Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
suspect that violent radicalisation is declining within the Muslim
community. There may be growing support for nonviolent extremism,
fed by feelings of alienation, and while this may not lead to
a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for violent extremism,
it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general and
for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth
in more extreme and violent forms of far-right ideology. Indeed
it is clear that individuals from many different backgrounds are
vulnerable, with no typical profile or pathway to radicalisation.
However, there is a lack of objective data, much of the evidence
inevitably being anecdotal. Only 250 people have been convicted
in the UK of terrorism-related offences since 11 September 2001.
However, there is a wealth of knowledge held by people working
with individuals judged to be vulnerable to violent radicalisation
at a local level that could better inform our understanding of
why some of these individuals do become radicalised and, crucially,
why some do not. One of the aims of the increased auditing demands
to be placed on Channel providers should be the collection of
a wider range of data to contribute to this evidence base. We
recommend that the Government publish the methodology whereby
this data will be collated and analysed, and make arrangements
for suitably de-sensitised data to be made available to the wider
research community. (Paragraph 21)
2. One of the few
clear conclusions we were able to draw about the drivers of radicalisation
is that a sense of grievance is key to the process. Addressing
perceptions of Islamophobia, and demonstrating that the British
state is not antithetical to Islam, should constitute a main focus
of the part of the Prevent Strategy which is designed to counter
the ideology feeding violent radicalisation. (Paragraph 22)
3. The Government
notes in the Prevent Strategy that individuals "who distrust
Parliament" are at particular risk of violent radicalisation.
This appeared to be borne out in our inquiry, both in terms of
Islamist and extreme far-right- radicalisation. Individuals are
frustrated because they feel unable to participate in the political
process and feel that mainstream parties do not recognise their
concerns. This may not be true and we stress that we are talking
about perceptions. Clearly there is much to be done by Parliamentarians
and by the political parties to ensure that there is a nonviolent
outlet for individuals throughout society, but we also consider
that there is an insufficient focus within Prevent on building
trust in democratic institutions at all levels. This should be
emphasised more strongly, including how work currently being undertaken
by the Government Equality Office to implement the 2010 recommendations
of the Speaker's Conference on Parliamentary Representation feeds
into Prevent. (Paragraph 23)
4. As with the scale
and drivers of radicalisation, it proved difficult for us to gain
a clear understanding of where violent radicalisation takes place.
In terms of the four sectors we explored—universities, prisons,
religious institutions and the internet—we conclude that
religious institutions are not a major cause for concern but that
the internet does play a role in violent radicalisation, although
a level of face-to-face interaction is also usually required.
The role of prisons and universities was less obvious. Much of
the uncertainty relates to the fact that a number of convicted
terrorists have attended prisons and universities, but there is
seldom concrete evidence to confirm that this is where they were
radicalised. The Home Office told us that violent radicalisation
is increasingly taking place in private homes, particularly as
the authorities clamp down on radicalisation in more public arenas.
Given this, we are concerned that too much focus in the Prevent
Strategy is placed on public institutions such as universities,
and that it may be more accurate, and less inflammatory, to describe
them as places where radicalisation "may best be identified".
We consider that the emphasis on the role of universities by government
departments is now disproportionate. (Paragraph 38)
5. One further issue
that came to our attention was that there may be a particular
risk of radicalisation linked to membership of some criminal gangs,
of which there is no mention in the Prevent Strategy. Given the
fact that elsewhere some terrorist organisations appear to have
identified recruitment to gangs within prison as providing an
opportunity for radicalisation, we suggest that the authorities
should be alert to the potential for a future threat in this area.
We recommend that the Government commission a piece of research
to explore these issues in more detail. (Paragraph 39)
6. On the whole, witnesses
supported the outcome of the Prevent Review. We too welcome many
aspects of the new Strategy, which appears to address some of
the major criticisms levelled at its predecessors. (Paragraph
41)
7. A view was expressed
by some of those giving evidence to us, and those to whom we spoke
less formally, that the revised Prevent Strategy only pays lip
service to the threat from extreme far-right terrorism. We accept
that Prevent resources should be allocated proportionately to
the terrorist threat, and that to an extent we must rely upon
the intelligence and security services to make this judgement.
However, we received persuasive evidence about the potential threat
from extreme far-right terrorism. The ease of travel and communications
between countries in Europe and the growth of far-right organisations,
which appear to have good communications with like-minded groups
within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm evidence
should not be a reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent
Strategy should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to
tackle far right radicalisation as well as explicitly acknowledge
the potential interplay between different forms of violent extremism,
and the potential for measures directed at far-right extremism
to have a consequential effect on Islamist extremism, and vice
versa. (Paragraph 46)
8. We accept that
some universities may have been complacent about their role, and,
while we agree in principle that universities are ideal places
to confront extremist ideology, we are not convinced that extremists
on campus are always subject to equal and robust challenge. We
recommend that the Government issue clearer guidance to universities
about their expected role in Prevent, following consultation with
university and student representative bodies. We would hope that
college authorities and student bodies will recognise that individuals
or groups expressing hatred against any particular race or nationality
is simply not acceptable on a British campus, and certainly needs
to be challenged immediately. (Paragraph 51)
9. We further recommend
that, a designated contact point with relevant expertise within
Government is provided to student unions and university administrators
to assist them in making difficult decisions about speakers on
campus. (Paragraph 52)
10. The Counter-Terrorism
Internet Referral Unit does limited but valuable work in challenging
internet service providers to remove violent extremist material
where it contravenes the law. We suggest that the Government work
with internet service providers in the UK to develop a Code of
Conduct committing them to removing violent extremist material,
as defined for the purposes of section 3 of the Terrorism Act
2006. Many relevant websites are hosted abroad: the Government
should also therefore strive towards greater international cooperation
to tackle this issue. (Paragraph 59)
11. Given the impossibility
of completely ridding the internet of violent extremist material,
it is important to support defences against it. We support the
Government's approach to empowering civil society groups to counter
extremist ideology online. The whole area of communications technology
and social networking is complex and extremely fast-moving. A
form of interaction that is commonly used by thousands or even
millions of people at one point in time may only have been developed
a matter of months or even weeks earlier. It follows that legislation
and regulation struggle to keep up and can provide a blunt instrument
at best. Leaders in fields such as education, the law and Parliament
also need to be involved. Evidence taken by this committee in
regard to the riots in London last August showed that some police
forces have identified social networks as providing both challenges
and opportunities, with the message from one chief constable that
the police recognised that 'we need to be engaged'. In respect
of terrorism, as in respect of organised crime, the Government
should seek to build on the partnership approach to prevention
that has proved successful in the field of child abuse and child
protection. (Paragraph 60)
12. Good aftercare
is critical to ensuring that prisoners who may have been vulnerable
to violent extremist ideology in prison can make the transition
safely into the community, and family involvement is critical
to good aftercare. We are concerned that The National Offender
Management Service has not paid more attention to ensuring that
conditions of release do not unnecessarily restrict family contact
and indeed actively encourage positive family support and engagement.
Where there is a tendency for a family to reject the offender
it can be important for the mosque to encourage the family to
provide support and engagement. We are not convinced that the
work of the chaplaincy in facilitating the transition from prison
to the home community is as effective as it needs to be, although
we were impressed with the hopes and aspirations which were described
to us by the Imams we met and it is clear that there are serious
moves within the Muslim community to create the necessary structures
and arrangements.. We recommend that this is always taken into
account. We also heard conflicting evidence about the level of
support available in the community and recommend that resources
are prioritised towards closing any gaps. (Paragraph 65)
13. The National Offender
Management Service must be an equal participant in the Prevent
strategy, alongside other agencies. We are very concerned that
prison authorities are not receiving feedback about prisoners
vulnerable to radicalisation after their release. Such information
would be critical to improving understanding of prison radicalisation
and prison processes for monitoring and dealing with it. We recommend
that the Government should a) implement a system whereby this
information is fed back into prisons and b) develop a portal that
would allow the relevant agencies dealing with prisoner intelligence,
including the UK Border Agency, to share data more quickly and
easily. (Paragraph 66)
14. We fully agree
with the Government that public money should not be used to fund
groups who hold views that contradict fundamental British values.
However, we are concerned that the parameters for this policy
are not sufficiently clear and that the situation could arise
whereby risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for
effective groups because of unfounded allegations of "extremism".
The Government should draw up and issue guidelines with clear
criteria to potential funders. We also note that several Channel
providers have recently lost funding and there is currently a
lack of capacity on the ground to deliver the Strategy. This should
be rectified urgently. (Paragraph 74)
15. The view came
across strongly in our evidence that Prevent is most successful
at the local level where it is mainstreamed into local safeguarding
procedures, youth services, neighbourhood policing and so forth.
We support this approach and encourage the Government to do the
same. (Paragraph 75)
16. Despite the Government's efforts to
remedy this perception, there is a lingering suspicion about the
Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities, many of whom continue
to believe that it is essentially a tool for intelligence-gathering
or spying. This might be mitigated if these communities felt more
ownership of the strategy: the Government should be even more
open and transparent about whom it engages with in the UK's varied
Muslim communities and should seek to engage more widely. Only
through engagement will the Government be able to get communities
on their side and really prevent radicalisation. It would also
be assisted by adopting a more pro-active approach to combating
negative publicity, particularly in respect of the Channel programme.
We saw plenty of evidence during our enquiry both of engagement
and of considerable expertise within the Muslim community. This
needs to be acknowledged and respected by the authorities in order
to strengthen the foundations of the partnership approach, which
is proving effective in many places. Finally, we believe there
is a strong case for re-naming the Prevent Strategy to reflect
a positive approach to collaboration with the Muslim communities
of the UK, for example the Engage Strategy.
(Paragraph 80)
17. The language used
to talk about Prevent, and counter-terrorism more generally, can
have a detrimental effect on Muslim communities' willingness to
cooperate with Prevent where it conflates terrorism with the religion
of Islam. The Prevent Strategy largely manages to avoid this.
However, those engaged in public life must ensure that the language
they use reflects the same tone. (Paragraph 81)
18. The Government
recently reviewed proscription legislation as part of the review
of counter-terrorism powers published in January 2011. We agree
with the decision not to strengthen the law on proscription in
a way which would allow for the banning of groups which are currently
operating within the law, as the evidence suggests that proscription
would not be effective and could be counter-productive. However,
we are concerned that it is too difficult for groups who no longer
pose a terrorist threat to obtain de-proscription, a move which
might encourage some groups in their move away from active support
for terrorism. We therefore endorse the recommendation of the
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the law be
changed to make proscription orders time-limited. (Paragraph 87)
19. Violent radicalisation
is clearly a problem within the UK but it takes place within an
international context and it is important for the UK authorities
to be aware of developments elsewhere and to share information
with partners abroad, both in respect of extremist Islamist organisations
or movements, and in respect of extreme right-wing groups within
Europe and America. However, the strongest forces against radicalisation
are the partnerships of mutual respect and shared citizenship
within the UK and within local communities in our towns and cities.
The evidence given by Muslim organisations was impressive and
we were encouraged by the evidence of greater effectiveness of
local partnerships, of leadership within individual communities
such as the student community, and the evidence of joined up thinking,
for instance in preparing for the return of offenders to the community.
It is important for the government to demonstrate, by action and
words, strong support for these initiatives as well as maintaining
the determination to support the work of intelligence agencies
and the police in tackling those who choose the route of violence
and intervening to protect those they seek to recruit. (Paragraph
88)
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