-9 Back
Q 51 Back
This practice is described in HM Chief Inspector of Prisons' Report
on an announced inspection of Tinsley House Immigration Removal
Centre, 7-11 February 2011 (published July 2011). Back
Ibid, p. 5 Back
Qq 46-47 Back
Qq 64-69 (UKBA) Back
Ev 12 Back
Page 15. The form is reproduced at about 90% of its original size. Back
Qq 43-44 Back
Qq 8-10 Back
The Professional Standards Unit is part of the UK Border Agency
(and therefore part of the Home Office). It is responsible only
for complaints about the conduct of UK Border Agency staff, not
for professional standards in other parts of the Home Office.
If complainants are unsatisfied with the outcome of the investigation
by the Professional Standards Unit, where they relate to the treatment
of detainees they can complain to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman.
There is a separate UK Border Agency Security and Anti-Corruption
Unit which investigates cases where corruption is suspected. Back
Ev 16 Back
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons , Detainees under escort: Inspection
of escort and removals to Jamaica 24-25 March 2011 and Detainees
under escort: Inspection of escort and removals to Nigeria 20-21
April 2011 (published July 2011). Back
Nigeria Report, paragraph 4.18 Back
Nigeria Report , paragraph 4.21 Back
Qq 54-58 Back
Ev 16 Back
With the caveat that the data was based on management information
rather than published statistics and was subject to change. Back
Qq 28-32 Back
Ev 14 Back