2 Partnership with the EU's Neighbourhood
| (32815)
10794/11
COM(11) 303
| Commission Communication: A new response to a changing Neighbourhood
|
| Legal base | —
|
| Document originated | 8 March 2011
|
| Deposited in Parliament | 14 March 2011
|
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | EM and Minister's letter of 3 June 2011
|
| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (32588) 7592/11: HC 428-xxiii (2010-11), chapter 9 (5 April 2011); also see (29704) 9865/08: HC 428-x (2010-11), chapter 16 (8 December 2010); HC 19-xvii (2008-09), chapter 7 (14 October 2009); HC 19-xv (2008-09), chapter 1 (29 April 2009); HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008) and HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008); also see (29029) —: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November 2007)
|
| Discussed in Council | 20 June 2011 European Council
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Not cleared; for debate in European Committee B
|
Background
2.1 On 4 February 2011, the European Council met to discuss developments
in Tunisia and Egypt. In its subsequent declaration, the EU said
that was determined to lend its full support to the transition
processes towards democratic governance, pluralism, improved opportunities
for economic prosperity and social inclusion, and strengthened
regional stability; and committed to a new partnership involving
more effective support in the future to those countries pursuing
political and economic reforms including through the European
Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean.
2.2 In this context, the European Council invited
the High Representative within the framework of this partnership
to develop a package of measures aimed at lending European Union
support to the transition and transformation processes (strengthening
democratic institutions, promoting democratic governance and social
justice, and assisting the preparation and conduct of free and
fair elections); and to link the European Neighbourhood Policy
and Union for the Mediterranean more to these objectives.[9]
The Commission and High Representative's earlier
Joint Communication
2.3 At our meeting on 4 April we considered this
first formal response. The Communication recalled the European
Union's "proud tradition of supporting countries in transition
from autocratic regimes to democracy" and, while "respecting
what are primarily internal transformation processes", offered
the expertise of governments, the European Commission, the European
Parliament, local and regional authorities, political parties,
foundations, trade unions and civil society organizations. Based
on "a shared interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous
and peaceful Southern Mediterranean", the Commission/HR proposed
"a qualitative step forward in the relations between the
EU and its Southern neighbours…[which] should be rooted unambiguously
in a joint commitment to common values…[and] expressed in
recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious
political and economic reforms." On this basis, the Commission/HR
said that the EU was ready to support all its Southern neighbours
who were able and willing to embark on such reforms through a
"Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity" —
this having to be based on commitments to and concrete progress
on democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and
the rule of law. The approach would need to be differentiated,
acknowledging the fact that, despite some commonalities, no two
countries in the region were the same.
2.4 After reviewing what the EU had done to address
the short-term consequences of recent events in North Africa and
spell out their approach to the longer term process of "turning
into reality the tremendous hopes that have been voiced in the
region… by listening, not only to requests for support from
partner governments, but also to demands expressed by civil society",
the Communication set out the three elements on which the Partnership
would be based:
— democratic
transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus
on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the
judiciary and the fight against corruption;
— a strong partnership with the people,
with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced
opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with
a particular focus on the young; and
— sustainable and inclusive growth and
economic development, especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health
and education systems and development of the poorer regions
2.5 The detail of these elements includes an incentive-based
approach based on greater differentiation —"more for
more" — in which those that went "further and
faster" in their reforms would receive greater support. A
commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections would
be the entry qualification. Progress in human rights and governance
would have minimum benchmarks against which performance would
be assessed. Those who did not follow agreed reform plans would
have their support reallocated. The Partnership would be underpinned
by enhanced political dialogue, with a strong focus on human rights
and political accountability. Partner countries carrying out the
necessary reforms could expect to resume negotiations on Association
Agreements with the aim of achieving "advanced status",
viz., significantly strengthened political dialogue, increased
links between the partner country and EU institutions, deeper
engagement on mobility and improved market access to the EU.
2.6 A "Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility"
would be created to help develop the advocacy capacity of civil
society organisations and increase their ability to monitor reform,
and the EU would continue its work on supporting capacity building
to strengthen government institutions and strengthen borders and
migration, asylum and law-enforcement co-operation, to improve
security.
2.7 "Mobility Partnerships" would be drawn
up in order to manage movement of persons between the EU and third
countries would include visa facilitation and readmission agreements,
and, eventually, steps towards visa liberalisation.
2.8 The promotion of economic development, including
support for SMEs, an increase in the European Investment Bank's
(EIB) general lending envelope by €1 billion, extending the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) operations
to the region, and allowing "reflows" — the re-investment
of previous financing operations to support the private sector
— were all outlined.
2.9 The proposal also addressed longer term financing
issues and refocusing existing programmes. Noting that €4
billion was currently available to the region under the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Communication
stated that all ENPI programmes for the region would be screened
and possibly re-focused to address the Partnership's three priorities.
It also detailed the need to leverage loans via IFIs, and encouraged
Member States to contribute to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility
(NIF), which provided grant support.
2.10 The development of trade and investment would
be supported through the conclusion of a single, regional, Convention
on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin. It would
include the conclusion of EU trade liberalisation agreements and
the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas,[10]
building on the current Association Agreements.[11]
2.11 Sectoral co-operation would include the establishment
of an EU-South Mediterranean Energy Community with the long-term
aim of extending the Energy Community Treaty; launching an Agricultural/rural
development support programme; increasing participation in education
programmes; and developing access to the Internet and other communication
technologies.
2.12 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 29 March 2011,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) described the proposed
changes as "broadly in line with UK thinking and the views
I expressed to the European Commission in response to their review
of the ENP."
2.13 The Minister continued as follows:
"We share their thinking on the need for greater
differentiation between countries. We have stressed that strict
conditionality is essential; that clear and measurable conditions
must underpin the EU's relationship with countries in the region,
and that those countries who meet agreed reforms should continue
to receive EU funding, whereas those that fail to reform should
have funding withheld. We have stressed the need for reforms in
human rights and governance to be given greatest priority."
2.14 The Minister was not opposed to the principle
of "Advanced Status", though he thought that the EU
should clarify what this status entailed, including what benefits
beneficiary countries might expect as a result.
2.15 The Minister supported the involvement of civil
society in the development of good governance and monitoring of
human rights.
2.16 The Minister went on to note that, as the UK
did not participate in the EU common visa policy, the EU visa
facilitation and liberalisation agreement proposals would not
apply to the UK.
2.17 With regards to financing, the Minister said:
"We believe that priority reforms can be supported
by the reallocation of existing funding, rather than an increase
in budget, so we are content that the Communication states that
assistance will come from the current EU budget."
2.18 The Minister then said that he was opposed to
the proposal of a general increase in the European Investment
Bank's (EIB) mandate, commenting as follows:
"The Chancellor is prepared to support the proposed
additional lending envelope of €1 billion, but subject to
the conditionality that the €1 billion increase is a one-off,
temporary increase, and that it is a stand-alone increase and
not part of a larger increase to general EIB lending. Our policy
on 'reflows' — recycling funding from one year to the next
— is guided by our commitment to the principle of budget
discipline that is enforced by the return of repayments to Member
States. Whilst we appreciate that the introduction of reflows
would facilitate more flexible use of funds, this should not be
at the expense of budget discipline. We favour a return of repayments
to Member States to ensure a balanced EU budget at the end of
the financial year."
2.19 With regard to the trade components of the proposal,
the Minister says:
"We share the view that development of sustainable
trade is key to the general reinvigoration of economies in the
region, and that the removal of barriers to trade with the EU,
and the opening of EU markets, would support this. The opening
of markets is one of the greatest incentives to reform we are
able to offer the region. However, we are aware of the sensitivities
of some, particularly southern, Member States to the opening of
certain sectors — in particular agriculture — and
are realistic about the difficulty of securing the agreement of
all Member States to this."
2.20 On the sectoral element, the Minister welcomed
in principle the proposal to establish an EU-South Mediterranean
Energy Community and will follow its development."
2.21 Finally, and looking ahead, the Minster said
that, as "an expression of the views of the Commission"
there was no timetable for implementation, and that the individual
proposals the Communication covered would be "dealt with
independently of the Communication and according to their nature."
2.22 On 14 March 2011, the European Council held
an extraordinary session to discuss developments in Libya and
the Southern neighbourhood region and set the political direction
and priorities for future EU policy and action. The Council noted
that progress and democracy needed to go hand in hand, and all
countries in the region needed to undertake or accelerate political
and economic reforms; and said that the EU would support all steps
towards democratic transformation, political systems that allowed
for peaceful change, growth and prosperity, and a more proportionate
distribution of the benefits of economic performance. It endorsed
the notion that progress by partners towards transformation would
drive EU support. Developing strong democratic institutions would
be one of the key objectives. On a more general level, the Council
noted that existing partnership and assistance programmes would
be rapidly reviewed, in close cooperation with partners in the
region, in order to target better. In this context, the Council
called on the Commission and the High Representative to give priority
to country-focused and performance based approaches. Looking to
the medium term, the European Council called for a new partnership
with the region, in line with its declaration of 4 February 2011,
broadly welcomed the joint communication and called on the Council
to examine rapidly the proposals contained in the communication
and in particular the conditions under which the EU's support
to its partners could be enhanced.
2.23 In particular, the Council was asked:
— to
agree urgently pending proposals on pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules
of origin (and the Commission was invited to present proposals
on further means to enhance trade and foreign direct investment
in the region in the short, medium and long term);
— to consider rapidly the Commission's
proposals on European Investment Bank reflows and look at further
possibilities to increase the EIB's overall financial support
capacity; and
— to review the missions of the Union for
the Mediterranean, with the objective of promoting democracy and
fostering stability in the region and giving "a new push"
to concrete measures and projects so as to strengthen democratic
institutions, freedom of expression, including unhindered access
to internet, reinforce civil societies, support the economy, reduce
poverty and address social injustice.[12]
Our assessment
2.24 We noted that the Barcelona Process (a.k.a.
the Euro-Med Process) was launched during the 1995 Spanish Presidency
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners — Algeria,
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority,
Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (Libya has observer status since 1999)
— with the aim of building "a space of dialogue, peace,
security and shared prosperity". At the outset, the Commission
described this as "a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean
relations". On examining the most recent Commission Communication
on the Process in November 2007, the previous Committee concluded
that, in reality, it had become impossible to judge the extent
to which the Process was merely processing, rather than achieving
concrete outcomes; and that, with approximately €4.7 billion
committed in 2000-06 and a further €1.3 billion earmarked
for 2007-10, it was time to examine the Process more closely,
via a debate on the Communication in the European Standing Committee.[13]
That debate took place on 22 January 2008.[14]
2.25 During that debate, there was some, perforce
limited, discussion of President Sarkozy's idea of a "Union
of the Mediterranean". The subsequent Communication (which
the previous Committee considered on 18 June 2008)[15]
set out the rationale for the Process and a vision for enhanced
co-operation. The intention was to build on the existing process,
but add a number of higher-profile projects to give added impetus
and visibility. Funding arrangements were somewhat imprecise.
The Commission noted that the EU and its Member States already
provided significant funding in the Mediterranean region,
[16] but that "to
bring added value to existing arrangements, the 'Barcelona Process:
Union for the Mediterranean' should be designed to mobilise additional
funding for the region, mainly through regional projects",
and that "its added value will very much depend on its capacity
to attract more financial resources for regional projects."
The UMed process was finally launched in November 2008.
2.26 Two years on, when the Committee last considered
the UMed, the Minister for Europe noted that the second UMed Summit
(due to have been held in Barcelona on 21 November 2010) had been
postponed, for a second time and sine die, because of the
lack of progress on a resumption of direct talks in the Middle
East Peace Process, and that a new date had not yet been set;
and the Secretariat had yet to become fully operational or make
substantial progress on developing and promoting any projects.
2.27 We outlined these earlier endeavours to establish
a productive partnership with the EU's southern neighbours not
to pour cold water on the latest manifestation, but to illustrate
the difficulties of implementation. While it was customary in
such circumstances to say that the proof of the pudding would
be in the eating, we felt that it was by no means clear what could
be achieved, when the polity of so many of the southern neighbours
was in a state of radical flux, and in circumstances very different
from those facing the then Member States in central and eastern
Europe in 1989. In present circumstances, it was by no means clear
what form the entry qualification of a "commitment to adequately
monitored, free and fair elections" would take, in societies
with little or no parliamentary history or embryonic civil society
(in contrast to the situation in Europe in 1989). Or whether,
once the process was underway, the EU would really be willing
to slow down or turn off funding in the face of backsliding.
2.28 Nevertheless, unpromising as the context was,
we felt that there was no good alternative to the essence of what
was proposed — with the proviso, as the Minister had rightly
noted, that priority reforms were supported by the reallocation
of existing funding, rather than any increase in budget.
2.29 We then cleared the document.[17]
The Commission and High Representative's further
Joint Communication
2.30 European Neighbourhood Policy was first proposed
by the Commission in 2003-2004 as a framework policy through which
an enlarged EU could strengthen and deepen relations with its
16 closest neighbours (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco,
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine) with
a view to counteracting risks of marginalisation for the neighbouring
countries which had not participated in the historic 2004 enlargement
and therefore ensuring the strengthening of a shared area of prosperity,
stability and security.
2.31 On 25 May 2011, as the centrepiece of a review
of the ENP, the Commission and High Representative produced this
further Joint Communication — "A New Response to a
Changing Neighbourhood" — which builds on the previous
Joint Communication.
2.32 It begins by noting that since its inception
in 2004, the ENP has promoted a variety of important initiatives,
particularly on the trade and economic front, which have allowed
the EU and its neighbours to develop stronger relationships, exchanges
and co-operation in virtually all policy fields, from energy to
education, from transport to research. It says that EU assistance
has increased and is better targeted:
"But there is room for improvement on all sides
of the relationship. Recent events and the results of the review
have shown that EU support to political reforms in neighbouring
countries has met with limited results. There is for example a
need for greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing
with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs — whether
they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process
of reform and democratic consolidation. Coordination between the
EU, its Member States and main international partners is essential
and can be improved."
2.33 Against this background, the Joint Communication
says that "a new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership
between the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood:
to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable
economic growth and manage cross-border links." The new approach
must be based on "mutual accountability and a shared commitment
to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule
of law". It will involve "a much higher level of differentiation
allowing each partner country to develop its links with the EU
as far as its own aspirations, needs and capacities allow. For
those southern and eastern neighbours able and willing to take
part, this vision includes closer economic integration and stronger
political co-operation on governance reforms, security, conflict-resolution
matters, including joint initiatives in international fora on
issues of common interest. This new approach aims to:
- provide greater support to
partners engaged in building deep democracy — "the
kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights
to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive
impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable
police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt
civil service — and other civil and human rights that many
Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, conscience
and religion";
- support inclusive economic development —
so that EU neighbours can trade, invest and grow in a sustainable
way, reducing social and regional inequalities, creating jobs
for their workers and higher standards of living for their people;
- strengthen the two regional dimensions of the
European Neighbourhood Policy, covering respectively the Eastern
Partnership[18] and the
Southern Mediterranean, so as to work out consistent regional
initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, transport or migration
and mobility, complementing and strengthening bilateral co-operation;
- provide the mechanisms and instruments fit to
deliver these objectives.
2.34 With regard to the Eastern Partnership,
the Joint Communication says that the degree to which the partners
have addressed key elements — respect for universal values
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; continuous efforts
to reform; and a strengthened focus on the resolution of protracted
conflicts — varies:
"While some are clearly committed to reaching
its full potential, others have only made piecemeal progress.
The EU will ensure that partners most advanced and committed to
the democratic reforms that underpin the Eastern Partnership benefit
the most from it. At the same time, Eastern Partnership instruments
need to be better tailored to the situations of individual countries,
based on experience following this first phase of implementation
— notably by identifying tools to bridge the long period
required to negotiate far-reaching and complex Association Agreements."
2.35 the EU will accordingly:
- move to conclude and implement
Association Agreements including DCFTAs;
- pursue democratisation;
- pursue the visa facilitation and liberalisation
process;
- enhance sectoral cooperation, notably in the
area of rural development;
- promote benefits of the Eastern Partnership to
citizens; and
- increase work with civil society and social partners.
2.36 In the shorter term, the Joint Communication
notes that the second Eastern Partnership Summit will take place
in September 2011 in Warsaw, and says that the Commission and
the High Representative will subsequently put forward a roadmap
to guide future implementation, drawing on the results of the
Summit.
2.37 The Southern Mediterranean Partnership
will be developed on the lines set out in the earlier Joint Communication.
2.38 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
should "enhance its potential to organise effective and result-oriented
regional cooperation", drawing on its inclusive character
for regional cooperation (given the membership of Turkey and the
Western Balkan countries) and "revitalising" itself
by "a switch to a more pragmatic and project-based approach"
and ensuring that the UfM Secretariat operates as a catalyst to
bring states, the EIB, International Financial Institutions and
the private sector together around concrete economic projects
of strategic importance and generating jobs, innovation and growth
throughout the region. Partner countries' participation in these
projects could follow the principle of variable geometry depending
on their needs and interests.
2.39 With regard to the funding aspects, the Joint
Communication says that the Commission will:
- re-focus and target foreseen
and programmed funds in the ENPI as well as other relevant external
policy instruments in the light of this new approach;
- provide additional resources of over €1
billion until 2013 to address the urgent needs of our neighbourhood;
- mobilize budgetary reinforcement from various
sources.
2.40 All in all, the Joint Communication says, implementing
the new approach requires additional resources of up to €1,242
million until 2013 over and above the €5,700 million provided
under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for
2011-2013. This includes €250 million stemming from reflows
from older loan and risk-capital operations to be made available
to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
(FEMIP) to promote growth and employment by financing new operations
and to support the long-term financing needs of SMEs. These additional
resources will be provided through reallocations from within Heading
4 of the 2007-2013 multi-annual financial framework, and by making
use of the unallocated margin under the expenditure ceiling in
2012 and — to the extent necessary — through the Flexibility
Instrument. The Commission will submit an Amending Letter to Draft
Budget 2012 shortly. The Commission is also "currently reflecting
on how best to integrate the overall country situation regarding
democracy, accountability, the rule of law and sound financial
management into its decisions on budget support arrangements",
and will outline its approach in an upcoming Communication on
budget support, which the Joint Communication says "should
also provide the necessary flexibility to tailor levels and types
of support to each partner's reform track record."
2.41 Beyond the present financial timeframe, the
Joint Communication says that the Commission will reflect the
renewed ENP vision and medium term objectives in its proposals
for the post-2013 EU Multi-annual Financial Framework, which will
be tabled later this year.
2.42 Summing up, the Joint Communication says that
cooperation with the EU's neighbours is the only means to take
on the challenges and threats that do not respect borders —
such as terrorism, irregular migration, pollution of our common
seas and rivers — and to tackle sources of instability and
conflict in the region. It regards it as in the EU's own interest
to support these transformation processes, "working together
with our neighbours to anchor the essential values and principles
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, a market economy
and inclusive, sustainable development in their political and
economic fabric." The new approach to the ENP set out in
this Joint Communication "is a step in this direction."
Calling on the Council and the European Parliament to endorse
both its overall thrust and the concrete proposals it puts forward,
the Commission and the High Representative now intend to pursue
consultations with the EU's neighbours on the best way to translate
this new approach into each individual partnership:
"The challenges are many, and fully meeting
them may take time. What we are aiming for together is a democratic,
prosperous and stable region where more than 800 million people
can live, work and shape their own country's future, confident
that their freedom, their dignity and their rights will be respected."
The Government's view
2.43 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 3 June 2011,
the Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that the UK
has taken a leading role in arguing for an ambitious new EU policy
towards the EU's neighbourhood, in particular following the momentous
events in the southern neighbourhood earlier this year, and given
the opportunity to support democracy in the region.
"We judge the Communication to reflect UK interests
well. The language has been heavily shaped by UK lobbying and
it incorporates most of our arguments. It also is in line with
the G8's commitment at the recent Summit in Deauville to support
the 'Arab Spring'.
"UK Ministers lobbied hard for the ENP reform
to include a bold, ambitious offer to our partners, centred around
trade liberalisation and economic integration. The Communication
majors on a long term vision of partners' economic integration
within the EU's internal market, leading to an economic community
between the EU and its neighbours. It states that the EU will
seek to extend trade concessions in existing agreements or ongoing
negotiations through the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Agreements, focusing particularly on those sectors
best positioned to provide an immediate boost to partners' economies.
There is also recognition of the need for capacity building, rural
development programmes and initiatives to promote regional trade
flows."
2.44 The Minister notes that, in line with the principle
of conditionality, the Communication suggests that only those
partners that have a fully functioning independent judiciary,
an efficient public administration and have made significant progress
towards eradicating corruption should be considered for integration
into the non-regulated area of the Internal Market for goods;
and that this integration could only happen once participating
countries have reached a sufficient level of administrative and
legal reliability.
2.45 The Minister says that the UK:
"also argued strongly and repeatedly in favour
of the principle of conditionality in the ENP: that the more and
faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more
support it will get from the EU. This principle is clearly stated
in the Joint Communication. We successfully made the case (against
some opposition) for "negative" conditionality —
that for those countries which fail to achieve benchmarks for
political as well as economic reform, the EU should scale back
its cooperation and even reduce its funding (or redirect funding
towards civil society partners as opposed to state organisations)."
2.46 This goes, the Minister says, "further
than the EU has ever gone before, and is in our view a welcome
change, providing additional incentives to our partners in both
the East and the South to implement meaningful reforms."
2.47 The Minister also highlights the emphasis in
the Communication on the work needed to strengthen respect for
the rule of law and to fight corruption, thus facilitating increased
FDI and technology transfer which will, in turn, stimulate innovation
and job creation. He also draws attention to aim of supporting
initiatives to clarify partner's national investment priorities
and seeking to build investors' confidence: e.g., an enhanced
investment protection scheme, or options to provide legal security
to investors.
2.48 With respect to migration and mobility, the
Minister welcomes proposals to pursue migration co-operation within
the existing framework of Mobility Partnerships, noting that:
"these partnerships ensure a comprehensive approach
to migration which focuses on strengthening the capacity of partner
countries to manage their borders effectively and to tackle irregular
migration, as well as measures on legal migration and migration
and development. Though visa liberalisation measures do not directly
apply to the UK, we nonetheless welcome the recognition in the
Communication that such measures should only be considered on
a case-by-case basis, where partner countries have taken the necessary
steps to ensure well-managed and secure migration. However, the
Communication still places a stronger emphasis on visa facilitation
than the UK feels is appropriate."
2.49 With respect to the section on labour mobility,
the Minister believes that:
"these offers should be balanced with progress
on tackling irregular migration, and should respect the differing
characteristics of Members States' demographic and labour market
needs, remembering that legal migration is a national competence.
The UK welcomes the emphasis on strengthening international protection
in the region — effective asylum capacity is key to a well
functioning migration system. However, we would be cautious about
overemphasising the role of resettlement in the immediate term
— we see resettlement as a strategic long term tool which
is best used in countries where there are protracted refugee situations."
2.50 With regard to the Financial Implications, the
Minister says:
The vast majority of the finances for the ENP are
to come from reallocation within existing spend. The Communication
suggests a headline figure of €1,242m for the period up to
the end of 2013 (€250 million of which relates to a Commission
proposal on European Investment Bank (EIB) 'reflows'), with the
majority of money for the South. It also recommends an extra €1
billion in additional EIB loans, and €154m being reallocated
from a reserve pot (outside Heading 4) under the Flexibility Instrument.
Funding levels will be linked far more closely to countries' track
records in reform, in line with the stricter application of the
principle of conditionality."
2.51 Finally, the Minister says that he expects the
Communication to be discussed at the 20 June Foreign Affairs Council
and the 24 June European Council; and that he expects the European
Parliament also to give its Opinion on this Communication in the
near future, and for the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions to do likewise.
The Minister's letter of 3 June 2011
2.52 Referring to the timetable outlined above and
the fact that the Joint Communication was published only on 25
May, the Minister says that he would therefore be grateful if
the Committee would scrutinise the Joint Communication in time
to allow the government to take a position on the review of the
ENP at the June FAC and European Council. He goes on to say that
"we are working to a tight timetable for a number of reasons",
viz:
- "The speed with which
the Commission and EAS have published these documents and the
short time between publication and discussion in the Council reflects
the EU's determination to respond nimbly to the momentous events
in the Southern Neighbourhood. We have been pushing hard for this
nimble response; quick and bold action by the EU is in the interests
of international security and prosperity, and so in the UK's interests.
- "If the EU fails to produce its response
in a timely manner, it will lose influence in this crucial region
at a time when others are actively seeking to extend their influence
(Russia, China, Iran and the Arab states).
- "It is important that the EU does not lose
the momentum built up in the last few months. If EU Heads of Government
fail to endorse the ENP Review in June, their next opportunity
is in October, pushing implementation back by over three months
while the crisis in the South continues to unfold.
- "For these reasons, I consider it unlikely
that the Council will be prepared to delay its discussion of this
Communication until October. As the UK is a key player in the
EU's response to events in the Southern Neighbourhood, and as
we have been a key influence in the preparation of this Communication,
I consider it to be very important that we take an active role
in the Council debate. Your early scrutiny would allow the government
to do that with the support of Parliament."
2.53 Noting that the Committee's only meeting before
the FAC will take place on 8 June, the Minister says that he is
therefore submitting this document for scrutiny at this meeting,
"with a request that you will forgive such short notice."
2.54 The Minister couples this with a further request;
that the Committee should agree to consider this Joint Communication
reviewing the ENP independently of the Joint Staff Working Papers
on the implementation of the ENP in 2010. He says:
"These latter documents were published only
on 30 May. They were annexed to the 25 May ENP Communication by
the Commission and EAS for reasons of expediency, and in the normal
course of events we would submit both sets of documents to your
Committees together for scrutiny. However, given the stand-alone
nature of the Joint Communication, the late submission of the
Joint Staff Working Papers, the urgent need for your scrutiny
of the Joint Communication, and the additional time required to
prepare an Explanatory Memorandum on the Joint Staff Working Papers,
we would be grateful if you would agree to a procedure whereby
your Committee will scrutinise the Joint Communication at its
8 June meeting and then scrutinise the Joint Staff Working Papers
separately at a later meeting."
Conclusion
2.55 We are happy to accede to the Minister's
timetabling requests, and look forward to receiving his Explanatory
Memorandum on the Joint Staff Working Papers in due course.
2.56 In the meantime, though we recognise the
desire to press on, we do not see that responding to events in
the Southern Neighbourhood requires precipitate consideration
of this important document. Several questions raised by the earlier
Joint Communication remain unanswered, both with regard to the
basis of the increased funding (see, for example, paragraphs 2.17
and 2.18 above) and the practicalities of the new approach. The
Minister says nothing about the inter-relationship with the UMed,
which remains as marooned as ever; nor about the Eastern Partnership,
which some other Member States are likely to see as every bit
as important as the Southern Neighbourhood, and which has already
demonstrated the many slips between concept and implementation.
Indeed, within the expanded EU itself, as we have noted on many
occasions, both Bulgaria and Romania remain notably short of meeting
some of the criteria that are now to be applied to countries for
whom they are likely to pose significantly greater challenges.
The EU has been reluctant, Bulgaria and Romania's continued failings
notwithstanding, to adopt the "negative" conditionality
being proposed here — where, when countries fail to achieve
benchmarks for political or economic reform, cooperation is scaled
back and funding reduced. Given that, as the Minister notes, there
was opposition by at least some Member States to this approach,
we are bound to wonder how well it would survive the test of reality.
2.57 We see no reason why the Government should
not continue to take an active role in the Council debate. But
before it can properly expect to receive the support of the House,
the issues raised in this important document need to be discussed
and debated in European Committee B. This debate will also enable
the Minister to explain and be questioned on whatever conclusions
are adopted by the Foreign and General Affairs Councils.
2.58 We so recommend. In the meantime we shall
continue to retain the Communication under scrutiny.
9 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119145.pdf
for the full text of the Declaration. Back
10
A free trade agreement covering a wide array of trade-related
issues ("comprehensive") and aiming at eliminating "behind
the border" obstacles to trade through processes of regulatory
approximation, thus partially opening/extending the EU internal
market to the other party. It is currently offered only to ENP
countries. Back
11
These refer to contractual relationships between the European
Union (EU) and a non-EU country. Association Agreements may promote
the establishment/strengthening of regular dialogue and close
relations on political and security matters; gradual liberalisation
of trade in goods, services and capital; economic cooperation
with a view to encouraging economic and social development and
regional economic integration; social, cultural and human dialogue.
The concept of "advanced status" under the Association
Agreements means a strengthening of political cooperation and
new opportunities in economic and trade relations, progressive
regulatory convergence as well as strengthened cooperation with
certain European agencies and programmes.
Back
12
The full declaration is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119780.pdf. Back
13
See headnote: (29029) -: HC 16-i (2007-08), chapter 2 (7 November
2007). Back
14
See Stg Co Deb, 22 January 2008, cols 3-18: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmgeneral/euro/080122/80122s01.htm. Back
15
See headnote: HC 16-xxiv (2007-08), chapter 5 (18 June 2008). Back
16
See HC 16-xxix (2007-08), chapter 6 (10 September 2008), Annex
1. Back
17
See headnote: see (32588) 7592/11: HC 428-xxiii (2010-11), chapter
9 (5 April 2011). Back
18
The European Union formally launched the Eastern Partnership Initiative
at a Prague summit in May 2009, within the framework of its European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The Eastern Partnership (EaP ) seeks
to enhance the eastern dimension of the ENP. The goal is developing
economic and political relations between the EU and six former
Soviet Republics: Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia
and - depending on the development of the relations with the EU
- Belarus.
Back
|
