Written evidence submitted by the Foundation
for Democracy and Sustainable Development
A. INTRODUCTION
AND SUMMARY
A.1 The Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable
Development is a charity which works to find ways to equip democracy
to deliver sustainable development.
A.2 Section B of this submission is an
overall stock-take structured according to two of the three objectives
of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development ("Rio
+ 20") and its two themes. In Section C we address
the Committee's six questions in turn. We draw the following key
points to the Committee's attention by way of summary.
A.2.1 A crisis of political short-termism is
among the emerging challenges that threaten progress on sustainable
development. This is linked to lack of proper regard for the needs
of future generations in the context of sustainable development.
Both can and must be tackled through the Rio + 20 process.
A.2.2 Rapidly evolving recognition of the fundamental
constraints, and the urgency, of tackling planetary boundaries
and their associated tipping points must be reflected in the political
outcomes of Rio + 20, in particular through the adoption of a
Declaration on Planetary Boundaries.
A.2.3 Given gradual erosion in the currency of
"sustainable development" at national and global levels,
the UK must ensure that renewed political commitment to sustainable
development reflects a progressive vision of sustainable development.
A.2.4 The UK must play a full part in ensuring
that "the green economy" is positioned as "the
green and fair economy"; not "green growth".
A.2.5 People, not businesses, must be at the
centre of commitments to a green and fair economy. Policy measures
to secure a green and fair economy cannot rely only on technological
innovation and the power of competition. Social and political
change is also required to deliver the necessary political will.
A.2.6 Rio + 20 should mark the creation of a
new institution or office for future generations within the UN;
for example a UN High Commissioner for Future Generations.
A.2.7 Commitments on institutional frameworks
for sustainable development must address national, regional and
subnational levels of sustainable development governance where
innovative practice flourishes. The UK Government should actively
provide space for local authorities and devolved administrations
to participate in preparations for Rio + 20 within both the EU
and the UN, alongside a commitment to actively enabling and promoting
participation by NGOs and community based organisation.
B. TAKING STOCK
Renewed political commitment to sustainable development
B.1 There are signs of erosion in the overall
global political commitment to sustainable development. One weakness
of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development was its
inadequate regard for the social dimension of sustainable development.
This had partly been overcome by the time of the 2002 Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). However, the imperative
to reduce and ultimately eradicate poverty, a centre-piece of
WSSD, led to over-emphasis on the economy and economic growth
in the sustainable development equation. As new policy areas such
as labour rights were added to the overall negotiating mix there
was a worrying loss of clarity and precision in the concept of
sustainable development. Even more concerning, the importance
of the idea of integration across the three pillars of sustainable
development (environment, economy, society) diminished. In
Rio +20, we see a risk that the centrality of intergenerational
and intragenerational equity to sustainable development could
be further eroded.
B.2 Today, the term "sustainability"
is often used in preference to "sustainable development"
in order to distinguish between the process and the end goal of
"sustainable development". We are concerned that the
ex post introduction of a distinction between sustainable
development and sustainability carries with it the risk of watering
down the significance of the words "sustainable development"
in earlier UN instruments by relegating them to commitments
related to the process of sustainable development (rather than
its goal: sustainability). In the remainder of our evidence, references
to sustainable development are to both the process of sustainable
development and its goal.
B.3 The failure of the UN Commission for Sustainable
Development's 19th session to reach agreement earlier this year[24]
augurs badly for Rio + 20. One cause may have been a tendency
to trade negotiating issues arising in other settings, bringing
them into the sustainable development arena. The UK must show
leadership by example by not allowing foreign policy priorities
arising outside the Rio + 20 process to determine its substantive
position on the Conference objectives and themes.
New and emerging challenges
B.4 Weakness in global governance is itself among
the rapidly evolving (if not emerging) challenges of sustainable
development. The intergovernmental global governance system has
failed to demonstrate sufficient adaptive capacity effectively
to rise to contemporary governance challenges including economic
globalisation (most particularly in the failure to develop adequate
global frameworks, such as a convention, for corporate accountability)
and climate change. It is clear, equally, that reliance on multi-stakeholder
partnerships (which was in vogue at the time of WSSD) is inadequate
to fill the gaps.
B.5 To any obvious list of new and emerging challenges
such as the impacts of rapid economic growth in so-called "emerging
economies"; high food prices; and resource scarcity; we would
add another: a crisis of short-termism in political decision-making,
including within UN processes, and the challenge of developing
the institutional architecture needed to engage openly and transparently
in the balancing acts that are needed for political decision-making
to deliver regard for the needs of future generations in ways
that serve sustainable development.
B.6 Here in the UK, the government frequently
appeals to the needs of future generations or the long term when
justifying controversial policy decisions, including spending
cuts, increases in tuition fees, and controversial aspects of
proposed planning reforms. This is the "horizon shift"
to which the Coalition government is committed.[25]
However, without an institutional space in which to evaluate
the competing needs of future generations; let alone a time horizon
for determining which future generation(s) or which
needs, the result is simply political advocacy of unpopular policy
choices without engagement of the wider population and, consequently,
a missed opportunity to build real support or a culture of participation
and deliberation.
The green economy
B.7 Much of the negotiating time and political
energy in preparations for Rio + 20 thus far have been devoted
to the green economy. Already, the potential for international
commitments to generate transformational change has been eroded
by lack of clarity over the substantive meaning of the term "green"
(and in particular whether this incorporates a commitment to the
social dimension of sustainable development); and polarised discussion
over issues such as technology transfer and financial assistance.
B.8 There is a real risk that Rio +
20's green economy theme will deliver little more than "slightly
greened business as usual", particularly given the difficult
economic circumstances in which many nations find themselves.
The UK government must play a full part in ensuring that "the
green economy" is positioned as "the green and fair
economy"; and not "green growth" or even "green
and fair growth".
Institutional frameworks for sustainable development
B.9 There is a marked contrast between the "international
institutional" topics that have been dominant in discussions
to date and the reality that local, regional and national institutions
are critically important in the pursuit of sustainable development.
B.10 Reform of international institutions alone
will not deliver changes in institutional frameworks at the national
and subnational levels, nor at the regional level. Much more attention
needs to be given to these levels of sustainable development governance
as preparations for Rio + 20 gather pace.
C. THE COMMITTEE'S
QUESTIONS
1. Issues that should be urgently addressed,
and any that should be avoided
C.1 Issues that should be urgently addressed
include:
— the
reality of planetary boundaries and their associated tipping points;
— the
problem of political short-termism as a barrier to sustainable
development; and
— creation
of institutional frameworks to ensure that the needs of future
generations are brought into the heart of decision-making from
the local to the global levels in ways that serve the overall
goal of sustainable development.
C.2 Three things in particular should be avoided:
— placing
business (or the private sector), not people, at the centre of
efforts to pursue and achieve sustainable development
— any
outcome in which only international, rather than national regional
and local, frameworks for sustainable development are addressed
in the political declaration and actions emerging from Rio + 20
— further
weakening the concept of the sustainable development through a
renewed political commitment that is in reality a retrograde step,
for example through any express mention of commitment to continued
economic growth
2. The extent to which greening the economy
can help eradicate poverty, including the tensions between growth
and prosperity in the context of sustainable development
C.3 The tensions between growth and prosperity
in the context of sustainable development are well described in
Professor Tim Jackson's 2010 book and associated report, Prosperity
Without Growth.[26]
We add that it will not be possible to deliver "prosperity
without growth" unless political systems are themselves capable
of delivering the policy frameworks needed to support it.
C.4 One approach is simply to understand
"greening" of the economy as a call to unleash the power
of business and social enterprise to do good; in particular through
social and technological innovation in support of sustainable
development. However, implementing policy measures to achieve
this end does nothing to ensure that those parts of the economy
that are "unfair" or not "green" wither.
C.5 Policy measures to secure "greening
of the economy" cannot rely only on technological innovation
and the power of competition. Social and political change is also
required to deliver the necessary political will. Rio + 20 needs
to deliver express political recognition of this fact.
C.6 Political systems must be equipped to
overcome the short-termism of electoral cycles; to have regard
to the needs of future generations, and to engage people on important
issues in styles that are far more participatory and deliberative
than is the norm. Rio + 20 can play an important role in setting
the right tone, including through a commitment not only to the
"environmental democracy"[27]
reflected in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,[28]
but to a genuine "sustainable development democracy".
C.7 In liberal democracies such as that of the
UK, the challenges are compounded. Only when elected representatives
feel free to prioritise policy priorities that do not actively
support economic growth is it likely that we will be able consistently
to deliver consistent policy for sustainable development. That
is unlikely to happen without (a) consistent and charismatic political
leadership of the kind that can inspire commitment of hearts and
minds, or (b) cultural transformation so that people actively
consent to, and pursue, prioritisation of policies that allow
collective needs and wellbeing to be met in support of sustainable
development, rather than pursuit of selfish self-interest.
C.8 If the current threats of severe climate
change and resource scarcity were to come to fruition, societal
innovation and resilience could prove a far more useful commodity
than business-centred policies for growth, whether green or not.
A people-centred, socially transformative route to a green
and fair economy offers a far better "win-win" prospect
for change than a business and technology-centred approach that
further erodes cultures of democratic decision-making.
C.9 The Brundtland Commission's
1987 report stated that "overriding priority" should
be given to the essential needs of the world's poor people.[29]
This has been interpreted as justification for a continued emphasis
on economic growth, including in the World Summit on Sustainable
Development.
C.10 It is alarming that the terms
"green economy" and "green growth" appear
increasingly to be used interchangeably in the UK policy context.
It is important that they do not come to be seen to be synonymous.
There is considerable wishful thinking in the idea that global
economic growth can continue and at the same time a bolt-on
"green economy" (even if it is a fair one) will deliver
massive dematerialisation of consumption and production (ie reduction
in reliance on natural resources) on the scale needed to deliver
sustainable development.
C.11 The wishful thinking is exemplified in the
statement of the European Commission's Communication on Rio +
20 that responses to the challenges of meeting demands for better
lives and addressing environmental pressures will not come from
"slowing growth".[30]
Planetary boundaries must circumscribe any commitment to the green
economy as a necessary condition precedent for sustainable development
(see further the Annex below).
3. The institutional frameworks (at international,
regional, national and local levels) required to deliver a "green
economy" and a more sustainable future for all, now and into
the future
C.12 Institutional frameworks for sustainable
development need to be addressed in relation to the overall challenge
of achieving sustainable development, not only the "green
economy". One particular risk of associating institutional
frameworks for sustainable development with the green economy
is that it may give rise to a tendency to see business,
rather than people, as a centrepiece of "institutional frameworks
for sustainable development".
C.13 As resource scarcity and climate change
make political choices related to sustainable development more
difficult at national and international levels, much of the innovation
and good practice that is needed will be found at local levels.
We are concerned that there has not thus far been much effort
to explore what commitments might be possible at Rio + 20 in relation
to the regional, national and subnational levels.
C.14 Regional, national and subnational governments
and institutions should use Rio + 20 as an opportunity to share
ideas on how best to integrate sustainable development—including
regard for the needs of future generations—into regional
and domestic policy decisions. Examples include the idea of
guardians, commissioners or ombudspersons for future generations,
building on the institutional trailblazing of Hungary's Parliamentary
Commissioner for Future Generations; and legal and policy mechanisms
to deliver respect for planetary boundaries.
C.15 We have two suggestions on institutional
innovations in global governance frameworks for sustainable development.
(a) we support emerging efforts to bring the needs of future
generations into the overall global governance framework, for
example in proposals for the creation of a new office of a UN
High Commissioner for Future Generations,( b) we propose that
political recognition of the concept of planetary boundaries as
a precondition for sustainable development be linked with the
adoption at Rio + 20 of a Declaration on Planetary Boundaries
as a precursor to a global Convention on Planetary Boundaries
(as to which see further the Annex prepared by Barrister
Peter Roderick below).
4. The objectives and roles the UK Government
should assume in order to drive ambition in the run-up to the
Conference and at Rio, including its part in the EU preparations
and negotiations
C.16 The UK's ability to engage meaningfully
in preparations for the Conference is not assisted by the fact
that the government has chosen not to develop a publicly available
sustainable development strategy, and has recently abolished some
key planks in the overall institutional framework for sustainable
development (including the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
and the independent Sustainable Development Commission). Furthermore,
recent indications are that the government fails effectively
to recognise the concept of sustainable development as providing
guidance for domestic policy. This is exemplified in the proposed
approach to the "presumption in favour of sustainable development"
(defined in effect as a presumption in favour of development)
within the proposed National Planning Policy Framework.
C.17 In light of the imperative to recognise
that respect for planetary boundaries is a necessary precondition
for sustainable development, and drawing on the potential international
leadership role of the Climate Change Act, the UK should adopt
a leading role in championing the need for recognition of environmental
limits, more specifically in the form of planetary boundaries.
C.18 Recognising that much of the innovation
for sustainable development must in future come from subnational
levels, including devolved administrations and local authorities,
the UK Government should actively provide space for local authorities
and the devolved administrations to participate in preparations
for Rio + 20 within both the EU and the UN; showcasing those areas
where their approaches offer potentially transferrable insights.
The Welsh Government's commitment to develop a Sustainable
Development Bill is particularly noteworthy in this regard, as
is the appointment of a Commissioner for Sustainable Futures.
5. The ideal outcomes from Rio+20, and how
any agreements should be subsequently monitored
C.19 Ideal outcomes from Rio + 20 would include
the following elements:
C.19.1 Political recognition of respect
for planetary boundaries as a prerequisite for sustainable development.
This should be linked to a commitment to development of a
political and institutional architecture capable of supporting
that recognition. In an ideal outcome, we would want to see
a Declaration on Planetary Boundaries adopted at Rio + 20 as a
precursor to a UN Convention on Planetary Boundaries (as to
which, see further the Annex below).
C.19.2 Renewed political commitment to sustainable
development in a form which a) repositions full integration
of economic development, environmental protection and social
development at the heart of sustainable development, AND b) explicitly
restates the political commitment to securing intergenerational
and intragenerational equity.
C.19.3 Political commitment to place people,
not businesses, at the heart of efforts to secure a green and
fair economy and deliver sustainable development. This would in
an ideal outcome be complemented by adoption of a global convention
on corporate accountability to provide redress to those affected
by the worst excesses of transnational corporate irresponsibility.
C.19.4 Renewed commitment to guaranteeing wide
rights of public participation, access to information and access
to justice for people around the world, whoever and wherever they
might be, in line with the principles and spirit of the Aarhus
Convention and in accordance with the July 2011 Chisinau Declaration
of the meeting of the parties to the Convention (ECE/MP.PP/2011/CRP.4/rev.1).
Rio + 20, in an ideal outcome, would be a milestone in global
commitment to guaranteed access to justice, public participation
and access to information across the pillars of sustainable development
(economy, environment and society).
C.19.5 Political recognition that political
short-termism is a significant barrier to sustainable development.
This should be linked to a clear commitment to development
of institutional frameworks, from the local to the global, that
are capable a) of delivering actions in support of sustainable
development informed by long-termism and regard for the needs
of future generations, and b) doing so in ways that respect the
need for intragenerational equity.
C.19.6 Support for the creation of a new UN institution
or office with a mandate to integrate the needs of future generations
within the overall institutional framework for sustainable development
at the global level.
C.19.7 Broad-based and wide-ranging engagement
by civil society and subnational governments in both the formal
governmental and less formal non-governmental processes associated
with Rio + 20, with a view to sharing good practice and catalysing
the next generation of practical activism and social innovation
for sustainable development.
6. The potential risks to the ideal outcomes
being achieved, and any lessons that should be learnt from previous
conferences
C.20 We wish to identify three potential risks:
C.20.1 Lack of political will or ambition for
either Rio + 20 or, more generally, for the concept of sustainable
development, as its realisation is made increasingly politically
difficult by rapid economic and population growth and their side-effects.
Effective mobilisation of civil society is part of the key to
countering this risk and to ensuring more generally, by helping
to foster new civil society alliances, that intergovernmental
outcomes are not the only outcome of the process. We trust and
hope that the UK will take seriously not only the substantive
analytical and advocacy capacities within UK civil society (including
non-governmental organisations and community based organisations),
but also our comparative advantage as among the global hubs of
sustainable development expertise.
C.20.2 That a political commitment to economic
growth within national governments will taint both the substance
of the political commitment to sustainable development, and specific
commitments on the green economy, and lead to a weak focus on
the importance of "sustainable development democracy"
in delivering sustainable development.
C.20.3 That the need to transform the internal
incentives within political and other public policy decision-making
systems in favour of sustainable development (and, conversely,
away from short-termism or prioritisation of economic growth)
will not be recognised at Rio + 20, even though it has a critically
important role to play in determining the quality of development
on the ground.
Annex
RIO + 20 AND PLANETARY BOUNDARIES
The UK's Climate Change Act 2008 is an example of
environmental limits legislation, which the Sustainable Development
Commission described as a "robust and world-leading approach
[which] needs to be extended as a matter of urgency to other environmental
limits".1
An innovative approach to this question, which offers
a new approach to sustainable development, is the planetary boundaries
concept. Launched by 29 scientists in 2009, it posits that there
are nine non-negotiable Earth-system processes and associated
thresholds that we need to respect and keep within, in order to
protect against the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental
change at continental to global scales. This would create a safe
operating space for humanity, and within this space economy and
society would play out. According to the concept's authors, three
of the nine suggested thresholds have already been crossed (for
climate change, biodiversity and the nitrogen cycle).2
What is new about the concept is that rather than
understanding environment, economy and society as three pillars
of sustainable development, it focuses on the initial importance
of biophysical realities as necessary pre-conditions for sustainable
development. Environment, economy and society would remain the
pillars of sustainable development, but in future they would do
so against a non-negotiable backdrop of biophysical reality.
The idea has been taken up by the Secretary-General's
High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability: the overall goal for
its report later this year and input into Rio+20 is "To
eradicate poverty and reduce inequality, make growth inclusive,
and production and consumption more sustainable while combating
climate change and respecting the range of other planetary boundaries."
The UK's Institution of Civil Engineers has said that "the
concept is clear and sufficiently intuitive that we can begin
to explore ways in which society can stay within such boundaries."3
We need to recognize, respect and be responsible
for not transgressing planetary boundaries - internationally,
regionally, nationally and locally. Recognition would imply that
States and the UN System acknowledge that planetary boundaries
exist; research their nature, parameters, variables, thresholds
and inter-actions; gather, collate and present data and information
by reference to planetary boundaries; identify the human activities
that affect them; implement in law a scientific, transparent and
participative process for establishing and reviewing them, and
their parameters, variables, thresholds and inter-actions, and
for advising on them; and give the concept an over-arching institutional
home which cooperates with current institutions with responsibilities
across the range of human activities that affect planetary boundaries.
In time, such an institution could become, under
a UN Convention on Planetary Boundaries, an over-arching Planetary
Boundaries Commission.
Respect for planetary boundaries implies, for example,
ensuring they are not transgressed; accepting the advice provided
through a scientific, transparent and participative process, unless
there are clear, imperative, stated and legally-challengeable
reasons for not doing so; designing public and private sector
institutions, as well as policies, laws and strategies, to minimise
the risk of transgressing any of them or, where one or more have
already been transgressed, to pull back; making decisions to minimise
that risk or to pull back; and integrating recognition of planetary
boundaries into international, regional and national decision-making
processes across the range of human activities that affect them.
Being responsible for not crossing the boundaries
implies, for example, over-arching legal objectives and obligations
to recognise and respect them across the range of human activities
that affect them; rights to information about them; rights to
participate in decisions which affect them; and rights to go to
court to ensure they are respected.
Rio +20 is an obvious opportunity to adopt the innovative
approach to sustainable development offered by the planetary boundaries
concept, which could be significantly developed over the coming
years. In this way, the biophysical pre-conditions for achieving
the Millennium Development Goals—and for other associated
commitments that could be adopted at Rio, such as Sustainable
Development Goals and/or Millennium Consumption Goals - would
be acknowledged.
REFERENCES
1 NEWP Discussion
Document, An Invitation to Shape the Nature of England, SDC Consultation
Response, December 2010, page 4, available online at:
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications/downloads/SDC%20Response%20to%20NEWP_Discussion%20paper.pdf
2 Rockström,
J et al. Planetary boundaries: Exploring the safe operating
space for humanity. Ecology and Society [online] 14, 32 (2009).
Available online at
www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32.
3 Engineering
to live within planetary boundaries: Civil engineering research
needs, Institution of Civil Engineers, October 2010, available
here:
http://www.ice.org.uk/Information-resources/Document-Library/Engineering-to-live-within-planetary-boundaries.
25 August 2011
24 See http://www.i.ca/csd/csd19/ Back
25
See
http://www.libdems.org.uk/news_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg_speech%3A_Horizon_shift&pPK=f8f7b543-d586-40e2-b4c9-e7be68970bf3 Back
26
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/prosperity_without_growth_report.pdf Back
27
The term is used in the Chisinau Declaration of the Conference
of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention: ECE/MP.PP/2011/CRP.4/rev.1,
1 July 2011. Back
28
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 Back
29
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our common
future, Oxford University Press, 1987, page 8. Back
30
European Commission Communication, Rio + 20: towards the green
economy and better governance (COM(2011) 363 final, 20 June 2011). Back
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