Piracy off the coast of Somalia

PIR 04

Written evidence from BCB International Ltd

Summary:

· Industry Best Management Practice (BMP) is not currently meeting the perceived needs of the merchant fleet as evidenced by the increasing calls for the use of armed personnel on board merchant vessels.

· Military Naval support is effective on a local scale but not on a regional scale and there are insufficient resources in military terms to attempt to cover the vast geographical operating environment.

· The perceived vulnerability of the merchant fleet may act as encouragement to others considering acts of piracy or, more concerning, as potential targets for acts of terrorism.

· The use of armed personnel is fraught with difficulties in terms of C2 and legality and runs the risk of militarising the merchant fleet with no proper standards or regulations in place. Equally the provision of armed personnel carries with it the risk of an ‘arms race’ between the protagonists.

· No comprehensive studies of proactive non-lethal counter piracy systems has taken place to date meaning that their efficacy is unknown despite the ability of non-lethal systems to offer a potential solution to industry (both in terms of security firms offering guard services and the merchant fleet).

· Selecting armed personnel as a generic solution before a thorough consideration and appraisal of the alternatives runs the risk of channelling the industry into a single lethal option.

Jonathan Delf was educated at Royal Holloway University London. From 1996 to 1998 he served with the Royal Navy as a Warfare Officer on board HMS Coventry, HMS Hurworth and HMS London. He subsequently transferred to the British Army where he served as a Commissioned Officer with an Infantry Regiment (Royal Anglian Regiment) in operational theatres including Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan until 2008. He now serves as a Reserve Officer with 104 Regiment Royal Artillery (V). As project manager for BCB International’s ‘Buccaneer’ non-lethal air pressurised launcher system he advises the project board with respect to the tactical deployment of non-lethal devices. He advises BCB International Ltd’s Research and Development Department with respect to capability, development and specification of the ‘Buccaneer’ in order to meet end user requirements.

1. BCB International Ltd is an established and long term supplier to the UK MoD. BCB International Ltd manufactures a comprehensive range of security related products to military and security forces globally. BCB International has won two Queen’s Awards for Export Achievement as well as the acclaimed Wales Innovation Award 2010. It is approved to ISO 9001:2008 International Quality Standard.

2. On 7 June 2011 the Rt Hon Alun Michael MP submitted written Parliamentary questions with respect to what evaluation the Secretary of State for Transport’s Department had under taken of non-lethal equipment to counter acts of piracy [Hansard 58151].

3. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mike Penning MP, replied that: "The industry-developed document ‘Best Management Practices’ sets out a range of non-lethal ship self-protection measures which can help avoid, deter or delay acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and throughout the Indian Ocean. The recommendations included in BMP are wide ranging and include the use of non-lethal equipment to inhibit boarding by pirates, such as razor wire, electrified barriers, anti-climb paint and water sprays; and the use of binoculars and night vision optics to assist in identifying potential threats. The Department for Transport has previously evaluated a number of these measures as part of a research and development programme, and the results were communicated to industry".

4. It is submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee that the BMP, whilst welcome, have not sufficiently protected vessels transiting high risk areas. The advice contained within the BMP is predominantly passive and / or reactive in nature. In some cases the advice suggested is beyond the capability of the vessel (high speed manoeuvring) or is only applicable once the vessel is being boarded (vessel hardening) or indeed has been boarded. Evidence that the current BMP are not providing a sufficient solution is demonstrated both by the increasing number of attempted pirate attacks taking place, successful pirate attacks and by the growing demands from the marine industry to be able to employ armed personnel on board vessels transiting these regions.

5. Of particular concern to the Foreign Affairs Committee will be the high risks entailed with the prospect of trade in international waters becoming increasingly ‘militarised’ through any provision of armed personnel. The impact of such an environment upon the tactics and modus operandi of the pirate groups will be self-evident. As pirates encounter lethal resistance from merchant vessels the natural conclusion will be an escalation of lethal force being applied by both parties. In the worst case scenario it seems logical to conclude that pirate attacks may well involve pre-emptive use of lethal force as the norm rather than the exception.

6. More concerning is the implication that once faced with well trained, professional armed personnel the pirates will look to armed extremist groups, such as Al Qaida, for advice, training, equipment and support in executing their acts of piracy. Pushing these normally disparate groups together by means of necessity and mutual gain is likely to have long lasting and serious ramifications for global sea trade.

7. Whilst the provision of international military Naval support is not to be discounted in terms of deterring acts of piracy, the geographical scale of the problem means that the use of military forces can never be a single solution to the issue. Naval support can be effective in localised areas whilst those forces are in place, but cannot realistically cover the entire region in sufficient time or numbers.

8. Currently industry, both in the UK and abroad, has developed several innovative and practical non-lethal devices that through a layered approach could significantly assist the merchant fleet. Consideration and support for these solutions has, as demonstrated by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State’s reply to questions in the House, been somewhat lack lustre. Provision however of non-lethal proactive defensive devices has the capability to fill the gap between passive protective measures and the application of lethal force. Lethal force is most commonly supported due to its ability to cause an effect at range from the vessel under attack, thereby providing an intermediate layer of defence between visual identification and vessel hardening. Lethal force however entails all of the problems mentioned above with the additional complexities of international, and domestic law. The application of non-lethal effects at range from a vessel or platform maintains the spirit of the BMP in terms of non-lethal deterrents whilst filling the capability gap in terms of a layered approach.

Recommendations:

We believe it would be precipitous for the UK Government to introduce legislation which allows the carriage of armed guards on board UK Flag vessels without first properly conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness and adequacy of self-protective measures available to the industry, including non-lethal devices. This would allow confidence that all potential protective measures had been exhausted before lethal force was selected as the preferred recommendation to industry, or equally, in the event of an attack on a vessel, the response would be both incremental and proportional to the threat.

A failure to consider the value of an incremental and proportional response could very well lead to a situation whereby lethal force is used in error with the resultant backlash of public opinion precluding its use thereafter.

1 July 2011