24 EU Special Representative for Kosovo
| (33609)
—
—
| Council Decision appointing the European Union Special Representative for Kosovo
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| Legal base | Articles 28, 31 (2 ) and 33 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 11 January 2012
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (33170) —: HC 428-xxxvii (2010-12), chapter 22 (12 October 2011); (33306) —: HC 428-
xxxv (201-12), chapter 13 (7 September 2011); (32738) — and (32590) —: HC 428-xxvi (2010-12), chapter 10 (11 May 2011) and HC 428-xxi (2010-11), chapter 4 (23 March 2011); also see (32505) —: HC 428-xvii (2010-11), chapter 12 (16 February 2011)
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| Discussion in Council | 23 January 2012 Foreign Affairs Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
24.1 EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to represent
Common Foreign and Security Policy where the Council agrees that
an additional EU presence on the ground is needed to deliver the
political objectives of the Union. They were established under
Article 18 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and are appointed by the
Council. Their purpose is to represent the EU in troubled regions
and countries and to play an active part in promoting the interests
and the policies of the EU.
24.2 All EUSRs carry out their duties under the authority
and operational direction of the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR, Baroness Catherine
Ashton) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC).[143]
Each is financed out of the CFSP budget implemented by the Commission.
Member States contribute regularly, for example, through seconding
some of the EUSR's staff members.
24.3 In February 2010, the mandates were extended,
not for the usual 12 months, but only until 31 August 2010, or
until the establishment of the European External Action Service
(EEAS), whichever was the earlier; the HR intended to revert to
the matter in the light of further work on the EEAS.[144]
24.4 In the case of the EUSR Kosovo, the appointment
of Pieter Feith was further extended in the first instance until
28 February 2011 or until the Council decided, on a proposal by
the HR, that appropriate corresponding structures to those under
the current decision had been established in the EEAS.
24.5 His mandate stems from the 14 December 2007
European Council having underlined the EU's readiness to play
a leading role in strengthening stability in the Western Balkans,
including by contributing to a European Security and Defence Policy
mission and to an International Civilian Office as part of the
international presences in Kosovo. Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP
adopted on 4 February 2008 established an EU Special Representative
for Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008.
24.6 The mandate of the EUSR is based on the objective
of securing a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo,
which will contribute to regional stability. His tasks include
being the channel for the EU's advice and support to the political
process, promoting political coordination in Kosovo through the
EU missions, ensuring a coherent public message, and contributing
to the consolidation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in Kosovo.
24.7 The EUSR role was until recently combined with
that of the International Civilian Representative (ICR) who is
appointed by an International Steering Group (ISG, of which the
UK is a member) and is the ultimate supervisory authority over
the implementation of the UN Special Envoy's Comprehensive Settlement
Proposal (Kosovo committed itself to that proposal as part of
its declaration of independence). The ICR does not have a direct
role in the administration of Kosovo, but retains strong corrective
powers to ensure the successful implementation of the Settlement.
The ICR's mandate will continue until the ISG determines that
Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.
24.8 In earlier submissions to the Committee, the
Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington) fully supported maintaining
the office of the EUSR in Kosovo and welcomed the continued appointment
of Pieter Feith in this post. He noted Mr Feith's long track record
of crisis management in both NATO and the European Union and close
involvement with Kosovo since his time as a senior policy official
in the NATO International Secretariat in the late 90s. He said
that Mr Feith had proved highly capable in his role in Kosovo,
supporting development of a stable, viable and prosperous Kosovo
as it worked towards its European perspective — in particular,
his contribution to efforts to hold free and fair elections in
line with international standards, to reach out to the non-majority
community and to support dialogue in the field of religious and
cultural heritage. He was, the Minister judged, very well placed
to continue to provide strategic policy leadership to the international
community effort in Kosovo and to work closely with the NATO and
EU missions there. His double-hatting as the ICR had proved highly
effective, adding authority and political influence to enable
the EUSR to achieve the EU's objectives.
24.9 On 16 February 2011, we considered a further
Council Decision extending the mandate of the EUSR Kosovo for
a further two months, until 30 April 2011. In his Explanatory
Memorandum of 11 February 2011, the Minister for Europe described
the proposed extension as a pragmatic way of ensuring political
continuity of EU expertise and visibility in Kosovo as the EEAS
sought to finalise its plans for an enhanced EU presence in Kosovo
within the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty. He emphasised
the EUSR's presence for the international community's efforts
to build stability and prosperity in Kosovo and key role in advising
and encouraging the Kosovo government to drive forward the reforms
necessary for Kosovo's continued progress along its European path,
and in providing strategic policy leadership to the international
community effort in Kosovo, in particular by giving political
direction to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Looking
ahead, the Minister emphasised the importance of the EUSR and
the Kosovo Government focussing their attention on taking forward
the much needed reforms highlighted in the 2010 Commission Progress
Report on Kosovo, and in particular in relation to improving governance,
fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law. The EUSR
would also have an important role to play in supporting the upcoming
EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina on how to
improve practical cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo and make
progress towards both countries' European perspective. Recent
political events in Kosovo — early general elections and
subsequent re-runs — had prevented a start to the EU-facilitated
dialogue. But all parties were, the Minister said, committed to
commencing as soon as possible.[145]
24.10 A further Council Decision on the EUSR for
Kosovo's mandate was dealt with in a single Explanatory Memorandum
of 15 March from the Minister for Europe which also dealt with
Council Decisions on the mandates of the EUSRs to the MEPP, the
South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia.[146]
24.11 The Minister noted that, as well as the tasks
of offering the EU's advice and support to the Kosovo Government
on the political process, promoting overall coordination of the
EU presence in Kosovo and contributing to the development and
consolidation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo,
the proposed mandate also required the new EUSR to assist in the
implementation of the EU-facilitated (and UN-endorsed) Kosovo-Serbia
dialogue.
24.12 The Minister also noted that it also ended
the current practice of combining (or "double-hatting")
the EUSR role with that of the International Civilian Representative
(ICR); and that, instead, it foresaw the role of the EUSR being
combined (or "double-hatted") with that of the Head
of the European Commission Liaison Office in Pristina (ECLO).
The Minister strongly supported the HR's desire to improve the
EU's relationship with Kosovo and her proposal to extend the EUSR's
mandate: but also his concern that this would not in practice
enhance EU influence and reputation as much as the HR and the
UK would like, and that, given the tight timescales involved,
the EU risked being without a EUSR for a sustained period of time.
This would, the Minister felt, be the wrong signal when the EU
was looking to the new Kosovo government to drive forward the
reform priorities highlighted in the Commission's progress report,
and would like to send tangible signals of its support for Kosovo's
progress towards the EU, in line with the European perspective
of the entire Western Balkans region.
24.13 The Minister underlined longstanding UK support
for the "double-hatting" of the EUSR and International
Civilian Representative (ICR) role, seeing it as important for
the coherence of the overall efforts of the International Community;
and for bringing the greatest possible authority to the mandates
of both roles when working with the Kosovo government. Given these
concerns, the Minister had instructed his officials not to support
the draft decision in its current form, and to seek significant
improvements to it.
Our assessment
24.14 Reading between the lines, it seemed to us
that the Minister was concerned about getting the right person
— there was no mention as to whether it was envisaged that
this would be Mr Feith or someone else — and how, if the
EUSR was no longer to wear the ICR hat, it was proposed to ensure
that EU activity and ICR activity continued to be in lock step
and not, instead, at risk of being out of step. Given the importance
of these matters, particularly at this juncture, we continued
to retain this Council Decision under scrutiny and awaited what
we hoped would be further, reassuring, information from the Minister
about these issues.
24.15 The Council Decisions that the Committee considered
in May:
— ended
the "double-hatting" arrangement, leaving Mr Feith as
the ICR;
— set out a new mandate that combined the
EUSR role with that of heading a new Commission Liaison Office
in Belgrade, as part of the EU-sponsored (and UN-endorsed) Dialogue
between Pristina and Belgrade;
— appointed Fernando Gentilini as EUSR
(a career diplomat: previously NATO Senior Civilian Representative
in Afghanistan and Director for Western Balkans in the Italian
MFA, now a member of the EEAS and closely involved with the Pristina/Belgrade
Dialogue since its inception).
24.16 Though continuing to support the HR's desire
to improve the EU's relationship with Kosovo and her proposal
to extend the mandate of the EUSR, the Minister still did not
favour ending "double-hatting" the EUSR with the ICR
and saw two other flaws in the original proposal:
— continuing
the practice of referring to Kosovo as being "Under UNSCR
1244", which he regarded as prejudicial to the positions
of those Member States who recognise Kosovo as an independent
state; and
— requiring the EUSR to play a lead role
in "a settlement defining Kosovo's future status", which
was, he judged, also prejudicial to those Member States who believed
Kosovo has achieved its final status and to the EU's declared
status neutral position.
24.17 The Minister reported that, thus far, he had
had to agree to ending "double-hatting" and had now
succeeded via the removal of the wording in the second tiret from
the mandate. But his other concern remained unresolved —
hence the latest two month, no cost extension. Though by no means
ideal, it was better than having no EUSR at all; the Minister
hoped to submit a new Explanatory Memorandum on the permanent
mandate in time for the Committee September meetings, subject
to the EAS selecting a successful candidate.[147]
24.18 A subsequent Council Decision extended the
EUSR's mandate from 1 August to 30 September 2011. In his Explanatory
Memorandum of 3 August 2011, the Minister of Europe explained
that the HR had not yet been able to appoint someone on a permanent
basis and explained that, whilst the permanent mandate had reached
near agreement, it could not be adopted in Council without the
name of the individual taking on the role. The EAS expected the
recruitment process to be complete in the first half of September
and had therefore proposed another two-month technical extension
to ensure there were no gaps in the EUSR presence. He again found
this far from ideal; that the EU had not been able to agree a
full mandate since August 2010 did not send the appropriate signals
about the EU's support for Kosovo's European Perspective; however,
not to have an EUSR at all would be an even more damaging signal
for the EU/Kosovo relationship: it was for that reason that the
UK supported this technical extension.
24.19 The Minister then said that UK officials, with
the support of several like-minded EU Member States, had secured
what he described as a number of significant improvements to the
draft previously seen by the Committee, which he described as:
— strengthening
the EU presence in Kosovo;
— supporting Kosovo's progress towards
the EU, in line with the European perspective of the region;
— monitoring, assisting and facilitating
progress on political, economic and European priorities to ensure
a broader understanding and support from the Kosovan public on
EU related issues;
— assisting in the implementation of the
EU facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina;
— deletion of the requirement for the EUSR
to play a lead role in "a settlement defining Kosovo's future
status".
24.20 The Minister also recalled his strong concerns
about the inclusion of references to Kosovo being "Under
UN Security Council Resolution 1244", which he viewed as
prejudicial to the position of recognition taken by 22 Member
States, and the review by the EAS and Presidency of these references.
As he was still awaiting a completion of the review, he had accepted
the inclusion of "the prejudicial references" only on
condition that a Cover note was attached to the Council Decision
as follows:
"The references to Kosovo in this Council Decision
are without prejudice to the Member States' positions on its status,
and without prejudice to the Member States' positions in the ongoing
discussion on the EEAS paper 'Kosovo — Review of References
in EU documents'".
24.21 The Minister then said that he hoped to submit
a new Explanatory Memorandum on the permanent mandate in time
for the Committee's September meetings, subject to the EAS having
selected a successful candidate.
24.22 In the meantime, regarding the EU-facilitated
"Dialogue", the Minister reported that:
—
Pieter Feith continued to act as the ICR, thereby continuing to
function as the Head of the International Civilian Office; his
sole focus remained full implementation of Comprehensive Proposal
for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which would require him to coordinate
closely with the EUSR and the EU's Rule of Law Mission (EULEX),
not least in the context of the "Dialogue";
— progress in the "Dialogue"
had been slow: a fifth round concluded on 2 July with agreement
on freedom of movement (allowing Kosovo citizens to travel into
Serbia using Kosovo ID's and number plates, and vice versa), sharing
civil records and an "agreement to agree" mutual recognition
of diplomas; however, despite expectations for the sixth round,
scheduled for 20 July, that agreement would be secured on customs
stamp recognition, cadastral records and telecommunications, on
19 July the EU facilitator, Robert Cooper,[148]
cancelled the sixth round as it was in his view clear that no
agreement would be reached; the next meeting had been scheduled
for September;
— the Government continued to be a strong
supporter of the "Dialogue", which it viewed as essential
for building practical cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia,
for moving them in a more stable fashion towards EU membership
and for improving the lives of all citizens in both countries;
it accordingly continued to encourage both parties to engage constructively
and flexibly with a view to securing further agreements.
24.23 Finally, the Minister noted that:
— there
were no financial implications to this Council Decision, as the
€690 000 to cover the expenditure related to the mandate
of the EUSR in the period from 1 May 2011 would be extended to
30 September 2011;
— the draft Decision was likely to be circulated
under a written procedure by Friday 29 July.
Our assessment
24.24 We felt that the only oddity in this otherwise
unexceptionable proposal was that there was no explanation in
May that Mr Gentilini's appointment was temporary. However, the
Committee's interest was in there being an obviously well-qualified
incumbent — which we presumed might still be Mr Gentilini
or, otherwise, someone else who was at least as well qualified.
All would, we felt, no doubt become clear in the Minister's next
Explanatory Memorandum. In the meantime, technical though it was,
we are reported this latest extension to the House, given the
level of interest in Kosovo, and in the circumstances did not
object to the Minister having agreed to its adoption prior to
scrutiny.
The most recent Council Decision
24.25 This Council Decision was a further technical
extension to the mandate of the current temporary EUSR, Fernando
Gentilini, from 1 October to 31 January 2011.
The Government's view
24.26 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 30 September
2011, the Minister for Europe explained that Baroness Ashton had
proposed this technical extension to the Kosovo EUSR mandate because
she remained keen to appoint a relatively senior figure to the
post — an opinion strengthened after the events in northern
Kosovo in July — but recruitment efforts so far had not
produced a candidate of suitable calibre. A second official
recruitment round would be launched; the Minister had underlined
the importance of this recruitment and the need to use this four
month extension period to maximum effect.
24.27 The Minister said that he would have much preferred
a permanent EUSR appointment during the summer, in order to put
an end to the series of rolling, temporary extensions. He recalled
his earlier view that the continuing failure of the EAS to secure
a permanent EUSR risked being perceived by those in Kosovo as
a diminution of EU support for Kosovo's European Perspective,
which was, he said, not the case: however, he continued to believe
that to have no EUSR at all would be an even more damaging signal
for the EU/Kosovo relationship, including at a time of tension
in northern Kosovo; for that reason he supported this further
technical extension.
24.28 The Minister also recalled:
—
his earlier strong concerns about the inclusion of references
to Kosovo being "Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244",
and view that this is prejudicial to the position of recognition
taken by 22 Member States;
— his success earlier this year in requesting
a review by the EAS and Presidency of these references;
— his acceptance, as a result of this review,
of the inclusion of the prejudicial references on the condition
that a cover note was attached to the Council Decision as follows:
"The references to Kosovo in this Council Decision
are without prejudice to the Member States' positions on its status,
and without prejudice to the Member States' positions in the ongoing
discussion on the EEAS paper "Kosovo — Review of References
in EU documents",
and said that he continued to insist that this cover
note was attached to the relevant Council Decisions.
24.29 The Minister then referred to his earlier emphasis
on the need for close coordination between the ICR, Pieter Feith,
the Kosovo EUSR and the EU's Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), not
least in the context of "the Dialogue" between Kosovo
and Serbia. He reported that there had been good levels of cooperation
and transparency over the past few months. The ICR and his team
continued to make progress towards full implementation of the
CSP, including in northern Kosovo, and cited as examples the continued
use — predominantly by Kosovo Serbs — of the Government's
Civil Services Centre in northern Mitrovica and the peaceful opening
of a new Centre for Citizens' Services nearby.
24.30 He also noted that Fernando Gentilini continued
to perform well as EUSR. His focus since July had been on working
with the international community to try to calm the situation
in northern Kosovo following violence there in July/August, and
on supporting Robert Cooper as he continued to take forward the
"Dialogue". He had also continued to take forward reorganisation
of the EUSR office following its decoupling from that of the ICO,
as well as work in other key areas such as good governance, human
rights, the economy, religious and cultural heritage, and community
outreach.
24.31 The Minister also reiterated his strong support
for the "Dialogue", but noted that the process remained
complex, and that the meeting on 28 September had failed to see
negotiations started following ongoing Serbian concerns about
customs arrangements. He continued to urge both sides to engage
constructively and flexibly. Meanwhile, the Minister said, the
situation on the ground in northern Kosovo remained tense: there
had been a recent confrontation between Kosovo Serbs and KFOR
(the NATO peacekeeping mission) at a Customs Gate 1, and pipe
bombs had been thrown at KFOR troops, resulting in injuries to
four NATO soldiers; seven Kosovo-Serbs had also been injured.
The Government had made clear that violence against KFOR was unacceptable
and that the best way for Kosovo and Serbia to resolve these and
other practical issues was through the "Dialogue."
Our assessment
24.32 Like the Minister, we hoped that the next
Explanatory Memorandum on this subject would deal with a permanent
appointment to this important position.
24.33 Though this further extension raised no questions
in and of itself, we again drew it to the attention of the House
because of the level of interest in developments in Kosovo.[149]
The draft Council Decision
24.34 This Council Decision appoints Samuel Žbogar
as European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo for
the period 1 February 2012 to 30 June 2013. Žbogar will be
double-hatted as Head of the European Union Office in Kosovo.
The Government's view
24.35 In his Explanatory Memorandum of 12 January
2012, the Minister of Europe (Mr David Lidington) says that, following
a second recruitment round, Baroness Ashton wrote to all Member
States on 19 December 2011, proposing Samuel Žbogar for the
position of EU Special Representative in Kosovo, to be double-hatted
as Head of the European Union Office in Pristina:
"I welcome this recommendation. Žbogar
is the former Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, having previously
served as EU Political Director (2001-2004) and Ambassador to
the United States of America (2004-2008). Žbogar brings deep
knowledge of the region and its personalities, as well as extensive
diplomatic and EU experience. He has been in regular contact with
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office over policy towards the Western
Balkans and has helped us maintain the EU's focus on the region
and enlargement in general. Furthermore, the appointment of a
former Foreign Minister is, I believe, a firm signal of the EU's
commitment to Kosovo's European future."
24.36 The Minister then recalls earlier and (in his
estimation) significant improvements to the EUSR mandate (paragraph
24.19 above) and concerns about the inclusion of references to
Kosovo being "Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244"
and the pro tem solution (paragraph 24.28 above), and says
that he continues to insist that such a cover note is attached
to the relevant Council Decisions and is confident that this will
be the case again for the current mandate.
24.37 The Minister then comments on recent developments
in Kosovo as follows:
"Fernando Gentilini has performed well as EUSR.
His tenure had covered a difficult period in Kosovo, with violence
in northern Kosovo in July and continuing instability since. Gentilini
has continued to provide support to Robert Cooper, the facilitator
in the EU-led Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. He has continued
his close levels of cooperation with the International Civilian
Representative, Pieter Feith. And he has continued to take forward
reorganisation of the EUSR office following its decoupling from
that of the ICO, including through efforts to strengthen the EU's
activity and representation in northern Kosovo. Gentilini will
take up his position of EAS[150]
Director for the Western Balkans from 1 February. We expect Žbogar
to continue to engage with other international actors in a similar
spirit of transparency and cooperation."
24.38 The Minister then reaffirms his strong support
for the "Dialogue":
"We view it as essential for building practical
cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia, for moving them in a more
stable fashion towards EU membership and for improving the lives
of all citizens in both countries. The Dialogue remains the key
mechanism for normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia,
and seeking to tackle a range of issues. Further agreements have
been reached in recent weeks on university diplomas and integrated
border management on the Serbia/Kosovo border. The first copies
of civil registries were exchanged on 20 December and the agreement
on freedom of movement was implemented successfully on 26 December.
"The situation on the ground in northern Kosovo
does however remain tense. On 28 November, in accordance with
its mandate, KFOR carried out freedom of movement operations in
the municipality of Zubin Potok. During the operation, small arms
fire and homemade explosive devices were used against KFOR soldiers
by K-Serb demonstrators. A number of NATO soldiers were injured
as a result. The UK has made clear, including at the 8 December
meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, that violence against KFOR
is unacceptable and that the best way for Kosovo and Serbia to
resolve practical issues such as customs controls is through the
Dialogue.
"As noted above, the UK continues to urge the
EU to offer tangible signals of support for Kosovo's European
destination. The new EUSR mandate and the appointment of Samuel
Žbogar are important and positive steps in this regard. I
also welcome the 5 December Council Conclusions on Enlargement
which, inter alia: reiterated the Council's readiness to work
in support of Kosovo's European Perspective; welcomed the Commission's
intention to launch visa liberalisation and rule of law dialogues;
invited the Commission to propose a way forward for achieving
a trade agreement with Kosovo; and, recognised that socio-economic
development would be enhanced through Kosovo's membership of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We will look
to maintain and build on this momentum in 2012, working closely
with the new EUSR and other key partners."
24.39 The Minister concludes by saying that the projected
cost for this extension is €2,410,000 for the 17 month mandate
which, pro rata, represents a cut from the previous budget
"as a result of (a) the EAS paying for Žbogar's salary
and (b) the efforts of the current EUSR to reduce staff numbers
through re-organisation of the EUSR office."
Conclusion
24.40 We share the Minister's satisfaction
over Mr Žbogar's appointment, and wish him well in his very
important work.
24.41 Though his appointment raises
no questions, we are reporting it to the House because of the
continuing interest in developments in Kosovo.
24.42 We now
clear the document, asking only that the Minister write to us
if his expectation regarding the Council Decision "cover
note" is unfulfilled.
143 Thecommitteeofambassador-levelofficialsfromnationaldelegationswho,byvirtueofarticle38TEU,undertheauthorityoftheHighRepresentativeandtheCouncil,monitortheinternationalsituationinareascoveredbytheCFSPandexercisepoliticalcontrolandstrategicdirectionofcrisismanagementoperations,assetoutinarticle43TEU. Back
144
For further details, see (31290-1) -, (31295-99) - and (31300-04)
- (2009-10): HC 5-x (2009-10), chapter 8 (9 February 2010). Back
145
See headnote: (32505) -: HC 428-xvii, chapter 12 (16 February
2011). Back
146
For our consideration of the other Council Decisions, see (32601-3)
-: HC 428-xxi (2010-11), chapter 4 (23 March 2011). Back
147
See headnote: (32738) - and (32590) -: HC 428-xxvi (2010-12),
chapter 10 (11 May 2011). Back
148
Previously a senior member of HM Diplomatic Service, Robert Cooper
assumed the role of Director-General for External and Politico-Military
Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European
Union in 2002. In that role, he was responsible to Javier Solana,
the former High Representative of the EU's Common Foreign and
Security Policy, and assisted with the implementation of European
strategic, security and defence policy. After Solana's replacement
by Baroness Ashton and the establishment of the European External
Action Service in December 2010, Mr Cooper was made an EEAS "Counsellor". Back
149
See headnote: (33170) -: HC 428-xxxvii (2010-12), chapter 22 (12
October 2011). Back
150
European External Action Service Back
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