Written evidence from Admiral Sir John
Woodward GBE KCB and colleagues
WAYS AND MEANS OF DELIVERING THE ENDS SET
OUT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This memorandum is presented as a possible
guide to future Strategic Defence Reviews observing that the last
SDSR had no such guidance and, as the probable result, lost its
way. It proposes a fundamental change in the way the british military
defence budget is determined. It is based on seven critical assumptions
and essentially proposes that a "bottom line" for Defence
spending by a liberal/socialist democracy in "peacetime"
can be established. Such a "bottom line" should provide
at minimum cost a stable national defence plan robust against
long term direct threats to national security but sensitive to
short term unexpected crises.
INTRODUCTION TO
THE SUBMITTER
2. Joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1946.
Served in cruisers, destroyers [one ship command], frigates, submarines
[four ship commands including one nuclear], as Commander of the
[Aircraft] Carrier Battle Group during the Falklands War and as
Flag Officer, Submarines. He filled a series of appointments in
the MoD on the Naval Policy Staff and finally on the Central Staff
as Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments)—effectively
head of the MoD Operations Department. During this time he passed
a post-graduate course in nuclear physics and power plant operation,
and attended both the Joint Services Staff Course and the Royal
College of Defence Studies Course in the rank of Commander. His
final naval appointment was as CinC Naval Home Command, in charge
of all naval training barring aviation and submarines. Since retiring,
he worked for a "head-hunter" in the City for 18 months,
then for the DOE as an Inspector on the Lord Chancellors Panel
for two years, then as a lecturer and consultant on Crisis Management
for a further two years. Publications: "Strategy by Matrix",
"100 Days".
"We should always remember that we are a maritime
nation and not just an extension of continental Europe. Our perpetual
interest is the defence of our economic prosperity which depends
primarily upon the free passage of our trade across the high seas
and the deterrence of those who would may seek to harm us there.
Our strategic defence policy and the configuration of our armed
forces should inevitably reflect that. Three decades of MoD experience
in the Naval Staff and the Central Staffs have convinced me that
a fundamental change in the way we do business in Whitehall is
necessary if we are to satisfy our strategic defence requirements
at sensible cost in a period of extreme financial stringency."
JFW.
INTRODUCTION
3. Labour and Conservative governments have successively
"gone astray" on Defence for some 40 plus years. In
1998, the Labour Government produced an entirely reasonable, short
term but limited-scope Policy Paper [SDR 98]. However they largely
failed to implement it. SDSR 2010, having laid out its plans for
equipment provision over the next ten years, declared that "the
risks inherent in the currently envisaged Defence structure are
acceptable". In an uncertain, fast moving and dangerous world,
this was no more than a blind declaration of faith for the next
10 years, which history shows to be dangerously unjustifiable.
The SDSR report advocates essential flexibility but then cuts
some of the capabilities that offer it. Poor executive management
and a wish to spend Defence money on those ventures most likely
to buy votes has continued and indeed has accelerated the adverse
trends in the maintenance of national security. Failure of the
Government to address the simplest questions (such as, "How,
exactly, Oh Ministry of Defence, does addition or deletion of
this equipment meet our stated policy?") Has left the three
Services in substantial disarray and in a very poor position to
meet a serious threat to national security should it arise. The
SDSR, because it predicated large reductions in defence spending
before laying out the requirements of national strategy, resulted
in a strategy limited by equipment rather than an equipment programme
indicated by strategy.
4. For example, the European Fighter Aircraft,
Typhoon, remains incapable of deployment beyond established friendly
air bases, has been introduced with no ground or surface attack
capability and substantial sums are now being spent to give it
that capability despite the fact that:
— (i) in
the numbers ordered, it is greatly in excess of any formal stated
requirement
— (ii) its
costs have outrun any other MOD project including Trident.
5. Defence procurement has been a dysfunctional
story since the early 1970's. The causes lie deep—there
has been no academic or professional approach to developing a
coherent, comprehensible and long term Defence Policy since well
before the 70's. Without such a Policy statement, agreed by both
main political parties, consistency in implementation is bound
to be unachievable in a government department which has to look
thirty years ahead but is funded by governments which naturally
tend to look primarily as far as only the next election.
AIM
6. To provide a robust, coherent long-term strategic
policy for the Defence of the United Kingdom, its offshore interests
and territories.
ASSUMPTIONS
7. This Core Force Defence Policy paper makes
seven assumptions:
— (i) Human
nature has not substantially changed in the last thousand years
and is unlikely to do so in the next few decades. It follows that
unless we do something about it, we will almost inevitably be
involved in another major war which directly affects our homeland
at some time in the future, though we have no idea when, who our
enemy might be or what form this threat will actually take.
— (ii) Democracies
are always reluctant to spend on defence when they observe that
no immediate direct threat to their continued economic prosperity
and sovereignty exists.
— (iii) We
will not wish to rely on weapons of mass destruction as our main
defensive weapon system when that "inevitable war" finally
turns up.
— (iv) As
an island nation it is not possible to defeat us in war quickly
by direct surprise attacks on the homeland base because,
— (a) A
major landing would take too long to prepare for and the preparations
would be obvious.
— (b) Bombing
us into submission would invoke our ICBM response.
— (v) Our
industrial and commercial activity at home could be shut down
by the interruption of our oil and gas supplies from offshore
or serious interdiction of our global trade routes.
— (vi) Faced
with anything less than national submission, we should always
prefer to deter/defend at the lowest possible conventional [attritional]
level first.
PLANNING—A
FURTHER ASSUMPTION
8. For the Core Force concept to work, it is
essential to agree what notice we should assume for being able
to react to Assumption 5.i) above. This is a difficult subject
but between WWI and WWII it was accepted as being 10 years—up
until about 1935-36. 10 years notice, as accepted by the SDSR,
is demonstrably unsafe. Perhaps five? Perhaps three? In national
security, you should play safe to the extent you can afford to
do so. Thus this paper assumes, for planning purposes and as a
starting point, that the country will have at least three years
warning of the next major war directly affecting the homeland.
It is important to recognise the value of such a planning assumption
because many strategic procurement decisions spring from it.
STRATEGIC PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
9. These considerations are straightforward:
— (i) We
should expect our strategic planning to be different from that
of our continental neighbours whose armies can march over their
neighbour's border at any moment.
— (ii) We
do not have to choose between a continental or a maritime policy
because we are de facto a maritime nation.
— (iii) The
EU continentals have to look after their own security interest—which
is not identical with ours. And if they won't, we should certainly
not try to do it for them. We should maintain a British Expeditionary
Force capability, not stationed abroad but available to go wherever/whenever
needed.
— (iv) Core
Force Policy is centred upon deterrence—if we remain demonstrably
able to re-arm adequately within the given notice time, those
that might wish to harm us will be deterred from taking such action.
DISCUSSION
The Minimum Force Level
10. Today in 2011, we are definitely not facing
major war before 2014, and so what is the least we should spend
on defence? Starting from nothing, could we create and develop
all the necessary forces to deter/fight such a war in just three
years? Could we, perhaps, rely almost entirely on a powerful ally
to defend our interests? If the answer to both questions is "yes",
we would need to spend very little on Defence.
11. Unfortunately, today's ally may turn out
to be tomorrow's enemy and, even if he does not turn against us,
he is always liable to say "why bother" on the day [USA
1914-17, 1939-41]. "Starting from nothing" is not an
option simply because you cannot develop all the necessary military
capability [equipment and skills] from nothing in much less than
20 years. However, there is still a fairly wide range of skills
and requirements that could be met from "nothing", or
at least very little, in three years. Unless needed in normal
"peacetime", these should not be funded.
12. Arguably and for most effective military
and budgetary planning purposes, military skills and capabilities
should be divided into two groups, which together represent the
full range of capability needed for a major war. These two groups
would be:
— (i) Group
1—The skills and capabilities that could be provided/re-provided
within the warning time assumed (three years).
— (ii) Group
2—The skills and capabilities that could not be provided/re-provided
within the warning time assumed.
13. With a warning time of three years or more,
it would be possible to cut back substantially from present levels
on provision of Group 1, while maintaining Group 2 at levels adequate
for skill maintenance and capability for war. It has to be realised
that most military equipment, provided the manufacturing capability
is maintained and the designs are kept up-to-date, can be produced
within three years. Skills however, once lost can be very difficult
to regain. Anything provided in excess of the strict needs of
these two groups would represent the margin for national involvement
in day-to-day military events not directly affecting defence of
the home base, trade routes and offshore territories. Afghanistan
would be a case in point.
QUALITY AND
QUANTITY
14. The quality of such provision will need to
be the highest available—this will ensure:
— (i) the
best equipment for our military personnel who have to do the fighting
and ensure; and
— (ii) that
our forces are readily able to co-operate with the most advanced
ally we can find on the day.
15. As to quantity, this should be the smallest
possible "core" force/ skill/ equipment/ industrial
capacity inventory sufficient to:
— (i) Permit
the training of large numbers of new personnel within the three
years warning time assumed.
— (ii) Permit
the building/construction/assembly of all necessary equipment
in the same period.
— (iii) Permit
proper training, development and maintenance of the "core
force" capabilities in "peacetime".
— (iv) Deter
and if necessary react to perceived threats that could materialise
within the three-year "notice" period.
OTHER FACTORS
16(a) Complexity: The complexity of modern military
equipment means that there will seldom be sufficient warning time
to bring forward completely new designs. There will only be time
to increase the force levels of existing designs that have been
properly tested and proven. Such designs should all be found and
kept up-to-date in Group 2.
16(b) Costs: The main "savings" on
existing Defence costs would be found in reduced front line levels
across the whole range of existing military systems. While markedly
fewer units would be required, maintenance of the means to re-provide
them within the assumed warning time would be required. Active
manpower would be reduced even as less costly Reserve manpower
would be increased. The costs of research and development would
rise considerably in comparison to the costs per unit produced
but not in total project terms. The costs of maintaining aircraft
construction jigs in case they were needed would be another extra
cost, but a great deal less than actually building and operating
the aircraft in large numbers. The cost of maintaining large but
empty barracks and training facilities would again appear wasteful,
but much less expensive than filling them with fully trained manpower.
The costs of supporting shipyards would also be major, though
if building was co-located with maintaining and refitting, it
could be done a lot more cheaply than at present.
16(c) The numbers required for Group 2 is probably
the area that most needs thorough examination—above all
not by anyone with a vested interest. Industry will object, the
three individual Services will object, European partners in joint
projects will object. However, none of them will be able to defeat
the logic of national self-interest. It is just conceivable that
the Central Defence Staff could do the job, but recent events
cast serious doubt on this.
16(d) Residual Peacetime capability: Our Group
2 Defence forces would be able to do much of what they could do
prior to SDSR 2010, albeit on lesser scales and with less sustainability
if required at less than three years notice. Their capabilities
would emerge from the initial "core" exercise and if
the government of the day decided it needed something extra, it
would have to find the money to do it over and above the existing
budget rather than, as now, relying upon left-overs from previous
policies and equipment programmes.
DISCUSSION SUMMARY
17. Adoption of the Core Force concept could
provide a stable and consistent basis for long term planning within
the Ministry of Defence, robust against short term enthusiasms,
commercial pressures, Treasury-inspired last-minute cuts, political
vote-grabbing, vested interests and less-than-rigorous arguments.
Its few main assumptions, though arguable, appear robust. Its
logic, whether it entailed more or less Defence expenditure, is
simple, comprehensible and soundly based in history.
THE WAY
AHEAD
18. The ideas presented above form only the bare
bones of a feasible Core Force Defence Policy. In order to move
on from feasibility to a properly researched and robust final
policy, certain steps would need to be taken:
— (i) Phase
1: Invite each of the various vested interests to come up with
their answer in a short time-scale and no opportunity to consult
each other. Then proceed to….
— (ii) Phase
2: Invite each vested interest to criticise all the others, not
in open forum, but to a small central analysis team.
Each step should take no more than about two weeks—so
that single interests would simply not have time to make deals
with any other vested interests.
19. While there would be considerable difficulties
in putting such a "radical" policy into place wholesale
and in quick time, a gradualist approach could still work, simply
providing the criteria for all future procurements and developments
via the process at para 20 above. The adoption of such a policy
would fit with historical experience and contemporary politics
and would provide a robust bottom line for Defence: obviating
the need to flounder from crisis to crisis and wasting funding
on partisan interests.
FURTHER WORK
20. Among the range of further work required
would be:
— (i) To
work through the many subsidiary policies on reserves of manpower
and equipment, production and production reserves, industrial
consequences, etc., which would be required if such a policy were
adopted.
— (ii) To
identify the appropriate force types and force levels for each
Group.
— (iii) To
adopt a common Harmony Policy for all military Services/Personnel.
— (iv) To
calculate the budgetary costs. The savings on existing defence
costs could be very substantial.
21. Being so radical and so careless of vested
interests, this policy would meet very substantial resistance:
ways of ameliorating or bypassing such resistance should be sought.
22. The resulting Group 2 "Core Force"
could be so small as to be of little day-to-day, year-to-year
use and would find realistic training [on real operations rather
than limited exercises] difficult without the help/cooperation
of a major ally.
23. Extra funding, beyond that strictly required
for the Core Force, could be authorised as external events demanded,
to meet "peacetime" political needs short of a major
direct military threat to the UK Homeland base.
24. Core Force budget requirements could be "demand
led" rather than "cash constrained" and thus much
less vulnerable to political raids. ["Cash constrained"
does tend to lead to some very wasteful programmes mainly because
the "cash constraints" often only appear after the programme
has been started].
25. Requirements for all expenditure extra to
the Core Force would be "cash constrained" as decided
by Government from year to year.
FUTURE DEFENCE
BUDGETS
26. Future Defence budgets would be in two parts
therefore:
— (i) The
[strategic] Core Force Budget should be fairly stable and predictable,
largely apolitical and probably inflation-proofed [note that defence
inflation tends to be about three times that of domestic inflation—modern,
cutting-edge technology is never cheap].
— (ii) The
Extras Budget would be negotiable in the light of what Governments
saw as needed from time to time, responding to a stated Government
[tactical] Defence policy. Today it might emphasise counter-terrorist
operations rather than Expeditionary Forces or European defence.
By 2020, it might move to some other idea occasioned by developments,
say, in Europe—or wherever. But at least, we would all know
where the Defence budget bottom line was—which we have never
known before.
CONCLUSION
27. Adoption of the Core Force concept would
provide at minimum cost a stable national Defence plan robust
against long term direct threats to national security but sensitive
to short term unexpected crises. It would provide a stable and
consistent basis for long term planning within the Ministry of
Defence, robust against short term enthusiasms, commercial pressures,
Treasury inspired last-minute cuts, political vote-grabbing, vested
interests and less-than-rigorous arguments. Its few main assumptions,
though arguable, appear robust.
28. Its logic, whether it entailed more or less
Defence expenditure, is simple, comprehensible and soundly based
in history.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ACTION
29. A gradual process, with its logic stated
as Government policy, could be the optimum way of putting it into
execution.
PLANNING FOR
THE FUTURE
AND REGENERATING
LOST CAPABILITIES
1. This memorandum is submitted in support of
the Committee remit to investigate:
— (a) The
timing of future SDSRs and the ability to plan for the medium
to long term, and the process for renewing and updating the NSS,
including the regeneration of lost capabilities.
— (b) Whether
the prescriptions of the SDSR will allow the MoD to balance its
budget and make the required efficiency savings.
It is a long submission which presents the many supporting
details at Annex.
INTRODUCTION TO
THE SUBMITTERS
2. The staff work for this Submission has been
conducted by:
— (a) Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Benjamin Bathurst ex-First Sea Lord.
— (b) Admiral
Sir John Woodward GBE KBC submarine Commander, destroyer Commander,
Carrier Battle Group Commander and Submarine Force Commander.
— (c) Commodore
Steve Jermy ex- naval aviator and frigate Commander.
— (d) Commander
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC. A leading expert in Air Warfare
with experience varying from Command in combat, Nuclear Intelligence
within NATO to the Navigator and Gunnery Officer of a small ship.
All have MoD experience.
PLANNING FOR
THE FUTURE
AND UPDATING
THE NSS
3. It is for consideration that the timing and
periodicity of future SDSRs should be tied to a firm requirement
for updating the NSS. At present, there would appear to be no
fundamental policy baseline upon which the National Security Strategy
is decided. Establishing this policy baseline is therefore considered
high priority.
4. The Committee might therefore wish to take
note of the Core Force Defence Policy proposed by Admiral Sir
John Woodward GBE KBC.[178]
The adoption of such a policy would be extremely helpful in guiding
National Security Strategy and would clearly define the optimum
periodicity of future SDSRs.
5. The military aspects of National Security
Strategy should, in all logic and by necessity, be defined by
a National Security Council that includes a balanced cross-section
of proven military expertise.
REGENERATING LOST
CAPABILITIES.
Introduction
6. It is clear that SDSR 2010 was led by "cost
constraints" and was not adequately influenced by existing
and declared Strategic Defence Policy. This has led to recommendations
which have:
— (a) Left
serious gaps in Britain's capability to protect its economically
vital trade routes, fuel supply routes and offshore interests.
— (b) Seriously
reduced Britain's ability to project political and military influence
on a global basis.
— (c) Left
in place expensive military capabilities:
— (i) that
can no longer be justified by any perceived threat and
— (ii) that
do little to support the defence of our global interests or to
ensure the continuation of our global influence.
7. The SDRS process has left us with the prospect
of having to regenerate the Fleet's principal "force enabler"
for the deterrence of those that would harm us and for the protection
of our offshore interests: that is the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm.
Expert naval air warfare opinion dictates that gapping this capability
until at least 2020 will not allow full regeneration of that capability
for at least a further five years. It is for consideration that
this will cause irreparable damage to Britain's political influence
in this troubled world and to our ability to protect our vital
offshore interests.
8. It would appear that SDSR 2010 did not address
the feasibility of gapping or radically reducing the major investment
that is still planned for the land-based air defence of United
Kingdom airspace against which there is no perceived threat. The
initial Staff Requirement for 232 Typhoon aircraft was based on
the Cold War Soviet threat. We are informed that this has been
halved. The total program cost of Typhoon as given by the Defence
Procurement Agency is in excess of £68 billion.
REGENERATING THE
FIXED WING
FLEET AIR
ARM
9. The fixed wing Fleet Air Arm is a vital and
fully integrated part of the complex Fleet Weapon System. Carrier-borne,
its operational practices, expertise and a global utility are
strikingly different from that required of the land-based air.
Without in-depth training and naval air expertise, a land-based
Squadron cannot embark in a carrier and conduct effective, fully
integrated naval warfare operations whether in support of ground
forces ashore or providing area air defence for offensive task
force operations.
10. The Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm is not part
of the Royal Air Force and has not been so since before World
War II. The ethos of the two services is entirely different and
this is explained in some detail at Annex B to this submission.
11. The military and political consequences of
gapping the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm for an extended period are
given at paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) above. An understanding of the
difficulty of regenerating this expertise and capability can be
drawn from Annex B.
12. In the context of our agreed national Strategic
Defence Policy, the SDSR recommendations appear to have ignored
the dependence of this island nation on the robust defence and
protection of our trade routes and offshore interests. At the
same time, the SDSR has failed to recommend gapping or appropriate
cuts in the land-based air defence of the Homeland base - against
which there is no perceived threat.
RESOLVING THE
SITUATION
13. The immediate and most important measure
to be considered is to retain the Harrier and HMS Ark Royal in
Royal Naval service. The complete withdrawal of the Tornado GR4
from service would pay for this measure. Please see Ev w120 for
cost and combat effectiveness comparisons between the two aircraft
types.
14. The further steps that the Committee might
wish to consider are associated with the introduction to service
of the Queen Elizabeth class carrier and its air group. The Harrier
Force is lifed and costed up until 2018. Prior to this date it
will be necessary to equip the Fleet Air Arm with new aircraft
for the continued conduct of our Strategic Defence Policy. As
it stands today, the aircraft of choice has been the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter. The initial variant chosen was the Advanced Short
Take Off and Vertical Landing (ASTOVL) F-35B. Extensive development
problems have now ruled this option out for operations from our
carriers. The United States Navy version, the F-35C is now being
considered as the prime option but the indications are uncomfortably
clear that this too will be an inappropriate choice for our carrier
air groups.
15. The F-35C is encountering major development
problems:
— (a) It
is unlikely that its stealth qualities can be maintained in the
maritime environment—and it was these stealth qualities
that made it the first choice for satisfying the Joint Strike
Fighter requirement.
— (b) Its
landing speed is too high for recovery on board a conventionally
powered aircraft carrier in low wind conditions. A ship's speed
of at least 33 kn is required and the Queen Elizabeth will only
be capable of 27 kn.
— (c) Development
costs are soaring leading to an expected cost per aircraft well
in excess of $100 million US—perhaps approaching US$150
million.
— (d) Replacement
engines cannot be delivered on board in a conventional manner
because they are too large.
In the light of these problems, the United States
Navy has reduced its order for the aircraft and is planning to
procure more F-18 Super Hornet aircraft to satisfy its operational
requirements until the year 2035. The major and continuing increase
in cost coupled with doubts about the aircraft's stealth capability
and timescale of availability arguably rule this aircraft out
as a prime contender for the Queen Elizabeth class air group.
16. The F-18 Super Hornet has a pedigree
of more than one million hours in service (earlier variants) and
is a very capable swing role fighter:
— (a) It
is a 4.5 generation aircraft with better stealth characteristics
than the Typhoon.
— (b) It
has state-of-the-art proven weapon systems.
— (c) The
Growler variant of the aircraft provides a state of the art, in-depth
and comprehensive electronic warfare and ELINT capability.
— (d) It
is already fitted for air to air refuelling either as the tanker
or the receiver (which the F-35 is not).
— (e) Its
radius of action with a full war load is approximately 800 nautical
miles (somewhat greater than the F-35C).
— (f) Its
cost at 2010 prices is US$60 million (far less than the F-35 and
the French Rafale).
— (g) Royal
Navy pilots are now involved in an exchange program with the United
States Navy flying the F-18.
17. Paragraphs 15 and 16 above suggest that the
UK should now consider the F-18 Super Hornet as a prime choice
to fulfil the Joint Strike Fighter requirement. It's relatively
low-cost, proven capability, compatibility with the Queen Elizabeth
class carrier and ready availability would appear to make it an
obvious choice.
18. Early procurement of this aircraft to satisfy
the needs of the Queen Elizabeth class air group and the Royal
Navy Fleet Air Arm could be funded by a reduction in the number
of Typhoon aircraft on order for the defence of UK airspace. Up
to 5 F-18 aircraft could be procured for the price of one Typhoon.
The recent decision to scrap tranche one Typhoons, which cost
approximately £6 billion and have already been delivered,
could be reversed and any further orders and modification programs
for this aircraft cancelled. The numbers of Typhoon aircraft in
service today and their capabilities are already more than adequate
for their only formally stated role of policing UK airspace.
BALANCING THE
BUDGET AND
MAKING EFFICIENCY
SAVINGS
19. The proposals above make economic and operational
sense—both in the context of fiscal constraint and the National
Strategic Defence Policy.
— (a) Reversal
of the Harrier/Tornado decision would:
— (i) Result
in savings over the next four years of approximately £600
million.
— (ii) Provide
markedly more effective support to our ground forces in Afghanistan.
— (iii) Enable
Britain to continue to protect its economic interests offshore
and to project political and military influence worldwide.
— (iv) Ensure
the retention of the vital expertise of the fixed wing Fleet Air
Arm.
— (v) Obviate
the need to regenerate that expertise.
— (b) Choosing
the F-18 Super Hornet to satisfy the requirement for the Joint
Strike Fighter would:
— (i) Provide
a more than adequate 4.5 generation swing role fighter that is
already proven in carrier operations and is the preferred choice
of the United States Navy.
— (ii) Represent
a considerable reduction in cost.
— (iii) Ensure
the timely continuation of Britain's fixed wing Fleet Air Arm
carrier expertise.
20. Funding for this way ahead could be made
available by cuts in or the cancellation of other military programs
that continue to support a defence capability against threats
that do not exist.
RECOMMENDATIONS
21. In the light of the above, the Committee
may wish to investigate further:
— (a) The
SDSR decision to withdraw Harrier and HMS Ark Royal from service.
— (b) The
SDSR decision to retain Tornado GR9 in service.
— (c) The
efficacy of the F-35C as a realistic and cost effective contender
for the Joint Strike Fighter requirement.
— (d) The
proposal that the F-18 Super Hornet would be the most cost-effective
and operationally effective solution to the Queen Elizabeth class
carrier air group needs.
Annex A
FLYING FROM OUR NEW CARRIERS—THE RN
OR THE RAF ETHOS
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1. This paper describes the experience and expertise
required for an aviator to become fully qualified as a Carrier-borne
All Weather Pilot.
2. Land-based and carrier-borne air operations
are compared and found to have very different challenges. These
are examined in some detail.
3. It examines the aspirations of a young pilot
on entry into the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy and discusses
the markedly different ethos of each service.
4. The paper demonstrates that a casual/part
time approach to embarked flying operations is inappropriate and
would not allow an embarked air group or the carrier itself to
achieve effective operational readiness.
5. Appropriate conclusions are drawn.
INTRODUCTION
6. There is little knowledge within the public
domain concerning the differences between Royal Air Force aircrew
and Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm (FAA) aircrew. But these do exist
and have resulted from the entirely different in-service requirements
and experience of the RAF and the FAA that has produced arguably
"incompatible" levels of expertise. Flying fixed or
rotary wing aircraft from a land base is a markedly different
proposition from operating them from a ship's deck at sea.
7. The sea is an extremely unpredictable element.
It covers the majority of the globe, is an open highway for all
who wish to use it and throughout history has provided an opportunity
for pirates, military enemies and now terrorists to attack our
maritime merchant trading interests. Merchant shipping can, with
good forecasting and care, minimise the effect of Neptune's occasional
wrath. But providing protection for such shipping against those
that would harm us is an entirely different matter. The bulk of
British imports and exports travel by sea and rely upon the Royal
Navy to provide a strategically flexible and mobile force that
can pre-empt the uncertainties of the modern world where our global
defence, diplomatic and trade interests may be threatened. Balanced
maritime forces are necessary to achieve this with an umbrella
of protection that comes from visible naval power and associated
deterrence.
8. The keystone of effective maritime force is
the concept of the balanced fleet. This is a force that is capable
of dealing with a wide variety of threats and tasks. These tasks
are most varied in nature and range from naval diplomacy, through
maritime policing and disaster relief to fighting at sea and projecting
power over land by naval air power or amphibious forces such as
the Royal Marine Commandos, or to achieving political coercion
with submarine launched cruise missiles.
9. In providing such power and deterrence, the
Fleet needs to be fully capable in all aspects of naval warfare
including Anti-Submarine, Anti-Ship and Anti-Air Warfare. A marked
deficiency in any one area is likely to render other capabilities
ineffective. The three are interdependent and require full integration
into what is effectively one large and homogenous Fleet Weapons
System.
10. Naval personnel including aviators need to
have considerable knowledge of these widely ranging tasks and
their interdependency. Arguably this can only be realised through
continuous exposure to active Fleet operations at sea and in the
littoral. This is where the underlying ethos of the Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force is completely different. The Navy and indeed
the Fleet Air Arm represents a sophisticated integrated weapon
system whose effectiveness as a whole is far greater than the
sum of all the parts and with the resultant end product far more
important than any one type of equipment or specific capability.
The Royal Air Force arguably has concentrated instead on the "means"
(particularly the procurement of large numbers of fast combat
jets) rather than the global capability of the "end product".
Furthermore, a rather narrow approach to airpower has ensured
that few, if any, of RAF fast jet pilots have had prolonged periods
at sea in which to absorb adequate knowledge of the complex Fleet
Weapons System. As a consequence they lack appropriate qualification
for the embarked naval air warfare role. This qualification cannot
be obtained in a classroom ashore or through occasional "part
time" embarkations of a week or two here and there.
11. This paper will attempt to address these
matters and also to define the standard of qualification and expertise
required of a fully qualified, multi-role carrier-borne all weather
fighter pilot. For this is arguably the most demanding role for
any aircrew.
THE
ENVIRONMENT WITHIN
WHICH AIRCREW
OPERATE
Land-Based Air
12. Operations from a land-based airfield are
entirely different from operating from a ship at sea. These differences
should not be treated lightly.
13. The RAF aviator lives in the mess or at home
with his wife and family and enjoys all the social amenities that
would be expected in any other form of life. This alone provides
for a lower overall stress factor in his or her life; being able,
for example, to resolve domestic problems in the home at all times,
walk the dog, go to a pub, spend weekends with friends and so
on.
14. In general, the RAF operates on an air base-oriented
routine with their personnel having each weekend at home with
the family and having predictable holidays, albeit on a flexible
basis, three times every year in line with their civilian counterparts
(and every day of their leave allowance is diligently taken).
Night flying and membership of a duty roster presents a mild interference
factor with this harmonious way of life. For the most part, the
RAF aviator enjoys a nine to five work routine.
15. Operationally, the land-based flying task
is very much less demanding. Long, broad, static runways ensure
that launch and recovery (take-off and landing) is relatively
safe and routine. There is a large room for error, miscalculation
or lack of concentration. Further, the RAF tends to specialise
its aircraft and pilots in particular roles; specifically either
Air Defence or Ground Attack/Offensive Air Support, Transport
or Support Helicopters, Search and Rescue, Airborne Early Warning,
Air-to-Air Refuelling, etc. This markedly reduces the aviator's
workload and expectations in terms of overall air warfare expertise.
16. The principal hazard to land-based fighter
operations is the weather which can normally be adequately predicted.
Further, diversion airfields are always specified prior to flight
so that if there is an accident on the runway or the weather suddenly
dictates that aircraft cannot be recovered at their home base,
alternative landing fields are always available. In addition and
of particular relevance, unlike a ship's deck, airfield runways
do not move around in bad weather. This makes landing an aircraft
in marginal weather conditions much less stressful and difficult.
CARRIER-BASED
AIR
17. The carrier at sea represents an entirely
different world to a shore-based airfield. It is a compact floating
weapon system with many integral parts. For its personnel it is,
therefore, no different from life in any frigate, minesweeper
or even a submarine.
18. The ship's company which includes all embarked
personnel, including aircrew, engineers, medics and logisticians,
enjoy an existence that is far removed in quality and content
from that of their civilian or land based colleagues. They are
confined to an existence in a steel box from which they cannot
easily escape. As Samuel Johnson once wrote, "No man will
be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a jail;
for being in a ship is being in jail, with the chance of being
drowned." They are separated from their friends, wives
and families and cannot respond rapidly to domestic problems and
difficulties. This separation places a great strain on the families
left behind and can be demoralising and extremely stressful for
the embarked sailor—especially when crises in the home occur.
19. Few social amenities are available to embarked
personnel. There is no pub, no shops, no green fields for walking
the dog and no escape from the confinement of the steel hull that
can be their home for extended periods of time.
20. Unlike an airfield on shore, the active safety
and operation of the ship is a 24/7 responsibility and there is
no place for a nine to five mentality. Weekends do not exist.
The smooth functioning and operability of an aircraft carrier
demands continuous and fastidious attention to detail and a full
integration of all the differing specialisations embarked; whether
these are ships engineers, flight deck handlers, operations room
personnel, watch keeping personnel, armourers, medics, cooks and
caterers, or aircrew.
21. For safety reasons in particular, all embarked
personnel must know their ship well. Hazards facing the ship and
crew are numerous and vary from violent weather, fire on board,
collision risk, to crashes on the flight deck. The ship's company
must be on its guard continuously and be ready and prepared to
cope with any emergency; which is why, for example, all personnel
are required to have detailed training in damage control, fire-fighting,
survival and other safety-at-sea issues. Every man is fully involved
in "fighting the ship" during action stations, if only
to ensure his own and his shipmates' survival. Each is fully aware
that their ship may be the next target.
22. The maritime environment can be extremely
hostile both to men and to machines, including aircraft. The salt
laden air has a corrosive quality that is unremitting. Aircraft
and other equipment must be particularly designed to counter this
with the use of special alloys and materials. Inevitably, the
maintenance of modern state-of-the-art weapons systems is much
more demanding in the embarked environment and requires more detailed
attention and hard work from ships and aircraft engineers.
23. Flight deck operations are extremely complex
and dangerous—there is no room for error by any party. Each
man must know his job thoroughly and understand precisely the
part that others around him have to play. All the functions carried
out on an airfield ashore that covers hundreds of acres have to
be conducted within the close confines of the flight deck—as
well as additional functions such as catapult launch and arrested
landings that use the same space. And several of these functions
are incompatible with the concurrent operation of others due to
the confined deck space.
24. There is no place for casual visitors or
part timers in this extremely hazardous environment. Instead,
all carrier-associated personnel including the air group must
go through a series of work-ups that familiarise them with the
complex working of the flight deck and air operations from it.
These work-ups are essential to the long-term safety of all concerned
and culminate in an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) in
which the ship has to demonstrate its ability to conduct intensive
flying operations safely from the deck by day and by night. No
individual or group can absent themselves from such operational
preparation, particularly aviators and the aviation department.
Following the ORI, the ship will proceed to sea and over subsequent
months fine-tune its flight deck and flying operations as well
as its other armaments.
THE
FAST JET
PILOT
25. The aviator who is finally responsible for
the safety of the aircraft and its crew is the pilot. For the
sake of brevity, this section now concentrates upon the fast jet
pilot but it is important to note that helicopter aircrew have
to deal with many similar challenges when embarked.
26. For the fast jet pilot, operations on board
a carrier during peacetime operations represent significantly
greater challenges to his expertise and dedication than those
faced by his counterpart ashore. For example, conventional deck
landing into arrestor wires by day is an art in itself requiring
100% concentration and extremely precise control of speed, aircraft
attitude and glide path (in the vertical as well as the lateral
sense). The touchdown area where the tail hook of the aircraft
catches the arrestor wire is extremely small and any lapse in
concentration can cause pilots to miss the wires completely or,
catastrophically, impact the stern of the ship. As if this was
not enough, the flow of the wind over the deck often creates "a
hole" just behind the ship. This has to be anticipated by
the pilot by applying a small amount of power. Failure to correct
can result in disaster. Too much correction will result in missing
the wires and the aircraft "bolting" down the deck and
having to go around once more. In calm, benign sea conditions
this can still represent a major challenge to an inexperienced
carrier deck pilot. In rough seas with the ship pitching, rolling
and heaving, the challenge becomes much greater. Conducting night
deck landings in poor weather represents the most difficult and
challenging flying task that any military pilot will face in any
environment.
27. Vertical deck landings as conducted by the
Harrier or the F-35B present something of a paradox when it comes
to the ease of execution. For fair weather landings by day with
a clear horizon and a calm sea in temperate climates, vertical
deck landing is unquestionably easier than conventional deck landings
into arrestor wires especially for an ab-initio pilot embarking
for the first time. However, experienced pilots in either discipline
do not find deck landing in such good conditions a challenge.
In foul weather by day in temperate climes with the ship pitching,
rolling and heaving and with limited visibility (and therefore
a poor horizon for the Harrier pilot to refer to) the stress factor
for each discipline rises. The conventional deck lander has to
disregard the movement of the ship (this is not as easy as it
sounds) and rely totally on the ship's deck landing sight for
controlling his approach path and landing. The Harrier pilot also
has to disregard the movement of the ship and come to a steady
hover in relation to the real world as opposed to the flight deck—again,
this is not easy when there is no discernible horizon to refer
to and as the ship you are trying to land upon is "bobbing
around like a cork".
28. In hot weather (whether fair or foul) by
day, the vertical lander has an additional problem, that is he
will normally be returning to the deck with enough fuel for just
one landing. There is no room for error and he knows that if he
fails to complete his landing in one attempt, he will lose his
aircraft. This alone causes a higher stress level in good conditions
and the fouler the weather gets, that stress level can increase
exponentially especially for the inexperienced deck pilot.
29. If we now progress to night vertical landing
in other than perfect conditions (a calm sea with a bright moon
and a clear horizon), the stress and difficulty factor can go
off the clock, as they say, particularly for all but the most
adept and experienced night deck landing pilots. The findings
from the night deck trials carried out by test pilots from Boscombe
Down and British Aerospace, Dunsfold during the introduction to
service of the Sea Harrier were that "night deck landings
of the Sea Harrier would probably be beyond the capability of
the average frontline pilot". Two front line pilots in
801 Squadron prior to the Falklands (the author of this paper
and the then Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer, Royal Air Force,
who had been embarked with the Squadron continuously from the
beginning) demonstrated that this finding was not necessarily
accurate. However, as a result of the almost complete lack of
embarkation of Joint Force Harrier squadrons, full all weather
night deck qualification has probably not been achieved by any
pilot in the last decade. (The emphasis here is on "full
all weather": that is to say being competent in foul
weather by night—not just benign conditions.)
30. A further significant challenge/stress factor
for carrier aviators is that they will often be flying with no
diversion airfields available: that is to say, their only chance
of returning on board without getting wet is to be fully competent
in their navigation and the pilot's deck landing ability.
31. When embarked, all squadron personnel need
to play a full part in non-flying aspects of life on board, especially
when in harbour/visiting foreign ports. For example, Lieutenants
will be employed on the Officer of the Day roster and Lieutenant
Commanders will be employed on the Duty Lt Cdr roster. These positions
require a detailed knowledge of the working of the ship as well
as a developed understanding of the personnel on board—and
those returning on board from a night ashore! The safety and routine
operation of the ship in harbour is controlled by these officers
and there can be no excuse for aircrew officers not playing their
part or, more importantly, not being fully trained to fulfil such
responsibilities.
32. There are two further reasons why it is important
for the squadrons to be embarked and to remain embarked when the
ship is deployed offshore.
— (a) First,
the non-aviation members of the ship's company tend to remain
on board throughout a major deployment with no thought at all
of being relieved on task by a complete second ship's company
being flown out from the UK. Such rotation would have a severely
detrimental effect on the carrier's competence and efficiency
as an integrated weapons system. The full rotation of aircrew
and aircraft engineers during a deployment would also have an
equally detrimental effect on operational capability and the ship's
company's morale. It is not therefore acceptable. Further, it
would be invidious for aviation personnel to come and go as they
please thereby reducing the war fighting capability of the ship
whilst at the same time non-aviation personnel were continuously
retained on board. The rules of harmony for the Royal Navy reflect
this and are very much more demanding on personnel than is the
case for the RAF or the Army. Ethically, each service should operate
under the same rules.
— (b) Second,
in practically all modern conflicts offshore naval air power has
been the key element in providing for control of the airspace
over the combat zone. It has also been responsible for more than
80% of the interdiction missions launched against land targets
during the initial phases of conflict (whether Korea, Vietnam,
Iraq or Afghanistan). The embarked naval aviator is fully mentally
prepared for such engagement in active operations and understands
the need for being fully prepared to carry out such warlike missions.
By virtue of his incarnation he is constantly closer to the possibility
of active combat than his land-based counterparts.
THE
RESULTS OF
SQUADRON EMBARKATION
WITHOUT FULL
FAMILIARISATION AND
TRAINING
33. In 1982 during the Falklands crisis, a small
number of RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft of No. 1(F) Squadron were embarked
in HMS Hermes to supplement the number of Sea Harrier aircraft
and to take on some of the ground attack and reconnaissance missions,
thereby enabling the limited Sea Harrier assets to concentrate
upon the more pressing need for defence against air attack. The
RAF pilots' exposure to these carrier borne operations can be
summed up as follows:
— (a) All
pilots embarked without any previous deck landing experience but
first landed on a clear deck, in benign conditions. All the pilots
were highly qualified on the Harrier airframe, probably more so
than the majority of the Sea Harrier aircrew.
— (b) The
immediate and surprising attitude of a number of the pilots was
that "they were now the primary weapon system of the ship
and hence the ship should do what they wanted" (the classic
RAF ethos). This stemmed in part from a complete lack of understanding,
or indeed they were not interested, in the prevailing tactical
situation in the other warfare areas (surface/subsurface/air defence),
logistics and ship requirements such as positioning for future
tasks, the threat, threat directions, intelligence etc. Arguably
this might have been expected: in most non-action operations the
RAF are able to live comfortably in accommodation miles away and
totally divorced from the scene of action. Life is different for
them in Afghanistan because no such accommodation exists. However,
it is clear that they arrived on board in 1982 with the wrong
mind-set.
— (c) A
very highly experienced naval aviator, Commodore Neill Thomas
CBE DSC, has clear memories of this active combat embarkation:
"I had the pleasure of briefing and leading the RAF on a
familiarisation sortie. They had been briefed in depth on ship
procedures etc. The task was simple—launch for a 1 hour
10 minutes sortie with a fixed recovery time. The sortie included
a familiarisation of the area around the fleet, some simple ship
controlled intercepts followed by a couple of practice air combat
manoeuvring engagements. Fuel management. which is critical at
sea, was strongly emphasised and briefed thoroughly. In spite
of my careful briefing, I had to take the RAF Harriers back to
the ship after just 40 minutes because one pilot in particular
had allowed himself to run seriously short of fuel—the others
were not much better. And these were experienced Harrier pilots!
As far as I remember, the attitude of the pilot concerned (supported
to some extent by at least one of the others) was not one of wishing
to integrate properly into the carrier weapon system but that
"the Fleet Air Arm was allowing the ship to impose undesirable
restrictions on their operations". This is backed up by Squadron
Leader Pook who stated rather naïvely in his book that the
FAA knew nothing about flying or operation from ships at sea and
needed RAF input to improve.
— (d) The
Royal Navy ethos obviously did not suit Pook or his colleagues.
In the synopsis to his book, he remarks: "Very soon after
starting operations from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes the squadron
realised that they were considered as more or less expendable
ordnance. The Harriers lacked the most basic self-protection aids
and were up against 10,000 well-armed troops who put up an impressive
weight of fire whenever attacked." There were no such complaints
from the Sea Harrier aircrew embarked in HMS Hermes. In total,
they conducted many more ground attack missions than did the RAF
Harrier and early on suffered the tragic loss of Lieutenant Nick
Taylor at low level over Goose Green. This was an expected and
inevitable result of engaging in combat operations and was something
that the RAF pilots appeared to be ill-prepared for.
34. Later, during the Sierra Leone crisis, a
Naval Sea Harrier FA2 Squadron and an RAF Harrier GR7 Squadron
were embarked to provide Joint Force Harrier support to the peace
keeping task of ground forces ashore. Naval squadron personnel
were immediately comfortable in the maritime environment. This
was not so for the RAF squadron. The latter found it difficult
coming to terms with operating from a carrier out of sight of
land and they were very concerned that if they did carry out the
armed reconnaissance missions planned for them onshore, "they
would not be able to find their way back to the ship". As
a result, they withdrew their services from the tasked missions.
The naval squadron immediately stepped forward and carried out
all the armed reconnaissance missions that had been planned for
them. It was very clear that the RAF aircrew were out of their
depth in the embarked environment and significantly failed to
live up to the promises made on their behalf by the Chief of the
Air Staff concerning the overriding importance of the RAF Harrier
in embarked offensive air support operations.
35. The only reasonable interpretation of the
events on the two occasions when the RAF has embarked in a Carrier,
is that the RAF squadrons involved were ill-prepared and unqualified
for embarked carrier operations. Their previous exposure to such
operations, if any, had obviously been totally inadequate and
their attitude was very different from that of the FAA.
36. In spite of this operational shortfall, it
appears that the RAF have disregarded these fundamental deficiencies
in training and operational preparedness and continue to suggest
that their squadrons need only embark when dictated by a particular
operational need. It seems they do not understand carrier borne
air warfare and do not have the expertise to control or conduct
the same.
MULTI-ROLE
CAPABILITY AND
FLEXIBILITY
37. A maritime battle group is normally responsible
for all aspects of its own defence. It is a self-contained entity
within which individual parts have no other option but to adapt
to circumstances and overcome obstacles. If they fail to do this,
they put at risk the whole of the battle group. The carrier air
group is no exception to this. The air group is inevitably limited
in numbers of aircraft and so, traditionally, naval aircraft are
normally multi-role. Unlike their land-based counterparts who
might well spend every mission practising the intercept of intruders
into British airspace, the naval fighter pilot has to be proficient
at all roles that may be given to him by the command and his aircraft
is capable of. These roles include:
— (a) Long
range air defence including the detection, interception and destruction
of anti-ship missiles.
— (b) The
establishment of air supremacy over a combat zone.
— (c) Over
the horizon surveillance and targeting.
— (d) The
interdiction of surface targets.
— (e) Armed
reconnaissance.
— (f) The
interdiction of land targets.
— (g) The
close air support of ground forces.
— (h) The
protection of ground forces from Fixed and Rotary wing air attack.
— (i) The
interception, identification and warning off of intruders.
38. The effective practice of the majority of
these roles can only be conducted from an embarked posture. Airspace
and weaponry restrictions within the United Kingdom greatly inhibit
the realistic practice of some of these roles, most of which need
to be integrated with other battle group capabilities such as
Surface to Air Missile fitted ships in order to achieve full training
value.
INITIAL
PILOT TRAINING
39. A carrier pilot is not considered fully qualified
as a front-line all weather pilot until he has mastered the art
of fighting his aircraft and returning it safely to the deck in
all weathers by day and night. With constant practice and the
expertise that can only come from having conducted numerous deck
landings in different weathers, first tour pilots may eventually
reach full all weather qualification. This is one of the many
reasons why it is essential for the squadrons to be embarked whenever
a carrier puts to sea for exercise or offshore operations. The
Command, as well as common sense, requires the carrier weapon
system as a whole to be ready by day and night to meet any contingency.
The squadrons are an important part of that weapon system, providing
over the horizon long range air defence, surveillance, anti-submarine
warfare capability, strike and offensive support of ground operations.
40. Prior to commencing flying, officers of each
service receive special-to-type training at their respective Colleges;
either RAF Cranwell or BRNC Dartmouth. This initial training develops
an instinct for the expectations and demands of the individual
Service and is crucial to the manner in which a young officer
develops and views life in the service. Each Service has developed
a different ethos and culture.
41. The expectations of a young RAF officer are:
— (a) That
his career will be based on land and primarily within the UK.
— (b) That
he will enjoy an enhanced level of harmony—rarely being
required to be separated from his family and children.
— (c) That
all personnel within the RAF are there exclusively to support
their pilots (other matters are of little import).
42. The expectations of a young Naval officer
are:
— (a) That
he will spend a high proportion of his early career (up to the
rank of Lt Cdr) at sea in Her Majesty's warships.
— (b) That
he will be separated from his wife and children frequently and
often for long periods*.
— (c) That
in spite of his expertise he is just one small cog (albeit an
important one) in the Fleet Weapons System and needs to integrate
fully with that weapons system.
*Accepting such lack of harmony requires a special
dedication and marks a fundamental difference between the two
Services.
FLYING
TRAINING
43. Both RAF and R.N. pilots undergo Basic Flying
Training and Advanced Flying Training under the auspices of the
Royal Air Force. During these two stages of training, the highest
standards are demanded of the student pilots and they are systematically
graded to establish their aptitude and ability. There is an extremely
high failure rate. Those with the highest aptitude and ability
are selected for fast jet operational training; provided that
they have reached a "high enough standard".
44. That standard is predicated on the corporate
view of the training staff who take into account many different
factors including:
— (a) Basic
flying skills.
— (b) Ability
to cope with several tasks at once in addition to simply flying
the aircraft (such as operating the radar, weapon system and navigation
equipment—and controlling multi-aircraft missions).
— (c) Whether
the student pilot would be a danger to the safety of himself in
the demanding fast jet environment.
— (d) Whether
the student pilot would be a danger to the safety of other pilots
that he will be flying with and that will be relying upon him.
Provided the student pilot satisfies these expectations,
he will move on to Operational Flying Training in the aircraft
type that he has been selected for. Those student pilots who fall
short of these high expectations but who are considered safe to
operate helicopter, transport and logistics aircraft will be sent
for final training in the appropriate field.
45. Within the highly skilled group of student
pilots selected for fast jet training, the training staff will
have made recommendations concerning the potential of the student
for qualifying in the frontline on a particular type of fast jet/fighter
aircraft. Those with the highest potential and the greatest perceived
overall flying aptitude will be selected for the most demanding
operational flying tasks. The Harrier force is where the highest
rated pilots in the Royal Air Force will find themselves.
46. Within the Royal Navy, only the highest rated
pilots are accepted from training and these are all destined for
front-line fixed wing squadrons. But in contrast to the Royal
Air Force selection procedure, the pilots destined for front line,
embarked, multi-role carrier operations are further screened to
establish their full aptitude for such operations which can be
very much more demanding than equivalent land-based ones. Those
who fail to make the grade have the opportunity to transfer to
helicopter flying training.
EMBARKED
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
AND QUALIFICATIONS
At Squadron Level
47. For more than seven decades the expertise
level of fixed wing Fleet Air Arm pilots has been passed on naturally
from "the old and bold" to the fresh young faces in
the squadrons. This has of course been through word of mouth as
well as observation and the desire to learn and succeed. However,
that expertise has also been enshrined in progressive editions
of Squadron Standing Orders, Standard Operating Procedures, Operational
Instructions and Tactical Manuals.
48. A significant insurance for the continuation
of appropriate war fighting expertise came with the introduction
of the Air Warfare Instructor. This specialist qualification has
always been reserved for those aviators who have demonstrated
exceptional aggression, leadership, dedication and a high level
of operational capability in the front line. The Air Warfare Instructor
qualification was aspired to by most Squadron pilots but few were
selected and even fewer were able to pass the demanding ground
school and flying modules of the course. Only the very highest
standards of leadership in the air were acceptable and the AWI
became the accepted authority within each frontline squadron for
all tactics, training and weapons instruction in all roles. Often,
the Squadron Commanding Officer and/or the second in command would
also enjoy the AWI qualification but the responsibility for the
attainment of first-class war fighting expertise within the Squadron
remained the recognised responsibility of the Squadron AWI.
49. AWI expertise has proven to be invaluable
to Squadron command as well as to carrier command, especially
when planning for and conducting combat operations. There is therefore
a recognised hierarchy of carrier aviation experience and expertise
that is necessary for the efficient and flexible conduct of training
and of combat operations. In most circumstances, the Commanding
Officer and the Senior Pilot will have had several frontline embarked
tours under their belts and, as such, will have the necessary
experience to run the Squadron effectively in the embarked environment.
The Squadron AWI supports the command by overseeing the operational,
flight safety awareness, training and competence of all aircrew
and the Squadron Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI) is the acknowledged
mentor for the standardisation and improvement of flying practices
including Instrument Flying. This structure ensures that the junior/younger
members of the Squadron have a knowledge base available that they
can respect and learn from.
50. Empire Test Pilot (ETP) qualification is
also available to a small number of front line pilots and Air
Engineer Officers. Many Air Engineers qualify as Maintenance Test
Pilots (MTP) after they have fully qualified at sea. Their experienced
input into the development and testing of naval aircraft is essential
for ensuring the right capabilities of front line, carrier borne
aircraft.
AT
SHIP LEVEL
51. There are key senior positions within the
ship's company that are essential for the effective conduct and
coordination of air group operations. It has always been the norm
and is, in all logic, essential that these positions are filled
by carrier qualified aviators of equivalent experience and knowledge
to that of the squadron commanders. Here, it should be noted that
a carrier air group usually consists of Fixed and Rotary wing
aircraft and therefore adequate career exposure to the roles,
tasks and capabilities of each aircraft type is essential for
certain senior figures. Experience has shown that lack of such
exposure prevents an individual from conducting effectively the
command functions required on board and has a detrimental effect
on the operational capability of the air group as a whole.
52. The captain is responsible for working up
his ship's company and his air group so that the ship will conduct
itself safely and operate to its best ability. He has Heads of
Department to supervise sections such as Air, Engineering, Supply
and Seaman. The senior aviator on board is the Commander (Air)
(generally known as "Wings") who is the direct adviser
to the Captain on all aspects of aviation within the ship. He
has general responsibility for the operational and domestic conduct
of the air group. His right-hand man is known as Lt Cdr (Flying)
(generally known as "Little F") and he is principally
responsible for the safe movement and control of aircraft operating
to and from the deck. Other equally important appointments include
the Flight Deck Officer (FDO) who controls all movements on the
flight deck and the Landing Sight Officer (LSO) who is responsible
for "talking down" aircraft on the approach to the deck
and grading the quality of the approach and the deck landing,
thus ensuring high standards and the preservation of flight safety.
Other important appointments include Air Operations Officers,
Direction Officers and Carrier Controlled Approach Officers.
53. In parallel, the Observers who fly in anti-submarine
and early warning helicopters have little in common with their
RAF counterparts. They hold qualifications that are directly compatible
with ships and are inter-operable. Much the same can be said of
the Rating aircrewmen. On the air engineering side there is a
hierarchy of highly qualified aviation engineers or Air Engineer
Officers (AEOs) who carry out similar supervisory and command
duties to their aviator counterparts. Their sphere of influence
encompasses Squadron engineering standards, certain aspects of
flight deck operations and Hangar Control and aircraft maintenance.
54. All of the above need to have in-depth experience
of embarked carrier operations without which they would be unable
to conduct their work effectively. Although members of the air
group, they generally remain with the ship both in harbour and
at sea and are an integral part of the ship's company.
SUMMARY
— (a) The
ethos behind Royal Air Force fast jet operations has been developed
from continuous land-based operations with each aircraft type
specialising in a specific role, whether air defence, ground attack
or offensive air support. They operate in isolation from and with
general disregard for effective integration into the operational
requirements of the other two services.
— (b) The
ethos behind Royal Navy fast jet operations has been developed
from significant exposure to integrated Fleet combat operations
at sea since World War II. The Fleet Air Arm understands that
it is just one part of the much larger Fleet Weapons System and
that full integration into that system is necessary in order to
achieve full combat effectiveness.
— (c) Knowledge
and expertise in carrier borne flying operations can only be achieved
by substantial and prolonged exposure to such operations. The
carrier air group staff must be equally knowledgeable and expert
in the conduct of such operations.
— (d) The
Falklands and the Sierra Leone experiences were an indicator that
the RAF's recent reluctance to embark for anything other than
the minimum time to achieve initial deck qualifications demonstrates
an inadequate understanding of carrier borne flying operations
and this clearly supports the conclusion that they are unqualified
to administer or control any part of such operations.
— (e) Fleet
Air Arm aircrew, being an integral part of the Royal Navy, have
career expectations within the senior service that includes the
command of ships and the attainment of a high naval rank. Their
conduct, dedication to duty and loyalty reflects such expectations.
Embarked RAF aircrew would not have the same expectations and
their allegiance will naturally lie with their own service and
the different expectations of that service. Where conflicts occur,
this could only be to the detriment of the fighting efficiency
of the ship.
CONCLUSIONS
— (a) Aviation
assets, aircraft and aircrew are just one important part of the
total Fleet Weapons System and must be fully integrated into the
aircraft carriers' at-sea programmes.
— (b) The
well proven expertise and efficient conduct of carrier-borne flying
operations by the Fleet Air Arm has been clearly demonstrated
in the many successful combat operations undertaken over the past
seven decades.
— (c) Royal
Air Force personnel have little if any expertise in the conduct
of such operations and, as such, are inadequately qualified or
experienced for consideration as administrators or controllers
of these operations.
THE TORNADO/HARRIER
DECISION
Executive Summary
1. This memorandum discusses the SDSR recommendation
to withdraw the Harrier GR9 and HMS Ark Royal from service in
favour of the retention of the Tornado GR4 and provides arguments
as to why this decision should be reversed forthwith. This falls
within the Committee remit to investigate:
— (a) What
capability gaps will emerge due to the SDSR.
— (b) How
these were assessed as part of the development of strategies and
what impact this may have on the U.K.'s defence planning assumptions
and the ability to adapt to changing threats or unforeseen occurrences;
and
— (c) Whether
the prescriptions of the SDSR will allow the MoD to balance its
budget and make the required efficiency savings.
The main body of the submission is four pages long.
It requires much detailed supporting evidence. This is to be found
in the three Annexes which contain a further 11 pages.
INTRODUCTION TO
THE SUBMITTERS
— (d) Admiral
Sir John Woodward GBE KBC submarine Commander, Destroyer Commander,
Carrier Battle Group Commander and Submarine Force Commander.
— (e) Commander
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC. A leading expert in Air Warfare
with experience varying from Command in combat, Nuclear Intelligence
within NATO to the Navigator and Gunnery Officer of a small ship.
Both are proven military experts who have achieved
notable success in the front line and who between them have decades
of appropriate experience in the MOD, including the Central Staff.
THE CAPABILITY
GAP
Introduction
2. As the SDSR currently stands, the withdrawal
from service of the Harrier GR9 and HMS Ark Royal will leave Britain
without a fixed wing carrier strike capability for at least 10
years. It is apparent that this decision did not emanate from:
— (a) the
careful consideration of developing strategy; or from; and
— (b) the
UK's ability to adapt to changing threats or unforeseen occurrences.
These two elements had already been addressed in
detail within the SDSR and the balanced conclusion had been reached
that Tornado GR4 should be withdrawn from service. This conclusion
was presumably based upon our perpetual interest in the defence
of our economic prosperity which depends primarily upon the free
passage of our trade upon the high seas and the deterrence of
those who would harm us there. The Harrier/Ark Royal capability
provides us with the means to ensure that deterrence.
DISCUSSION
3. The decision to retain the Tornado instead
of Harrier/Ark Royal was therefore not based upon the careful
deliberations of the SDSR team but resulted from the last minute
private meeting between the then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
and the Prime Minister. In this meeting, it is understood that
CDS denigrated the proven combat effectiveness of the Harrier
in Afghanistan and insisted that the Tornado GR4 was a much more
capable and effective aircraft in theatre.[179]
4. There can be no doubt that the Prime Minister:
— (a) was
misled by CDS on this matter, and that
— (b) CDS
placed partisan single-Service interest before the effective Close
Air Support of our ground forces in Afghanistan and the national
interest.
There was no opportunity for balanced operational
input from the Harrier community or the troops on the ground and
there is now every cause to believe that the Tornado is not the
right aircraft for Afghanistan or indeed for contingent operations
elsewhere in the world. The responses within Annex A and Annex
B to this submission confirm this.
5. Further, it is understood that the Prime Minister
was not informed of the following airworthiness problems facing
the Tornado GR4:
— (a) The
Tornado airframe is old—25 years or more.
— (b) Tornado
airframes are lifed to 4,000 flying hours and now most have about
6,000 flying hours. This is 50% over the "safe design limit".
— (c) Resulting
from this, there is an issue with fatigue cracks on the aircraft's
main wing spar and some aircraft have already been grounded because
of this. Whether the recent loss of aircraft is attributable in
any way to these airworthiness problems has yet to be determined.
— (d) Certainly,
these fatigue and airworthiness problems will have resulted in
limitations being imposed on aircraft performance: including maximum
G force limits and air speed limits, particularly at low level
and in air turbulence. This reduces operational capability particularly
in the Close Air Support of ground forces role.
These problems represent a significant flight safety
hazard and if properly addressed by the aircraft operator may
result in the grounding of the majority of the Tornado fleet in
the near future.
6. It is possible that, as soon as the Harrier
has been disposed of, the Royal Air Force will feel free to inform
ministers of this "new problem" and place an urgent
request for a replacement aircraft such as the F-18 Super Hornet.
This situation can be avoided by retaining in service the much
younger air frames of the Harrier GR9 whose airworthiness is projected
to be sound up until at least 2018.
7. A concise review of what is lost by withdrawing
Harrier/Ark Royal from service is presented at Annex C.
8. The Committee may wish to note that although
there is no direct military threat to the United Kingdom Homeland
base, our industrial and commercial activity at home could be
rapidly shut down by the interdiction of our oil and/or gas supplies
from offshore. It is fundamental to our maritime strategy that
our naval forces should be properly equipped to deter and prevent
such interdiction. The most effective means of ensuring such deterrence
as well as projecting political and military influence offshore
is through the deployment of fixed wing carrier battle groups
(eg Harrier/Ark Royal now and the Queen Elizabeth class carrier
later). The land-based interdiction bomber, Tornado GR4, is incapable
of providing such deterrence or power projection.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ACTION
9. In the light of:
— (a) The
Tornado's extremely poor performance in Afghanistan to date as
given in the attached documents (and equally poor performance
in the Iraq Theatre),
— (b) The
serious doubts concerning the continued airworthiness of the Tornado
and associated cost implications,
— (c) The
continuing need to protect our trade routes, offshore interests
and territories, and
— (d) The
continuing need for Britain to be able to project political and
military power in defence of our national interests.
It is recommended that the decision to withdraw Harrier/Ark
Royal from service is reconsidered and, instead, the Tornado GR4
force is withdrawn from service.
A BALANCED BUDGET
AND EFFICIENCY
SAVINGS
10. At the time of the publication of the SDSR,
the official MoD DOC Audit figures demonstrated that withdrawal
of the Tornado from service would save the nation £7.5 billion.
The same audit showed that withdrawal of the Harrier from service
would save just £1.1 billion.
11. Since that time the number of Tornado GR4
aircraft to be retained in service has been reduced; first to
90 aircraft and now, it is understood, to 60 aircraft. The results
of this are twofold:
— (a) An
overall saving in the defence budget (compared with larger numbers
of Tornadoes but not in comparison with the savings that would
be achieved by retaining Harrier instead).
— (b) A
reduction in the Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) of the Tornado
to 12 aircraft available for deployment (as opposed to an FE@R
of 18 Royal Naval Harrier aircraft available for deployment from
a smaller fleet of 40 aircraft). The airworthiness and flight
safety problems referred to at paragraph 6 above bring into question
the ability of the Tornado force to provide an FE@R of even 12
aircraft. This may be why the Royal Air Force are now requiring
24 hour notice for Close Air Support missions in Afghanistan.
12. Cost figures extrapolated from the official
MoD DOC Audit are provided at Annex D and demonstrate that the
retention of 40 Harriers and the immediate withdrawal of the last
60 Tornado aircraft would produce a cost saving of at least £678
million in four years and £2.8 billion over lifetime (since
SDSR, the Royal Air Force has already submitted several expensive
Urgent Operational Requirements for giving Tornado more effectiveness
in Afghanistan. This in itself demonstrates that the advice given
by CDS to the Prime Minister concerning Tornado effectiveness
in theatre was misleading). The cost of retaining 40 Harrier and
HMS Ark Royal in service under Naval management would be no more
than retaining the 60 Tornado aircraft in service and would provide
for a greater FE@R availability for operations in Afghanistan
and for contingency operations elsewhere.
RECOMMENDATION
13. It is recommended that the SDSR recommendation
to retain Tornado in preference to Harrier should now be considered
for reversal. Doing so would reduce costs in the short and the
long terms and markedly increase operational capability in Afghanistan
and in any contingent operations that arise elsewhere.
Annex A
THE LETTER TO ANDREW TYRIE MP FROM THE MINISTER
OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF 17 DECEMBER 2010
RESPONSES ARE
GIVEN BELOW
FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE
PARAGRAPHS
"Dear Andrew,
Thank you for your letter of 8 November to Liam Fox
sent on behalf of your constituent, Mr Alan Hensher, about the
retirement of the Harrier fleet. Mr Hensher also referred to some
figures from the Phoenix Think Tank which underpin an alternative
proposal to preserve both the Harrier and the Tornado, albeit
in reduced numbers.
The decision to retire our Harriers and also to reduce
the number of Tornados we have shows the very difficult choices
we had to make to focus resources where they are most needed—in
support of current operations.
Response
The Government and the National Security Council
clearly failed to understand that "current operations"
include the continued deterrence of those that would harm our
vital interests on the high seas and offshore; specifically our
maritime trade routes and interests and our overseas territories.
Focusing our resources on a single campaign in Afghanistan that,
through the government's own admission, is likely to be cut short
within a year or so represents very blinkered thinking by the
elected Government of this island nation.
Minister
As the Prime Minister said on 19 October, the military
advice is clear, we should sustain the Tornado fleet as that aircraft
is more capable and better able to sustain operations in Afghanistan.
Response
The "military advice" given to the Prime
Minister in a private meeting with Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock
Stirrup, the then Chief of the Defence Staff was unquestionably
"tainted" by single service, RAF partisan interest and
did not take into account the true/relevant capabilities of each
aircraft type or our national need to be able to mount contingent
operations to deter or dissuade those that could harm us from
doing so.
Minister
The Tornado GR4 force—at its reduced size—will
be significantly larger than the current Harrier force and it
also has a number of key capability advantages over the Harrier
GR9 including: greater payload and range and integration of capabilities
such as Storm Shadow; fully integrated dual mode Brimstone; the
Raptor reconnaissance pod and a cannon. Thus retaining the more
capable Tornado allows continuous fast jet support to forces in
Afghanistan and the ability to support concurrent operations.
This would not be possible if the smaller Harrier fleet retained
and Tornado retired.
Response
First sentence above.
Although the number of Tornado GR4 aircraft is greater than that
of the Harrier GR9, its true serviceability rate is much lower
than the Harrier. Official Figures given by one Group late last
year in response to a Parliamentary question were as follows:
| Total No | In service
| Serviceable 10 Dec 10 |
| Harrier | 79 | 41
| 33 |
| Tornado | 137 | 100
| 50 |
Quite clearly it takes 66 Tornadoes
to provide the same aircraft availability/serviceability as 41
Harriers. These figures were later changed by the RAF by describing
unserviceable Category 1 and Category 2 aircraft as "serviceable".
(These aircraft can take months to repair and remain unavailable
for operations.) This resulted
in the following utterly misleading figures:
| Total No | In service
| Serviceable 10 Dec 10 |
| Harrier | 79 | 41
| 41 |
| Tornado | 137 | 100
| 98 |
Further, the "key capability advantages" of the Tornado
as given above either do not exist or are irrelevant in the context
of Afghanistan operations:
— The
Tornado has no greater payload or range than Harrier for most
of the year (in the summer when the intensive combat operations
take place). This is because of its poor performance at altitude
and in high temperatures.
— Storm
Shadow is a cruise missile designed for the long range Air Interdiction
of hard targets and has zero relevance or utility in the Close
Air Support of our ground forces in Afghanistan. The only time
it was used in action was in Iraq when it failed to reach its
target (no one knows where the two missiles fired eventually ended
up).
— Brimstone
is nothing more than the equivalent of the helicopter/UAV launched
Hellfire missile. It is nowhere near as effective as the Maverick
missile capability of the Harrier.
— The
Tornado Cannon is limited in the number of rounds it can fire
due to overheating and is less effective than the CRV air to ground
rocket system of the Harrier.
— The
Raptor reconnaissance pod fitted to Tornado has no advantage over
the Harrier system because our ground forces do not have the ability
to download real-time intelligence information from the aircraft.
Second sentence above.
The Tornado has already proved to be far less reliable in response
to requests for Close Air Support than the Harrier. It has very
little, if any, ability to support "concurrent operations"
elsewhere in the world because it is confined to operating from
land bases and therefore does not have the flexibility and availability
of the First Echelon, carrier-capable Harrier. Many of these "declared-serviceable"
Tornadoes have no meaningful Close Air Support capability and
could not provide support even for small scale military operations,
say off the coast of Africa (eg Sierra Leone—where they
were not even considered for deployment; too difficult and no
safe host nation support).
Third sentence above.
In the light of the true facts given immediately above, this sentence
is invalid.
Minister
The decision to retire Harrier has not been taken
lightly. It has been influenced by the need to make economies
over the short term and the fact that withdrawal of an aircraft
type delivers greater savings than partial reductions, due to
the fixed costs associated with an aircraft platform. Therefore
running two smaller fleets would not have been cost-effective.
Response
The decision to retire Harrier was misguided and
was based upon information presented by the Royal Air Force. Because
these facts were presented in private there was no opportunity
for the Harrier community or the Royal Navy/Army to correct them
and provide a more balanced picture of true aircraft capability.
Minister
The Ministry of Defence has made estimates of cost
savings accrued from fast jet measures considered in the Strategic
Defence and Security Review for the purposes of formulating policy.
Some of these have been published to help inform the public debate.
Release of further detail may prejudice our negotiating position
with commercial suppliers. Furthermore, final savings figures
will depend on detailed implementation.
Response
The important/relevant cost savings that could have
been realised by the withdrawal from service of each aircraft
type were given by the MoD DOC Audit. These presumably reliable
and "un-manipulated" cost saving figures were as follows:
— Withdrawal
of Tornado from service: £7.5 billion.
— Withdrawal
of Harrier from service: £1.1 billion.
In other words, by choosing to withdraw Harrier from
service rather than Tornado the Government is missing an opportunity
to save £6.4 billion.
Minister
We accept that by withdrawing the Harrier
the Armed Forces will temporarily
be without a carrier strike capability. We believe, however, that
there were no realistic alternatives given our overriding priorities
of bringing the nation's finances back into
balance and ensuring success on operations in Afghanistan. The
Government is firmly committed to reintroducing the carrier strike
capability in around 2020. With the Queen Elizabeth class ships
and the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, which we
plan to bring into service at about the same time, the new capability
will be far more potent than the old.
Response
First sentence above. In the context
of our maritime interests you should not have accepted this so
lightly and easily and without proper naval advice.
Second sentence above. There was an
entirely realistic and much more cost-effective alternative available,
the Harrier, and you have so far failed to realise this. The Harrier
achieved far greater success in Afghanistan then the Tornado is
now doing—unable to fulfil 50% of requested Close Air Support
tasks.
Third and fourth sentences. Promises
and vaguely considered timescales at least a decade hence will
not suffice if we need to project military and political power
in defence of our interests offshore before 2020.
Minister
With regards to the Falklands, the situation
has changed substantially since 1982. Argentina is now a vibrant
democracy, committed to the peaceful resolution of issues over
the Islands. Nonetheless, we closely monitor Argentine military
capabilities and we maintain a highly capable permanent military
garrison in the Islands and a well defended airfield. This garrison
consists of warships, ground troops and combat aircraft (Typhoon)
and can be rapidly reinforced should the need arise. We will remain
able to respond to any and all threats.
Response
Lord Carrington, Maggie Thatcher, Admiral
Sir Sandy Woodward and others, including such organisations as
the United States Naval Institute, would most strongly disagree
with this analysis. Argentina is a highly volatile, Latin democracy
with an inclination to take ill-considered military actions—such
as when the Argentina air force bombed Argentina Navy installations
in Buenos Aires over an inter-service dispute.
Our capability to defend the islands from another invasion is
not as given. It remains in doubt as to whether the fast jet runways
at Ascension and Mount Pleasant [Falklands] are safe from effective
attack. Consequently on-site forces may not be rapidly reinforced.
Any initiative to temporarily disable Ascension Island would completely
negate any capability for rapid
reinforcement by air. Today, the small Typhoon
detachment has no capability whatsoever to interdict ground or
surface targets and the aircraft themselves represent thin-skinned
targets on the ground that can be put out of action
with a variety of readily available weapons—even small arms
such as machine guns. We are not able to respond to any and all
threats! The only real deterrence to a further Falklands invasion
is to have a robust carrier battle group available.
Minister
Our current fleet of Harrier and Tornado
air defence and ground attack aircraft have performed magnificently
over the last 30 years, and Tornados currently provide essential
support to our forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. But these
aircraft risk becoming outdated as threats continue to become
more varied and sophisticated, and maintenance of their fleets
will become an increasing challenge. Therefore transitioning our
fast jet forces to a combined fleet of Typhoon and Joint Strike
Fighters, two of the most modern and capable multi-role combat
aircraft, in the medium to long term makes operational and economic
sense."
Response
The Harrier does indeed have an outstanding
combat record over the last 30 years. The Tornado record is, by
comparison, very poor. It was a failure in the Iraq war with eight
aircraft being lost: only one of which was the result of enemy
fire. The remainder were lost through a combination of poor training,
pilot error and a lack of real understanding of the safe delivery
of the ordnance that was carried by the aircraft in theatre.
Now, in Afghanistan, two aircraft have already been lost as a
result of the poor performance characteristics of the aircraft
in theatre. Further, in one month alone, the Tornado failed to
respond to more urgent Close Air Support requests than did the
Harrier in its five years of service in theatre.
Annex B
THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE LETTER
FROM THE RT HON DR LIAM FOX MP TO THE RT HON DAVID LAWS MP, DATED
30TH DECEMBER 2010
RESPONSES ARE
GIVEN BELOW
FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE
PARAGRAPHS
Secretary of State
1. Thank you for your
letter of 10 November on behalf of your constituent Rear Admiral
Terry Loughran CB of Court Lodge, 10 St Margarets, Tintinhull,
Yeovil, regarding the Strategic Defence and Security Review decision
to withdraw Harrier from service.
2. I would like to reiterate
the tribute that I made in the House on 4 November in relation
to the Harrier Force. The hard work and contribution to combat
operations in Afghanistan by the Harrier Force, its crews and
pilots, will not be forgotten. The Harrier has served this country
well for many years and is a flexible aircraft, so the decision
to retire the fleet was a difficult one.
Response
2.1 As we are sure you
are now fully aware, the decision to retire the Harrier was wrong.
It was based on misleading and unquestionably partisan last-minute
advice and should now be reversed. The "military advice"
you refer to is understood to have been delivered privately by
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the then Chief of the Defence
Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff only: not a reliably impartial
pair of advisers. The Harriers were held in a Joint RN/RAF force
and any discussion should have included an RN input. Since WWII
the RN has had far greater operational flying experience than
the RAF and naval opinion should have been sought. The subsequent
decisions on Harrier and consequent deprivation of fixed wing
Carrier capability for a decade show a failure to recognise:
— the
facts of the Joint agreement, and
— the
strategic value of maritime air capability.
It also creates an unnecessary
exposure to risk.
Secretary of State
3. The overriding factor
in deciding between removing either the Tornado GR4 or Harrier
was the ability to support operations in Afghanistan. The Harrier
fleet would have been too small to support Afghanistan operations
at current levels, notwithstanding Carrier Strike and other contingent
operations. Conversely, the Tornado GR4 force even at its reduced
size will be significantly larger than the current Harrier force
and would allow continuous UK fast jet close air support to forces
in Afghanistan and the ability to support concurrent operations.
Response
3.1 Although the number
of Tornado GR4 aircraft is greater than that of the Harrier GR9,
its true serviceability rate is much lower than the Harrier. Official
Figures given by RAF 1 Group late last year in response to a Parliamentary
question were as follows:
| Total No | In service
| Serviceable 10 Dec 10 |
| Harrier | 79 | 41
| 33 |
| Tornado | 137 | 100
| 50 |
Thus it takes 66 Tornadoes
to provide the same aircraft availability/serviceability as 41
Harriers. It is now understood that only 60 Tornado are to be
retained giving an availability rate of just 30 aircraft. This
will provide for a lower Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R) than
with Harrier. Further, keeping 60 Tornado in service will cost
at least 50% more than keeping 41 Harrier in service—enough
to operate the HMS Ark Royal.
These figures were later
manipulated by the RAF by describing damaged Category 1 and Category
2 aircraft as "serviceable". Category 1 and 2 aircraft
can take more than one year to repair. This resulted in the following
misleading figures:
| Total No | In service
| Serviceable 10 Dec 10 |
| Harrier | 79 | 41
| 33 |
| Tornado | 137 | 100
| 98 |
Secretary of State
4. Tornado also has a
number of key advantages including a greater endurance and additional
capabilities such as Storm Shadow; fully integrated dual mode
Brimstone; the Raptor reconnaissance pod and a cannon. The Tornado
has wider utility in the intelligence, surveillance, targeting
and reconnaissance role, in addition to its close air support
capabilities. This ability to undertake an increased number of
operational tasks means it is tasked more frequently and over
a wider geographical area in Afghanistan than the Harrier was
when it was previously deployed. We will retain a reduced Tornado
GR4 fleet that will drawdown gradually to ensure there is no effect
on operations in Afghanistan as we transition to Typhoon and joint
strike fighter, from which we will also regenerate our Carrier
Strike capability. In line with these transitions, we currently
plan to take the Tornado GR4 out of service in 2021.
Response
4.1 First Sentence above.
The "key advantages" of the Tornado as given above either
do not exist or are irrelevant in the context of Afghanistan operations:
— 1. The
Tornado has no greater payload or range than Harrier for most
of the year (in the summer when the intensive combat operations
take place). This is because of its poor performance at altitude
and in high temperatures.
— 2. Storm
Shadow is a cruise missile designed for the long range Air Interdiction
of hard targets and has zero relevance or utility in the Close
Air Support of our ground forces in Afghanistan. The only time
it was used in action was in Iraq when it failed to reach its
target (no one knows where the two missiles fired eventually ended
up).
— 3. Brimstone
is nothing more than the equivalent of the helicopter/UAV launched
Hellfire missile. It is nowhere near as effective as the Maverick
missile capability of the Harrier.
— 4. The
Tornado Cannon is limited in the number of rounds it can fire
due to overheating and is less effective than the CRV air to ground
rocket system of the Harrier.
— 5. The
Raptor reconnaissance pod fitted to Tornado has no advantage over
the Harrier system because our ground forces do not have the ability
to download real-time intelligence information from the aircraft.
Indeed, the Harrier Sniper pod is now being fitted to the Tornado
to make up for the latter's deficiencies.
4.2 Second Sentence above.
The Tornado GR4 was specifically designed as a high-speed, low-level
Interdiction Bomber; not as a Close Air Support aircraft—hence
its relatively poor operational performance in Afghanistan. The
Harrier was specifically designed as a Close Air Support aircraft;
hence its extraordinary success in Afghanistan. In the context
of this operational theatre, the Harrier is the more appropriate
aircraft and has proven its worth.
4.3 Third Sentence above.
The broad statement that the Tornado has an "ability to undertake
an increased number of operational tasks" is a substantial
exaggeration. Its record of responding to urgent Close Air Support
requests from our ground forces is abysmal compared with the Harrier.
Further, some of the missions now being flown by Tornado in Afghanistan
have no relevance to the important Close Air Support need and
are being flown specifically to generate the impression that it
is a more productive and efficient aircraft and the Harrier. A
critical examination would show that the hours flown are entirely
disproportionate to the effect on the ground in support of our
ground forces. In the simplest of terms, this puts our ground
forces at unnecessary risk and is a deplorable practice.
4.4 Last Two Sentences.
In the context of our maritime interests this loss of a capability
vital to the Expeditionary and Fleet weapons systems for at least
10 years is a major change in national strategy which has not
been discussed in any detail. It should never have been accepted
so lightly and without recognition of Naval and Land Force advice.
There was an entirely realistic and much more cost-effective option
available, ie the Harrier, which has achieved far greater success
in Afghanistan than the Tornado is now doing—the latter
being unable to fulfil 50% of requested Close Air Support tasks.
Assurances and vaguely considered timescales at least a decade
hence are no substitute for Ark Royal still in commission with
an air group of Harriers embarked and will not suffice if we need
to project military and political power in defence of our interests
offshore before 2020.
Annex C
What is Lost by Withdrawing the Harrier?
1. More than £5 billion pounds in the short
and the longer term to keep the more expensive Tornado in service.
2. The expertise of the fixed wing Fleet Air
Arm that has taken 100 years to generate and nurture.
3. Our only fighter/fighter ground attack aircraft
capable of:
— 3.1 Operating
from roads, damaged runways and rough airstrips. This would be
extremely useful in the Falklands during the coming extensive
works on the runway there.
— 3.2 Operating
from carriers with their advantage of flexibility of manoeuvre,
avoidance of diplomatic and over-flight problems and independence
from vulnerable land and air supply lines.
— 3.3 Providing
air support for expeditionary/amphibious operations at short notice
throughout the world.
4. The most rapid and reliable response to urgent
tasking in support of ground forces in Afghanistan (Harrier: 12
minutes. Tornado: 30 minutes or more. It is understood that the
RAF are now asking for 24 hours' notice for requests for close
air support missions. The Tornado has failed to satisfy more requested
ground support missions in one month than did the Harrier in five
years).
5. Our only fighter ground attack aircraft capable
of delivering highly accurate GPS precision-guided munitions in
Afghanistan without the risk of collateral damage to civilians/own
forces. (The Tornado requires extra expenditure to be fitted with
the Harrier Sniper Pod—£100 million plus. Further expensive
UORs have now been submitted for Tornado GR4.)
6. The respect of our allies in Afghanistan who
consider the Harrier to be the best and most popular Close Air
Support aircraft to have been deployed in that theatre.
What would be Lost by Withdrawing Tornado?
1. Little, if anything. The Tornado replacement,
Typhoon, is already in service in adequate numbers and is available
for land-based operations. Later expensive tranches will be able
to deploy the Storm Shadow short ranged cruise missile as well
as the Brimstone anti-armour missile—even though Storm Shadow
has no relevance to Close Air Support in Afghanistan. It should
also be noted that the Harrier GR9 can deploy the Maverick anti-armour
missile in place of Brimstone.
What is gained by keeping Harrier rather than
Tornado in service?
1. A major saving in cost over the next 15 years
and a significant saving in cost of £678 million in the short
term (four years).
2. An additional embarked contingent capability
through to 2018 that cannot be provided by Tornado or Typhoon.
3. The approval and support of our allies in
Afghanistan who have the highest respect for the combat effectiveness
of the Harrier in theatre and little or none for the Tornado.
4. Political and military respect for the visible
power that the Royal Navy can continue to present around the world
in order to deter those that would harm our interests.
5. The retention in service of personnel who
have unique and irreplaceable expertise in the field of naval
air warfare and carrier operations.
Annex D
RETENTION IN SERVICE COST COMPARISON—TORNADO
V. HARRIER
Table 1
COSTS BASED ON OFFICIAL MOD DOC AUDIT
| Costs are in £1,000's
| Mod DOC Audit figures for in life cost
| Per Annum | 4 years
| Plus Sniper pod upgrade* |
| 60 Tornado to 2025 | £3,284,000
| £219,000 | £875,000
| £975,000 |
| 40 RAF Tornados to 2025 | £2,189,000
| £146,118 | £583,471
| £683,471 |
| | |
| | |
| 74 Harrier to 2018 | £1,100,000
| £137,500 | £550,000
| |
| 40 Royal Navy Harriers to 2018 | £595,000
| £74,000 | £297,000
| |
| | |
| |
| * Tornado Upgrade to fit Sniper Pod to Aircraft - more than £100 million
| |
1. It is very clear from the above that retaining 40 Harriers
in naval service rather than 60 Tornadoes in RAF service for the
next four years would save the government £678 million.
2. In terms of total in life cost, a decision to retain 40
Harrier rather than 60 Tornado would save the government £2.8
billion.
3. At the same time, FE@R availability of aircraft for combat
operations would be 33% higher with Harrier than with Tornado.
"HARMONY" RULES
Executive summary
1. This short memorandum is presented as a brief on the differences
in some of the terms and conditions of service across the three
Services. It shows that they are markedly different but offers
no reasons for this. As such, it may be a subject for consideration
by Committee members since any attempt to make them the same for
all three Services could have substantial effects on overall funding
quite apart from the effects on individuals.
Introduction to the submitter
2. Joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1946. Served in cruisers,
destroyers [one ship command], frigates, submarines [four ship
commands including one nuclear], as Commander of the [Aircraft]
Carrier Battle Group during the Falklands War and as Flag Officer,
Submarines. He filled a series of appointments in the MoD on the
Naval Policy Staff and finally on the Central Staff as Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments)—effectively head of
the MoD Operations Department. During this time he passed a post-graduate
course in nuclear physics and power plant operation, and attended
both the Joint Services Staff Course and the Royal College of
Defence Studies Course in the rank of Commander. His final naval
appointment was as CinC Naval Home Command, in charge of all Naval
training barring aviation and submarines. Since retiring, he worked
for a "head-hunter" in the City for 18 months, then
for the DOE as an Inspector on the Lord Chancellors Panel for
two years, then as a lecturer and consultant on Crisis Management
for a further two years.
THE "HARMONY
GUIDELINES" FOR
THE BRITISH
ARMED FORCES
IMPACT ON
OPERATIONS AND
STRUCTURE
Introduction
3. "Harmony" is important to the British service
man or woman, because the term is shorthand for a key issue within
his or her terms and conditions of service (TCOS): they govern
how long he or she may routinely expect to spend away from home.
This means that "harmony" has a direct impact on the
availability of the individual or a unit for operations.
The RN, RM, Army, and RAF take different approaches:
— (a) RN
and RM—in a three year period a sailor or marine (or
unit) may expect to spend no longer than 60% of the time deployed.
Navy shorthand for this is the "60 in 3 rule"[equivalent:
1-in-1.66].
— (b) Army—a
soldier (or unit) should expect to undertake a six months operational
tour, and then have a 24 months "tour interval" before
the next deployment. Characteristically, the interval between
operational tours is spent initially at home, then preparing for
deployment. The Army short hand for this is the "1-in-5
rule."
— (c) RAF—an
airman (or unit) should expect to do a maximum of four months
on an operational tour, followed by a 16 month "tour interval",
predominantly on his or her home base—There is no RAF shorthand
for this approach but, for simplicity, we will use the term "4-in-20
rule" [equivalent 1-in-5].
Additionally, each service also uses the following
measures for the number of days an individual (or indeed a unit)
can be deployed on operations:
— (d) RN
and RM—up to 660 days deployed within a three year period.
— (e) Army—a
maximum of 415 days deployed in a 30 month period.
— (f) RAF—no
more than 280 days deployed in a 24 month period.
It should be noted that the RN, RM and Army use the
same time period for their two measures (three years for the RN
& RM, 30 months for the Army), but the RAF uses a different
length period for each of the two "harmony" measures.
These rules matter for the individual, but they also
have a major impact for defence planners, both at the operational
and strategic levels.
Operational Impact
4. The main operational impact occurs when the
British Armed Forces are engaged in enduring operations, such
as in Afghanistan and Iraq—where the key contrast is between
the RN, RM and the Army on the one hand, and the RAF on the other.
Whereas a sailor, marine or soldier is able routinely to conduct
a six month operational tour, an airman will need to rotate after
four months to stay within his harmony guidelines.[180]
By way of example, the Tornado aircrew deployed to
Afghanistan rotate every three months, resulting in additional
churn, greater use of the air bridge, and less continuity in theatre.
There will be operational impacts in the future, too. A typical
deployment period for an aircraft carrier—American, French,
or British—is not less than between six and nine months.
With their harmony rules, RAF squadrons deployed to RN carriers
would need to rotate at the 4 month period, with the associated
repatriation expenses as well as the loss of cohesion when a new
Squadron arrives on the carrier and needs to be worked up. Fleet
Air Arm squadrons, by contrast, sail and return with the ship
without "breaking harmony."
Strategic Impact
5. The strategic impact is more profound. This
is because the harmony guidelines are one of the key drivers in
the overall size of each service. Here, the key contrast is between
the RAF and Army on the one hand, and the RN and RM on the other.
However, it is recognised that the two different measures each
service can use will produce different results.
For example, using the first set of measures (a.
to c. above) in order to conduct an enduring operational deployment,
such as Afghanistan, the Army and RAF will need to employ five
times as many people as those deployed (based on the Army's "1-in-5
rule" and the RAF's "4-and-20" rule).
Whereas for the RN and RM, it varies, depending on the maintenance
cycle required for the vessel or equipment; typically it is between
three and four times as many people, but it can be as low as 1.7
for every person deployed.
If the second set of "harmony" guidelines
(d. to f. above) are used, the Army requires 25% more personnel
to deliver the same number of operational personnel as the Navy
and Royal Marines while the RAF requires 36% more.
The strategic impact for aircraft carriers is also
significant. When compared to the Fleet Air Arm, because RAF squadrons
need to rotate at the 4 month point, twice as many RAF squadrons
will be needed to man an RN aircraft carrier on the current model
of six-to-nine month deployment. It should be noted, however,
that with the plans for only a limited implantation into service
of the new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, it
is highly likely that considerably longer deployments will have
to be used in order to maximise the time on task of the single
operational hull between short periods of essential maintenance
at a dockyard. Longer deployments may therefore exacerbate the
differences between RN/FAA and RAF "harmony" and increase
the number of RAF units that will be required.
Comparison
6. Comparisons may be invidious with each Service
having entirely valid reasons for their own rules. However, should
these reasons be now invalid given the "joint" nature
of operations, there could be considerable possible implications
for further reducing any funding gap that still remains.
Recommendations for Action
7. Committee members may wish to assure themselves
that valid reasons for these differences exist and the implications
that they might have on the ability to maximise the operational
availability of future equipment/force structures as well as the
current situation.
THE ROLE
OF THE
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE AND
ASSOCIATED AGENCIES
AND FUNDING
GAP IMPLICATIONS
Executive summary
1. This memorandum is submitted in support of
the Committee remit to investigate:
— (a) The
role of the Ministry of Defence, including the Defence Reform
Unit, and other Government departments, the National Security
Council, the Armed Forces and other agencies in the development
and implementation of the NSS and SDSR, including areas that stretch
across Government such as the U.K.'s increased role in conflict
prevention.
— (b) Whether
a funding gap still remains, how significant is it and how will
it impact on defence capability.
Introduction to the submitters
— 2(a) Admiral
Sir Michael Layard KCB CBE. Seaman officer in Destroyers, Frigates,
Minesweepers & Aircraft Carriers. All weather fighter/ ground
attack/tactical nuclear, pilot in The Fleet Air Arm, Air Warfare
Instructor. Commanded a front line, embarked Sea Vixen Squadron,
a Frigate, a Destroyer and a Naval Air Station, Director of Naval
Air Warfare in the MOD, Flag Officer Naval Aviation, and finally,
Second Sea Lord & Chief of Naval Personnel.
— 2(b) Admiral
Sir John Woodward GBE KCB Served in cruisers, destroyers [one
in command], frigates, submarines [four in command including one
nuclear], as Commander of the [Aircraft] Carrier Battle Group
during the Falklands War and as Flag Officer, Submarines. He filled
a series of appointments in the MoD on the Naval Policy Staff
and on the Central Staff as Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments)—effectively
head of the MoD Operations Department. Finally, as CinC Naval
Home Command, he headed all naval training except aviation and
submarines.
— 2(c) Commander
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC. A leading expert in Air Warfare
with experience varying from Command in combat, Nuclear Intelligence
within NATO to the Navigator and Gunnery Officer of a small ship.
All are proven military experts who have achieved
notable success in the front line and who between them have decades
of appropriate experience in the MOD, including the Central Staff.
Introduction
3. Currently, there appears to be no easily visible
policy baseline on which the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and associated
National Strategic Security agencies can draw or refer to in the
development and implementation of the NSS and SDSR.
4. The Core Force Defence Policy proposed by
Admiral Sir John Woodward GBE KBC could be considered a possible
template for such a policy baseline and would assist in the assessment
of logical priorities, particularly at times of severe fiscal
constraint.
5. In the absence of such an agreed policy baseline,
this submission addresses some of the areas that arguably merit
attention if future SDSRs are to provide a better balance between
National Strategic Policy and the wherewithal to carry out that
policy.
National Strategic Policy
6. There would appear to be a level of confusion
at all levels concerning exactly what is Britain's declared National
Security Strategy. SDR 98 and SDSR 2010 each "defined"
that Policy in a manner that was arguably ambiguous and, in the
SDSR in particular, appeared to place little weight on the fundamental
reality that we are an island nation.
7. It behoves us to remember that we are not
just an extension of continental Europe. Our perpetual interest
is the defence of our economic prosperity which depends primarily
upon the free passage of our trade upon the high seas and the
deterrence of those who would harm us there. It is for consideration
that this should be the baseline for our Strategic Defence Policy
and for the configuration of our Armed Forces.
The National Security
Council (NSC)
8. The NSC is virtually a Cabinet in its own
right and "the Chief of the Defence Staff, Heads of Intelligence
Agencies also attend when required". Without wishing to detract
in any way from the corporate wisdom of the NSC, it is arguable
that without a clear defence policy baseline as proposed above
it is open to persuasion by individuals who may have partisan
interests to protect and promote.
9. The representation of a single Service voice
to such an important Council clearly has its dangers and in this
instance, albeit not to the Council directly, resulted in the
long-term gapping of the one military capability that:
— (a) ensures
Britain's ability to project military and political influence
around the world, including conflict prevention, and
— (b) is
our prime deterrence against those that would do us harm.
10. Further to the above, it appears from the
SDSR Minutes that there was an almost total lack of Royal Navy
representation during the oral sessions of the Review. One must
question the wisdom of such imbalance and a lack of representation—especially
in the context of our island nation status and our vital offshore
interests and trade routes.
11. This leads to the need to examine the role
and the constitution of the Ministry of Defence itself.
The Ministry of Defence
12. One could be forgiven for describing the
MoD as a bureaucratic monster that appears to have lost its way.
Its constituent parts (the three Armed Services) each govern the
size of their own representation without any regulation imposed
from the interpretation of National Strategic Defence Policy.
This has resulted in a major imbalance with:
— (a) By
far the largest representation coming from the Royal Air Force.
— (b) A
medium representation coming from the Army.
— (c) By
far the lowest representation coming from the Royal Navy.
13. The Central Staff has an equivalent imbalance
in representation.
14. Recent history can suggest that this would
not necessarily be in the interest of providing the nation with
forces that are in balance any declared defence policy.
Discussion
15. That there is a major imbalance between the
three Services within the MoD, there is no doubt. Hopefully, the
Defence Reform Unit will address this issue in detail and pay
due regard to the "knock-on effect" which can be summarised
as follows:
— (a) If,
within MoD, a single Service has the most staff officers and therefore
the loudest voice, that Service will have the ability to manoeuvre
the other two Services into supporting programs and procurements
that would otherwise be rejected as inappropriate to National
Strategic Policy.
— (b) This
can lead to a large proportion of the defence budget being spent
on weapon systems that have little or no direct relevance to the
front line, first echelon operational need or to the perceived
priority within the National Strategic Policy.
16. Further, British Aerospace and other defence
related companies are able to recognise the loudest voice in the
MoD and they have made it their business to recruit retiring senior
officers that will assist them in perpetuating the interests of
that "loudest voice". Whether we like it or not, this
practice brings into question the vested interests of those serving
in the MoD. It also provides British Aerospace in particular with
a platform/avenue for obtaining lucrative development and production
contracts that:
— (a) are
often overpriced compared with international competition, and
that
— (b) often
do not result in the quality of weapon system desired. Please
see Annex B to this submission.
17. Should there be a clearly defined baseline
policy such as that recommended in the Core Force Defence proposal,
it is for consideration that the Defence Reform Unit would be
able to recommend a level of single service representation within
the MoD that is directly related to that policy and to the current
National Strategic Policy.
18. If it is agreed that our National Strategic
Defence Policy is fundamentally led by our island nation/maritime
interests, this would fit well historically with practically all
the military initiatives taken by Britain since World War II.
The Royal Navy has extensive corporate experience of successful
worldwide combat and maritime operations in support of our ground
forces offshore. Please see Annex A.
Conflict Prevention
19. Conflict prevention may be achievable by
diplomatic, political and/or military means. Each of these represent
an important and often mutually dependent arm of persuasion as
well as the three pillars of graduated response and deterrence.
A robust military capability that can be deployed effectively
and at short notice anywhere in the world adds considerable strength
and meaning to both diplomatic and political initiatives. In stark
contrast, the lack of any visible military capability markedly
reduces the impact of any diplomatic or political initiative.
20. Annex A provides several examples of where
a robust British military presence in the guise of the Royal Navy
has indeed prevented unrest developing into armed conflict. It
is therefore only reasonable to suggest that a robust maritime
military capability that is centred upon today's capital ship,
the aircraft carrier, is a prime and flexible "persuader"
for conflict deterrence and prevention.
21. The two emergent major powers, China and
India, have both recognised this and their aircraft carrier building
programmes are causing some consternation and concern within the
military intelligence communities of Western nations; including
the United States. It is arguable that this concern is not directly
related just to war fighting but more to the spread of Chinese
and Indian diplomatic and political influence that will result
from their visible power upon the high seas. Such influence will
bring economic benefits that would otherwise not be open to them
and that will compete with our own interests.
Conclusion
22. SDSR 2010 recommendations, if implemented,
will remove Britain from the world's stage as a visible military
power, will prevent us from engaging in contingency operations
to deter and prevent conflicts and, as a result, will adversely
affect our trading opportunities and economic prosperity.
Annex A
ROYAL
NAVY CORPORATE
COMBAT EXPERIENCE
SINCE WORLD
WAR II
1. Herewith a brief outline of 17 events, crises,
conflicts and deterrence, in which Royal Navy carrier battle groups
were deployed in support of UK Government policy since 1945. It
demonstrates that the availability of sea-based tactical aviation
adds immensely to the nation's overall deterrent capability. In
several instances it has been the only form of intervention that
was initially possible.
2. Significantly it also demonstrates the inability
of potential aggressors to deter the deployment of aircraft carriers
into areas supposedly dominated by land-based aircraft. The myth
of aircraft carrier vulnerability is belied by experience in:
— (a) Palestine
1948.
— (b) Korea
1950-53.
— (c) Suez
1956.
— (d) Levant
1958.
— (e) Korea
1960.
— (f) Kuwait
1961
— (g) Confrontation
with Indonesia 1963-66.
— (h) East
African Mutinies 1964.
— (i) Defence
of Zambia 1965-66.
— (j) Beira
Patrol 1965-66.
— (k) Aden
1967.
— (l) Belize
1972
— (m) South
Atlantic 1982.
— (n) Kuwait
1991.
— (o) Bosnia/Former
Yugoslavia 1992-96.
— (p) Sierra
Leone 2002.
— (q) Iraq
2003.
Annex B
THE
FUNDING GAP:
PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
Introduction
1. The funding gap that exists has resulted from
several factors:
— (a) The
lack of a baseline defence policy against which Ministers can
assess the validity and wisdom of formal MoD requirements.
— (b) The
failure of successive governments to require British defence contractors
to be competitive in cost, timescale of delivery and performance.
— (c) The
lack of transparency concerning the efficacy and real performance
in combat of various weapon systems.
— (d) The
failure of successive governments to channel spending in accordance
with declared National Strategic Policy.
The lack of a baseline
Defence Policy against which Ministers can assess the validity
and wisdom of formal MoD requirements
2. This problem has been discussed in some detail
in the body of the main submission.
The failure of successive
governments to require British defence contractors to be competitive
in cost, timescale of delivery and performance
THE
PAST
3. The approach of successive governments to
the British defence industry (and to our European collaborative
partners) has been one of "the carrot but no stick".
This does not work with children and it has not worked with British
or European industry.
4. If we look at history, we find that occasionally
British industry and ingenuity has produced classic and highly
successful weapon systems at a sensible price. In modern times,
the Harrier and the Sea Harrier are prime examples of this. In
1979, the Sea Harrier cost £12 million per aircraft, was
extremely reliable and versatile, deployed to the South Atlantic
in 1982 and won the air war over the Falkland Islands in spite
of the overwhelming numerical odds against it (the Mirage three
fighter, the Mirage five Dagger and the A-4 Skyhawk). The ship-launched
Sea Wolf missile is a further example of success.
5. In contrast and in the same timescale, collaboration
with the Europeans produced the Tornado F1 at a price of £42
million per aircraft and the Tornado GR1 at a price of £37
million per aircraft. The Tornado F1 did not have an effective
air to air weapon system until at least the mid-90s and underwent
many weapon system modifications including a new radar at enormous
cost. It was never deployed successfully to any theatre of combat
operations.
6. Also in the same timescale, the versatile
F-18 Hornet became available. A swing role fighter aircraft with
far greater all-round performance than the Tornado F1/3, it was
available for purchase at US$28 million per aircraft—less
than half the price of the Tornado.
7. The desire to buy British had become an extremely
expensive exercise and continued in the same vein with other projects
such as the Nimrod and the Sky Flash air to air missile—neither
of which could compete in the market place with their American
or French counterparts. Storm Shadow represents a further example
of high cost coupled with poor performance in service.
8. Conservative estimates show that, since 1967
and correcting prices for inflation to 2010 rates, more than £350
billion has been spent on fixed wing military aircraft and weapon
systems—of which less than £20 billion has been spent
on the Harrier and the Sea Harrier. Both of these aircraft have
achieved great success in combat operations: virtually all the
success that has been achieved by any British military fixed wing
aircraft since 1979. A breakdown of these cost figures is given
at Appendix 1 to this Annex.
THE
PRESENT AND
THE FUTURE
9. This sad history is now being compounded by
the ill-advised continuation/ expansion of existing programs or
the launch of new development programmes. The Typhoon programme
is a case in point for the former. For the latter, one might wish
to scrutinise more closely the cost-effectiveness (compared with
international proven alternatives) of:
— (a) The
air to air refuelling tanker program.
— (b) Any
Nimrod replacement.
— (c) All
Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) development projects.
Proven and very much cheaper alternatives are readily
available in the international market.
10. We should of course lean towards "home-grown
products" but only on the strict understanding that:
— (a) Operational
performance in service is guaranteed at the contractor's expense.
— (b) The
cost of the program is no more than the cost of the alternative
product—again guaranteed at the contractor's expense.
The lack of transparency
concerning the efficacy and real performance in combat of various
weapon systems
11. There are several embarrassing records of
"home-grown" or "European collaborative" projects
failing to meet operational performance expectations in the combat
theatre. Three of these are:
— (a) The
Tornado F3 which spent 12 years in service "protecting UK
airspace against the Soviet threat during the Cold War" without
a functional air to air weapons system.
— (b) The
Chieftain tank which was unable to take an effective part in Desert
Storm, 1991, owing to serviceability and reliability problems.
— (c) The
Tornado GR4 which under-performed in Iraq and is now under-performing
in Afghanistan.
12. The regrettable deficiencies in these three
very expensive weapon systems were hidden from the public and
from the Government and this deception allowed further ill-advised
procurement contracts to be secured by the same defence contractors
that had produced the underperforming weapon systems. This has
again led to excessive costs that are far higher than those that
would have been realised through the procurement of readily available
international products. This has contributed significantly to
the funding gap.
The failure of successive
governments to channel spending in accordance with declared National
Strategic Policy
13. The exorbitant amount of money spent on military
fixed wing aircraft since 1979 and particularly since the end
of the Cold War has demonstrated an inability within MoD and the
Government to align expenditure with the perceived threat and
with our on-going commitments offshore. It is for consideration
that the introduction of a baseline Policy such as the Core Force
Defence Policy proposed in this submission and in associated submissions
would provide the means for ensuring such alignment.
WHY NAVY
Executive Summary
1. This memorandum is presented as the simplest
possible answers to the questions "Why Navy?" and "Why
aircraft carriers within it?"
Introduction to the submitters
2. Professor Martin Edmonds, Captain Alan
Hensher, Admiral Sir John Treacher. All three are experienced
retired naval officers. Two had front line naval aviation experience.
One has joined academe.
THE MARITIME
DIMENSION OF
UK DEFENCE STRATEGY
POWER, PRESENCE,
PROJECTION & FLEXIBILITY
The severity of the current financial crisis appears
to dominate all political thinking to the point that it distorts
the issue of government responsibility for the defence of the
United Kingdom and its vital interests. The terrorist threat,
in all its complexity and varied forms, alongside the conventional
and nuclear threats from rogue states to both UK national and
commercial interests, seeks to undermine the very structure of
the nation. Defence spending, unappealing as it may be to the
electorate, should reflect the defence of the realm as the prime
duty of government. The threat is more difficult than ever to
analyse or predict but a response of diminished military presence
inevitably leads to dwindling international influence.
Spending on defence procurement ensures that manufacturing
industry benefits from new technologies and their application.
Intense financial pressure generates a short-term perspective
that obscures the long-term value to our defence strategy, scientific
research and industrial health. The spectre of spending billions
even when amortized over a decade or more tends to overshadow
the enduring benefits to our security and strategic industries.
We should be careful to avoid the effect of short term decisions
in sterilising essential future requirements.
As an example, recent agreements between the MoD
and industry associated with the carrier build programme will
provide £230 million a year to a wide range of suppliers
over the next fifteen years and will sustain key maritime and
other defence industrial skills. It will in the long run save
hundreds of millions of pounds, retain an essential industrial
skills base, help promote future scientific development, and reduce
our already heavy dependence on foreign suppliers whilst strengthening
our international competitiveness.
It is axiomatic that governments of all political
persuasion need to have effective military options to counter
any crisis, or unexpected threat that may arise: a visible capability
that sends a clear diplomatic and political message of government
policy and intention. It
is here that the unique qualities of Maritime Forces come into
play. The ability to deploy ships, to poise and to operate aircraft
at a place of the government's choosing is at the heart of maritime
power. Operating in international waters confers independence
of diplomatic clearances, and over flying rights. The carriers
and the afloat support system obviate the need for host-nation
assistance for airfields or other logistic support and give the
ability to support land forces ashore.
Carriers, amphibious ships, escorts and submarines
have an extensive flexibility of roles ranging from high-intensity
warfare to defence diplomacy, prevention or deterrence, with the
added resources for alliance cohesion, humanitarian support or
disaster relief.
The UK now faces no immediate conventional threat
but must take urgent action to improve homeland security from
a Mumbai-type attack. However, it remains a maritime nation, is
heavily dependent on maritime trade and is now facing a shortage
of energy, much of it delivered by sea. As the UK's dependence
on LNG supplies, carried in massive and vulnerable vessels, increases,
protection against pirates and the conventional naval forces of
hostile states will become critical. Effectiveness of defence
starts with the potential adversary's assessment of the capability
and will of the target to defend itself. NATO managed to do this
for 50 years through the massive military support of the USA.
The UK presented a different profile in the case of the Falklands
and paid the price. The hydro-carbon rich off-shore areas of the
Falklands will surely attract the Argentines in due course and
we must be prepared.
The UK's response to an intense and complex threat
situation can be defined, we believe, by four key words: Power,
Presence, Projection and Flexibility. All these elements are embodied
in the aircraft carrier, amphibious ships and associated naval
assets. However, as important as a military response is a policy
of prevention. A Carrier and its Air Group brings leverage to
avert crises before they ignite, simply by being on station and
available for the application of instant military force anywhere
in the world.
CAPABILITY GAPS
EMERGING FROM
THE SDSR
Executive Summary
(i) This paper draws together the threads of
advice to Ministers and the process that led to the recent SDSR
recommendation that Harrier and HMS Ark Royal should be withdrawn
from service resulting in a ten year gap in fixed wing aircraft
deployed with the Fleet.
(ii) It concludes with a statement of what should
have occurred and what might still be done to correct the situation.
Introduction to the Submitters
— (a) Admiral
Sir John Woodward GBE KBC submarine Commander, destroyer Commander,
Carrier Battle Group Commander and Submarine Force Commander.
— (b) Commander
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC. A leading expert in Air Warfare
with experience varying from Command in combat, Nuclear Intelligence
within NATO to the Navigator and Gunnery Officer of a small ship.
Both are proven military experts who have achieved
notable success in the front line and who between them have decades
of appropriate experience in the MOD, including the Central Staff.
THE HISTORY
OF EVENTS
BEHIND THE
HARRIER WITHDRAWAL
FROM SERVICE
Introduction
1. A review of MoD history since 1967 demonstrates
that a clear conflict of interest has emerged between the Royal
Air Force and the Royal Navy fixed wing Fleet Air Arm. Britain's
defence and the economic interests are global in nature as they
have been for centuries and, as the uneasy peace maintained by
NATO and the nuclear deterrent progressed, funding for our Armed
Forces was being gradually reduced.
2. The Royal Navy's (and Royal Marines') role
was and still remains clear:
— (a) To
project military and political power upon the high seas to ensure
the lawful and free movement of trade.
— (b) To
deter those that would harm our national interests from taking
any such action.
— (c) To
provide humanitarian relief following natural disasters to small/developing
nations that cannot help themselves.
— (d) To
deter emerging nations and future superpowers from territorial
aggrandisement that could/would destabilise the global marketplace.
3. The Royal Air Force's role was also clear
and was centred upon defending the UK home land base against air
attack by the Soviet bloc and maintaining the nuclear deterrent
through the medium of the "V" Bomber force. The latter
was clearly vulnerable to interdiction and did not have a global
reach and so the national nuclear deterrent was vested in the
Polaris programme and our nuclear submarines. This left the Royal
Air Force with the following principal roles:
— (a) To
provide for the air defence of the UK against the Warsaw Pact
bomber threat.
— (b) To
provide an air bridge of logistic support to naval and ground
forces engaged in expeditionary Force operations.
— (c) To
police UK airspace against intruders.
4. When the Cold War ended, unhappily so did
any strategic role of the Royal Air Force which at that juncture
was one of the largest air forces in the world. With no perceived
air threat against the UK homeland base, the justification for
maintaining this large air force had disappeared.
5. Lord Trenchard had predicted that at some
stage the Royal Air Force would be subsumed by the Royal Navy
and the Army. The end of the Cold War presented an obvious opportunity
for that to occur.
6. It is arguable that the Royal Air Force had
"seen this moment coming" for decades. If it did, it
was not ready to admit it. That is where the conflict of interest
between the RAF and the Navy/fixed wing Fleet Air Arm arose. To
remain a third single Service, they needed to demonstrate that
they have a substantial war fighting role. To do that they needed
to take over all flying, Navy and Army, rotary and fixed wing.
This would be on the basis that airpower is indivisible and must
be kept in the hands of a capable single Service. However, the
carrier battle groups of the Royal Navy with the Fleet Air Arm
embarked have continued to demonstrate their utility and flexibility
at many trouble spots around the world since the end of World
War II. A list of the more prominent conflicts is provided at
Annex A1. Annex A 2 provides detail of where RAF operations overseas
were facilitated by naval carrier battle groups.
7. Quite rightly, the Royal Air Force was proud
of its heritage based on the Battle of Britain and the immense
efforts of Bomber Command during WWII. A single Service had indeed
been required to avoid defeat in WWII. Sadly, its relevance started
to diminish during the long years of the Cold War threat, but
its "survival instinct" caused it to over-reach and
falsely proclaim a worldwide capability for its land-based aircraft
even though the events presented at Annex A 1 did not in many
instances include any participation or contribution from land-based
air. The claimed worldwide capability to respond to or to deter
threats to our national offshore interests did not exist.
8. In contrast, the Royal Navy fixed wing Fleet
Air Arm has always responded to such threats in a rapid and effective
manner. Events since the end of the Cold War have underlined the
desire of the Royal Air Force to survive at any cost: it would
appear that this "cost" includes the loss of our capability
to project political and military influence on a global basis
in order to deter those that would harm our interests. These events
are summarised below.
Joint Force Harrier
9. Joint Force Harrier was conceived in the year
2000 to provide integral air support to UK Expeditionary Task
Force Operations. It was agreed between the Air Staff and the
Naval Staff that it should consist of Naval Sea Harrier FA2 Squadrons
for fighter air defence, surface search, probe and strike, and
RAF Harrier GR 7/9 Squadrons for the offensive air support of
ground forces ashore. Part of the arrangement was that "in
the name of joint efficiency" the naval squadrons should
move from Royal Naval Air Station, Yeovilton, to RAF Cottesmore
and the RAF helicopter squadrons would move to Yeovilton from
RAF Odiham. Both sets of aircraft squadrons would continue to
be administered by and remain under the operational control of
the originating single service.
10. A sign of things to come, these plans were
changed in very quick time with very little opposition from the
Naval Staff who evidently trusted in the concept of "jointery".
The move of the RAF helicopter squadrons to Yeovilton was cancelled.
This was a precursor for a vigorous attack by the Air Staff on
the continued existence in service of the Sea Harrier FA2 squadrons;
in spite of the fact that the FA2 was the only operational BVR
fighter in the UK inventory—recognised by our NATO allies
as the most capable area interceptor fighter in Europe.
11. Single service interest/survival instinct
rather than "jointery" was beginning to evidence itself.
THE
LONG TERM
PLAN TO
REMOVE THE
CARRIER CAPABLE
HARRIER FAMILY
FROM SERVICE
Stage 1: The Untimely
Withdrawal of Sea Harrier from Service
Stage 1A
12. No reasons for this failure to keep an inter-Service
agreement (the move of RAF helicopters to Yeovilton) were asked
for or presented and, in the light of subsequent events it appears
to have been part of an RAF "plan" to retain full control
of their own assets including helicopters whilst taking full control
of Joint Force Harrier (JFH).
13. There had been agreement for a two star Admiral
to be the head of the JFH organisation. Very soon after the latter's
introduction, the Royal Air Force conducted a Command level internal
reorganisation resulting in the removal of the two star Admiral
and the subsequent loss of control by the Royal Navy over its
management of Fleet fixed wing aircraft.
14. There was then set in motion what can be
described with hindsight as a "plan to engineer the removal
of the Sea Harrier from service". In late 2001, Sea Harrier
front line squadrons were directed by signal from MoD to submit
a comprehensive list of equipment upgrades that would benefit
the aircraft's operational capability. They were told that there
is "money to spend" and "we need to spend it now".
In other words, MoD was asking for a "nice to have list".
15. The lists were forwarded to MoD where Jointery-specific
Committees (staffed predominantly by RAF officers) were considering
ways of saving money (rather than spending an excess - as they
had intimated directly to SHAR front line squadrons). The "nice
to have list" was purposefully taken out of context and was
reviewed by the Committees as a "Must have if Operational
Capability is to be sustained list". Some of the "nice
to have list" items, notably the need for a more powerful
engine, were then used as justification for the withdrawal of
the SHAR "based on cost constraints and the limited in-service
period remaining for the FA2".
Stage 1B
16. In MoD, the then First Sea Lord was persuaded
by the RAF under the heading of Joint Operations that the ground
attack variant, the GR7 Harrier, was the most important element
of Joint Force Harrier and that, as a result of "financial
imperatives", the SHAR must be discontinued prior to the
expected In Service Date of the Joint Strike Fighter (JFS)/Future
Joint Combat Aircraft (FJCA)[181]—the
F-35.
17. This would leave a gap in the First Line
of Air Defence of the Fleet/JTF of not less than six years (2006
to 2012) and probably more (now 16 years)—the JSF programme
would undoubtedly slide to the right, as usual. It appeared that
"logic", "operational imperatives" and SDR98/DP
2001 Statement had played little part in the decision-making process.
18. A Joint First Sea Lord/Chief of the Air Staff
statement released at the time the decision was made public, along
with statements by James Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces.
A MOD Question & Answer news brief was also issued on the
decision. (See Annex B and C).
19. These documents demonstrate that the Sea
Harrier withdrawal decision was flawed.
20. Later, in the House of Commons Defence Select
Committee Meeting on Procurement dated 8 May 2002, the following
statements were made:
Lord Bach (Minister for Defence Procurement):
Sir Jock [Stirrup] was saying last week ……that the role
of the Royal Navy carriers is not primarily now to defend the
fleet, but it is in line with the expeditionary doctrine that
underpins our defence policy, much more about the ability to project
power a distance, precisely the point Sir Jock made. The Sea Harrier
makes little contribution to this frankly. The GR7 makes a much
more substantial one and will make an even greater one when it
is upgraded to GR9. That is the first point.
Lord Bach: Clearly Sea Harrier provided a useful
defence against attacking aircraft, but in general terms it offers
no protection against sea-skimming missiles launched from ships,
from submarines, from land or from aircraft standing off from
distance and that is something that those who attack this decision
have never tried to answer. The real issue here is that Sea Harrier
does not help against sea-skimming missiles from wherever they
are launched. Now, that sea-skimming missile is now assessed to
be the primary threat to maritime assets.[182]
These statements clearly showed that neither Air
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, KCB, AFC, Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff (Equipment Capability) representing MoD, but advised presumably
by RAF officers, nor Lord Bach had an operational understanding
of naval air warfare in the Fleet and in the expeditionary task
force operation arena. Nor did they speak honestly about the Sea
Harrier operational capability. It was incorrect to say that "...
in general terms it offers no protection against sea-skimming
missiles... The real issue here is that Sea Harrier does not help
against sea-skimming missiles from wherever they are launched."
21. Facts rather than convictions had already
demonstrated that the Sea Harrier with AMRAAM represented the
only Fleet/UK weapon system that was specifically designed to
counter the sea-skimming missile threat; and it was very capable
of doing so with a probability of kill expected of close to 100%.
How Sir Jock Stirrup could be unaware of this fact is not clear
- it was certainly a function of his appointment to remain fully
briefed on all aircraft capabilities before recommending action
on them. His ignorance was either inexcusable or feigned.
Stage 2:
The Untimely Withdrawal of Harrier from Service
Stage 2A
22. The Harrier GR7/9 provided highly effective
Close Air Support to our ground forces in Afghanistan for five
years. It was the ideal aircraft for this role having been designed
for it in the first instance.
23. However, the Royal Air Force decided to replace
the Harrier in theatre with the Tornado GR4.
24. Of the 134 Tornado GR4 aircraft in service,
only 28 were configured/equipped to conduct this Close Air Support
role effectively. The remaining aircraft required expensive weapon
system upgrades prior to any deployment. From the time of their
initial deployment it was quickly demonstrated that the Tornado
could not respond to urgent Close Air Support requests as quickly
or as effectively as the Harrier. These performance deficiencies
were not reported to Ministers but instead the parliamentary questions
submitted on this issue were answered in a misleading manner,
giving the impression that the Tornado was far more capable than
it had shown itself to be in theatre.
25. Tornado aircraft performance deficiencies
resulted in the loss of aircraft in theatre and its overall serviceability
rate has produced a situation where, instead of a 12 minute "wheels
off the ground" response time by the Harrier, a Tornado deployment
now requires 24 hour notice of Close Air Support requests.
Stage 2B
26. Prior to final publication, the SDSR team
had come to the operationally and financially correct conclusion
that the Harrier should be retained in service for operations
in Afghanistan and for contingent operations elsewhere. It had
also concluded that the Tornado force should be withdrawn from
service forthwith. MoD DOC Audit figures showed that this way
ahead would save the defence budget at least £7.5 billion
whereas withdrawal of Harrier would save the budget just £1.1
billion.
27. The then Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir
Jock Stirrup, RAF, was apprised of these findings and immediately
arranged a private meeting with the Prime Minister. It is now
clear that CDS misled the Prime Minister concerning the operational
capability of the Tornado GR4 and persuaded him, without any reference
to the Royal Navy or the Army, that the SDSR recommendations should
be changed and that it was Harrier that should be withdrawn from
service and the Tornado retained. What he deliberately failed
to mention in that meeting was that:
— (a) The
continued airworthiness of the Tornado GR4 was a major problem.
— (b) Some
aircraft had already been grounded because of fatigue cracks in
the wing's main spar.
— (c) The
aircraft's planned fatigue life expectancy of 4,000 flying hours
had already been exceeded by up to 50%.
— (d) More
funding would be required to provide the Tornado with the right
sensors for the safe deployment of GPS precision guided weapons.
— (e) The
cumulative effect of a) to d) above would represent considerably
less capability in theatre than that provided by the Harrier and
would be considerably more expensive.
Stage 3: Promoting
the Need for a Land-Based Fighter Ground Attack Capability
28. Part of the RAF's current strategy is to
justify a need for a new land-based fighter ground attack aircraft.
This is an expensive strategy for the following reasons:
— (a) The
modification of the Tranche 2 Typhoon to give it a ground attack
capability is at additional high cost. In placing the Harrier
Force in store, the RAF stated that it wished to economise by
reducing to two types of fast jet only and stating grossly incorrectly
that the Tornado could perform better in the support of ground
forces than the Harrier. Simultaneously, the RAF now wish to replace
the Tornado capability with that of the modified Typhoon in Tranche
2. Had the Harriers been kept in front line service, neither of
these expensive programmes need have been undertaken before the
planned arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter F35C.
— (b) Having
spent approximately £5.3 billion on Tranche 1 Typhoon aircraft
only a fraction of which are required to fill the UK air policing
and air defence of the Falkland Islands roles, there is now a
proposal to withdraw these relatively new aircraft from service
within the next two years—replacing them with modified Typhoons
on grounds that the Tornado is ageing, its weapons systems are
inappropriate and the Harrier GR9s have been taken out of service.
It should be noted that they are presently still being kept in
store at RAF Cottesmore and fully capable of return to front line
service at markedly less expense.
29. RAF longer term plans include a requirement
for the Joint Strike Fighter to be able to embark in our new carriers.
This conflicts with the modified Typhoon plan in that there would
then be no operational requirement for a land-based Joint Strike
Fighter. Common sense, operational logic and fiscal constraint
all point to the conclusion that if the Joint Strike Fighter is
to be procured at all, it should be as part of the Royal Navy
fleet weapon system—that is for carrier operations only.
DISCUSSION
30. The chain of events described above demonstrates
the conflicts of interest that exist within the RAF and between
the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm. These conflicts underline
the prediction by Lord Trenchard that in due course the Royal
Air Force would need to be subsumed into the Royal Navy and the
Army.
31. Arguably, that time has now come although
there would be merit in maintaining a much smaller Air Force to
support the other two Services with ISTAR and strategic lift capability.
All envisaged future combat theatres are offshore; as are the
majority of our military commitments, our trade routes and associated
interests.
32. The flexibility and effectiveness of carrier
battle groups within the Royal Navy weapon system is well proven.
The lack of capability of the land-based air to respond rapidly
to crises offshore and to deter their escalation is also well
proven. In all logic therefore, the focus of our national defence
spending should be on the maritime strategic policy that has served
us so well in the past. Further expenditure on land-based fighter
ground attack aircraft would be a waste of scarce resources.
What Should Have Occurred?
33. What should have occurred in 2002 was for
the MoD and the Government to follow the strategic policy laid
down in SDR 98 and subsequent papers. That is to say:
— (a) The
Sea Harrier FA2 and the Harrier GR9 could have been retained in
service for both land-based and carrier-borne operations.
— (b) The
ageing, land-based Tornado could have been withdrawn from service.
— (c) At
the same time, the procurement of the Typhoon air to air fighter
could have been limited to less than half of Tranche 1.
— (d) The
Joint Harrier Force could have been replaced at the end of their
operational lives by either the F18, or the F35 that aircraft
manages to meet capability, time, cost and our new carrier requirements.
Massive savings in the defence budget would have
been realised and little real operational capability would have
been lost.
The Way Ahead Now
34. There is still time to correct the situation:
— (a) The
flawed decision to withdraw Harrier GR9 and HMS Ark Royal from
service can still be reversed despite the political difficulties
of being seen to be doing a "U" Turn.
— (b) Tornado
GR4 could be removed from service as soon as Joint Force Harrier
is reinstated.
— (c) Further
procurement of Typhoon should be curtailed and the existing aircraft
employed to fill the low-key role of UK airspace policing.
While there would be a diminution of RAF-manned fast
jet flying, major savings would be realised as a result of these
three measures and, just as importantly, our ability to project
political and military power on a global basis could be kept intact
rather than gapped for an indeterminate period with all the uncertainties
of regeneration after such a gap. The military arguments are convincing
and economic, the political decision to do a "U" Turn
can readily be justified by the very considerable sums saved which
had deliberately not been factored by the MoD into the original
decision.
Annex
A 1
ROYAL NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIER CORPORATE COMBAT
EXPERIENCE SINCE WORLD WAR II
1. A brief outline of 17 events, crises, conflicts
and deterrence, in which fixed-wing aircraft carriers were deployed
in support of UK Government policy since 1945. They show that
the availability of sea-based tactical aviation adds immensely
to the nation's overall deterrent capability and, in several,
no other form of intervention was initially possible. More significant
is the inability of potential aggressors to deter the deployment
of aircraft carriers into areas supposedly dominated by land-based
aircraft. The myth of vulnerability is belied by experience.
PALESTINE 1948
Naval aircraft from HMS Ocean covered the
final evacuation of British forces from Palestine in May 1948.
RAF aircraft had already been evacuated and only carrier-borne
naval aircraft were capable of providing the protection required.
KOREA 1950-53
HMS Triumph joined the USS Valley Forge
to strike at North Korean targets shortly after N Korea attacked
the South in June 1950. The British aircraft carriers Triumph,
Theseus, Glory and Ocean provided all the UK's
tactical strike and fighter operations throughout the three years
of the war. RAF involvement limited to transport flights into
safe airfields and some flying-boat MPA patrols in the open ocean
off Japan. RN carrier aircraft flew thousands of effective sorties.
SUEZ 1956
A combined assault on Egypt by British and French
carrier-borne and land-based aircraft. In the British operations
the RN deployed three fixed-wing carriers, Eagle, Albion
and Bulwark plus two helicopter carriers, Ocean
and Theseus. Because of their ability to gain better position
the strike carriers reacted more quickly to calls for action than
RAF aircraft in distant Cyprus and Malta. Despite only having
one-third of the total British strike fighters embarked, RN strike
fighters flew two-thirds of the strike sorties and their aircraft
spent longer over the target area. RAF aircraft had long transits
from their bases, carried less weapons and could spend little
time on task, most of that at high level to conserve fuel.
LEVANT 1958
US/UK assistance sought to protect Lebanon and (land-locked)
Jordan against Iraqi aggression. Eagle provided support
for airborne and amphibious forces deployed into theatre. RAF
transport aircraft flying British troops into Jordan were protected
by carrier-borne fighters since RAF fighter bases were too far
away for their aircraft to be effective.
KOREA 1960
UN forces including an RN carrier deployed to the
Yellow Sea on exercises aimed at deterring the North from launching
a renewed attack on the South. Deterrence succeeded. No RAF involvement
since no bases close enough.
KUWAIT 1961
British forces deployed to Kuwait to defend it against
threatened Iraqi aggression. HMS Bulwark arrived with 42
RM Commando within 24 hours since good intelligence had put her
in the right place and used its helicopters to deploy and support
them. British troops flown into Kuwait by RAF transport with only
what they stood up in—had to requisition vehicles and wait
for RN amphibious shipping to bring in more. Strike carrier Victorious
took several days to arrive with her battle group from the South
China Sea but brought the "complete package of power"
that subsequently dominated the area. A single RAF Hunter squadron
had deployed to Kuwait from Bahrain but lacked fuel, ammunition,
spares and most of all GCI radar coverage other than that provided
by Bulwark. RAF transport being used to fly in troops so
none available to support the Hunters which left once Victorious
arrived. The need for the RN to support RAF aircraft led to the
second commando-carrier, Albion, being fitted with better
surveillance radar (Type 965).
CONFRONTATION WITH
INDONESIA 1963-66
British and Commonwealth supported the Malaysian
Government against Indonesian aggression and deployed forces from
all three Services. The Far East Fleet provided a considerable
deterrent against Indonesian escalation and the presence of its
strike carriers posed a threat that Indonesia could not counter.
Carrier and air group transits of high-visibility international
waters such as the Sunda Strait added to their value. RAF could
not provide such a visible deterrent.
EAST AFRICAN
MUTINIES 1964
Following a mutiny by Tanganyikan Army units in January
1964 Britain was asked to provide assistance. HMS Centaur
was at Aden and embarked 45 RN Commando; 16/5 Lancers with their
vehicles and two RAF Helicopters in addition to her normal air
group. Subsequent assault a model of how flexible carriers are
and how quickly they can act. Another example of RAF being taken
into action by an RN carrier. Centaur was capable of launching
her normal air group although at times it would have been a "squeeze".
DEFENCE OF
ZAMBIA 1965-66
Following the Rhodesian UDI in November 1965 the
Zambian Government asked Britain to provide air defence against
possible attack by the Rhodesians. Deploying an RAF fighter unit
and the ground environment to support it took many months and
the gap was filled effectively by HMS Eagle which provided
fighters, AEW and an effective air defence environment quickly.
BEIRA PATROL
1965-66
Followed on from above. Britain undertook to enforce
UN sanctions preventing tankers from entering Beira with oil for
Rhodesia. Only carriers could search the vast areas of sea involved
in the months it took the RAF to build up an MPA base and deploy
aircraft to it. Eagle and Ark Royal both involved
for considerable periods at sea.
ADEN 1967
British forces were evacuated from Aden in November
1967 covered by an RN task force off shore. RAF aircraft were
among the forces evacuated and therefore relied on RN carrier-borne
aircraft for their defence while they did so.
BELIZE 1972
A show of strength by Buccaneers from Ark Royal
prevented a threatened invasion of British Honduras (Belize) by
Guatemala. RAF too far away and could do nothing.
SOUTH ATLANTIC
1982
Carrier-borne strike-fighters and helicopters were
fundamental to the campaign which would not have been possible
without them. Significantly the RAF needed carriers/Atlantic
Conveyor to get them into action.
KUWAIT 1991
USN carriers played a big part in the coercive all-arms
forces that drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait; Ark Royal
5 operated in the Eastern Mediterranean in a containment role
that was not, in the event, used.
BOSNIA/FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 1992-96
RN and USN carriers operated in support of UN and
NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. Carriers were able to
position clear of weather which sometimes limited RAF and coalition
operations from land bases. The UK Government ordered one carrier
to be available constantly in case it proved necessary to withdraw
British forces under fire since land-based aircraft could not
guarantee to do so and did not have the valuable mix of fighters
and helicopters close to the scene of action.
SIERRA LEONE
2002
Illustrious provided air
support for British forces that rescued UN forces in Sierra Leone
providing a secure base that could not be located or attacked
by the terrorists ashore. A floating base and national command
centre.
IRAQ 2003
Ark Royal 5 operated in
her alternative LPH role with Sea Kings and RAF Chinooks embarked
to land RM commandoes on the Al Faw Peninsula. Latter difficult
to operate because they could not be struck down into the hangar
and blades could not be folded—had to be removed.
"Strange as it may seem, the Air Force, except
in the air, is the least mobile of all the Services. A squadron
can reach its destination in a few hours, but its establishments,
depots, fuel, spare parts, and workshops take many weeks, and
even months, to develop."
W. Churchill, "The Second World War",
Vol. 11, page 384
Annex
A 2
EXAMPLES OF OFFSHORE RAF OPERATIONS THAT
HAVE BEEN FACILITATED BY RN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
By David Hobbs
1. There are a number of examples where the RAF
could not have deployed aircraft, aircrew and maintainers into
conflict zones without aircraft carriers. Once deployed, the RAF
then relied on sea-borne bulk supplies of fuel and ammunition
which, in turn, needed the RN to maintain control of the sea supply
routes with its aircraft carriers playing a prominent role. Examples
include:
Russia 1919
British forces deployed into Russia against Bolsheviks
in 1919 needed air support most of which was transported into
theatre in RN aircraft/seaplane carriers and then deployed ashore.
Palestine 1929
Aircraft from HMS Courageous landed to support
British troops in action in Palestine.
Norway 1940
RAF aircraft based in the UK had insufficient range
to be effective in operations over Norway after the German invasion.
Most support came from carrier-borne aircraft but the only effective
RAF involvement came from Gladiator and Hurricane fighters landed
from the aircraft carriers Glorious and Furious.
The carriers also gave navigational and technical support.
Malta 1940-42
RAF fighters had insufficient range to fly to Malta
from Gibraltar after Italy entered the war and the only way to
get Hurricanes and Spitfires to Malta was to fly them off the
decks of RN and USN aircraft carriers. There would have been no
fighters in Malta without them. HMS Ark Royal 3 was lost
returning from flying Spitfires to Malta.
North Africa 1941-42
Most of the fighters in the Desert Air Force relied
on sea control to get them there and numbers were carried in aircraft
carriers such as HMS Furious.
Sumatra 1942
RAF fighters did not have the range to reinforce
Allied forces in South East Asia as the Japanese advanced in early
1942. HMS Indomitable ferried and flew off Hurricanes to
Sumatra which could not, otherwise, have got there.
Pacific 1945
RN escort carriers ferried RAF Mosquito bombers and
their secret "Highball" bouncing bombs to Australia
in 1945. They were intended to operate from the decks of fleet
carriers to attack Japanese warships in the home islands but the
USN refused to allow them to do so. The RN put considerable effort
into training their crews.
Korea 1950-53
Although the RAF did not operate combat aircraft
in the Korean War, it did supply Meteor fighters to 77 Squadron
of the RAAF which did operate. They were ferried to Iwakuni in
Japan in British aircraft carriers including HMS Unicorn.
Without her, the RAAF could not have supported the Squadron in
action.
Confrontation 1963-66
During the Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia,
the RAF relied on RN commando-carriers to ferry helicopters to
Borneo. They lacked the range to fly there.
East African Mutiny 1964
Two RAF Belvedere helicopters were embarked in HMS
Centaur; they had no other means of reaching the scene
of action.
South Atlantic 1982
RAF Harriers and Chinook helicopters had no means
of reaching the conflict other than Atlantic Conveyor and the
decks of Hermes and Invincible. They relied on the RN radar/air
defence environment and RN supplies of fuel and weapons to be
effective, neither of which would have been there without the
carriers.
Iraq 2003
RAF Chinooks embarked in HMS Ark Royal five took
part in the amphibious assault by Royal Marines on the Al Faw
peninsula. Again, they lacked the range to operate from a land-base
and needed the aircraft carrier to take them to the fight.
Annex
B
JOINT FORCE HARRIER—MIGRATION TO FUTURE
JOINT COMBAT AIRCRAFT
PERSONAL
FROM FIRST
SEA LORD
(ADMIRAL SIR
NIGEL ESSENHIGH)
AND CHIEF
OF THE
AIR STAFF,
(AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
PETER SQUIRE)
(Statement issued early 2002) (Comments in italics)
1. The Secretary of State (The Rt. Hon James
Ingram MP) will this afternoon announce some significant news
concerning Joint Force Harrier (JFH) and the power projection
capability vested in the joint force and the Invincible Class
aircraft carriers. Following extensive study work, he will announce
our intention to migrate JFH to an upgraded all Harrier GR9
force manned 50/50 by RN and Royal Air Force personnel by
2007. To that end the Sea Harrier FA2 will be withdrawn from service
early by 2006. This signal presents the background to this important
decision and should be used to ensure all of those in both services
closely involved in this unique force are fully aware of the changes
ahead which have our strong support.
2. A strong theme throughout the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) was the importance of joint operations in
the delivery of war-fighting capability. One of the initiatives
announced was the intention to create Joint Force 2000 (JF2000)
which would operate a single, common aircraft type from land and
sea. The SDR acknowledged that this aspiration would not be realised
fully under current plans until the Future Joint Combat Aircraft
(FJCA) was in full frontline service. It was noted during SDR
that total integration of the Joint Force would be impracticable
as the Sea Harrier (the FA2) and the RAF Harrier (the GR7) share
less than 10% of their airframe and avionics, and they have quite
different primary operational roles. Notwithstanding this, it
was considered that closer harmonisation between the existing
Harrier forces would certainly pave the way for a truly joint
force for the future.
3. As a first step towards this goal, the formation
of a new organisation entitled Joint Force Harrier (JFH) was announced
in Feb 1999. Its purpose being further to develop the joint operational
culture with the longer term aim of facilitating the migration
path to CVF and FJCA. JFH was formed on 1 Apr 2000 commanded by
AOC 3 Group, a 2 star naval officer based at HQ STC, RAF High
Wycombe. From the outset, the staff of the JFH set out to expand
on the success of Joint Harrier operations and gradually to merge
the two service's culture and practices towards a properly joint
force. It was announced in Feb 99 that the RN FA2 force and its
personnel would relocate from their base at Yeovilton to the two
RAF Harrier bases, Cottesmore and Wittering (Cott/Witt). This
move, planned for the second half of 2003, would create an environment
where the two services would work effectively as an integrated
force.
4. In the longer term, the successful introduction
to service of FJCA is key to the future of the UK's expeditionary
offensive air power capability and our colleagues in the equipment
area of the MoD are working hard to deliver the aircraft and associated
systems into service on time. The Services, too, need to prepare
to accept the aircraft by its in service date of 2012. Last year
a study team formed to examine how best to migrate the current
capability of the JFH to the era of FJCA and the future carriers
(CVF). This study included a detailed assessment of the capability
the force delivers now, and how this needs to be developed to
facilitate the transition to a common land based and carrier-borne
attack aircraft. The study team was tasked to develop a series
of options for migration to FJCA/CVF. In doing so the team was
to ensure that each proposed migration path was coherent, deliverable
and designed to ensure that the JFH retained a credible expeditionary
military capability until the introduction to service of FJCA.
In addition, the team would take full account of key SDR conclusions
germane to carrier operations and the JFH. The most significant
of these was:
"The Invincible Class carriers were designed
for cold-war anti-submarine operations with helicopters and a
limited air defence capability provided by a small number of embarked
Sea Harriers. This is no longer the main requirement. The emphasis
is now on increased offensive air-power".
(CNS and CAS had ignored SDR 98 which emphasised
the need for an effective "air supremacy" and "airspace
denial" capability that could only be provided by the Sea
Harrier FA2.)
5. The study work drew extensively on advice
and expertise from key stakeholders such as front line commands,
industry, IPTs, and from those within MOD itself. The main outcome
of the JFH study work has been to recommend an investment strategy
reflecting the guidance above. The principal findings of the study
work are summarised below:
— (a) Both
FA2 and GR7 would require significant investment over the next
few years to maintain and upgrade their individual capabilities
to ensure that both types retain a credible expeditionary capability
to their respective out of service dates.
— (b) In
accordance with the outcome of SDR, maintenance of an offensive
attack capability through to FJCA and CVF was considered of overriding
importance. (This was not in accordance with SDR 98. It did
not suggest in any way that the offensive attack capability overrode
the need for effective air defence and air supremacy.)
— (c) The
FA2's embarked capability in hot climates will remain critically
limited for a substantial proportion of the year by its poor engine
performance because it cannot easily be retrofitted to take the
more powerful mk107 engine currently being fitted to the Harrier
GR7. (The study was confined to a short period of the Persian
Gulf year when the Sea Harrier could not land back on deck within
the approved operating safety limits if still carrying its AMRAAM
outload and completely ignored the operation of fixed wing assets
from Forward Operating Bases ashore. The US Marine Corps AV8B
Harrier flew nearly 4,000 missions over Iraq from such operating
bases—because they had the same engine problems as the Sea
Harrier. That did not dissuade them from doing their job. It should
be noted that CTOL fighters operating from United States carriers
were also limited on operations by heat induced engine performance
reduction. And so it was entirely wrong to isolate this problem
as an unacceptable problem for Sea Harrier.)
— (d) The
ability to operate world-wide by both day and night was required
to ensure a robust expeditionary capability.
— (e) It
would be possible to migrate to an all Harrier GR force whilst
maintaining a credible expeditionary capability until the introduction
to service of FJCA/CVF, albeit this would exacerbate the acknowledged
capability gap in the air defence of the fleet until the introduction
to service of a significant number of Type 45 destroyers equipped
with the Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS) and later,
FJCA. (Even with the Type 45, a major air defence capability
gap still exists without the FA2.)
— (f) Migration
to a single aircraft type would require modifications to the Harrier
GR7 to ensure a credible expeditionary capability was maintained
(until FJCA/CVF ISD) including the ability to employ smart/precision
weapons such as the precision guided bomb and the brimstone anti-armour
weapon. The Harrier GR7 will therefore be upgraded to GR9 standard.
6. The study team recommended that the JFH investment
strategy should be based on early migration to a single aircraft
type, maximising investment in Harrier GR. The next step was to
consider when would be the appropriate date to withdraw FA2 from
service. A number of options were examined which would begin the
withdrawal on dates between 2003 and 2007. Many factors were considered
in this phase of the work, including: the potential size of the
fleet air defence capability gap; the funding profiles required
for the GR7-9 upgrade programme; the impact on RN and Royal Air
Force personnel; and, the convergence of RN and RAF air engineering
practices. After considerable debate we agreed a date of 1 April
2004 as a planning assumption for the commencement of the FA2
draw down with the caveat that this should be revisited if necessary
once implementation work is underway.
7. It is intended that JFH migrates to an all
Harrier GR9 force based at Cott/Witt commencing in April 2004
completing by about April 2007. Shortly after this date 50/50
RN/RAF manning will be achieved across the joint force. The precise
timing will be dependent on the implementation of air engineering
convergence, which will be brought forward from 2008 to ensure
that fully joint engineering operations are possible. A small
number of Sea Harrier pilots will convert to the Harrier GR7 during
2003, ahead of the main transition, to establish a core of RN
experience within the Harrier GR force. Planned collocation of
the force will be modified in that FA2 personnel will relocate
to Cott/Witt to operate the Harrier GR7/9 as FA2 squadrons disband
between 2004 and 2006. The FA2 and ac-specific supporting infrastructure
will remain at Yeovilton until withdrawn from service.
8. The precise structure of the re-brigaded JFH,
which will remain a STC formation, has yet to be confirmed but
it is assumed that, post migration, there will be four front line
squadrons. Within two of the squadrons, the establishment will
comprise a majority of Royal Air Force personnel, within the other
two squadrons the RAF/RN balance will be reversed with RN personnel
in the majority. The operational conversion unit will be manned
50/50 by RAF/RN aircrew and ground crew. In parallel with the
reconfiguration of the Harrier Force, the Invincible Class carriers
will be modified to operate GR9 aircraft and will be provisioned
to sustain the force elements declared. The Joint Force aircraft
will be double-earmarked for operations from land or sea. The
Harrier GR9 will be maintained in service until 2015.
9. This significant change announced by the Secretary
of State today will allow us to deliver a greater offensive strike
capability from the CVS than even SDR envisaged would be possible
ahead of FJCA. The new structure for the Joint Force which we
have agreed will allow us coherently to migrate to FJCA whilst
operating a common aircraft and taking advantage of best single-service
practice. These advantages will more than outweigh the impact
on air defence of the fleet caused by the withdrawal of the FA2
until the new Type 45 destroyer and PAAMS enter service from 2007
(and FJCA enters service from 2012). (This last sentence is
totally wrong in its operational judgement. When you are attacked
by air to surface missiles at sea, it does not matter how many
bombs you have on board.)
10. CINC STC will shortly provide further details
for those in JFH.
Annex
C
THE MOD(UK) Q & A NEWSBRIEF
(Submitted in support of the statement by First
Sea Lord [Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh] and Chief of the Air Staff
[Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire] giving details of the planned
withdrawal from service of the Sea Harrier FA2 by the year 2006.
[Submission date, early 2002])
Editorial note: Comments below concerning appropriate
Q & A's present the real truth of the matter and call into
question whether Defence policy 2001 Statement was indeed a serious
document. The latter stated that "we will be maintaining
the emphasis on deployability and the ability to survive
and fight in an expeditionary environment".
FINANCIAL
1. Q. Is this move just another cost saving
measure?
A. No. It is the entirely logical conclusion
to work that has sought to establish a smooth transition to FCJA.
It will see the enhancement of our expeditionary offensive air
capability and, with the Type 45 Destroyers, establish a route
map to the Navy of 2010 and beyond.
Comment: This may be "entirely logical"
to financial mandarins but it is entirely illogical when considered
from an operational point of view. Lessons learned from operations
over the past thirty years show that the combatant with the better
air-to-air and air-to-ground capability is the one that wins the
day. One has to "kill off" or deter the enemy air capability
before it is safe for air-to-ground operations to take place.
Further, the modern, accepted air-to-ground doctrine is for the
delivery of smart weapons from altitude (out of reach of small
arms and short range surface-to-air missiles). Ground attack aircraft
with weapon systems designed for low level, over-the-target direct
delivery are too vulnerable to enemy ground fire.
2. Q. Will this plan save money? If so how
much?
A. There will obviously be savings from the withdrawal
of the FA2 from service earlier than previously planned. However,
the vast majority of the benefit from this will be realised in
a later timeframe, beyond 2006, after the last FA2 squadron is
disbanded.
Comment: Much more money could have been saved
by discontinuing some or all "non-essential" and less
than efficient operational aircraft. Why does the RAF need additional
shore-based ground attack aircraft (Tornado GR4 and later, Typhoon)?
This clearly does not fit with an expeditionary force policy.
3. Q. How will the money saved be used?
A. In part it will be used to upgrade the Harrier
GR7 to GR9.
Comment: How could this be so when the Harrier
GR9 upgrade was already approved and needed to be complete before
Sea Harrier finished service?
AIR-DEFENCE
GAP
1. Q. Will this leave a gap in the RN's air-defence
capabilities?
A. While there will be temporary degradation
in the outer layer of air defence until FCJA is operational, this
will be adequately compensated for by the introduction of the
Type 45 Destroyer, and other elements of our layered maritime
air defence system. Also, with the increasing emphasis on coalition
operations in the littoral and the much reduced requirement to
conduct blue water operations, there are few, if any scenarios
which in the interim will require FA2 aircraft to ensure operational
success.
Comment: This is not so. In small numbers
(only three by 2010), the Type 45/PAAMS cannot provide flexible
air defence over large threat sectors. Nor can it engage low level
threats below the radar horizon. It will be much more capable
than the Type 42/Sea Dart system inshore but it cannot compensate
for the complete lack of an outer layer of fleet air defence.
If faced with, for example, the uprated, supersonic Chinese sea-skimming
missile, SS-N-22 Sunburn (now being sold to third world and developing
nations), it will be no more capable than Sea Dart against Exocet.
It does not therefore compensate. The "other elements of
our layered maritime air defence system" are only chaff plus
Point Defence Missile Systems and guns. All these are "last
resort" measures and, lacking the early attrition by the
outer layers, will be easily saturated by co-ordinated air-to-surface
attacks.
Finally, the most likely UK specific scenario that
could arise after the removal of Sea Harrier from service is for
the Argentine to retake the Falklands. Britain would be unable
to intervene to protect her interests there.
2. Q. How do you justify the withdrawal
of the FA2?
A. It is a logical step in the progression to
a single aircraft type. The end result will be vastly increased
offensive capability from the Invincible Class carriers.
Comment: Embarked operational experience
to date with Harrier GR7 is limited to the Sierra Leone experience,
where:
— (a) The
RAF Harriers did not fly armed recce missions ashore in support
of own forces. They did not feel confident in being able to "find
the ship" during recovery. So the Sea Harrier FA2 carried
out all the day and night armed recce missions instead.
— (b) The
GR7 did not have a clearance to fire its gun and would
therefore have been less effective than the FA2 when on task.
3. Q Surely the FA2 is no older than the
GR7?
A. The FA2 is essentially a modified Harrier
GR3, an all-metal aircraft that was withdrawn from RAF service
in the late 80s. The GR7 is of a more modern design, is largely
constructed of composite materials and designed to accept the
more powerful Pegasus 11-61 engine similar to the one used by
the US Marine Corps.
Comment: This reply does not answer the question.
The FA2 is no older than the GR7. It is specially
fitted with hardware that does not corrode in the maritime environment
and is therefore better able to cope with the rigours of this
environment. Expensive modifications will have to be made to prepare
GR7/9 for these maritime conditions.
4. Q. Is the air-defence capability of
the GR7 as good as that of the FA2?
A. No. The GR7 is optimised for offensive support
operations, although it has a limited air defence capability using
Sidewinder Air to Air missiles.
Comment: The real answer is that the GR7 has
a limited self defence capability even when fitted with Sidewinder
missiles. Without an air-to-air radar, the GR7 has little
fleet air defence capability and with its short range air-to-air
missile system ASRAAM compared to the FA2s AMRAAM, it is very
vulnerable to any modern air-to-air fighter.
5. Q. Is the air-defence capability of
the GR9 as good as that of the FA2?
A. No. The GR9 will be optimised for offensive
support operations and be capable of employing the latest smart
weapons such as the Brimstone anti-armour weapon. (why was
it then fitted to the Tornado GR4 and not the Harrier GR9?)
It will be a more capable platform in the offensive role than
the GR7. Like the GR7 it will be able to utilise Sidewinder Air
to Air missiles.
Comment: See comment to answer 4, above.
6. Q. What are the operational advantages
of the GR9 over the GR7?
A. In essence, the capability to employ the latest
generation of smart weapons such as Brimstone. There are other
advantages too, but these are classified. Why then was not
Brimstone fitted to the Harrier GR9?
7. Q. At what range did the FA2 operate
to provide air defence to the Fleet?
A. Not prepared to comment on specific operational
detail, but in some climates its operational performance is constrained.
Comment: Combat Air Patrol stations are typically
held at ranges of 100 nm or more from the centre of a task force
over land or sea. Although operational performance is constrained
in the hottest environments, it can still provide a carrier based
effective outer layer of air defence (or police "no fly"
zones) up to ambient temperatures of about 34ºC. When operating
from a Forward Operating Base in support of beach head operations
it is unconstrained.
TIMESCALE
1. Q. What is the timescale for the migration?
A. By 1 April 2007, JFH will operate an all Harrier
GR9 fleet.
2. Q. When will the first FA2 squadron
disband?
A. During the first half of 2004 so that personnel
can begin their conversion to the Harrier GR.
3. Q. When will the last FA2 squadron
disband?
A. During 2006, at about the same time as the
last part of the Sea Harrier Force is withdrawn from service.
4. Q. Why are you taking the FA2 out of
service before the Type 45 comes into service?
A. The FA2 is not the only system that
contributes to the overall defence of the fleet. This is especially
true for coalition operations and operations in the littoral.
In addition the aircraft lacks performance in certain areas and
this can constrain operations. The aircraft's systems would also
require significant investment for it to remain credible in the
air defence role beyond 2006. Overall, the cost of keeping the
Sea Harrier in service from this date until the entry to service
of the Type 45 is judged to represent poor value for the taxpayer.
We assess the risk is manageable considering other air defence
capabilities available in the intervening period.
Comment: This is more of the same misleading
information. The FA2 aircraft systems actually required no significant
investment for it to remain credible in the air defence role beyond
2006. Some limited investment would have provided valuable operational
advantages; such as the fitting of the JTIDS system.
What other air defence capabilities are available
in the intervening period? None beyond "last ditch"
Point Defence systems and certainly not the Type 45 even if they
became available in adequate numbers.
TYPE
45
1. Q. Will the
arrival of the Type 45 and PAAMS provide an air defence capability
for the Fleet that meets that provided by the FA2?
A. It's a different and superior capability in
the context of today's operational requirements. It will be better
suited to the protection of maritime assets operating close to
shore.
Comment: It is neither superior nor capable
against long range air threat targets, below the radar horizon
threats or against threat aircraft with modern stand-off missiles.
When operating close to shore, the FA2 is invaluable with its
positioning flexibility and its Blue Vixen/AMRAAM look-down/shoot-down
capability. It can deter a threat from attack or engage attack
aircraft well before fleet radars can detect their presence and
before they are in a position to threaten the fleet or ground
forces.
2. Q. What is the plan for the introduction
to service of the Type 45?
A. The first of class will enter service in 2007,
with 3 in service by 2010.
Comment: This is far too late to "fill
the gap".
3. Q. What is the range of PAAMS?
A. Not prepared to comment on operational detail.
But it represents a quantum leap in capability over its successor,
Sea Dart, and thus offsets the loss of the FA2 outer layer.
Comment: Although still unproven, it may well
be much superior to Sea Dart but it is still limited by radar
horizon and by the Type 45's relative immobility. Without the
outer layer of fighters, it may easily be saturated by a multi
threat attack from different directions.
FJCA
1. Q. When will the first FJCA enter service?
A. 2012.
2. Q. When is the first FJCA squadron
expected to be operational?
A. The timing has not yet been set in concrete.
A lot will depend on which aircraft is eventually chosen. Current
planning assumes that FJCA will be capable of operational tasking
shortly after entering service.
3. Q. Has the MoD chosen the FJCA?
A. No. The MoD has identified that the Joint
Strike Fighter offers the potential to meet the FJCA requirement.
4. Q. Do you have a fall-back position
if JSF does not go forward—could this mean a delay?
A. It is highly unlikely that the JSF programme
will not produce at least one variant that would meet the UK's
requirement. Nevertheless, there are fall-back options available
to meet our required timescales.
Comment: What are these so-called fall-back
options? If the Naval and Air Staff have done their planning job
efficiently, these options (if any) should now be available and
should be made public. The F-18 Super Hornet is an obvious prime
contender.
5. Q. How will Joint Force Harrier be
structured once the FA2 has been withdrawn from service?
A. We are planning four front line squadrons
and an Operational Conversion Unit. Two of the squadrons will
be manned predominantly by RAF personnel. In the other two squadrons
the manning balance will be reversed with RN personnel in the
majority. The Operational Conversion Unit will be manned 50/50
RAF/RN.
PERSONNEL
1. Q. Is this just one step on the road
to "disbanding" the Fleet air Arm? If this did not appear
a probable part of the plan, then why ask the question?
A. There is no hidden agenda to "march off"
the Fleet Air Arm. SDR envisaged that there would be a joint RN/RAF
shareholding in both JFH and FJCA and this has been agreed by
the service chiefs. Moreover, Joint RN/RAF carrier-based deployments
are now very much the norm, as was seen recently in Sierra Leone.
Comment: But the RAF Harriers did not/would
not fly missions over the land in Sierra Leone—they were
afraid of not getting back to the ship. The RAF Harriers rarely
embark and then only for a few weeks at most. This can hardly
be called a "norm".
2. Q. With the
demise of the FA2 Squadrons, Will the RAF be responsible for carrier-borne
aviation?
A. No, the GR7/9 will be manned and maintained
by both the RN and RAF and both services will take an equitable
share of the land based and sea based operational and training
commitment.
3. Q. What are the pilot requirements
for the RN/RAF after migration has taken place?
A. For the RN, there will be little change to
the current requirement for fixed wing pilots. For the RAF, there
will be a small reduction but given the relative size of the RAF
the impact will be positive but small.
4. Q. What will
be the net increase/decrease of military/civilian personnel at
RNAS Yeovilton and Wittering/Cottesmore?
A. Approximately 565 RN personnel will relocate,
principally from RNAS Yeovilton to RAF Cottesmore/Wittering over
the period 2004-06, between one and three years later than original
planned.
Through a combination of substitution of RN and RAF
personnel and withdrawal of Sea Harriers from service some 380
RAF Air Engineers, 105 RAF support posts and 32 RAF aircrew posts
will be disestablished with individuals released for redeployment
elsewhere.
Of the 235 civilian posts currently at RNAS Yeovilton,
some 20 non-mobile civilian posts will be extended beyond 2003
to be disestablished over the period 2005-06. These posts will
not now be transferred to RAF Cottesmore/Wittering. The remaining
civilian posts at RNAS Yeovilton will be unaffected.
In addition, 26 new civilian posts that were to have
been created at RAF Cottesmore/Wittering, currently unfilled,
will now no longer be required.
5. Q. Will there be any redundancies amongst
civilian personnel?
A. It is difficult at this stage to predict whether
any redundancies will be necessary. However, in the event that
some personnel were to be made redundant, every effort would be
made to find alternative employment and careful and sympathetic
consideration would be given to each individual's preference.
In these circumstances staff made redundant would be compensated
under the terms of the appropriate regulations. In addition, the
MoD Outplacement Service (MODOPS) would be available to help those
made redundant to identify new opportunities.
6. Q. Will there be any redundancies amongst
military personnel?
A. No. There will be no redundancies amongst
Military Personnel. Displaced RAF personnel will be re-employed
elsewhere within their specialist areas. Such postings are routine.
Comment: There may well be massive RN Fleet
Air Arm voluntary redundancies. And if the surface Navy realises
that it is going to remain relatively defenceless against air
attack, ship's company personnel may also leave the service in
droves. No one wants to fight if one's masters do not provide
the means for adequate defence and survival.
7. Q. Is this decision based at all on
the shortage of aircrew?
A. No. This is driven by operational imperatives
and the need for the UK to focus on expeditionary offensive capability.
Comment: The greatest operational imperative
is to deter the enemy from proceeding with his malign intentions.
To do that requires a sensible balance between offensive systems
(GR9/JSF and FA2/JSF) and defensive systems (FA2/JSF only).
SDSR—DOES IT
SET OUT
THE WAYS
AND MEANS
TO DELIVER
THE ENDS
REQUIRED BY
THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
Introduction to the submitter:
1. Professor Martin Edmonds is Honorary Professorial
Fellow and Reader Emeritus of the University of Lancaster. In
a career in defence and international security studies lasting
over 47 years he has held appointments at: Manchester University;
Lancaster University; Columbia University in the City of New York;
the University of Southern California; the University of Maryland;
and the University of Toulouse. He is also the Founder (and still)
Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security
Studies (CDISS), and also (Founding) Editor-in-Chief of the international
journal, Defense and Security Analysis. In 2005, he was appointed
Academic Advisor on research to the UK Defence Academy and is
Convenor of the Carrier Conclave Group. Relevant publications
include: Future NATO Security; 100 Years of the Trade (RN Submarines);
Future Conditional: War and Conflict after Next; Defence Diplomacy
and Preventive Diplomacy: the Role of Maritime Forces; Maritime
Manoeuvre: Expeditionary Warfare, "Jointery" and the
Role of the Carrier; Maritime Forces in Peace and War: Joint and
Combined Operations; British Naval Aviation in the 21st Century;
ASW in Coastal Waters; The Future of Naval Aviation: Views from
the USA.
INTRODUCTION
2. It is over 12 years since the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR). In the intervening years the world has changed
considerably, as has the United Kingdom. Much of what has happened
since then had not been anticipated: "globalisation";
"cyber-warfare"; terrorism; counter-insurgency; piracy;
humanitarian intervention; environmental hazards; illegal immigration;
and, today, overseas military occupation and political development.
Such has been the rate of change that from a defence and security
perspective serious shortcomings in Britain's defence capability
and the equipment available to the Armed Forces have been (sometimes
embarrassingly) exposed. Irrespective of the current economic
and political circumstances, a thorough and comprehensive reassessment
of Britain's role in the world and her defence and security requirements
was not just desirable, but a necessity.
DISCUSSION
3. The SDR took almost 15 months to prepare,
The SDSR did not have that luxury, given the Coalition Government's
urgent need to address the country's severe economic and financial
difficulties and its policy radically to reduce overall public
expenditure. No item of public expenditure was exempt, defence
included, with the exception of the health, education and international
development budgets. The challenge facing the government's National
Security Council (NSC) should not be underestimated. At best,
the NSC can only first identify and, then, project world economic,
political and cultural trends and correlate these with Britain's
future capacity to provide for the security and wellbeing of her
people. The SDR did not get it this wholly right; the question
now is whether the SDSR has done any better. Regrettably, informed
opinion is that it has not.
4. One effective way to look for a solution on
any problem (not just defence) is to go back to basic principles.
Vis a vis the SDSR, two basic approaches lend themselves: one
is to assess what one has now and then adapt and build from that
foundation; the other is to identify where one wants to be in
so many years time—say 25 years from now—with what,
how and where—this can be called the "bottom up"
approach. Once that is done, take measured decisions that are
most likely to get the optimal outcome. Both approaches are beset
with immense problems, but they help clarify the issues. To provide
guidance when addressing these problems, the Government commissioned
a National Security Strategy (NSS) that, in theory at least, define
the underlying principles and parameters of Britain's future defence
and security policies—the "top down" approach.
5. Given these first two approaches and the role
of the NSS, emphasis on the former is better in the short term;
in the long term the latter is preferable. Does Britain want defence
and security problems addressed now, or in the future? The outcome
of the SDSR inevitably had to be a compromise of both: the former,
because that is what had to be done—there was no escape—and
the latter, is what needed to be done, if Britain can be defended
and secure against clearly identified threats in, say, 25 years
time. Both approaches need the over-arching "top down"
NSS principles and parameters
6. It was inevitable that the outcome of the
SDSR would likely be an amalgam of capabilities necessary to prosecute
Britain's current commitments throughout the world—Afghanistan,
especially—and of those thought desirable to meet future
potential threats on or around 2030. At issue was how to arrive
at a balance between the two within the Treasury's requirement
to cut defence spending by up to 18% and reduce the "black
hole" of £38 billion committed on future equipment.
Compounding the problem was, apparently, the lack of knowledge
in depth of defence and military issues of both the members of
the Prime Minister's NSC team and the team of Cabinet Senior Civil
Servants who were charged with "pushing through some of the
most controversial cuts". To help their deliberations, an
advisory group of some 20 experts was appointed, though apparently
their recommendations were ignored.
7. There may, however, have been sound reasons
to isolate the Armed Services and the Ministry of Defence from
the NSC's deliberations, not least to avoid Service partisan interests
and inter-Service rivalry further complicating matters, though
this seems now to have been less than successful. Ultimate responsibility
had, therefore, to be held "where the buck stops"—within
the Cabinet, or more specifically the NSC. Ultimately, it rests
with the Prime Minister himself as would appear in the case of
the SDSR. Despite the loud and trenchant criticisms from a wide
variety of sources and not just the military, the PM has since
insisted that the SDSR represents a "good deal" for
the Armed Services and currently appears reluctant to be persuaded
otherwise.
8. The issue, before it is too late, is to ask
whether he is right to stick to his guns or should he now listen
to criticisms from those who, allegedly, were either ignored or
were by-passed during the relatively rushed deliberations leading
up to the SDSR. The response should be to be to look at what the
Government itself has said, particularly in respect of the thrust
of the NSS and the content of the SDSR that was announced two
days later. The NSS, titled "A Strong Britain in an Age of
Uncertainty", stipulated the following main objectives:
— To
ensure British forces in Afghanistan were to have the equipment
they need;
— To
begin to bring the defence programme back into balance; and
— To
enable Britain to retain the best and most versatile Armed Forces
in the world and better equipped to protect British security in
an uncertain world.
In making a number of further statements of relevance
to the SDSR, the NSS concluded:
— There
is no major state threat to Britain;
— Britain
is to play a major role in shaping international institutions
and alliances, such as NATO and the EU; and
— Britain
should, on the strength of its National Security Risk Assessment
(NRSA), prepare capabilities to address threats to the UK, in
order of magnitude and likelihood:
— Tier
1 (Terrorism; Cyber attack; International Military Crises; Major
Accidents);
— Tier
2 (Attacks on British Overseas Territories; Major overseas instability
and civil wars; Organised crime; and Satellite communication interference);
and
— Tier
3 (Conventional attack on the UK; Increases in illegal immigrants,
organised criminals and terrorists into the UK; Attacks on UK
overseas territories; Release of radioactive materials; and Attacks
on NATO or EU allies).
9. Derived from the content of the NSS, the main
driving force behind the SDSR was clearly Britain's' involvement
in Afghanistan—at least until her ultimate withdrawal on
or around 2015. This is what was meant, above, by the Review addressing
current commitments—there are, of course, many more commitments
than just Afghanistan—before planning for future threats
and defining Britain's interests and place in the world. No one
has disputed that Afghanistan needs to be addressed, first. The
subsequent arguments have been over where defence cuts should
fall, what capabilities should be retained, and which should be
developed to meet future threats. The sensitive issue is how much
current commitments affect future plans and policies within a
constrained annual budget.
10. The SDSR makes it clear that the flexibility
of the Armed Forces and the maintenance of a broad spectrum of
capabilities are highly important, as are geographical reach and
the ability to engage in high intensity operations, as and when
needed. It declared that, "we will maintain our ability to
act alone where we cannot expect others to help". More specifically,
the SDSR asserts that the Armed Forces will be "balanced,
flexible, and adaptable", rigorously prioritised and pragmatic,
and based on needs and expeditionary in character. It does not,
however, include any explicit statement about the broad strategy
to be followed. If the SDSR means what it says, only a maritime
strategy is flexible and adaptable enough to enable Britain to
engage in expeditionary operations. But it has been Britain's
maritime and amphibious capabilities and the Royal Navy, in particular,
that the SDSR policies and budgetary cuts have affected the most.
11. In other words, there is a serious mismatch
between the content of the NSS and that of the SDSR. The decisions
that have followed from it not only have rendered the strategic
assumptions of the NSS unworkable, but have also seriously damaged
the structures and capabilities of all three branches (four, with
the Royal Marines) of the Armed Services, potentially irrevocably.
Among the more incomprehensible decisions—though allegedly
as a result of last minute behind-the-scenes representation to
the PM by two senior RAF personnel—was the scrapping of
the GR9 Harrier jump-jet and the retention of the ageing, costly
and operationally unreliable Tornado. Aside from leaving Britain's
future carriers with no aircraft for upwards of 10 years, it failed
to recognise that operationally and financially—by some
considerable margin—the Tornado was a worse alternative.
The cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 "spy plane" reconnaissance
aircraft was another that would leave a long-term capability gap
and, again, runs contrary to stated NSS priorities.
12. Without going into specific details, the
Royal Navy has had its amphibious capability seriously curtailed;
it has no sea-borne air capability until 2020; it can only maintain
2.3 attack submarines in operational areas at one time; and the
loss at a stroke of 20% of the destroyer and frigate force is
little short of catastrophic in the face of six current operational
commitments and the requirement for other national tasking in
the form of national and international exercises, task group training
and operations, and ship visits in support of foreign and trade
policy. Further, the expedient of sharing aircraft carriers with
the French reveals a level of ignorance—or naivety—on
the part of the Government that has left Navy personnel with years
of carrier operational experience almost at a loss for words.
However, the most serious concern of all is that the Royal Navy
as a whole has been reduced to such an extent that organisationally,
it has fallen below its "critical mass" and to such
a degree that it would be unable to respond to those very Tier
1 and 2 threats identified in the NSS.
13. The Army has come off relatively lightly,
reflecting the current emphasis on Britain's counter-insurgency
role in Afghanistan. However, the future imbalance in the structure
of the Army has not been properly addressed. That up to 37% of
the Army's strength will not be in permanent, formed, supported,
deployable combat formations is not merely a source of concern,
but more especially a significant waste of money. Given the limitations
of the resultant multi-role brigades, the focus on land operations
is not so much a balanced capability able to work across the spectrum
of military operations, but more one that is configured for enduring
land counter-insurgency operations. It is these that are scheduled
to end in four years time.
14. The Royal Air Force has, arguably, emerged
the least affected, even though it contributes least to the objectives
defined in the NSS document or towards the claims for flexibility
and an intervention capability in the SDSR. Only a reduction in
Tornado squadrons, the withdrawal of the GR4 Harrier and the cancellation
of the MRA4 are the major casualties. The Typhoon jet programme
will go ahead, the RAF will eventually also get the F-35C carrier
jet aircraft, additional helicopters and the A400M transport aircraft.
But the devil is in the detail: for example, the proposed new
transport aircraft does not have the capacity to accommodate the
Army's new equipment and the Apache battlefield helicopter, has
not been acquired. The RAF has since been reported as being the
Service responsible for Britain's future Cyber-warfare capability,
though this has been contradicted by a senior Foreign Office official.
15. All in all, the SDSR is significant as much
for what it has proposed—which does not entirely marry with
the National Security Strategy statement—as for what it
has left out. There is not any mention of Reserve Forces; nor
is there anything on Defence procurement. There is no reference,
either, to any degree of harmonisation between the three Services
(ie work load and output). Likewise, there is little on wider
security issues and the Armed Forces' role in fighting international
crime, protecting Britain's sea lanes of communication, cyber
warfare, piracy, humanitarian aid, defence diplomacy, etc.
CONCLUSION
16. The three Services may have to come to terms
with what has been decided, though very few with professional
military experience are convinced that what they are left with
makes coherent military or operational sense, either to them separately
or collectively. The SDSR's claim is that the flexibility of the
Armed Forces and the maintenance of a broad spectrum of capabilities
are highly important, as are geographical reach and the ability
to engage in high intensity operations, as and when needed, even
to the extent that, "We will maintain our ability to act
alone where we cannot expect others to help". At present,
none of these aspirations is likely to be met. There is plainly
a need "to think again", most critically, in order to
achieve some better coherence between the NSS's assumptions and
the content of the SDSR.
A "NAVALISED"
TYPHOON—IS
THIS A
PRACTICAL AND
FEASIBLE PROPOSITION?
Executive Summary
1. This paper fits within the Defence Select
Committee remit to examine whether a funding gap still remains,
how significant is it and how will it impact on defence capability.
In particular it seeks to brief the Committee on a mooted project
that carries a significant risk of increasing the funding gap.
— (a) It
is concerned with the proposition being put forward by British
Aerospace Systems for development funding to be put into the modification
of the Typhoon aircraft (Eurofighter) into a multi-role aircraft
with an ability to operate from aircraft carriers.
— (b) It
draws on extensive naval air warfare expertise, direct experience
of carrier deck landing and take-off expertise (both conventional
and VSTOL) and Naval Air Engineering expertise gained from involvement
with the Sea Harrier and two USN aircraft projects (T-45 Goshawk
and F-35).
Introduction to the submitters
2. The staff work for this Submission has been
conducted by:
— (c) Commander
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC. A fully qualified expert in Air
Warfare and aircraft carrier operations with experience varying
from Command in combat, Nuclear Intelligence within NATO to the
Navigator and Gunnery Officer of a small ship.
— (d) Mr
Steve George. A Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, a highly
experienced former Fleet Air Arm Air Engineer Officer with direct
experience of Sea Harrier design and operations, and also industrial
experience, having worked with BAE SYSTEMS on two YUS navy aircraft
projects, the T-45 Goshawk and latterly the Joint Strike Fighter
programme.
Introduction
3. A proposal that the Typhoon can be modified
to enable it to operate from aircraft carriers as a full "swing
role" fighter aircraft has been made by British Aerospace.
4. British Aerospace Systems and its European
partners are informing the British and the French Governments
and their prime prospective overseas customer (India) that this
major modification to the aircraft is feasible and worth substantial
government support and funding. See ANNEX A for the press release
on this issue. Extracts from a further media outlet are provided
at Annex B.
5. This paper will discuss the feasibility of
the proposal.
6. It will then go on to raise pertinent questions
concerning the BAE proposal relevant to:
— (a) the
funding gap already facing the defence budget; and
— (b) the
resultant likely capability of the aircraft.
Background
7. Previous MoD-funded studies have already
shown that it would be impractical, and non-cost-effective for
the Typhoon aircraft to be made fully carrier capable. It appears
that British Aerospace Systems is disregarding these studies and
has launched a further initiative to persuade politicians, senior
MoD officials and offshore customers that a Navalised Typhoon
is feasible.
8. BAe uses computer simulations to validate
their proposals. There have been major problems in the past with
such work. For example, in the mid-90s, British Aerospace Warton
privately developed a carrier deck simulator to and from which
it could fly a simulated Typhoon (an aircraft not then in production).
They invited Peter Levine, the then head of the Defence Procurement
Agency, to try out the simulator and to show him how easy it was
for the Typhoon to be operated from a carrier. Mr Levine sat in
the cockpit and tried it himself. He was very impressed as to
how easy it was to land on and take-off from an aircraft carrier.
What he didn't know was that the programming of the simulator
bore very little relation to reality. But he presumably went away
convinced that flying from aircraft carriers was simple, easy,
learnable in a single day and that Typhoon was readily operable
from carriers.
9. The personal experience of one of the authors
of this paper of British Aerospace Warton simulation is also relevant.
In 1980, they created an air combat simulator for the training
of frontline pilots and asked two experienced fighter pilots from
the Fleet Air Arm to test out the simulator. They were pre-briefed
that it was "impossible to beat the aircraft in their simulation".
Each pilot flew 12 combat sorties against the "unbeatable"
simulated fighter aircraft and both claimed 12 "kills"
in quick time against it. They concluded that the simulation's
failure had to be blamed on the lack of front line combat expertise
in the BAe design team.
10. It can be deduced from this latter experience
that the carrier deck simulator flown by Mr Levine had been programmed
by company staff with no experience of operating from carriers.
This ill designed simulation made carrier deck landing look easy,
which it is not, and Mr Levine was seriously mislead: on all counts.
DISCUSSION
OF REPORTED
STATEMENTS BY
BRITISH AEROSPACE
SYSTEMS
Annex A, paragraph 2
11. "Eurofighter is here touting the potential
of a navalised development which has already been studied in detail
in the UK".
Comment
12. They naturally would not wish to disclose
that the formal MoD sponsored studies conducted in the UK came
to the conclusion that a viable navalised version of the Typhoon
was not a practical proposition.
Annex A, paragraph 4 and
5
13. "The European type [Typhoon] would receive
several new features to support its proposed life at sea. These
include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook
and thrust vectoring control nozzles for its two Euro jet EJ200
turbofan engines. The latter would enable the fighter to approach
the vessel at a reduced speed without restricting pilot vision
by requiring an increased angle of attack." "Eurofighter
says only localised strengthening would be required on some fuselage
sections near the landing gear and to the EJ 200."
Comment
14(a) This proposal appears to be for operating
Typhoon in a mode similar to the Russian "STOBAR" arrangement,
where a land based fighter/bomber with a high thrust to weight
ratio is launched from a ramp (ski-jump) and recovered at an acceptably
low speed using a combination of advanced flight controls systems
and vectored thrust. Such a proposal carries significant technical
risks, associated with launch, recovery and aircraft design:
— (i) Launch
Capability
— The
basic requirement for a naval aircraft is to be able to launch
from the flight deck under all sea and wind conditions with an
operationally effective payload. STOBAR aircraft face severe challenges
in achieving this, which are less severe for both CATOBAR (CATapult
Operations and Barrier Arrested—as per the US Navy) and
STOVL operations. These are set out below.
— During
any aircraft launch, ramp end speed is crucial
(for STOBAR and STOVL, the speed at which the aircraft leaves
the deck-fitted ski jump). A CATOBAR aircraft (eg F/A-18) relies
on the power of the steam catapult to achieve the required speed
to generate wing lift. A STOVL aircraft (Harrier or F-35B) leaves
the end of the ski jump at a speed below which wing borne flight
is possible, but uses vectored engine thrust through its centre
of gravity to support the aircraft while it accelerates to wing
borne flight speed. Unfortunately, the Typhoon doesn't have a
"powered lift" mode of the flight—that is lift
provided by downward facing nozzles -that can replace wing lift below
normal flying speed. Nor, critically, does it have reaction controls
(thrust nozzles fed by engine air) to control aircraft attitude
below normal flying speed. These factors mean that:
— It
can only sustain flight after launch by wing lift and whatever
component of thrust can be generated by a very high angle of flight.
This, in turn, generates drag, which means that the aircraft spends
longer in the most dangerous phase of flight—immediately
after deck launch, and
— It
runs a severe risk of severely degraded handling qualities as
it leaves the deck before full flying speed is reached.
— Without
a catapult (and BAE acknowledge that the Typhoon cannot use such
a device) the aircraft can only achieve higher end speeds by ever
longer take off runs, which are in turn limited by nose leg loads
on the ramp, or by reducing launch weight—payload. (Looking
at the Russian aircraft operations, it is noticeable that they
can only carry light weapon loads.)
— (ii) It
should be noted that during the previous UK MoD funded studies,
BAE proposed the addition of a reaction control system to Typhoon.
Such a modification would involve channelling high-pressure, high-temperature
air from both of the engines to the four extremities of the aeroplane,
installing the necessary control nozzles, and linking this system
to the pilot's control column and the flight control computer
system. This would add significant weight and cost to the aeroplane.
Critically, such a system would also rob the engines of power
at precisely the stage of flight when maximum thrust would be
required for safe operation.
— (iii) If
conventional aircraft such as the Typhoon could launch with their
normal payload in under 800 feet, ski jumps would be fitted to
all expeditionary air bases where take-off weight is constrained
by altitude and/or temperature. The reason ramps are not used
in this way is because such aircraft cannot benefit from the use
of ramps without very considerable modification.
— (iv) Landing
— (v) The
basic requirement is to be able to land safely and rapidly on
the ship, carrying a basic minimum fuel load and also unused weapons,
under all conditions, day and night. For a CATOBAR aircraft, this
means that the aircraft has to fly controllably on the prescribed
approach/glide path to the flight deck at a precise, not-to-exceed
speed into the arrestor wire—the arrestor wires have a limiting
load beyond which they will break. This is an extremely challenging
requirement and drives the design of CATOBAR aircraft. The standard
USN approach speed is around 130 to 135 knots, which delivers
stable approaches and minimum "trap intervals" (essential
when numbers of aircraft are being recovered) at a speed that
the arresting cables and engines can cope with. This speed delivers
precision approaches, so that the ship needs only three cables
for reliable "traps". It also allows the aircraft to
cope with the "burble", which is the area of turbulent
air immediately behind the ship, through which the aircraft must
fly. Finally, this approach allows the aircraft, should it fail
to engage the wire, or suffer a wire or hook failure, to accelerate
immediately and take off again (this is called a bolter) within
one second of touching the deck. The T-45 Goshawk, a very small
and basic jet trainer, required massive redesign of the entire
wing and tail to achieve adequate CATOBAR landings. (BAE are fully
aware of these lessons).
— Incidentally,
a STOVL aircraft gets around all these issues by applying the
"stop, then land" method, but at the cost of carrying
the penalty of a powered lift system.
— Typhoon
is not designed to fly safely in the landing configuration at
these speeds at normal landing weights and so the BAE suggestion
was that with very advanced flight controls (and possibly vectored
thrust?):
— 1. The
aircraft could be "over pitched" and
— 2. Flared
in such a way by the pilot as to arrive at the deck at a low descent
rate and lower speeds—essentially, a dynamically manoeuvred
landing.
— (vi) This
concept would rely on split-second timing, rapid aircraft manoeuvres
in the final seconds of the approach as well as an ability to
predict deck motion. It was also unclear how such an approach
would deliver precision touchdown points, or how it could be converted
into a bolter. In all, such a completely unproven method must
be considered extremely risky. The only effective way to reduce
some (not all) of the risks would be to reduce landing weight—critically
affecting the ability to "bring back" weapons.
— Furthermore,
in spite of the proposed changes, the Typhoon pilot's view of
the landing sight and deck during the extensive simulator tests
carried out continued to be minimal (or in some cases nil, due
to the location of the aircraft's fore-planes). This must be considered
completely unacceptable if pilot's lives are not to be risked
unnecessarily. (It should be noted that despite an extremely tight
budget, and a simpler method of landing, the redesign of the RAF
Harrier into the Sea Harrier included an elevated cockpit to solve
pilot view issues).
— It
must be concluded that attempting to adopt the completely new
and untried technique being proposed by BAE would carry extremely
high technical and safety risks that could only be mitigated by
an expensive programme of development and trials. See Annex C
for a more detailed explanation of some of the issues involved.
— (vii) As
an indication of how critical the landing issues were found to
be, the previous studies included a proposal for the ship to be
fitted with special RB211 gas turbines to produce an "updraft
blast" of air in the landing area and thereby assist the
aircraft to land. Again , this is a completely untried concept-normally,
carriers do all they can to keep gas turbine exhaust away from
aircraft during landing, to avoid loss of thrust due to hot gas
ingestion.
— (viii) Structure
— (ix) The
BAE assertion that "localised strengthening" would be
required to operate the Typhoon from an aircraft carrier would
be challenged by any aircraft designer with experience of naval
aircraft, and must be viewed as an unfortunately optimistic mis-statement
of the facts.
— Putting
an aircraft on to a flight deck at around 135 knots and stopping
it in a few hundred feet means taking a great deal of kinetic
energy out of the aircraft in a short time through the landing
gear and the arresting hook. The resulting loads are measured
in tens of tons and have to be transmitted through the airframe
to get to the wheels and the hook. This takes metal, and lots
of it. (The T-45 Goshawk required around a ton and a half of extra
reinforcement to make it carrier-capable. The F-35C CATOBAR variant
of the JSF is the least common of the three variants, with extensive
redesign of the structure throughout the entire airframe).
— Moreover,
the arresting hook system has to be radically different in design
and operation from a land based emergency system (Typhoon's arresting
hook will most probably be designed to be thrown away after a
single "trap").
— Launch
loads for a STOBAR design are not as bad as for a catapult launch,
but the loads on the nose leg are still non-trivial.
— The
main challenge for Typhoon is that the basic airframe has been
very aggressively pared down to minimum weight. The aircraft suffered
a major weight escalation during design, and every part of the
airframe was examined again and again for chances to reduce weight
(as an example, every nut and screw was pared down to the minimum
length and size to save weight—as a result, a single access
panel on the fuselage has over twenty different length screws
used). The structural modifications required for any effective
carrier operations would, without doubt, require a major airframe
redesign. An excellent example is the BAE proposal for a redesigned
landing gear. The existing design was carefully chosen for lowest
weight, least impact on fuel volume, and least interference with
under wing stores. The new design would increase all these penalties,
and it is not surprising that BAE proposing the addition of conformal
tanks that supposedly have no drag penalty. (If they do not provide
lift, they will certainly provide extra weight and drag—giving
less range/fewer weapons/lower combat speed.) The landing gear
is in the very core of the airframe, and such a new gear would
inevitably lead to a new centre fuselage at least.
— (x) Finally,
during the previous UK studies, BAE proposed that the landing
area of the ship's deck should be "sprung to reduce gear
loads". This quite impractical scheme was an indicator of
how tight the airframe loading issues were for any navalised Typhoon,
and how little appreciation the Warton team had for maritime aircraft
operations. In summary, Typhoon represents
a poor starting point for a naval aircraft, and structural modification
for naval operations would present massive technical risk which
would inevitably carry a major price tag. It strains credulity,
and is most unfortunate, that BAE are claiming that this is not
the case.
Annex B, paragraph 3
15. "According to Paul Hopkins, Vice President
Business Development (Air) at BAE Systems, simulation tests of
a "navalised Typhoon" show the aircraft can take off
and land with full mission payload, including two "Storm
Shadow" cruise missiles, four BVR missiles, two short range
missiles."
Comment
16(a) Simulation
It would appear that Paul Hopkins' enthusiasm for
a "navalised Typhoon" operational capability from carriers
is based upon BAE simulations that do not take into account the
realities of flying from the deck at sea (see comments at 14,
above).
16(b) Mission Payload
The feasibility and practicability of the Typhoon
returning to the deck and landing with this full mission payload
(as well as the extra weight incurred by a major airframe modification
and strengthening and the addition of conformal fuel tanks) again
calls into question the validity of the internal BAE mission simulation.
The F-35C, which is a dedicated naval aircraft design, and much
larger then a Typhoon, would not be able to recover to the deck
with such a payload. See Annex C.
Is a "Navalised Typhoon"
a good investment for Britain?
17. The questions that need to be asked are:
— (a) Is
it sensible to lay out large amounts of scarce Defence funds on
a project that proposes the adoption of radically new, untried
and inherently risky concepts that have been developed by a team
with the barest expertise in the field of naval aircraft design
and actual carrier operations?
— (b) Should
the British taxpayer be asked to fund projects which have not
been researched adequately, have limited chances of success and
which rest on assumptions that contradict basic physics?
— (c) Why
should the Government put any development money into a navalised
Typhoon project when alternative proven solutions for the Queen
Elizabeth class carrier air group are readily available at less
than a quarter of the cost of the Typhoon (eg the F-18 Super Hornet)?
Annex
A
AERO INDIA: EUROFIGHTER REVEALS OFFER TO
PRODUCE NAVALISED TYPHOON[183]
1. The Eurofighter consortium is offering India
the opportunity to acquire a new version of its Typhoon for use
from a future indigenous aircraft carrier, with the first firm
details of the proposal having emerged at the show.
2. One of six contenders battling for the Indian
air force's 126-aircraft medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA)
deal, Eurofighter is here touting the potential of a navalised
development which has already been studied in detail in the UK.
3. "If Typhoon wins MMRCA then India will
have the indigenous skills to develop a navalised version,"
says Paul Hopkins, BAE Systems' vice-president business development
(air) India. "This is a perfect opportunity for the nation
to add aircraft with both land and sea capabilities."
4. Being shown in model form for the first time
this week, the European type would receive several new features
to support its proposed life at sea. These include a new, stronger
landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and thrust-vectoring control
nozzles for its two Eurojet EJ200 turbofan engines. The latter
would enable the fighter to approach the vessel at a reduced speed
without restricting pilot vision by requiring an increased angle
of attack.
5. Eurofighter says only localised strengthening
would be required on some fuselage sections near the landing gear,
and to the EJ200. Conformal fuel tanks could also be integrated
with the airframe to extend the strike aircraft's range.
6. Video footage being shown in the Eurofighter
and BAE exhibit areas includes recent simulation-based imagery
of tests made using adapted flight control software and new engine
modelling. Sporting Indian navy markings, the navalised Typhoon
is depicted taking off from a deck space similar to that aboard
the ex-Russian navy aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which is
now being modified for Indian use.
7. Also of interest for Indian applications is
a new weapons option being displayed for the first time with a
full-scale model of the Typhoon. Working in conjunction with Saab
and Diehl, Eurofighter is offering the RBS15 anti-ship missile
as a future payload for the multi-role fighter.
8. The company is also showcasing technologies
including an active electronically scanned array radar offered
for the Typhoon, and providing demonstrations with a BAE-developed
smart helmet display system for the type.
Annex
B
EXTRACTS FROM DEFENSE UPDATE'S RELEASE[184]
1. While the competition between six international
aircraft manufacturers moves on, some of the competitors are already
looking a step further, positioning their respective platforms
addressing possible interest from the Indian Navy. The Super Hornet
F/A-18E/F from Boeing and French Rafale from Dassault are already
operational on board U.S. and French carriers, while the MiG-35
could be matched with the MiG-29K model the Indian Navy already
operates. That leaves the Lockheed Martin F-16IN, Saab Gripen
and Eurofighter Typhoon in a disadvantage.
2. Well… Things may change quite soon, according
to BAE Systems. The company has anticipated this, highlighting
at its display a navalised version of the Typhoon, utilizing few
of the Tranche 3 features, such as thrust vector nozzles, conformal
fuel tanks, and spoilers at the leading edge wing roots, designed
to minimize landing speed. Unlike the Super Hornet and Rafale
using catapult launch which requires significant strengthening
of the landing gear and airframe, Typhoon is considered for "ski-jump"
equipped carriers only (like QE2 and India's future indigenous
carriers).
3. According to Paul Hopkins, Vice President
Business Development (Air) at BAE Systems, simulation tests of
a "navalised Typhoon" show the aircraft can take off
and land with full mission payload, including two "Storm
Shadow" cruise missiles, four BVR missiles, two short range
missiles, a centerline fuel tank and two conformal fuel tanks
- something no other navalised aircraft can perform. A navalised
Typhoon will be new built aircraft, fitted with strengthened airframe
and landing gear. The British decision to switch from STOVL F-35B
to F-35C conventional take off Lightning could pave the road for
reconsideration of using Navalised Typhoons by the Royal Navy,
on QE-2 aircraft carriers.
4. The Gripen can also potentially be modified
for service on aircraft carriers equipped with Ski Jumps. According
to Eddy de la Motte, Director of Gripen operations in India, Saab
performed a feasibility study of operating Gripen on aircraft
carriers about ten years ago. The study determined this possibility
is possible, feasible and affordable. "We don't have carrier
experience and will rely on our partners like Embraer and HAL
having more experience in this field to meet such requirement
when it comes" LaMotte said.
Annex
C
"HANDS ON" CARRIER DECK LANDING
EXPERTISE EXAMINES BAE'S PREDICTIONS
1. Landing on board a conventional aircraft carrier
in a fighter aircraft presents significant challenges that are
not experienced when operating from an airfield ashore. Deck landing
into arrestor wires by day is a high workload, high skill evolution
requiring 100% concentration and extremely precise control of
speed, aircraft attitude and glide path (in the vertical as well
as the lateral sense). Any diversion from the prescribed approach
parameters can and does result in various undesirable effects:
— (a) Too
high an approach speed can cause the hooked wire to break leaving
the aircraft with not enough residual speed to take off again
but too much speed to stop on the deck: resulting in the loss
of the aircraft.
— (b) Aircraft
attitude (the angle of attack that the aircraft wings are presented
to the air stream) must be accurately controlled. Too high a nose
attitude at the prescribed speed will cause the loss lift from
the wing surfaces and the aircraft will rapidly sink towards the
stern of the ship. Too low a nose attitude will result in an increase
in air speed, giving the aircraft to much inertia for the arrestor
wire to cope with—and the latter will break.
— (c) Maintenance
of the prescribed glide path as given by the stabilised landing
sight is necessary to ensure that the hook does indeed catch a
wire. If you are too low on the glide path, the hook can bounce
over all the wires (or you may crash into the stern of the ship).
If you are too high on the glide slope, your hook will miss the
wires.
In other words, the correct air speed, attitude/angle
of attack and glide slope must be maintained in a stable fashion
all the way down the approach path to the deck.
2. This means that the inertia of the aircraft,
both horizontal and vertical, remains constant to the touchdown
point: there is no reduction in rate of descent of the aircraft
(as with landing on an airfield) and the forces that the aircraft
under-carriage have to contain are markedly higher. Some have
observed in the past that a carrier deck landing is almost akin
to a "crash on deck"—the forces involved are so
large. The undercarriage strength also has to take account of
the movement of the ship, particularly a pitching deck and "ship
heave":
— (a) The
Pitching Deck. With the deck pitching around the ship's centre
of gravity in heavy seas a severe upward momentum of the deck
can be experienced at the touchdown point. This upward momentum
needs to be taken into account in undercarriage strength as it
represents to the undercarriage an increased downward force of
the aeroplane on touchdown.
— (b) Ship
Heave. This is caused by the ship being moved bodily up and down
by heavy seas and has a similar impact on required undercarriage
strength to the effects of ship pitch.
3. The prescribed glide path for deck landing
(as indicated by the deck landing sight) is, by virtue of simple
geometry, steeper than that experienced ashore. On land, the prescribed
glide path is 3°. But the land is stationary. With the ship
moving at up to 30 kn away from the aircraft on the approach,
the deck landing sight is set at 4° which gives the aircraft
an approach path through the air of just 3°. Aircraft handling
for maintaining the glide slope is therefore the same for landings
ashore and on the deck. It is of course important to recognise
that if the ship's deck is pitching 2°, this leaves only
1° of clearance between the aircraft flight path and the
stern of the ship. Any reduction in the prescribed glide path
and this clearance, through for example the adoption of a flared
landing technique, would therefore be totally unacceptable from
a practical and a flight safety point of view.
4. The touchdown area where the tail hook of
the aircraft catches the arrestor wire is extremely small and
any lapse in concentration can cause pilots to miss the wires
completely or, catastrophically, impact the stern of the ship.
As if this was not enough, the flow of the wind over the deck
often creates a "burble" just behind the ship. This
has to be anticipated by the pilot by applying a small amount
of power. Even in calm, benign sea conditions this represents
a major challenge to any carrier deck pilot.
5. When an aircraft lands ashore on an airfield
it encounters a "ground cushion" when its height above
the ground is at about 10 feet. This condition is caused by the
interaction between the flat surface of the ground and the airflow
across the aircraft's wings. This automatically causes a reduction
in the rate of descent of the aircraft, a side-effect of which
is that the aircraft stays airborne longer and touches down further
along the runway. If the pilot also reduces rate of descent by
flaring the aircraft, the ground cushion effect will be exaggerated
and the aircraft will touch down smoothly further down the runway
without placing heavy forces on the undercarriage system. Catching
a wire using this technique would be extremely difficult if not
impossible.
6. When landing on a carrier, with the deck approximately
60 feet above the sea surface, there is no ground cushion. If
there was, it would make landing on board more difficult and more
dangerous because the essence of a good approach to the deck is
to continue the prescribed glide slope all the way to the deck
without any reduction (or increase) in the steady rate of descent.
This allows the point of impact of the deck hook on the deck to
be more precisely achieved—allowing the aircraft to "catch
a wire". Any flaring prior to touch down (even the smallest
amount) will cause the aircraft to miss the wires. A side-effect
of this type of approach is that a heavy force is applied to the
landing gear on touchdown and, hence, the landing gear needs to
be much more robust (and heavy) than its land-based counterpart.
See paragraph 2 above.
7. The arresting hook system appears simple but
represents a major challenge for aircraft design. The dynamic
interaction between the aircraft and the arresting system at around
135 knots is massive, and reliably bringing aircraft to a halt
in around 350 feet is a difficult and dangerous evolution.
8. The "burble" behind the ship, as
referred to in paragraph 1 above, can cause an increase in the
rate of descent of the aircraft as it approaches the stern of
the ship. An obvious danger, this has to be anticipated by the
pilot by applying a small amount of power in order to maintain
the prescribed flight path to the required impact point of the
deck hook amidst the wires. If too much power is applied, the
aircraft rate of descent will be reduced and the aircraft will
flare, missing the wires.
9. The suggestion in the earlier BAE studies
that the Typhoon would be able to make a precisely flown, flared
landing on deck is at best highly risky and runs counter to the
experience earned in the last hundred years of carrier operations.
This places BAE's simulations and assurances in perspective.
10. When you are learning to deck land, one of
the golden rules is to always concentrate on the cues given by
the deck landing sight and NEVER to attempt to "fly the deck"
(which is precisely what flared landing would require). That is
because the landing site is fully stabilised and is positioned
so that if you do follow its cues, your hook will catch a wire
because you are maintaining the prescribed steady glide path all
the way to the deck. The deck can move considerably in heavy seas
and that movement must be totally ignored by the pilot if he is
to land on board safely.
11. In rough seas with the ship pitching, rolling
and heaving, the challenge becomes much greater. Conducting night
deck landings in poor weather represents the most difficult and
challenging flying task that any military pilot will face in any
environment. In such conditions it is quite impossible for a pilot
to "fly the deck" or to employ a flared landing technique.
It could be possible that BAE would propose some form of highly
assisted or fully automated landing system to take the pilot out
of the loop. Again, such a proposal would be extremely risky and
carry major development costs.
178 Ev w120 Back
179
This can be deduced from the letters from the Minister of State
for Defence and from the Secretary of State to MPs who had expressed
their constituents' concerns on this issue. Transcripts of these
letters and responses to the contents therein are provided at
Annex A and Annex B to this submission. Back
180
Not withstanding that they are deployed for shorter periods, airmen
qualify for the same amount of post-operational tour leave as
their RN, RM, and Army colleagues. Back
181
FJCA was the planned STOVL version of the US/UK Staff Requirement. Back
182
Defence Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, Major
Procurement Projects, HC 779 Back
183
Craig Hoyle, Flight Daily News, 9 February 2011 Back
184
http://defense-update.com/wp/20110210_naval_typhoon.html
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