Written evidence from the Ministry of
This memorandum provides evidence on the many aspects
of Operations in Afghanistan requested by the House of Commons
Due to the sensitive nature of information relating
to operations, elements of the memorandum are provided in strict
confidence within a classified annex and should not be disclosed
outside of the Committee.
The information provided in the text is principally
drawn from HM Government sources. Acknowledgment is made as appropriate
for sections which draw significantly from ISAF or other sources.
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Afghanistan's population of approximately 28 million
is made up of numerous ethnic groups. The largest are the Pashtuns
(40%), predominantly found in the South, and the Tajiks (35%)
predominantly in the North. Hazaras, Uzbeks, Chahar Aimaks and
Turkmen make up the other significant ethnic groups. Islam is
the predominant religion of Afghanistan, practiced by approximately
99% of the population, 80% of whom are Sunni. The major languages
are Dari and Pashto.
Afghanistan ranks second to last on the UN's Human
Development Index, with over a third of its people living in poverty.
Thirty years of conflict have undermined the Afghan state, society
and economy. However, despite ongoing conflict and security challenges,
progress is being made.
There is no doubt that the situation in Afghanistan
a third of Afghanistan's people live in poverty: 36% of people
live under the official poverty line of under US $0.90 per day
(May 2010). In the South-West region (which includes Helmand and
Kandahar), the figure is less than one quarter (22%);
in 6 children die before the age of five; and
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are off track and the Afghan
Government has agreed an extension until 2020 to meet them.
Despite the challenges, we are starting to see real
improvements in the lives of the Afghan people:
International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed 2009-10 tax revenue
at around US$1.26 billionexceeding the IMF target of around
$1.1 billion, for this period.
million children attended school in 2008-09. This is an increase
of 800,000 from 2007-08 and a five-fold increase since the fall
of the Taleban.
of Afghans now have access to basic health care, compared to only
9% in 2002.
At the crossroads of central Asia, lying on the historic
Silk Road, Afghanistan has long been of importance in regional
and international politics.
The roots of Afghanistan's most recent period of
instability stem from the 1970s, when Prime Minister Daud overthrew
King Zahir Shah (1973) and was subsequently overthrown himself
by the socialist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (1978).
This led to armed resistance by conservative Islamic elements
and the 1979 invasion by the Soviet Union.
Soviet intervention lasted 10 years and sparked a
bitter civil war with anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces. The departure
of Soviet troops in 1989 did not bring an end to the conflict,
as Mujahideen groups began to compete among themselves. By 1994,
the Pashtun Taleban began to emerge as the dominant power in Afghanistan,
taking Kabul in October 1996 and controlling most of the country
After 11 September 2001, the international community
called upon the Taleban to cease providing shelter to al-Qaeda.
When they refused, the US and UK acted under Article V of the
UN charter to prevent and deter further attacks that might originate
from Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taleban government, in
November 2001, the United Nations brought together leaders of
Afghan ethnic groups in Germany. The Bonn Agreement, signed on
5 December 2001, set out a road map for the restoration of representative
government in Afghanistan.
In June 2002, an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly)
established a Transitional Administration to govern until elections
could be held. The Loya Jirga marked the first opportunity for
decades for the people of Afghanistan to play a decisive role
in their future. It concluded with the election of Hamid Karzai
as President of the Transitional State of Afghanistan. The Transitional
Administration came to an end with the Presidential election of
1.3 Political System
Afghanistan has a presidential system of governance.
The Executive branch of government is made up of a Cabinet appointed
by the President, subject to Parliamentary approval. The Legislature
is made up of a bicameral parliament called the Afghan National
Assembly. The Wolesi Jirga (lower house), is directly elected.
It has 259 members, with 64 of these places reserved for women.
The Meshrano Jirga (upper house) is made up of 102 members, two-thirds
of whom are elected by district councils, and one-third of whom
are appointed by the President. Under the Constitution, the President
is obliged when making nominations to ensure that minorities such
as the disabled and the nomad Kuchi are represented, and 50% of
his nominations must be women.
The Afghan political neighbourhood does not have
Western-style opposition groups or issue-based political parties.
Most Members of Parliament stand as independents, though many
are loosely affiliated to one (often ethnic-based) political grouping
or another. These political parties field or endorse candidates,
but often do not have clear policy-based platforms or national
manifestos, and may not supply financial or campaigning support.
1.4 Presidential Elections
On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan held its first Presidential
elections, which were won by Hamid Karzai with 55.4% of the vote
on a 70% turnout.
On 20 August 2009 the second set of Presidential
elections since the fall of the Taleban were held. They were the
first elections to be Afghan-run in over 30 years. As no Presidential
candidate polled more than 50%, a second round run-off was scheduled,
for 7 November 2009, between the two leading candidates: Hamid
Karzai (49.7%) and Dr Abdullah Abdullah (30.6%). However, Dr Abdullah
withdrew before the second round was held. The Afghan Independent
Election Commission therefore announced that President Karzai
was re-elected on 2 November 2009.
1.5 Parliamentary and Provincial Elections
Elections to the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) were
held on 18 September 2005. They were the first such elections
in 36 years. Candidates stood in their own right as individuals,
with no parties officially recognised in the elections. Turnout
was 51.5%, 41% of whom were women. The elections and appointments
to the Meshrano Jirga (upper house) election were completed on
10 December 2005.
Parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2010 were
postponed by the Afghan Independent Election Commission, in accordance
with the Afghan Constitution. They took place on 18 September
1.6 Sub-national governance
A Province is the local administrative unit of Afghanistan.
Provincial Councils are directly elected bodies that advise the
Provincial Governor. They are elected every four years, most recently
alongside the Presidential elections in 2009.
In March 2010 the Afghan Government approved a new
Sub-National Governance Policy. The new policy defines the responsibilities
and authority of local administrations, strengthens local governance
structures and will improve the delivery of services locally.
This was a key outcome of the London Conference on Afghanistan,
and demonstrates the commitment of the Afghan Government to delivering
services for the Afghan people at the local level.
FORCE (ISAF) CAMPAIGN
2.1 The ISAF Mission
ISAF, in support of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and acting under UN Security Council
Resolution 1890, conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce
the capability and will of the insurgency; support the growth
in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF); and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic
development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable
stability that is observable by the population.
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council
Resolutions, ISAF's main role is to assist the Afghan Government
in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this
end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations
throughout the country together with the ANSF and are directly
involved in the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA)
and Afghan National Police (ANP) through mentoring, training and
2.3 Reconstruction and Development
Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),
ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development in Afghanistan,
securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other
national and international actors.
Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination
with GIRoA and UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)
representatives on the ground, ISAF is also providing practical
support for reconstruction and development efforts, as well as
support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan
government organisations, international organisations, and non-governmental
ISAF, through its PRTs is helping the Afghan Authorities
strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance
and rule of law and to promote human rights. The principle mission
of the PRTs in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting
the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment
within which governance can improve.
2.5 History and expansion of the ISAF mission
Afghan opposition leaders attending the Bonn Conference
in December 2001 began the process of reconstructing their country
by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional
Authority. The concept of a UN-mandated international force to
assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was
also launched at the Conference to create a secure environment
in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
ISAF was duly established through UN Security Council Resolution
1386 on 20 December 2001. These agreements paved the way for the
creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional
Authority, UNAMA and ISAF.
On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the
ISAF operation, turning the six-month national rotations to an
end. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination
and planning of the force, including the provision of a force
commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.
ISAF's mandate was initially limited to providing
security in and around Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations
extended ISAF's mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR
1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the
ISAF's UN mandate has been extended on a rolling
basis, the most recent extension, UN Security Council Resolution
1890, being adopted unanimously on 13 October 2009 and extending
the mandate for a further 12 months.
2.6 Stage 1: Expansion to the North
In December 2003, the North Atlantic Council authorised
the Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, to initiate
the expansion of ISAF by taking over command of the German-led
PRT in Kunduz. The other eight PRTs operating in Afghanistan in
2003 remained under the command of Operation Enduring Freedom,
the continuing US-led military operation in Afghanistan.
On 31 December 2003, the military component of the
Kunduz PRT was placed under ISAF command as a pilot project and
first step in the expansion of the mission.
Six months later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit
meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul,
NATO announced that it would establish four other PRTs in the
North: in Mazar-e-Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan.
This process was completed on 1 October 2004, marking
the completion of the first phase of ISAF's expansion. ISAF's
area of operations then covered some 3,600 square kilometres in
the North and the mission was able to influence security in nine
Northern provinces of the country.
2.7 Stage 2: Expansion to the West
On 10 February 2005, NATO announced that ISAF would
be further expanded, into western Afghanistan. This process began
on 31 May 2006, when ISAF took on command of two additional PRTs,
in the provinces of Herat and Farah and of a Forward Support Base
(a logistic base) in Herat.
At the beginning of September 2006, two further ISAF-led
PRTs in the West became operational, one in Chaghcharan, capital
of Ghor province, and one in Qala-e-Naw, capital of Baghdis province,
completing ISAF's expansion into the West.
The extended ISAF mission led a total of nine PRTs,
in the North and the West, providing security assistance in 50%
of Afghanistan's territory. The Alliance continued to make preparations
to further expand ISAF, to the South.
Over the period of the 18 September 2005 provincial
and parliamentary elections the Alliance also temporarily deployed
2,000 additional troops to Afghanistan.
2.8 Stage 3: Expansion to the South
On 8 December 2005, meeting at NATO Headquarters
in Brussels, the Allied Foreign Ministers endorsed a plan that
paved the way for an expanded ISAF role and presence in Afghanistan.
The first element of this plan was the expansion
of ISAF to the South in 2006, also known as Stage 3.
This was implemented on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed
command of the Southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition
forces, expanding its area of operations to cover an additional
six provincesDay Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan
and Zabul - and taking on command of four additional PRTs.
The expanded ISAF led a total of 13 PRTs in the North,
West and South, covering some three-quarters of Afghanistan's
territory. The number of ISAF forces in the country also increased
significantly, from about 10,000 prior to the expansion to about
2.9 Stage 4: ISAF expands to the East, Taking
Responsibility for the Entire Country
On 5 October 2006, ISAF implemented the final stage
of its expansion, by taking on command of the international military
forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition.
In addition to expanding the Alliance's area of operations,
the revised operational plan also paved the way for a greater
ISAF role in the country. This includes the deployment of ISAF
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to ANA units at
various levels of command.
See also Annex A Current ISAF Force Laydown (Security
classified, not publicly available to Committee Members at Defence
3. CURRENT ISAF
3.1 ISAF Force Structure
The following table gives an overview of the ISAF
Force Structure setting out the lead nations, troop strength and
PRTs for each of the six regional commands in Afghanistan:
3.2 ISAF Force Laydown
The following map gives an overview of the major
troop contributing nations in each regional command along with
the lead nation for each PRT:
4.1 Troop Contributing Nations
The following table gives the approximate troop contribution
for each of the 47 troop contributing nations as of 6 August 2010.
These figures are indicative and actual numbers will fluctuate
on a day by day basis due to visits, Rest & Recuperation (R&R)
and for operational reasons.
4.2. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
(OMLT) Contributing Nations
OMLTs provide training and mentoring to the ANA.
They also serve as a liaison capability between ANA and ISAF forces,
co-ordinating the planning of operations and ensuring that ANA
units receive necessary enabling support (including close air
support, casualty and medical evacuation).
Under the OMLT concept developed by ISAF, each team
deploys for a minimum of six months and consists of 11-28 personnel,
depending on the type and function of the ANA unit with which
it trains, and can consist of personnel from several ISAF nations.
In line with the recommendations of General McChrystal's
Strategic Assessment in 2009, UK forces in Helmand moved from
the small OMLT concept to the Embedded Partnering of UK units
with Afghan counterparts, usually using the UK "company"
and Afghan "tolay", each of around 120 men, as the basic
building block. While the UK retains liaison teams attached to
ANA units in Helmand, partnered UK-Afghan "Combined Forces"
have been the UK's principal means of training and mentoring newly
raised ANA forces over the course of 2010. These Combined Forces
are the UK's contribution to ISAF's OMLT statistics which sets
out the number of deployed OMLTS provided by ISAF nations as of
3 September 2010. The next NATO Force Generation Conference on
22 September is expected to result in some increases in the level
In addition to the OMLTs listed, the US contributes
76 Embedded Training Teams. These units can deploy to partner
the ANA across Afghanistan on training requirements, insurgent
activity and ISAF campaign direction.
||Number of OMLTs||Additional OMLTs offered to Deploy
||18 Additional Offered|
4.3 Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT)
The POMLT programme is an important part of NATO-ISAF's contribution
towards the development of the ANP. POMLTs are composed of 15-20
personnel from one or several countries. Each POMLT is normally
deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum period of six months.
As is the case with OMLTs, the US provides the bulk of the ISAF
POMLT contribution with a pool of 279 teams providing POMLTs on
a flexible basis, as required.
The table below sets out the number of deployed POMLTS provided
by other ISAF nations as of 3 September 2010, on 22 September
a NATO Force Generation Conference is likely to result in significant
increases in the level of contributions.
|Contributing Nation||Number of|
|Additional POMLTs Committed to Deploy
|Afghan National Civil Order Police||Poland
||13 Additional Committed
5. CURRENT STATE
See Annex B (Security classified, not publicly availableavailable
to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office).
6. Future of the ISAF Campaign
The International Community and the Afghan Government have agreed
that the ANSF will have responsibility for security across the
country by 2015. In line with this the Prime Minister has stated
his intent that there will not be British troops in a combat role
or in significant numbers in Afghanistan in 2015.
Transition is the process by which the ANSF will take responsibility
for security operations across Afghanistan. It is important to
note that Transition is a process not an event. It involves ISAF
and the international community progressively shifting responsibilities
to Afghan forces and institutions as we move increasingly to a
supportive role. Once Transition has been initiated, the Afghan
Government, in collaboration with NATO, ISAF, PRT lead nations
and international community stakeholders, will incrementally Transition
responsibilities for districts and provinces to the Afghan Government,
based on conditions on the ground. The criteria for Transition
reflect the three main pillars of the Afghan National Development
Strategy: security; governance; and development.
At the Kabul Conference on 20 July 2015 the International Community
agreed to support the Transition process, endorsing the joint
Afghan Government and NATO plan for phased transition to full
Afghan responsibility for security laid out in the "Inteqal"
(Transition) paper. A Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB)
has been established, co-chaired by the Afghan Office of the National
Security Council and NATO/ISAF and attended by key stakeholders
from the Afghan Government and the UN. The JANIB will assess conditions
on the ground against security, governance and development criteria
to establish which province/s fulfil the conditions to begin Transition.
Recommendations will be jointly approved by the Afghan Government
and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
See also ANNEX C (Security classified, not publicly available
- available to Committee Members at Defence Committee Office).
7. DEVELOPMENT IN
The UK's programme for development across Afghanistan is led by
the Department for International Development (DFID)it would
not make sense to develop Helmand alone while the rest of the
country faces major challenges. DFID's bilateral programme, alongside
the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MoD,
forms a comprehensive effort to help strengthen key government
institutions, counter the threat of violent extremism and pursue
sustainable economic growth across the country.
7.1 Impact of DFID's programmes to date
5.2 million children attended school in 2008-09. This is an increase
of 800,000 from 2007-08 and represents a five-fold increase since
the fall of the Taleban. Girls were banned from attending school
under the Taleban; now one third of children who attend school
in Afghanistan are girls.
DFID Contribution: DFID's Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)
allocation to education supports the equivalent of 31,000 teachers
(almost 1 in 5).
85% of the population now has access to basic healthcare, compared
to 9% in 2002. Five out of every six children are reaching their
fifth birthday. 24% of births are now supervised by skilled birth
attendantsan increase from 13% in 2005.
DFID Contribution: DFID's ARTF allocation to health is approx
£18 million since 2002, helping to build Government capability
to deliver health to its people.
7.2 Growth and livelihoods
DFID has contributed to national rural development programmes
to help elect almost 22,000 Community Development Councils and
initiate almost 50,000 locally-generated projects in agriculture,
education, health, irrigation, power, public buildings, transport
and water supply. Over $500 million worth of micro-credit and
savings facilities have been extended to over 440,000 farmer families
and small enterprises and over 9,790 km of rural roads have been
built or repaired.
7.3 Anti-Corruption Efforts
All DFID funding to Afghanistan is subject to high standards of
financial management and scrutiny to minimise the risk of misuse.
Our support to the Afghan Government is channelled primarily via
the multi-donor ARTF which is managed and monitored by the World
Bank. Aid given through the ARTF is provided on a reimbursement
basis and must conform to strict eligibility criteria. This means
money is only given when the government has proved that actual
expenditure has already been paid. The fund is also monitored
by international auditors as a further safety check.
In addition, the UK with other donors is working with the Afghan
Government to strengthen accountability, encourage financial management
reforms in the public sector and build institutions with the ability
to tackle corruption over the longer term.
8. AFGHAN NATIONAL
8.1 UK Responsibilities for Training the ANA
The UK provides support to the training and development of the
ANA in three main ways, through embedding staff officers in NATO
Training Missionfghanistan (NTM-A) Headquarters, by providing
trainers to the NTM-A training institutions and through the embedded
partnering of deployed ANSF in Helmand Province. Almost half of
the UK's deployed forcesome 4,500 troopsre available
to support ANSF training in one of these forms.
All UK ground-holding troops are available to support ANA development
through partnering. UK and ANA ground-holding troops are permanently
living and operating together throughout the UK areas of operation.
Alongside partnering there are small teams (OMLTs) which provide
coherence to partnering by offering liaison, advice and continuity
of relationships with ANA units. These teams attach themselves
to specific ANA units and stay with them as they move around different
ground-holding areas within the UK area of operations and can
be partnered by different ISAF units.
The UK's role in NTM-A training institutions includes leading
the Combat Arms Directorate; being the principal supplying nation
to the Infantry Branch School; and providing personnel to the
Afghan Defence University, the Officer Cadet School, the Counter
Insurgency Training Centre, and the Non-Commissioned Officer Training
8.2 UK Responsibilities for Training the ANP
The UK provides training and development in specialist police
skills (including civilian policing, investigative skills and
tackling corruption) and leadership skills. Mentoring is provided
for senior officers and Ministers at district, provincial and
national level. We support reform of the Ministry of Interior
and institutional development on both a strategic and operational
level. Training is reinforced through partnering and mentoring
on the ground.
The UK is a major contributor to the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL). We also second three senior police advisors to the NATO
Training MissionAfghanistan (NTM-A) and have contributed
to the costs of police salaries. We have a substantial bilateral
effort in Helmand, training and mentoring the ANP. Through our
engagement in NTM-A and EUPOL we support the Ministry of Interior
to strengthen leadership capability, police accountability and
develop training strategies and policy to ensure the role and
development of the ANP is appropriately tailored as the security
As part of our bilateral effort in Helmand, the UK continues to
deliver training to officers and patrolmen, and to provide embedded
partnering and on the ground mentoring to the police at all levels.
8.3 Numbers and Sources of Trainers
The UK currently provides, or is in the process of force generating,
around 160 military personnel to NTM-A HQ and institutions, which
support both ANA and ANP training. This includes 77 personnel
for the Helmand Police Training Centre.
All UK ground-holding troops are partnering ANA and ANP on the
ground in Helmand. Supporting partnering are small advisory teams
made up of 206 personnel for the ANA and 75 personnel for the
Further military uplifts to the Helmand Police Training Centre
and to police mentoring may result a review currently being undertaken
as a result of our changing force laydown in Helmand.
Civilian personnel are also provided by the UK to support police
training. This includes:
UK secondees to EUPOL (both serving and retired police officers).
UK secondees to NTM-A (both serving and retired).
Ministry of Defence Police.
8.4 Number of ANP Trained and Ethnicity
As at 31 August 2010, the current strength of the
ANP is around 115,500 policemen. Of those, around 18,150 are officers,
38,000 are NCO's and 59,300 are patrolmen. The ethnic makeup of
the total force is 43% Pashtun, 42% Tajik, 5% Hazara, 5% Usbek,
and 5% other. The 'other' category includes: Turkman, Balooch,
Nooristani, Bayat, Sadat, Pashayee, Arab, and Alevi. Because of
attrition, and ongoing training, the percentage of ANP that have
undertaken training is difficult to put an exact percentage on.
However, 90,350 policemen were trained between 2003 and 2009.
In 2010, 22,182 policemen have been trained to date.
8.5 Number of ANA Trained and Ethnicity
As at 31 August 2010, the ANA stands at around 136,000
personnel, already ahead of its 2010 growth objective of 134,000
and on-track to achieve the 2011 goal of 171,600. Development
of the ANSF is ISAF's strategic priority. While the size of the
infantry-centric force is growing strongly and exceeds established
goals, ISAF is working to improve institutional capability. Approximately
one third of Coalition troop offers are identified to support
ANSF training and mentoring.
The Afghan Ministry of Defence and ANA are addressing
continuing concerns about the lack of southern Pashtun soldiers
with several recruiting initiatives. The ANA Recruiting Command
sent four delegations on a recruiting fact finding mission to
examine possible ways to increase recruiting for future Pashtun
soldiers. The Defence Minister also committed to employing southern
Pashtun officers as "hometown recruiters". Other recruiting
initiatives conducted include billboards and media (radio and
TV spots). The success of these methods will only become apparent
over time; an improvement in security in the South is assessed
to have the greatest impact on increasing recruitment. The lack
of southern Pashtun soldiers is partly due to the fact that many
Pashtun areas are heavily dominated by the insurgency; either
Pashtuns do not want to join the ANA because they lean towards
the Taleban or they are unable to do so because of pressure and
8.6 Number of ISAF Personnel Involved in Training
The training capability required by the NTM-A is
listed in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR).
Troop contributing nations pledge personnel to deliver specific
capabilities identified by the CJSOR, as opposed to simply filling
designated posts. There are currently around 600 ISAF personnel
providing training through NTM-A and the associated US Combined
Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A). This number
is expected to increase as a result of the NATO Force Generation
Conference on 22 September 2010 and is scheduled to rise to 2,796
trainers by March 2012. ISAF nations also provide civilian personnel
to training efforts, and military personnel are involved in on
the ground mentoring and partnering that is not captured on the
See also Annex D (Security classified, not publicly
available - available to Committee Members at Defence Committee
Afghanistan's enduring stability requires an Afghan-led
political process of reintegration and reconciliation that takes
account of the concerns of disaffected Afghans.
Reintegration is focused at the low and mid levels
of the insurgencyfighters and their immediate commanderswith
the aim of reintegrating them back into mainstream communities.
Reconciliation refers to negotiations with the insurgent senior
leadership. The UK supports the Afghan Government's conditions
for this process that, in order to participate, insurgents should:
cut ties with Al-Qaeda; end violence; and live within the Afghan
President Karzai set out his commitment to this approach
during his inaugural address in 2009. This was then followed up
at the London Conference in January 2010 when the Afghan Government
pledged to create a sustainable reintegration programme, supported
by an international Peace and Reintegration Fund. President Karzai
convened a Peace Jirga (a consultative meeting with a large cross-section
of Afghans) on 2-4 June to secure wider Afghan support for his
reintegration and reconciliation proposals. The Kabul Conference
in July then secured clear commitments from the Afghan Government
on the next steps for reintegration and reconciliation, and to
advance a political settlement. The international community endorsed
One of the key outcomes of the conference was the
recommendation for the establishment of a High Level Peace Council
to take forward reintegration and reconciliation. The Council
was formally announced on 4 September. We are now looking forward
to President Karzai's appointment of the Council's chairman and
membership so that this process can get going, in particular the
rollout of the reintegration programme in key provinces.
10. UK IN AFGHANISTAN
The UK contributes 9,500 troops to ISAF. Of these
around 7,700 are assigned to Helmand Province, 1,300 to Kandahar
Air Field and around 500 troops and staff officers are assigned
to Kabul in support of ISAF Headquarters, ISAF Joint Command and
the NATO Training MissionAfghanistan. Of the 9,500 UK troops,
nearly half are involved in mentoring, training and partnering
In order to assist ISAF in delivering the improvements
in security, the ANSF, governance and socio-economic development,
the UK civilian and military personnel work closely with a number
of international partners and organisation including:
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): a political
mission established at the request of the Afghan Government to
assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations
for sustainable peace and development;
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - led by NATO since 2003;
donor nations; and,
11. UK Contribution Overview
The table below gives an indication of the number
of UK Staff officers placed within the major ISAF command structures
as well as senior posts held by UK military personnel:
||UK held senior posts||Notes
National Contingent Commander
|Deputy Commander (3*)|
Director Reintegration (2*)
|Lt Gen Sir Nick Parker, in addition to his role as Deputy Commander ISAF, is also Commander of the National Contingent for which he has a staff of five.
|HQ ISAF Joint Command||30
||Chief of Staff (2*)|
|NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan||30
||Commander (1*) of|
Coalition Training Advisory Group - Army
|British Embassy Kabul||10
|HQ Regional Command (South)||220
||Commander (2*)||When command of Regional Command (South) rotates to the US in November 2010, the UK contribution will reduce to 5.
||Kandahar Air Field|
|Kandahar Air Field||30
||Commander (1*)||When command of Kandahar Airfield is hander over to the US in November 2010, the UK contribution will reduce to 10.
||Kandahar Air Field|
|HQ Regional Command (South- West)||100
||Deputy Commander (1*)
|Task Force Helmand||230
|HQ Joint Force Support Afghanistan||110
|Provincial Reconstruction Team||20
12. HISTORY OF
UK FORCE LEVELS
The table below sets out the approximate UK conventional force
level in Afghanistan at certain dates since 2001. These dates
reflect either a point when public announcement of a change in
force level was made or when a sequence of rebalancing and adjustments
cumulatively resulted in a significant change in UK force levels.
The precise number of UK military personnel deployed at any one
time varies due to several reasons including periods of overlap
during the roulement of units and individuals into and out of
theatre, rest and recuperation and casualties.
|Date||Approximate Force Level
||Notes on UK Forces
||Relates to Op VERITAS and therefore predominately comprises forces (Royal Navy (RN)) and RAF) that were not in Afghanistan but were supporting coalition operations in the country.
||Relates to Op FINGAL and refers to the first ISAF deployment (Jan-Jun 2002) involving 1800 UK personnel on security operations and a temporary commitment of 300 UK military engineers to repair Kabul airport.
||Includes the UK's 1800 ISAF deployment and the 1700 UK personnel in Task Force JACANA (Mar-Jul 2002) based in Bagram and operating in eastern Afghanistan.
||Comprises the residual UK ISAF commitment following the transfer of command to Turkey. Does not include the c.4000 embarked RN personnel supporting coalition operations.
||Relates to the beginning of Op HERRICK and includes the 230-man HARRIER GR7 deployment to Kandahar which, at that time, was part of Op ENDURING FREEDOM although able to support ISAF as required.
||Comprises Task Force Helmand (TFH, then 3150 personnel deploying with 16 Air Assault Brigade and associated units), the HARRIER GR7 deployment and the UK personnel assigned to HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) - HQ ISAF - in Kabul (May 2006 - Feb 2007).
||Addition of c.130 RAF Regiment personnel in Kandahar, increase of c.770 Royal Engineers and infantry over the summer to reinforce TFH and the inclusion (absent from the early 2006 figure) of c.400 personnel in enabling forces providing support to TFH.
||Reflects the replacement of 16 Air Assault Brigade and associated units by the c.100-man larger 3 Commando Brigade and associated units. The level of 6300 UK personnel was maintained following the withdrawal of HQ ARRC in Feb 2007 because Ministers approved an initial package of force uplifts on 14 Dec 2006 plus contributions to HQ ISAF and the retention of some ARRC capabilities.
||Reflects the deployment, in Feb 2007, of an enhanced Regional Battle Group (South) comprising c.1370 UK personnel and subsequent, less significant, increases in UK personnel associated with training.
||Reflects the findings of the UK Force Level Review which recommended personnel increases in several areas including infantry, combat engineers, military training and stabilisation personnel, Protected Mobility (PM), helicopter crews, and ISTAR personnel.
||Reflects the findings of the Jan 2009 Theatre Capability Review which recommended the deployment of additional personnel include a 219-strong Counter-IED task force.
||Reflects the deployment of a UK Election Surge Force of 700 personnel in response to a request from NATO to ISAF members. Initially a temporary increase in UK force levels, the then Prime Minister agreed, based on military advice, to make the increase enduring beyond the end of the election and the withdrawal of the surge force. The increase in personnel provided additional capabilities including C-IED, helicopter crews and ISTAR personnel.
||Announced by the then Prime Minister on 14 Oct 2009, the increase to an established and enduring UK force level of 9500 reflected the findings of the then COM ISAF's Strategic Assessment and associated studies which recommended the deployment of more ISAF forces to increase the capacity to train and partner with the ANSF.
13. UK IN HELMAND
UK troops first deployed in significant numbers to Helmand province
in southern Afghanistan in April 2006, with the establishment
of Task Force Helmand consisting of 3,150 personnel, the majority
of whom were drawn from 16 Air Assault Brigade. The decision to
deploy UK forces to Helmand followed careful analysis and comprehensive
discussion within the MoD and across other government departments.
This decision helped the UK to implement a NATO decision to extend
its presence to the South in response to a growing threat of a
resurgent insurgency. The decision to deploy UK forces to Helmand
was based on the importance of the mission to UK national interests
and the UK's leading role in NATO. In common with many of our
international partners in Afghanistan, we have had to adapt our
approach and force levels to reflect developments on the ground.
During the first six months of the UK deployment to Helmand, we
increased our force levels to around 6,000 personnel, in response
to the situation there.
The UK currently contributes 9,500 troops to the NATO-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to Afghanistan on an
enduring basis, although actual numbers on the ground fluctuate
daily. We have around 7,700 troops assigned to Helmand, most -
but not all - in central Helmand where we are responsible with
the ANSF for providing security for around 32% of the Helmand
population. Camp Bastion, located to the north-west of the provincial
capital Lashkar Gah, is our main logistics hub for the province;
the main point of entry and departure by aircraft for UK troops;
as well as the base for elements of the UK's helicopter fleet.
It is also the location of our main in-country medical facility.
The UK also has forces assigned to Kandahar Air Field (approximately
1300) and to headquarters in Kabul (approximately 500), and holds
several key command positions, including Deputy Commander ISAF
(on a permanent basis) and Commander Regional Command (South)
(RC(S)) (until November 2010).
The UK has operated within the endorsed force levels of 9,500
troops deployed on operations in Afghanistan since December 2009.
This figure excludes "surge" deployments, such as the
annual deployment of engineers to repair wear-and-tear of Forward
Operating Bases, or deployment of the Theatre Reserve Battalion
(TRB), which is based in Cyprus and can be deployed rapidly and
on the authority of the Chief of Joint Operations when a temporary
need for additional troops is identified. The TRB was deployed
to central Helmand in July 2010 for a three-month period to further
progress and consolidate gains in central Helmand following recent
operations in the area.
13.2 Task Force Helmand
International forces deployed to Helmand province operate within
Regional Command South West (RC(SW)), currently commanded by the
US Marine Corps' (USMC) under Major General Richard Mills. The
majority of UK personnel operate under the command of the UK-led
Task Force Helmand (TFH), which also contains significant Danish
and Estonian contingents, which has responsibility for providing
security in the centre of the province alongside the ANSF.
UK command of TFH is refreshed on a six-monthly basis. It is currently
under the command of Brigadier Richard Felton, Commander of 4
Mechanized Brigade (4 Mech Bde), who will be replaced by Brigadier
James Chiswell and 16 Air Assault Brigade in October 2010. UK
forces are focused in the central part of the province, operating
in the population centres of Nad-e Ali North and South, Nahr-e
Saraj North and South and Lashkar Gah. Task Force Helmand Headquarters
is located in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, alongside the
PRT, which is headed up by a UK civil servant, Ms Lindy Cameron
(to be replaced by Michael O'Neill from the FCO in October). The
co-location of the Task Force with the PRT and the Provincial
Governor is key to coordinating the military effort with the international
civilian effort and that of the provincial government.
The UK's focus in Helmand, in line with ISAF's priorities, remains
protecting the Afghan people, increasing Afghan governance at
provincial and district level and building the capacity of the
ANSF. The UK has adopted a strategy of being physically located
in close proximity to the protected community, operating out of
bases located in and around the key population centres. In line
with ISAF intent, we are conducting a counter-insurgency operation,
a vital element of which is for troops to interact with the local
population and many key activities, including patrolling in population
centres and holding meetings with local community leaders, can
only be conducted on the ground. Partnering with the ANSF is key
to our strategy, as the quickest and most effective way of bringing
them up to the level where they can increasingly take over security
responsibility from international forces. On the ground, working
closely with the ANSF helps our troops to engage more effectively
with the local population; gathering valuable intelligence on
suspected insurgents and potential threats.
Operations, such as the recent Operation MOSHTARAK, follow the
Shape, Clear, Hold, Build phased approach to counter-insurgency
opinion before an operation to maximize popular support by engaging
the local population and disrupting the insurgency in the area;
an area of insurgents through operations designed to undermine
them and protect the population;
the area by rapidly introducing effective Afghan governance and
beginning immediate, quick-win 'hot stabilisation' activities;
sustainable Afghan Government-led progress
across the area through stabilisation and development.
Counter-insurgency is patient, methodical work. It
takes time to convince people that they should back the Afghan
Government over the insurgents. This is reflected in progress
on the ground. Nad-e Ali district, where ISAF and ANSF have had
a presence for around 18 months, is further advanced than Marjah,
where ISAF troops have only been for around six months. In Lashkar
Gah, the provincial capital, where we have had a long term presence,
there is even greater progress with the Afghans increasingly dealing
with the majority of security threats themselves. It is only through
helping to implement sustainable and accountable governance, that
ISAF will successfully separate the population from the insurgency.
UK personnel, operating as part of ISAF, have made
tangible improvements across their area of operations in Helmand
province since first deploying there in significant numbers in
2006. Successes include:
2008, of the 14 districts in Helmand, government authority, represented
by a district governor, extended to only five. In 2010 there are
now governors in 11 of Helmand's districts;
Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC) delivers training to 150
new recruits every four weeks. The HPTC is staffed by a mixture
of UK Ministry of Defence Police (MDP), British Army, other ISAF
and Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) instructors;
Mangal's Counter Narcotics strategy has reduced poppy cultivation
in Helmand by 33% over the past year. Since 2008, 3,200 tonnes
of wheat seed has been distributed annually to approximately 30,000
2006 there was one district hospital and nine comprehensive and
20 basic health clinics. In 2009, that had grown to one provincial
hospital, two district hospitals, and 54 health clinics; and
the end of 2008, 40 schools have re-opened across Helmand. There
are now 103 schools open in the province.
13.5 Looking Forward
COMISAF and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative
(SCR) have provided direction on transition implementation, outlining
a number of key principles:
Transition will be conditions based;
will be bottom up, not top-down, being informed by local assessments;
will involve thinning out of ISAF forces rather than handing off;
will require retaining headquarters elements even as units thin
will start at the district level and progress to the provincial
will involve "reinvesting" some of the Transition dividend
in terms of ISAF resources; and
will involve transitioning institutions and functions as well
as geographic areas.
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Northwood are
currently undertaking a review into the military options for security
transition and transfer in Helmand. It will look at Transition
in the context of a complete withdrawal of UK combat troops by
the end of 2014. We expect that our force profile will evolve
as the Afghan's take on more responsibility in our Area of Operations,
and that we will reinvest troops as required, for example to deepen
the hold in central Helmand and invest in police training, to
increase prospects of success. Any plan for changing force posture
through Transition will need to be developed over time and, dependent
on ISAF Transition planning, wider governance and development
work, will need to take into account the position on the ground
and the Taleban approach as we go through Transition. The plan
will be in line with and based on ISAF's conditions based plan
14.1 Overview of the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction
The Helmand PRT is a UK-led, multinational team helping
the Afghan Government deliver effective government and security
across Helmand Province. It has 260 staff, approximately half
of whom are civilian and half military, provided by the UK, US,
Danish and Estonian governments. The PRT includes some 21 civilian
police staff and 30 Afghan staff. The UK staff are drawn from
DFID, FCO, MoD and a database of consultants who can deploy at
short notice. DFID staff, who manage the UK's bilateral, long-term
development programme in Helmand, are co-located with the PRT
in Lashkar Gah. It is led by the Head of Mission, Lindy Cameron,
who has previously headed the DFID offices in Baghdad and Kabul.
The PRT works to a single Helmand Plan that has been
agreed with the Government of Afghanistan and international partners.
The plan is structured around seven themes: Politics and Reconciliation;
Governance; Rule of Law (Justice, Police and Prisons); Security;
Economic and Social Development; Counter Narcotics; and Strategic
The PRT is headquartered in Lashkar Gah and has UK,
US and Danish District Stabilisation Teams in 10 of Helmand's
14 Districts. A Stabilisation Team typically consists of civilian
stabilisation advisers (STABADs), civilian specialists (e.g. in
agriculture), a political adviser and either a UK Military Stabilisation
Support Team (MSST), a US Civil Affairs Team, or a Danish CIMIC
(Civil Military Cooperation) Support Team. The teams bring together
people with a range of backgrounds including development, politics,
engineering and project management. The Stabilisation Teams work
hand in hand with the District Regimental, Battle Group or Battalion
HQs to co-ordinate civil and military activity.
14.2 Progress in Helmand
The role of the PRT is to help the Afghan Government
improve the governance, services and security it provides in Helmand.
Since the PRT was established, in September 2004, there has been
progress across all themes of the Helmand Plan.
DFID's programme in Helmand focuses on four key areas
of work which set the conditions for medium term progress, and
complement the stabilisation activities of the PRT and other donors.
sustainable economic growth through the Helmand Growth Programme.
infrastructure and capacity building support at Bost Airfield
and Agricultural Centre.
the road between Lashkar Gah and Gereshk and starting the refurbishment
of the Gereshk hydro-power plant.
the Afghan Government to improve its ability to deliver for its
own people through the DFID/PRT state-building programme in Helmand
and the District Delivery Programme.
DFID's support in Helmand has contributed to:
wells benefiting 250,000 people;
km of road repaired, with a further 21km underway;
irrigation projects benefiting 350,000 people;
small loans to farmers and small businesses;
people in Lashkar Gah have access to safe drinking water and 65%
of the city is now being cleaned by the municipality; and
of essential infrastructure at the Bost Airfield and Agriculture
There are now district governors installed in 11
of Helmand's 14 districts (Nawa, Nad-e Ali, Gereshk, Sangin, Musa
Qaleh, Garmsir, Naw Zad, Khaneshin, Marjeh, Dishu, and Kajaki
with a mayor in place in Lashkar Gah). A temporary 14th District
has recently been established under direction from President Karzai
with an acting District Governor in place. At the end of 2008
there were only five District Governors in place.
With PRT support, four Community Councils have been
established in Helmand to empower local representatives to determine
the direction of development and security in their district. 5
members of the Gereshk Community Council are female.
Through the District Delivery Programme (DDP) process
the PRT has pioneered on-budget support to the provincial administration,
directorates and district administrations. The first District
Delivery Programme in Afghanistan has already been approved for
Nad-e Ali which will provide the district government with $1.5m
to provide services according to the priorities of the communities,
and work is now underway to roll DDP out in Gereshk and Marjeh.
26 Afghan line ministries are now represented in
Lashkar Gar, including the Ministries for Rural Reconstruction
and Development; Education; Public Health; Finance; Energy and
Water (including the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority); Public
Works; Transport; Information; Media & Culture and Counter-Narcotics.
There are now 103 schools open in Helmand, up from
47 in December 2007. Forty schools have re-opened across Helmand
since December 2008, four of them built by the PRT and TFH.
Pupil enrolment is rising in Helmand. The latest,
January 2010, figures, show total enrolment of 83,995 pupils:
64,846 male and 19,149 female. This represents an increase of
63% since December 2007. Female enrolment is estimated to have
increased by 34% during this period.
Alongside school construction and refurbishment,
the PRT is funding school supplies; Ministry of Education (MoE)
led teacher training and helping the Department of Education build
its managerial capacity and district outreach capacity.
14.5 Economic Development
The PRT is helping improve farmers' access to markets
through the provision of roads and regional transport links; delivering
more affordable electricity; improving access to finance; providing
vocational training; and increasing support for small businesses.
This will deliver more sustainable jobs and have a key impact
on medium and long term stability in Helmand.
The joint USAID/DFID-funded Lashkar Gah airport opened
in June 2009, allowing over 40 commercial flights a week to land
DFID is financing the further development of the
Agricultural Business Park adjacent to the airport, building on
initial work started with USAID financing. Once complete, the
park will provide small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with
a secure location and services on which to base their businesses.
Over 3,000 loans, totalling over $2m have been dispersed
to small businesses across central Helmand, using DFID funding.
The first national retail bank branch opened in Lashkar Gah in
2007. Two more have opened offices in the province since then.
Mercy Corps, a Helmand based NGO supported by DFID,
has built a new agriculture high school, providing vocational
training for 270 students aged 16-18 each year. Mercy Corps has
also trained over 4,500 farmers, supporting improvements in farming
techniques for almost 50,000 people.
Over the next three years, the DFID-funded £28
million Helmand Growth Programme will help to remove barriers
to economic growth by improving roads and market access, improving
electricity supplies, improving access to credit and providing
vocational training and business support to local farmers and
with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, a large
number of road construction projects are ongoing. Up to 2010,
over 90km of roads have been resurfaced, mainly in the provincial
capital of Lashkar Gah but also 10km of roads in district towns
such as Garmsir, Nad-e Ali, Sangin, Musa Qaleh and Gereshk.
Power: USAID have
financed refurbishment of the second turbine at Kajaki Dam, resulting
in an increase in power supply for Lashkar Gah residents from
four hours a day to anywhere between 12 and 24 hours a day, depending
Planning for the refurbishment of the Gereshk Hydro-electric
plant is underway, which will improve electricity for 50,000 people.
The work itself will be completed by 2013. This project, costing
$60 million, is funded by DFID (over £15 million), the Asian
Development Bank and Denmark.
Water and Irrigation: $1.3
million of improvements to Shamalan Canal has improved irrigation
for 10,000 farmers.
A major Helmand River Basin Study and Master Plan
is being started to re-build the capacity of the Helmand Arghandab
Valley Authority by restoring river and canal gauging stations,
re-creating data records, enabling river and canal modelling,
establishing an asset register and maintenance system.
A DFID-funded UN Habitat programme is providing access
to safe drinking water for some 35,000 people in Lashkar Gah by
installing hand pumps and building new water towers, as well as
improving water, sanitation and roads for local communities through
smaller projects, which have so far benefited 90,000 people.
District Stabilisation: In
the past two years, improvements have been made to roads and drainage
in the District Centres of Sangin, Garmsir, Nad-e Ali, Musa Qaleh,
Gereshk, as well as refurbishment of bazaars in Sangin, Nad-e
Ali and Garmsir.
14.7 Strategic Communications
There are currently five local radio stations in
Helmand, up from one in 2001.
The PRT has funded 18 months of training for Helmandi
journalists and provided the Journalist's Union with a building
and an IT/internet facility to help them conduct research and
The PRT has equipped the Governor's Media Centrethe
only Afghan Government press conference facility outside Kabul.
PRT funding has been allocated to provide Communications
Advisers to District Governors in six key districts. The PRT is
working with the Government Media Centre to develop a campaign
approach to government communications.
In 2008, the PRT supported the establishment of civil
justice institutions, including the Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission Provincial Office and the Land and Tribal Dispute Commission.
A Women and Childrens' Justice Group Independent Commission for
Women and Children's Rights have now been set up, and equipped,
assisted by the PRT, to support local communities and justice
The PRT has supported the provision of a legal defence
capacity in Helmand since 2008.
The PRT worked with the Chief Provincial prosecutor
to place prosecutors in Gereshk, Garmsir, Sangin, Nad-e Ali, Marjeh
In October 2009 Helmand's run down prison was replaced
with the first wing of a new, purpose-built facility. It houses
up to 450 prisoners in an environment that is more secure and
meets Afghan and international standards.
The HPTC delivers basic patrolmen training to up
to 150 new ANP recruits every four weeks on eight week training
courses. In May 2010 approval was granted by the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI) to run specialist leadership training for Police
Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The training for both basic
patrolmen and NCOs is delivered by a combination of UK Ministry
of Defence Police, UK, ISAF and MOI Instructors.
The Provincial Police HQ opened in January 2009.
The PRT provided the office equipment and IT to make the building
operational along with an education and training facility. A cadre
of women police officers completed police training at both Police
HQ and Kabul at the end of 2009 with another cadre of women currently
receiving training on a course that started in May 2010.
The Ministry of Defence Police are deployed in a
number of districts and provide mentorship and training to the
District Chiefs of Police and their police officers on the ground.
The detailed design work for the permanent Helmand
Police Training Academy has been completed and the first phase
is funded by the PRT. This will be a purpose built training facility
that will allow for training of ANP specialist courses, recruit
training and a separate facility for women officers.
The PRT has funded a number of ANP checkpoints, patrol
bases and police HQs in the districts to enable the ANP to operate
as a professional force and continues to project manage a number
of ANP infrastructure projects throughout Helmand.
14.10 Counter Narcotics
Governor Mangal's Counter Narcotics Strategy (also
known as the Food Zone Programme) has contributed to a 33% reduction
in poppy cultivation in Helmand over the past year, (UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey 2009). Cultivation levels
are expected to remain stable in 2010.
This strategy, launched in 2008, was the first provincial
In 2008, as part of this strategy, 3,200 tonnes of
wheat seed was distributed to 32,000 farmers across Helmand, supporting
a transition to legal livelihoods. In 2009, 37,500 farmers across
Helmand received wheat seed and fertiliser. This was followed
up in February 2010 with the distribution of fruit saplings (apricots,
plums and pomegranates) and vines to nearly 1,200 farmers alongside
By the end of May 2010, approximately 27,000 farmers
had received subsidised agricultural inputs, giving them the chance
to boost their agri-business and household income and reducing
farmers' dependency on poppy cultivation.
Governor Led Eradication was conducted in areas where
security conditions allowed and where access to alternative livelihoods
was provided previously. This acts as a means of injecting credible
risk into farmers' future planting decisions.
The PRT is also supporting and mentoring the Counter
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), to assist them with the
interdiction of those involved in the narcotics trade. The numbers
of people from Helmand being convicted of narcotics offences as
a result of CNPA investigations is continually increasing, reflecting
the robust approach to gathering intelligence and evidence.
The government-contracted health supplier is now
able to operate clinics in all priority district centres. In 2006,
there was one district hospital, nine Comprehensive Health Clinics
and 20 Basic Health Clinics in Helmand. In 2009, this has increased
to one provincial hospital, two district hospitals, 15 Comprehensive
Health Clinics, 30 Basic Health Clinics and nine Sub Centres.
Over 400 Health Posts operate across the Province providing basic
health care at a local level. The total number of Health Care
Workers in Helmand is now 1047.
The PRT, through UK and Estonian funding, has improved
facilities at Bost Hospital in Lashkar Gahmeaning it now
meets the standards set by the Ministry of Public Health. Medecins
Sans Frontieres took over the management of Bost Hospital in Oct
14.12 Non-Governmental Organisation
DFID maintains a regular dialogue with NGOs, both
in the UK and in Afghanistan.
Over 50% of DFID aid in Afghanistan is channelled
through Government systems. The Government of Afghanistan and
donor partners reached agreement at the London and Kabul Conferences
to increase assistance through the central government budget to
50% over the next two years. DFID has already achieved this target
but its ability to provide funding, off budget, for civil society
is limited. However, DFID does provide direct and indirect support
for NGOs in: agriculture and rural development, de-mining, business
and private sector development.
The Government of Afghanistan's National Solidarity
Programme works with NGOs as Facilitating Partners which deliver
essential services and support community development throughout
the country. DFID supports the National Solidarity Programme through
contributions to the multi-donor Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
DFID is developing a new civil society programme
called "Tawanmandi"which means "strengthening"
in Dari. The programme will be co-funded with Sweden, Norway,
Denmark and Finland.
In the UK, DFID works with the British Agencies Afghanistan
Group (BAAG), an umbrella organisation for UK-based NGOs with
an interest in Afghanistan. We participate in bi-monthly NGO contact
group meetings hosted by the FCO. In addition, DFID holds regular
meetings and consultations to discuss issues of mutual concern,
including civil-military cooperation.
DFID supported NGO and civil society participation
in the London and Kabul Conferences of January and July 2010.
DFID also supported BAAG and the Agency Coordinating Body for
Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the NGO umbrella organisation in Afghanistan,
in organising a civil society conference on 26 January and ensured
that civil society was represented at the main London Conference
on 28 January.
15. LIST OF
Operation Mar Karadad
was launched in December 2007 with the aim of driving insurgents
from Musa Qaleh district centre and establishing a permanent ANSF/ISAF
presence in the area.
Operation Asada Wosa was
conducted between April and May 2008 with the aim of extending
the influence of ANSF/ISAF forces and the Afghan authorities in
Operation Oqab Tsuka took
place between 22 August and 8 September 2008 to move a second
turbine from Kandahar to the hydro-electric dam in Kajaki. Extensive
support was provided by UK and ISAF assets including close logistics
support and air assets.
Operation Sond Chara took
place in December 2008 to allow further strengthening of the ISAF
position in central Helmand through reinforcement and consolidation
of the security of Lashkar Gah and Nad-e Ali, allowing the provincial
government to expand and deepen their influence.
Operation Panchai Palang
took place between June and July 2009 to set the security conditions
for successful presidential elections in Helmand and to support
an inflow of US troops. Security for the election period was achieved
by disrupting insurgents in the greater Lashkar Gah area and through
continuing to clear Nad-e Ali district to extend the Afghan Government's
influence in the Afghan Development Zone.
Operation Moshtarak is
the 3-phase regional operation, commanded and controlled by Commander
RC(S), to provide security in central Helmand and Kandahar and
to enable freedom of movement on main routes. Operation Moshtarak
Phase 2, planned and conducted by the ANSF in partnership with
ISAF, began in February 2010 to provide security in central Helmand.
Operation Omid Do was
launched on 11 July 2010 to reinstate government authority and
bring security to the area of Yakchal, south-east of Gereshk.
As one of the first major operations entirely planned and executed
under ANA command, mentored by UK forces, it is a significant
milestone in the development of the ANSF.
Operation Tor Shezada
was launched on 30 July 2010 by British troops partnered with
ANSF to continue the momentum generated by Operation Moshtarak
and further squeeze insurgents in central Helmand. It aimed to
clear insurgents from Sayedabad, to the south of Nad-e Ali, and
prevent them from being able to use the area as a base from which
to launch attacks.
Hamkari is the Afghan
government's ongoing initiative in Kandahar to strengthen institutions
of sub-national governance and reduce negative influences. Hamkari
objectives are jointly civil and military and the Afghan-led political
surge is being enabled by better security conditions, delivered
by ANSF and ISAF (mainly US). This military activity takes forward
the third phase of Operation Moshtarak. The UK is contributing
some specialised elements of support but Hamkari does not involve
significant numbers of UK personnel.
16. UK FORCE
16.1 Regional Command (South-West)
Following General McChrystal's Strategic Assessment
in September 2009 and the subsequent uplift in ISAF troop levels,
there are now more international forces in Afghanistan than ever.
The deployment of additional international troops to southern
Afghanistan in early 2010 created a large force in the South and
prompted a review of how troops are managed in the region. Command
of a force this size is beyond the capabilities of a single regional
command headquarters and therefore, in order to provide the most
suitable command and control relationship and to enable the right
level of command focus, the command structure in the South was
divided into two commands: RC(SW), headquartered in Helmand and
consisting of Helmand and Nimruz provinces, and RC(S), headquartered
in Kandahar and consisting of Kandahar, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan and
Zabol provinces. The separation of regional commands along provincial
boundaries also aligned the ISAF military structure in the South
with the structure of the ANA, enabling a greater partnering capacity
between ISAF and ANSF. Since June 2010, UK forces in TFH have
come under the command of RC(SW), commanded by the USMC's Major
General Richard Mills. RC(S) continues under the command of UK
Major General Nick Carter until November 2010, when rotational
command will transfer to the US.
The previous government agreed in principle that
the UK should seek to share command of RC(SW) with the US on a
rotational basis, following the previous command arrangements
in RC(S) where command was shared between the UK, Canada and the
Netherlands on the basis of annual rotation. Once the associated
resource implications of this are fully understood, a final decision
will be sought from the National Security Council.
16.2 Task Force Helmand
There has been further reorganisation of UK and US
forces in Afghanistan below regional command level. TFH have consolidated
their presence in central Helmand by withdrawing from bases in
the north of the province at Musa Qaleh, Kajaki and Sangin. Responsibility
for these areas was transferred to US forces in March, June and
September 2010 respectively. Withdrawal from northern Helmand
has enabled UK troops to further concentrate, and consolidate
gains, in the population centres of central Helmand. As part of
the UK's commitment to this area, the Chief of Joint Operations,
Air Marshal Stuart Peach, accepted an ISAF request for a temporary
deployment of approximately 300 troops from the UK's Theatre Reserve
Battalion, to give commanders additional flexibility to reinforce
progress in central Helmand in Summer 2010.
In addition to the logistics hub at Camp Bastion,
the UK has logistics and combat support troops at Kandahar Airfield.
Pending the completion of a new runway and infrastructure at Camp
Bastion, due to achieve Initial Operation Capability in early
2011, Kandahar Airfield is the only military airfield in southern
Afghanistan able to accommodate the largest transport aircraft.
The Headquarters of RC(S) is also based at Kandahar Airfield and
as well as being responsible for overseeing all operational activity
in RC(S), Major General Nick Carter also coordinates strategic
assets for the region. For example, the command is responsible
for managing intelligence and surveillance assets and close air
support (fast jets), both located at Kandahar airfield. These
assets can be deployed across a large geographical area and are
managed centrally, in order to get the most effect out of them.
16.4 ISAF Responsibilities
In September 2009, General McChrystal, outlined direction
for the campaign in Afghanistan, centred around a population-centric
counterinsurgency strategy and based on the four pillars of Embedded
Partnering, Governance, Operations and Geographic Priorities.
The current commander of ISAF, General Petraeus, has confirmed
his commitment to this approach, with regular reviews of progress.
Partnering. Developing the capability
of the ANSF by pairing up Afghan and International Security Assistance
Force units at all levels so that they are collocated, plan and
conduct missions side-by-side;
Prioritising responsible and accountable governance at both the
national and local levels through both formal and traditional
Gaining the initiative and reversing the insurgency's momentum
through a staged approach which incrementally increases the size,
capability and operational responsibility of the ANSF; and
Priorities. Prioritising Afghan and ISAF
resources to those critical areas where the population is most
threatened, with an initial focus of main effort on Helmand and
Kandahar provinces in southern Afghanistan.
16.5 Afghan Elections 2010
Afghan Parliamentary elections took place on the
18 September 2010. Security for the elections was the responsibility
of the MOI, with the ANSF in the lead. The IJC provided support
to their Afghan partners and the Independent Electoral Commission,
which was consistent with the overall ISAF approach. IJC also
provided support to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the United
Nations Development Programme and international observers upon
17. UK CASUALTY
As of 20 September 2010, 337 UK service personnel
have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001, with 92 fatalities
occurring in 2010. The most recent, detailed casualty and fatality
figures, which cover the period up to 31 August 2010, are provided
17.1 UK AFGHAN
|Very Seriously Injured|
|2010 (to 31 Aug)||51||66
17.2 UK Afghan Fatality Figures by Year
|Year||Killed in Action
||Died of Wounds||Other
|2010 (to 31 Aug)||67||13
17.3 UK Casualties and Fatalities by Month since August
|Very Seriously Injured|
|Killed in Action||Died of|
18. FRIENDLY FIRE
18.1 UK Service Personnel deaths due to friendly fire,
7 October 2001 to 6 September 2010
1. Those where the cause has been confirmed at a coroner's inquest
2. Data starts 7 October 2001, inclusive
3. Data ends 6 September 2010, inclusive.
18.2 UK Service Personnel casualties resulting from Friendly
Action/Fire as reported on the initial NOTICAS (Notification of
Casualty), 7 October 2001 to 15 August 2010
1. Data starts 7 October 2001, inclusive
2. There were four incidents where more than one person was injured.
3. Data up to 15 August 2010.
In the above table, casualty data has been sourced from the initial
Notification of Casualty (NOTICAS) using the Cause Category Friendly
Action/Fire. This a field populated by medical authorities with
the information that is available to them at the time of an incident.
It is not a definitive classification of the event. Not all casualties
will have a NOTICAS raised (those less severe casualties that
do not require hospitalisation), so the numbers presented here
should be treated as the minimum.
18.3 Process for Investigating Alleged Friendly Fire Incidents
Where it is immediately apparent or suspected that there has been
a breach of law or Rules of Engagement, or death, or injury to
friendly forces on operations which involves a shooting incident,
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) policy is that a Serious Incident
Report (SINCREP) is made at the earliest opportunity and they
are passed immediately to the in-Theatre Formation HQ Legal and
Service Police staffs to conduct investigations that will determine
whether and by whom any criminal or Service discipline offence
has been committed and provide information to the coronial system,
In addition to triggering the Joint Casualty and Compassionate
process to enable the notification of the emergency contact and
next of kin (NOK) the SINCREP also notifies the Army Incident
and Notification Cell (AINC) and Chief Environment and Safety
Officer Army in order that they can initiate incident mapping
and, where necessary, deployment of the Land Accident Investigation
Team. Within 48 hours, AINC and the Chain of Command are required
to initiate a Learning Account (LA), which is staffed during operations
as a priority, and submitted to the unit's Formation HQ where
any immediate lessons are identified and passed to other units
for their action. At this point it will also be decided whether
the incident merits an After Action Review (AAR).. A friendly
fire incident will also be reported to the Service police to decide
whether or not to initiate a criminal investigation. If there
is no AAR, the lessons from the LA may be considered in the Counter
Threat Working Group.
The final level of investigation is the completion of a Service
Inquiry which is used to examine the circumstances surrounding
an incident, to determine the facts and to make recommendations
to reduce the possibility of a similar incident happening again
without attributing blame.
19. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
19.1 Overarching Policy
The protection of the Afghan civilian population is at the core
of the international military strategy and the importance of this
was recognised by the international community in the Communiqué
which was released at the Kabul Conference on 20 July, which states
"Participants recognized that civilian casualties and protection
of civilians are of great concern and noted that most civilian
casualties are caused by insurgent attacks. Participants regretted
the death of every Afghan and international civilian, and Afghan
and international military forces remain committed to the objective
of a steady reduction in the rate of civilian casualties."
ISAF has worked extremely hard to reduce the levels of civilian
casualties and has introduced new rules to govern the use of force
which are laid out in ISAF Directives. As Commander ISAF, General
Petraeus has committed to building on the efforts of his predecessor,
General McChrystal, in this area.
UK forces in Afghanistan also make every effort to avoid civilian
casualties in line with the ISAF direction outlined in the Commander
ISAF Tactical Directive Revision 1, dated 1 August 2010. This
is currently classified as Secret but an unclassified version
of the previous COMISAF Directive dated 6 July 2009 is available.
19.2 Investigation Procedures
There are strict procedures, frequently updated in light of experience,
intended both to minimise the risk of casualties occurring and
to investigate any incidents that do happen. The procedures followed
after a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident by both the UK and
ISAF chain of command are set out below. The two processes run
in parallel but are independent and the reports cross from one
chain of command to another. This is to ensure that the neutrality
of the processes is maintained.
The Afghan operational theatre is a non-international armed conflict
with an insurgent enemy. This provides a difficult and complex
environment in which to identify enemy forces (EF) and the role
which other individuals who may or may not be civilians are playing
in the hostilities. The result of this is that careful judgement
has to be exercised before engaging to ensure that those being
engaged are legitimate targets.
19.3 UK Shooting Incident Review (SIR) Policy
The most recent issue of the UK SIR policy was on 4 January 2010
and it is regularly reviewed. The first report of all shooting
incidents is the Serious Incident Report (SINCREP). This report
is sent by the military unit involved to their unit operations
room in the first instance. It will then be forwarded as appropriate
up the Chain of Command. From the SINCREP, the Commanding Officer
(CO) of the Battlegroup must make one of three decisions:
only positively identified enemy forces have been killed or injured
and there is no suggestion of any breach of the Laws of International
Armed Conflict (LOAC) or Rules of Engagement (ROE) then no further
action will be necessary.
civilians may have been killed or injured although there is no
indication that LOAC/ROE have been breached an SIR should be initiated.
it appears there may have been a breach of the ROE or LOAC or
a friendly fire incident or any other circumstances deemed appropriate
then the incident is reported to the Service police.
If a SIR is required then it should be completed
within 48 hours and should set out the detailed facts to enable
the CO to conclude if any further action is required. The review
is to be conducted by an officer of at least the rank of Captain,
who was not involved in the incident. The review will involve
the collation of all documents, ledgers and logs that deal with
the incident, as well as reports from those present. At the conclusion
of the SIR the CO will have three options, depending on its outcome:
inform the Service police; recommend an investigation from within
unit resources; or take no further action.
If a service police investigation or unit investigation
is commenced this may or may not lead to disciplinary proceedings.
Any investigation will clearly produce documentation and a report.
A Service Police investigation will be conducted
in the usual manner in accordance with the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE), including the taking of statements and, in
most cases, the interviewing of suspects after caution. This will
produce a report which will be sent to the relevant authority.
A unit investigation will be less formal than a Service Police
one and will not be conducted in accordance with PACE. A unit
investigation will report to the CO who will then decide if disciplinary
action is appropriate.
19.5 ISAF CIVCAS Procedures
The primary difference between national investigations
and ISAF ones is the purpose of them. While a national investigation
is to establish what happened with a view to taking action for
any potential offences and to examine Tactics Techniques and Procedures
(TTPs), the ISAF process is aimed at establishing what happened,
to examine TTPs and assist in providing an explanation to local
nationals and GIRoA. ISAF has no disciplinary powers over troops
which are deployed under national service laws. The essence of
the ISAF investigations is to record CIVCAS allegations and learn
the lessons to improve TTPs in the future. A procedure for Initial
Assessment Teams (IAT) to be deployed from ISAF Joint Command
(IJC) in the immediate aftermath of a CIVCAS incident to report
on it has also recently been established.
The source of the ISAF CIVCAS investigation procedures
is the Escalation of Force (EoF) Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP). The first indication of a CIVCAS incident will again be
a SINCREP. The first appearance of this in an ISAF system will
be as an entry in Joint Operations Centre Watch (JOCWATCH). This
is a real time computer version of an Operations Log on to which
all incidents are reported. If CIVCAS appears to be a possibility
then this will be reported on the JOCWATCH entry.
If there is a CIVCAS possibility the unit concerned
will be required to provide a First Impressions Report (FIR) within
24 hours and a Second Impressions Report (2IR) within 48 hours.
The first report is the bare details of what happened while the
second is to give a full explanation along with any appropriate
documentation. As a result of the reports, alterations to TTPs
may be recommended or direction may be given on alterations to
ROE etc. The reports are archived by the HQ ISAF CIVCAS Cell.
If there is a large scale CIVCAS incident, COMISAF may direct
a large scale investigation.
Depending on the nature of the incident the IJC may
decide to deploy an IAT to conduct a short on the spot assessment.
This team typically consists of three people including a lawyer
who will conduct fact finding with the unit and, where possible,
at the location of the incident. The purpose of the IAT is to
conduct a more thorough investigation than the FIR/2IR process.
On occasions the IAT will also have Afghan members. As well as
taking accounts from troops involved it will liaise with the local
authorities to provide an initial explanation of the incident.
The IAT will produce a report which will be shared with the unit
and its Chain of Command and may make recommendations as to changes
in procedures. It may also conclude that in fact the CIVCAS was
as a result of an engagement that was lawful and within the ROE
and no blame could be attached to ISAF forces. IAT reports will
be archived with the CIVCAS Cell at HQ ISAF.
19.6 Civilian Casualty Numbers
The UK does not collate, publish or hold figures
of civilian casualties in Afghanistan because of the immense difficulty
and risks of collecting robust data. The operational environment
in Afghanistan makes it difficult to monitor the overall number
of civilian casualties. Among the complicating factors is the
removal in some cases of the dead and/or injured by local nationals
before investigations could feasibly take place (Islam directs
that bodies must be buried within 24 hours). UK forces may also
need to vacate an area before an accurate assessment of the numbers
of fatalities and casualties could be made and it is not feasible
to have personnel on the ground at the site of each attack to
ascertain the numbers of those killed or injured, particularly
if the attack is airborne. It is therefore impossible to estimate
with any confidence the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan
that have been caused by the current conflict. However, where
we are aware that a civilian casualty has occurred, a full investigation,
as outlined above, is undertaken.
It should be noted that insurgents routinely make
false and exaggerated claims about civilian casualties caused
by ISAF and Afghan forces; care must be taken not to accept their
accounts at face value.
20. COST OF
The Defence Budget is not used to fund the additional
costs of current operationsthey are met from the Treasury
Reserve. HMT funds the net additional costs MoD has incurred,
but not the costs that the Department would have incurred regardless
of the operation taking place (eg salaries). Any savings on activities
that have not occurred because of the operation (eg training exercises)
are also taken into account in arriving at the net figures.
Defence Resources can provide the actual net operating
and capital costs of operations in Afghanistan funded by the Treasury,
which to March 2010 totalled c£9.5 billion. However, given
the Department's purpose and how it is funded, it is not possible
to identify which elements of the core Defence budget are being
spent in Afghanistan.
THE ANNUAL AUDITED FIGURES FOR THE COSTS
OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2001-02
THE ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AT MAIN
ESTIMATE FOR FY 2010-11
|Total Resource DEL||£2,940M
|Total Capital DEL||£1,496M
|Total Estimated Costs||£4,436M
These figures conform to HM Government's Clear Line of Sight
(CLoS), or Alignment, project and do not account for Cost of Capital,
nor do they include the cost of provisions
In addition, the MoD contributes (along with the FCO and DFID)
to the tri-departmental Conflict Pool (formerly Global Conflict
Prevention PoolGCPP) for which the allocation and spend
for Afghanistan 2002-present is given below.
GCPP allocated no funding to Afghan in FY01/02, and between
FY 02/03 and FY07/08 funding for Counter Narcotics work is treated
21. LOGISTICS SUPPLY
Passenger Airbridge: The primary passenger air bridge,
or Air Line Of Communication (ALOC), runs five TriStar C2 / KC1
aircraft per week on the route Brize NortonAkrotiriKandahar
and back. The C2 variant is the passenger carrying variant and
can carry 190 passengers and baggage to Afghanistan; the KC1 variant
is a tanker/freight/passenger combination aircraft which can carry
The Second Air Line Of Communication (2ALOC) uses a twice weekly
civilian charter flight into Minhad, and then a C17 to move directly
into Bastion. This route is surged by up to five flights per week
during the Relief in Place (RiP).
Freight Airbridge: The regular strategic freight
airbridge is provided by six C17 flights per week and six charter
aircraft (DC8s & A300s) per week. These are often augmented
by outsize lift Antonov and Ilyushin aircraft for the movement
of outsize loads to theatre. The charter/military freight split
is 57% / 43% (January-June 2010) moving approximately 150 tonnes
per week on military aircraft and 200 tonnes per week on charter
Whilst operating under considerable pressure, the airbridge is
providing a robust service to theatre and the recent statistics
for August 2010 show that 73% of passengers flying from UK to
Afghanistan arrived on time with 89% arriving within three hours
of the planned arrival time. Over the past 12 months, 55,421 passengers
have been flown to Afghanistan with the RAF TriStars flying 33,565,
2ALOC charter / RAF C17 17,982 and 3,874 on RAF C17 direct to
and from the UK.
The complexity of interacting factors including diplomatic clearances,
access to slot times in Afghanistan, requirement for defensive
aids for the aircraft, passenger aircraft being restricted to
take off and landing in the dark and last minute changes to accommodate
high priority aero medical evacuation tasks all contribute to
the challenge of operating the airbridge.
Currently, the most significant issue is one of aircraft availability.
All UK aircraft carrying passengers into theatre are required
to have Theatre Entry Standard (TES) protection systems and the
fitting of these state-of-the-art systems has proven to be a complex
and lengthy process, taking aircraft out of the transport fleet
for the duration of the modification work. The availability of
TriStars, particularly the C2 variant is also significantly
impacted by maintenance and modification programmes to address
obsolescence issues and ageing aircraft problems. The introduction
of the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft, scheduled to replace
TriStar in mid-2013 will resolve these problems.
Charter aircraft used by MoD to carry freight into Afghanistan
have to be compliant with Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) regulations.
The CAA recently withdrew the UK licence for two of the three
companies which operate DC 8 aircraft on safety grounds. This
has had a significant impact as the DC 8 aircraft can operate
directly into Camp Bastion (BSN) whilst the Airbus A300 aircraft
can only operate into Kandahar resulting in an increased burden
on the Tactical Air Transport fleet. The opening of the new runway
in BSN in 2011 will help resolve this issue.
In addition to the airbridge, an option known as Op SUNDERLAND
is also used. This involves transporting equipment, including
UOR vehicles which cannot transit through Pakistan because of
security considerations, to Cyprus or the UAE where they are then
transferred to charter or C17 aircraft. This method reduces the
reliance on the SLOC through Pakistan and allows the reverse leg
to be used to remove obsolescent and damaged equipment from theatre.
21.2 Pakistan Surface Line of Communication
The Pakistan Surface Line of Communication (SLOC), which enables
deliveries into Afghanistan by road, runs between Karachi Port
and the two primary border crossing points (BXP) into Afghanistan;
Chamen BXP (north of Quetta) and Torkham BXP (in the vicinity
of the Khyber Pass.
While the Pakistan floods have not disrupted the SLOC, customs
processes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan can be slow, bureaucratic
and result in delays to the delivery of routine freight. Continual
in-Theatre engagement is required to obtain Afghan Tax Exemption
certificates and Pakistan customs clearances. At SHAPE's request,
and on behalf of ISAF, the British High Commission Islamabad with
support from PJHQ is seeking to assist the Pakistani authorities
in resolving the issues on their side of the border. In Afghanistan,
ISAF has the lead on ensuring a solution can be found within the
bounds of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA). The UK will
continue to concentrate on promoting improvements in the ISAF
process and working with the British Embassy Kabul and Afghan
Government Ministries to clear UK consignments. The recently established
In-Theatre MTA Joint Coordination Board will assist in resolving
friction points and the establishment of a Customs Coordination
Cell with UK representation will help to further improve understanding
21.3 Northern Distribution Network (NDN)
NATO has provided a significant logistic benefit by enabling a
network of routes to Afghanistan through Northern Europe, Russia
and the Central Asian States to complement the Pakistan SLOC through
a series of NATO Transit Agreements (NATO TA) open to all NATO
and non-NATO ISAF members. The UK has led the NDN trials on behalf
of NATO. As the largest anticipated user of the NDN (after the
US) it is anticipated that some of the other ISAF contributing
nations will follow the UK lead. Consignments are restricted to
non-warlike goods. In order to continue the development of the
NDN, further work is being undertaken to reduce Diplomatic Clearance
timelines and to negotiate expanding the types of commodities
carried to include warlike stores and to expand upon the NATO
TAs to enable a two way flow of freight.
21.4 HERRICK Campaign Support Plan (HCSP)
The HCSP is an operational level plan owned by the Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO). It represents a change in HERRICK campaign support,
drawing on strategic direction from the MoD whilst bringing together
a range of inputs from the wider support community. It promotes
both continuity and stability for the support elements of the
campaign in Afghanistan, allowing CJO to guide the logistic effort
more effectively. It is framed around Decisive Conditions (DCs)
(those things which need to be achieved/occur) set against a specific
timeline (currently ending 2015) to meet the Mission.
Progress is in line with expectations albeit that some DCs have
moved to reflect more realistic and mature timelines. Current
headline issues are:
sufficient relevant material in theatre.
Information Systems to enable a well managed joint inventory.
a robust supply governance regime.
all lines of communication in and out of theatre.
for effective Transition.
21.5 Contractor Support to Operations (CSO)Op
The UK military is increasingly making use of CSO
in Afghanistan, as reflected in the growth in the number of contractors
in-theatre and the increasing range of capabilities that they
provide. From July 2008 to July 2010 the number of companies supporting
the UK in theatre increased from 22 to 67 and the number of contractor
personnel deployed in theatre from 2,030 to 4,867. The latter
number is considered to be conservative, with a further estimated
500-1,000 contractors (mainly Afghans) working on in-theatre contracts.
The UK also utilises a number of NATO contracts for support, such
as for fuel and for rotary wing freight movement.
The range of support provided through CSO is indicated
below. This list is not exhaustive:
|Theatre Support Contracts
||External Support Contract||System Support Contracts
|Supply of construction resources
Rotary Wing Freight
Construction of infrastructure
Provision of low value goods
|Operation & Maintenance of UK infrastructure|
Real Life Support (eg catering, laundry) to UK personnel
Food and Water supply
Medical and welfare support
|Contractor Logistic Support for equipment systems|
Communication System support
SATCOM system support
Operation and Maintenance of some UOR systems
The MoD and contractors are currently implementing the findings
of a joint MoD-Industry 2009 study which provided a number of
recommendations to reduce MoD's cumulative risk, increase MoD's
assurance to contractors and better integrate the military and
contractors into a "Total Support Force" which will
best utilise the strengths of each.
21.6 Afghan First Policy (A1P)
While the UK military makes use, where essential, of UK and third
country contractors, an Afghan First Policy is practised; seeking
where possible to use Afghan contractors based in the country.
This is seen as a key element in achieving stabilisation and stimulating
and developing the Afghan economy. By spending money in Afghanistan
rather than on Afghanistan the UK can not only contribute
to economic rejuvenation by maximising local procurement and encouraging
legitimate business growth, but also realise benefits of winning
influence amongst the local community. In addition, local purchase
also reduces the amount of materiel sent from the UK and means
MoD can source goods at a lower price.
Operating alongside the US (which also has an A1P) and the NGO
Peace Dividend Trust, a series of Afghan Business Conferences
have been held to make local contractors aware of our requirements
and let contracts for a variety of goods. In addition, by encouraging
competition and widening the contractor base for the supply of
aggregates, theatre have achieved significant cost reductions.
A1P also addresses the training of local personnel where appropriate
and the screening of contractors to ensure that funds are not
channelled to malign actors, towards the insurgents or those involved
21.7 Equipment Sustainability System (ESS)
In order to provide the best possible equipment availability to
the Operational Commander, the ESS Programme is designed to undertake
deep repair and maintenance (regeneration) in theatre. By carrying
out repair and maintenance in Camp Bastion, this programme negates
the requirement for each vehicle to be returned to the UK for
maintenance. In addition to improving availability of vehicles
and other equipment in Afghanistan, it will save over £50
million per year in equipment rotation costs and reduce the demands
on the airbridge. As well as maintenance, ESS will deliver a Heavy
Repair Facility, significantly increasing the capacity to repair
damaged vehicles on site.
Full Regeneration Capability of ESS will commence from 1 October
2010 and grow in capacity over the first 18 months of the three
year contract gradually regenerating more of the HERRICK operational
fleet. By mid 2011 numerous platforms will be undergoing regeneration
including SUPPORT VECHILE, HEAVY EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER, MASTIFF,
RIDGBACK, WHEELED TANKER, JACKAL 2, COYOTE and ROUGH TERRAIN CONTAINER
HANDLER. It is intended that as much forward repair and regeneration
as possible will take place as ESS matures including Explosive
Ordnance Device and Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) equipment.
21.8 Multinational Support Solutions
In order to reduce costs, improve interoperability and share responsibility,
MoD has engaged in multinational support solutions. Examples of
Rotary WingISAF nations work together
to fund (through NATO) and utilise contracted helicopters to provide
cargo lift for the sustainment of ISAF throughout theatre. This
allows military support helicopters to focus on operations in
direct support of ISAF/ANSF.
Mobility SupportThe UK has committed
to a NATO initiative to scope multinational logistics support
for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles (MASTIFF,
Logistics PatrolsUK & US Logistic
units combine requirements and resources to deliver sustainment
stocks to Forward Operating Bases within the RC(SW), thus optimising
the logistics footprint and reducing the unnecessary exposure
of personnel to insurgent activity.
Life Support (RLS)/Theatre Air Port of Delivery (APOD) FacilitiesThrough
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) (as the lead organisation)
nations work together to fund and operate RLS/APOD facilities
that enable Kandahar Air Field (KAF) as the theatre APOD and Dispersed
Operating Base. The same construct has been applied to the military
estate at Kabul International Airport.
Theatre Airlift Support (ITAS)Nations
work together to pool Tactical Air Transport assets and offer
spare capacity to each other, thus optimising the Tactical Air
Transport and logistics footprint.
21.9 Logistics Information Systems (Log IS)
Due to the inherent end-to end nature of the military
logistics process, the logistics IS requirement in Theatre is
complextrying to deliver logistics support over poor infrastructure
to moving locations where demand surges in an often unpredictable
fashion and in a changing tactical situation influenced by the
enemy. The Log IS deployed to Theatre are mostly ageing legacy
applications and they need to be renewed in order to be effective
and robust. Progress has been made but until all the new systems
are fielded, Log IS will remain a principal area of risk.
The primary logistics applications cover the following
Support including Engineering and Asset Management for land equipment
and Air/helicopter assets. This is essential to maximise availability
of assets, exploit the savings associated with Whole Fleet Management,
and ensure the crucial safety-relevant aspects of asset management
Chain Management including Deployed Inventory Management, In Transit
Visibility and Air Movement processes.
Decision Support including a variety of tools which supports the
logistic commander ability to conduct support and planning.
22. CURRENT EQUIPMENT
22.1 Key Issues
Afghanistan is a demanding operational environment,
in terms of its physical characteristics, the threats to our forcesarticularly
the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threatand a persistent,
determined and adaptive enemy. We must recognise that most equipment
has to be a compromise with inevitable trade-offs to produce the
best overall solution (eg between levels of vehicle protection
and the need for mobility). Nevertheless, our equipment is widely
recognised as being better than ever before.
We are procuring increasingly bespoke and sophisticated
equipment for Afghanistanfor example, some of our cutting
edge protected mobility vehicles. But more complex equipment is
often accompanied by long lead-times for its delivery and fielding;
there are usually no simple, rapid solutionsalthough done
urgently, it necessarily takes time. This applies equally to the
increased training requirement and it is vital that we have sufficient
numbers to provide for pre-deployment training in a representative
environment, and for attrition reserve purposes.
In a constantly evolving operational situation, notably
the need to counter new enemy tactics, roles change and develop,
and equipment requirements must reflect these changes. This may
impose constraints on operational freedom which will be mitigated
by progressive improvements to capability over time and sensible
planning by operational commanders (eg restrictions on the use
of SNATCH Land Rover off-base).
We have consistently improved helicopter capability.
The baseline for this has been November 2006, since when we have
doubled the number of battlefield helicopters and have seen flying
hours increase by 140%. [Note: Only the percentage increases in
helicopters and flying hours are made public, for operational
We have achieved this through a combination of increasing
the number of aircraft and maximising delivery of capability through
efficient logistic support.
There are a number of different helicopters from
all the Services deployed in Afghanistan, performing a variety
of roles. Chinook, Merlin and Sea King Mk4 helicopters enable
the essential movement of men and materiel around the battle space,
whilst Lynx helicopters provide the light utility support. The
Apache helicopter delivers an attack/armed capability, whilst
the Sea King Mk7 contributes to the Information, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) task.
An additional eight helicopters will be delivered
to the Chinook Force from the Mk 3 Reversion Programme by December
2010the first three of these aircraft have already been
delivered for training purposes, and the remaining five will be
delivered by the end of 2010. These aircraft will provide resilience
within the Chinook Force, enabling the deployment of additional
capability to theatre and allowing a greater contribution to vital
pre-deployment operational training. In addition, a programme
is in place to provide the whole fleet with more powerful T55-714
engines, increasing their ability to operate "hot and high"
and improving flight safety.
The installation of up-rated engines to the entire
Lynx Mk 9 fleet has allowed these helicopters to operate in Afghanistan
during the summer months, providing for the first time a Light
Helicopter capability on a year round operational basis.
Whilst we will always be able to use more helicopters,
there is a requirement to balance the number of deployed aircraft
with the need to sustain their use with the number of aircraft
and crews deployed. Our ability to generate sufficient numbers
of operationally capable crews and engineers is fundamental to
the sustainment of our battlefield helicopter capability and therefore
22.3 Protected Mobility (PM)
In total, over £1.8 billion has been approved
for over 1,800 new Protected Mobility Vehicles for operations
since 2006, including MASTIFF, RIDGBACK, JACKAL, and Tactical
Support Vehicles. MoD has bought WARTHOG vehicles to replace the
VIKING on operations in Afghanistan, providing improved protection
to troops; the first vehicles deploying from this September for
operational use in Afghanistan.
Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs), funded by
the Treasury, are providing the in-theatre requirement, the requirement
for pre-deployment collective and individual training, and an
"attrition reserve" to off-set operational losses, and
the situation is improving month-on-month with regard to the delivery
Most recently, the inflow of significant numbers
of alternative platformsSNATCH VIXEN PLUS and HUSKYhas
been sufficient for the use of all SNATCH 2A Land Rover and VECTOR
vehicles "outside the wire" to cease before the end
of April 2010. We are also urgently progressing with delivery
of the next generation of Light Protected Patrol Vehicles (LPPV)
which will, in due course, succeed SNATCH VIXEN PLUS. Responses
to the Invitation to Tender were received from two contenders
and Force Protection Europe has been selected as the preferred
bidder. The chosen LPPV will represent leading edge technology,
providing the best currently available balance between protection,
weight and agility; LPPV has been specifically designed to meet
our requirements and will provide unprecedented levels of blast
protection for vehicles of this size and weight.
Notwithstanding the progress that has been and continues
to be made, no vehiclenot even MASTIFFis completely
invulnerable. All armour can, at some point, be overmatched. We
will continue to suffer casualties as a consequence of the ever-evolving
threat and the operational demands, not because of shortcomings
in protected vehicles. Physical protection necessarily forms only
one layer of protectiontactics, techniques and procedures,
such alternative route planning, are also critically important.
22.4 Dismounted Close Combat (DCC) Equipment
Enhanced Combat Body Armour is still used in transit
and on larger, less threatened bases, but everybody in Afghanistan
who needs it has a variant of OSPREY body armour. All front-line
troops are issued with OSPREY body armour, and Mk 6A helmets.
OSPREY ASSAULT and Mark 7 helmets are being issued, and offer
advantages in terms of comfort and freedom of movement. But the
current OSPREY body armour and Mk 6A helmets provide exactly the
same outstanding ballistic protection and is available nowand
will continue to be availableto everybody who needs it.
22.5 Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
2009 saw a step change in the threat posed by IEDs
in Afghanistan, with an unprecedented increase in their number.
In response, the MoD has invested significant resource and effort
into countering IEDs. A C-IED Task Force has been established,
manned by a niche of highly motivated and trained personnel, which
plays a significant part in developing C-IED capability, including
PM vehicles and specialist equipment. Among the non-specialist
equipment now being fielded are Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMDs)
known as VALLON, which are provided to all UK foot patrols in
Afghanistan. UORs have been approved for more HHMDs, in addition
to new robots and remote control vehicles, and MoD is also investing
in new C-IED facilities for training and intelligence.
The Prime Minister announced on 10 June 2010 that
up to a further £67 million is to be allocated to the C-IED
campaign. This includes over £40 million for more protected
vehicles for use by our C-IED teams in Afghanistan. Funding will
also be availablemore than £11 millionfor more
Remote Control Vehicles. The remaining funds will be used to enhance
other critical capabilities, including enhancements to our military
working dog capability.
22.6 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
ISTAR includes air and land capabilities, ranging
from manned aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), for
example REAPER and HERMES 450, to base protection (eg cameras).
We have successfully deployed the RN's Sea King Airborne Surveillance
and Control helicopters and the joint Army/RAF ASTOR system as
complementary capabilities to improve ISTAR in theatre. Our UAS
capability is improving and a new UASWATCHKEEPERwill
be introduced later this year to replace HERMES 450. Steady improvements
to our ISTAR capability incrementally increase our situational
awareness through the collection and dissemination of ISTAR data,
a vital element in mitigating the operational threat.
We continue to work with our Alliesprincipally
the USto ensure that we can share secure information in
a timely manner.
22.7 Fast Air Close Air Support (CAS)
Since July 2009 the Fast Air CAS capability has been
provided by TORNADO GR4 aircraft based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF)
as part of an international pool of aircraft. Eight TORNADO GR4s
are based at KAF on a permanent basis with an additional two deployed
temporarily until 31 October 2010, in response to a request from
Commander ISAF for additional CAS support around the Afghan Parliamentary
Elections on 18 September.
CAS aircraft deliver a range of non-kinetic and precise,
scalable kinetic effects as well as Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) in direct support to ISAF Forces. The
crews are well versed in the rules of engagement and the need
to minimise civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure
and only operate under control of a qualified Forward Air Controller
(FAC) who is normally on the ground embedded with friendly forces.
In many cases a "Show of Presence" or "Show
of Force", where the aircraft is flown in an increasingly
aggressive manner, is sufficient to disperse insurgents, enabling
friendly forces to break contact and reposition. On occasion however,
when insurgents can not be dissuaded by non-kinetic means, the
aircraft's own 30mm cannon, BRIMSTONE missiles and/or PAVEWAY
Mk IV precision guided bombs can be brought to bear to provide
In the ISR role the Raptor pod is carried and provides
high quality imagery rapidly to ground forces; this can be supplemented
by imagery from the laser targeting pod that can be linked directly
to the FAC and the troops on the ground.
UK aircraft can be tasked with providing support
to ISAF troops across Afghanistan, however, their tasks are mainly
conducted in the South and South-West where UK forces are based.
The provision of precise, timely air-delivered effect is often
decisive in assisting friendly forces in contact with the insurgents
whilst the provision of accurate and relevant ISR product often
helps them avoid trouble in the first place.
See also Annex E (Security classified, not publicly
availableavailable to Committee Members at Defence Committee
23.1 Harmony Guidelines and Pinch Points
Harmony is a measure of the number of nights individuals
spend away from home (separated service) over a given period.
Harmony guidelines differ between the three services and are given
as a ratio of days separated service within a period of so many
years. For the RN the ratio is 660 days in a three year period
(or 61% of the time), for the RAF 280:2 (39%) and the Army 415:2.5
(46%). On occasion, these guidelines are breached.
23.2 Royal Navy Harmony
As RN harmony guidelines permit greater tempo than
Army and RAF counterparts, it is less likely that Royal Marine
(RM) units or individuals have breached or will breach harmony
guidelines. However, the tempo of activity for RM units has been
higher than Army units currently rotating through HERRICK cycles
due to regular amphibious deployments in between HERRICK tours.
In general, over the period of operations in Afghanistan, individuals
in breach of the harmony guidelines have been very limited and
often as a consequence of HERRICK deployments combined with time
In the RN, the following trades have been identified
as "pinch points" which have been subject to a degree
of disruption to Harmony.
Support Squadronparticularly over
the periods HERRICK 5 to HERRICK 9. The pressure has now reduced
due to Army ranks taking on the Armoured Support role in theatre.
EngineersDirectorate of Naval Personnel
(DNPERS) have increased the trained strength to cope with increased
WeaponsDNPERS have increased the
trained strength to cope with increased demand.
Leaderslengthy courses (command
and specialist) add to the operational separated service bill
that has to be carefully managed by DNPERS.
The Directorate of Naval Personnel is confident these
groups have been managed sufficiently. The RN has not breached
its harmony guidelines in any great number over the past three
years and does not expect to do so over the forthcoming three
years as a consequence of HERRICK deployments.
23.3 Army Harmony
In the Army, in addition to individual harmony guidelines,
the impact of extended operational commitments on the Army's people
is also measured through unit harmony, the target for which is
an interval between operational tours of no less than 24 months.
Due to the way in which the different corps deploy their personnel
on operations, unit tour interval statistics are maintained only
for the Infantry, Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) and Royal Artillery
(RA). Given that this is a measure of unit activity, they are
not maintained for pinch point trades. A tour interval can be
established for the vast majority of units, aside from six of
the 14 units in the RA, who deploy at sub-unit strength as part
of larger formations rather than at unit strength. Taken across
these three Corps, the current average of the most recent tour
intervals for individual units is 22 months. This is broken down
by Corps, as follows:
average tour interval is 26 months, with 15 of the 36 Infantry
battalions breaching the 24 month guideline.
average tour interval is 21 months, with five of the 10 units
breaching the 24 month guideline.
those units where a tour interval can be established, the average
is 21 months. Of the 14 units in total (which includes those units
for which a tour interval cannot be established); six are breaching
the 24 month guideline.
The unit tour interval is in effect only an approximate
guide to the impact of the current operational tempo on individuals.
The natural flow of personnel through the Army (through recruitment
activity, discharges and transfers between units) means that not
all those who deploy with a particular unit will deploy again
on the next occasion. Moreover, many individuals, even within
the Infantry, RAC and RA deploy either as individual augmentees
or within sub-units. Such deployments are not, of course, captured
by the unit tour interval measure. In addition, not all personnel
with a particular unit will deploy on every occasionat
any one time and for a number of reasons a proportion of a unit's
personnel is always listed as "unable to deploy".
Separated service statistics for the Army are collected
from a combination of data on the Joint Personnel Administration
and Unicom systems. The most recent statistics, as at 1 July 2010,
show that 6% of current Trained Strength and 5% of Gurkhas are
exceeding the guideline of 415 days in 30 months.
23.4 RAF Harmony
For the RAF, as at 1 July 2010, 97% of personnel
had met individual harmony guidelines. In addition, the RAF applies
a filter to Individual harmony guideline figures, to include only
nights away due to operations or operational training both in
the UK and abroad to give an operational harmony guideline of
no more than 125 nights away from home in a rolling 20-month period.
88% of personnel met this guideline.
Within the RAF the following trades have been identified
as operational 'pinch points' which have been subject to a degree
of disruption to Harmony:
Air Traffic Control, Intelligence, RAF Regiment, Medical, Medical
AircrewWeapons Systems Operator.
TradesGeneral Technician (Mechanical),
RAF Regiment Gunner, Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Analyst
(Voice), Logisitics (Movements).
Eleven out of the twelve trades / branches have shown
improvement in meeting the guidelines. While detailed analysis
would be necessary to provide comprehensive reasons for these
improvements, it can be suggested that the cessation of Operation
TELIC in Iraq has reduced the deployment commitments of the RAF
within the two-year rolling period. The largest breaches are in
RAF Regiment and Intelligence trades/branches. Most deployments
for RAF Regiment or Intelligence roles are 180 days (six months)
long and require extensive pre-deployment training. Therefore
they are more likely to breach harmony guidelines on one deployment,
in comparison to other trades/branches whose commitments are usually
120 days (four months) and require less pre-deployment training.
24. PRE DEPLOYMENT
The overall policy for pre-deployment training is
defined and prioritised by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)
Joint Commanders' Operational Training Requirement (JCOTR). The
broad process for RN (including Royal Marines(RM)) and RAF personnel
is set out below. Personnel from both services also receive, as
appropriate, the more specialist Afghan-specific training provided
to Army personnel and set out at 24.2 and 24.3.
24.2 RN (RM) PDT
Royal Marine units are force generated in the same
manner as their Army counterparts. Royal Marine units are initially
trained under the RN's Littoral Manoeuvre training programme before
being delivered to Collective Training Level 4 (CT4) at the start
of HERRICK PDT (six months out). The only difference to the above
is for Individual Augmentation training for RM and RN ranks. This
is conducted by the RN Mobilisation and Mounting Centre (RNMMC).
Courses are delivered in accordance with PJHQ Individual PDT Policy
and liaison across the RNMMC and Land Forces Operational Training
and Advisory Group (OPTAG) is very effective.
24.3 RAF PDT
RAF personnel must maintain currency with their Common
Core Skills training, which is conducted at their local Force
Protection (RAF Regiment) Training Flight. This involves weapon
training, handling and shooting practice; combat first aid; and
revision and practice of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear (CBRN). The RAF has two types of pre-deployment training,
as stipulated by PJHQ: Individual and Formed Unit PDT. Individual
PDT differs depending on whether personnel may be required to
deploy within or outside the confines of a defensive location,
the former a five-day package and the latter a 10-day package
to cover more extensive deployment skills. Some personnel may
also undertake specific individual pre deployment training for
their specialised role. For those deploying as Formed Units (currently
only RAF Force Protection Wings and supporting personnel), personnel
will complete six month mission specific training delivered at
the RAF Force Protection Centre by the Operational Training Advisory
and Standardisation Squadron.
24.4 Army PDT
Land Forces troops preparing for operations in Afghanistan
begin their formal training 24 months before deployment. The revised
training cycle, known as the Campaign Formation Operational Readiness
Mechanism (C-FORM) has recently been introduced. This consists
principally of two sequential elements:
Foundation Training (HFT)HFT trains
individuals, units and formations (force elements) for Hybrid
For realism and relevance, the training environment is matched
as closely as possible to the contemporary operating environment.
Force elements use both core equipment and, if available and applicable
for a named operation, equipment used currently on operations.
Specific Training (MST)MST encompasses
both individual and collective training and delivers force elements
that are able to operate on a defined operation with defined capabilities.
It is conducted predominately using equipment used currently on
operations. On completion of MST, force elements are able to operate
in a complex, Joint, multi-national and inter-agency environment.
24.5 Counter IED Training
Pre-deployment training includes general education
on different types of IEDs, enemy tactics and what signs soldiers
should look out for. Soldiers will also cover in depth the drills
used in Afghanistan to ensure that the force is as well protected
as possible against the IED threat. Headquarters staff are trained
on IED scenarios to ensure that they can provide the most appropriate
response available. The level and detail of training provided
is dependent on the role of the individual. Every soldier deploying
on the ground has an awareness of the threat and can operate a
Hand Held Metal Detector. Drills are continued in theatre to ensure
that the very latest data and situational awareness is passed
24.6 Cultural Awareness Training
All soldiers receive briefings on the culture and
people of Afghanistan in order to place military operations in
the context of the people the mission is seeking to support. All
personnel also receive an introduction to local languages, including
the use of basic words and phrases, which are issued on a language
card. Commanders receive additional information on relevant aspects
of local culture and the effective use of interpreters. Cultural
Specialists receive extensive additional training appropriate
to their role.
24.7 Development of training to adapt to changing
All service personnel deploying to Afghanistan receive
theatre-specific training to ensure that they have the skills
to carry out their specific role, while maintaining their own
safety and contributing to the protection of those around them.
Recent work by Land Forces in support of the Permanent Joint Headquarters
has seen the development of revised Joint Training Requirements
(JTRs) which capture the relevant individual skills. The JTRs
are derived from an analysis of which tactical tasks are required
in the demanding operating conditions in theatre. They also incorporate
best practice identified by training specialists in theatre and
an extensive study of the lessons drawn from post-operational
reports. The training continues to evolve, driven by the rapidly
changing requirements of operations against a determined enemy.
The significant increase in C-IED training in direct response
to changing insurgent tactics in theatre is a particularly good
example of this.
24.8 Partnering/Training with other nations
A notable aspect of MST is the participation of foreign
forces. This is particularly helpful in replicating the particular
dynamics of partnering with the ANSF. In September 2008, an Indian
Army company was attached to the Land Warfare Centre Battle Group
for a month. The attachment was not only highly successful from
a training point of view, but it also generated significant defence
diplomacy benefits. Since then foreign forces have been used routinely
to replicate our Afghan partnered forces during MST Field Training
Exercises (FTXs); as indeed have UK based Afghans and member of
the ANSF from theatre. So far we have had a Polish company taking
part in MST FTXs in January 2010 and July 2010. In the future
we will have Jordanian and Latvian companies for January 2011,
Omani, Jordanian and Indian companies for July 2011 and Lithuanian
and Jordanian companies for January 2012.
24.9 Equipment availability for training
For the safe and effective operation of new equipment
in theatre, personnel need to be trained on it prior to deployment.
The availability of equipment for training is therefore given
a high priority. Training on or with operational equipment currently
begins about 12 months before deployment, with a full training
equipment pack being available to troops six months from deployment.
Work is ongoing within Land Forces to make more operational equipment
available even earlier in the process to increase the amount of
time available for soldiers to train on the equipment that they
will go on to use on operations. As new equipment programmes deliver,
there is an understandable imperative to provide operational units
with the new capability. A balance therefore needs to be struck
between the quantities available to the front line and the quantities
available to units in training. This balance is kept under constant
review and is managed and prioritised by Land Forces Equipment
Directorate and the Land Training Fleet.
24.10 Integration into US Marine Corps 2*
RC(SW) is currently being commanded by a US 2 star
headquarters and elements of pre-deployment training are therefore
being coordinated with US Forces, specifically for the 1* HQ Task
Force Helmand. This requirement is being met by a small number
of experienced British military personnel travelling to the US
in order to support the training of US formations, advise our
US allies about British tactics and procedures and develop command
relationships. Similarly, the US Army and US Marine Corps have
agreed that reciprocal support to British pre-deployment training
will be provided, with the costs borne by both nations as appropriate.
The types of training that will be supported by British forces
are as follows:
The following figures update previous evidence to
the Committee on military language training for Op HERRICK. Pashto
is predominant in Helmand province, whilst Dari is the official
language of the Afghanistan National Army and of governance. Higher
level training has increased in response to operational demand.
Lower level training has also increased to improve direct communication
with both Afghan security forces and the local population, and
also to enable the training of approximately 1,200 (11.4%) of
the deploying force in basic language skills (a one week course).
Military language training continues to generate an appropriate
volume and balance of capability in theatre from military, contract
and Locally Employed Civilian linguists.
|10-12 wks||9 months
26. PERSONNEL WELFARE
26.1 Operational Welfare, Rest & Recuperation
Deployed Welfare PackageThe Deployed Welfare Package
(Overseas) continues to improve, with considerable focus on communications
from the operational Theatre to home. Wi-Fi has been provided
into the eight Forward Operating Bases and will be rolled out
to other forward areas where possible. The ratio of personnel
to satellite handsets has improved from 1:30 to 1:15 and 12 more
e-bluey (electronic letter system) machines have been provided
to Theatre. In addition, work is in hand to reduce the cost of
private telephone minutes (those bought in addition to the allocation)
to cost price; this will happen by the end of this year.
The SSAFA Operational Welfare Fund has been established to enable
Service personnel to request specific desirable items (above and
beyond those provided under the Deployed Welfare Package) to be
provided Theatre. The fund has received tremendous public support
with a total of just under £39,000 being donated to date.
Around £31,000 of it has spent on items such as additional
Wii handsets, solar powered lanterns and table tennis tables.
Rest and RecuperationAs announced in July, all Service
men and women serving tours in Afghanistan (and on other qualifying
deployed operations) for six months or longer will receive two
weeks Rest and Recuperation. Where circumstances dictate they
cannot take all that Rest and Recuperation during their tour,
as occurred, for instance when flights were suspended because
of the volcanic ash cloud, personnel will receive additional Post
Operational Leave in compensation. We will also increase the resilience
of the airbridge and prioritise the needs of those who serve longestsix
months or morein Afghanistan. The best way to achieve this
improved resilience is to deploy those posted for short tours
for less than four months so that they will no longer receive
a week's Rest and Recuperation in the middle of their tour. This
will affect a minority of the force, primarily from the RAF, but
improved airbridge resilience will significantly benefit the eighty-five
percent of the force who are serving on longer tours. Together,
these two measures will strengthen our operational effectiveness
in Afghanistan and ensure those serving the longest tours receive
the Rest and Recuperation they so richly deserve.
DecompressionAll personnel who are part of a formed
unit normally undertake a period of decompression in Cyprus as
they return from operations. Whilst there is no medical evidence
to confirm the efficacy of decompression, military judgement is
that it is of benefit. As a consequence a trial has been conducted
to assess the value and viability of extending decompression to
include individual augmentees who do not deploy as part of a formed
unit. The findings of the study are currently under review; a
decision of any extension will be made later this year.
26.2 Care Planning
Transition Care Planning ProtocolA Transition Care
Planning Protocol has been developed between the MoD and the Department
of Health, and the appropriate Departments within the each of
the Devolved Administrations, to ensure that personnel leaving
the Services on medical grounds are provided with continuity of
care. The aim is that through early engagement between the MoD
and local service providers, the appropriate service providers
will have a comprehensive support package in place at the location
where the Service person intends to settle. The Protocol is currently
being piloted (to end-2010). Once the pilot has been completed
and evaluated, the lessons identified will be used to adjust the
Protocol as required.
26.3 Post Operational Support / Research Developments
Post-operational supportPost-operational support
comprises Decompression in Cyprus, a period of Normalisation in
the UK, followed by In-Service support for those that require
it. Aftercare arrangements are made for personnel leaving the
Armed Forces with known mental health difficulties. The Defence
Medical Services have a comprehensive, occupationally focussed
community mental health service, supported by contracts with NHS
Trusts to provide inpatient care.
Research programmeA vigorous program of research
has been undertaken over the last 15 years, spearheaded by the
Kings Centre of Military Health Research, which contains the Academic
Centre for Defence Mental Health. Much good quality data on mental
health issues has arisen out of various large cohort studies,
as well as two studies undertaken in operational theatres (Iraq
in 2009 and Afghanistan in 2010).
27. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
Defence Medical Services is responsible for delivering and sustaining
a deployed medical system, within an ISAF framework, configured
to provide optimal consultant delivered care to UK Forces, other
ISAF troops in the UK Area of Responsibility, and consultant delivered
emergency care to ANSF and Local Civilians, in accordance with
ISAF medical eligibility criteria, and in support of the UK's
strategic end state of a stable and secure Afghanistan.
The medical mission is co-ordinated by a medical cell within the
UK Joint Force Support HQ in Bastion delegating healthcare provision
to specific units. The HQ of the Field Hospital in Bastion provides
governance oversight and material support to the UK Medical Emergency
Response Teams (MERT) and the hospital, whilst the Medical Regiment
provides the primary health care, pre-hospital emergency care
and force protection advice to the deployed force. The rotary
wing aero-medical provision operates across southern Afghanistan
(with US counterparts) and final tasking authority is through
The entire medical group has continued to evolve to reflect the
changes in the operating environment. Due to the increasingly
advanced trauma care it can provide, the hospital now has a dedicated
Commanding Officer (CO). Close Support has increased to meet the
growing demand for forward based medical personnel embedded on
patrols, the requirement for additional environmental health teams
to reinforce health protection in patrol bases and Medical Officers
in support to UK detention facilities. In recognition of this
increased role, the Close Support medical capability now has its
own co-ordinating CO.
Capacity at the Field Hospital in Bastion has been increased to
meet the needs of the deployed UK force with the increase in numbers
of ISAF and ANSF forces having surged into Helmand during 2009-10
and the commensurate rise in operational tempo. The operational
medical framework is continually monitored to ensure that sufficient
capability / capacity is maintained, specifically reflecting both
changes in casualty numbers and wounding patterns.
27.2 Aeromedical Evacuation
The RAF Medical Services are tasked to provide the timely and
rapid evacuation of patients from point of wounding to appropriate
care in the UK. This is achieved whilst maintaining the highest
standards of intensive care, clinical care and ongoing treatment
whilst in transit.
Aeromedical evacuation is a priority activity that places significant
demands on the RAF's air transport fleet. Routine flights are
used whenever possible and if the clinical condition of the patient
allows, specialist flights are provided if required.
27.3 Disease and Non-Battle Injuries (DNBI)
While disease and non-battle injuries rates in Afghanistan have
fluctuated in recent years, the levels continue to fall within
the norm for operations and peacetime duties. (2009 NAO Report
Illness and Injury on Operations). We continue to work to refine
our understanding of the underlying causes and to drive rates
further downwards. The 2010 second Force Protection audit report
is due in October 2010. An interim action matrix has been produced
to enable immediate action to be taken with regard to issues identified
27.4 Manning and International Aspects
The current operational tempo continues to challenge manning with
delivery of capability sustained by contributions from regular
forces, Volunteer Reserves, and use of NHS Support to Operations
and contractors. The use of NHS personnel has proven to be a useful
addition providing small numbers of niche specialities flexibly
that either do not exist within the military (paediatric nursing)
or are in short supply (Intensive Care Nurses).
The UK will continue to lead the Role 3 Medical Treatment Facility
at Camp Bastion setting the standards of care and governance practices
within the hospital on behalf of ISAF. Following the successful
deployment of a Danish Field Hospital in 2009; coalition support
has been sustained. The US continues its commitment currently
providing 55 personnel, a significant component of the hospital.
During 2011-12 on two separate tours the Role 3 will also be augmented
by an Estonian Surgical Team demonstrating the UK's commitment
to Coalition and wider NATO medical development and integration.
27.5 In-Theatre Capability Enhancements
There are ongoing developments in the level of care on operations,
contributing to increased survival and improved long-term morbidity
rates. The following are exemplars of enhancement:
- The introduction
of novel haemostatic (bleeding control) techniques to the front
line is saving lives in the critical first few minutes, with regular
updates of equipment as it evolves;
- The UK
MERT, continues to deliver critical consultant led emergency care
to the front line;
in resuscitation and blood transfusion, consequent upon Defence
maintenance of critical life support in readiness for surgeryongoing
research effort continues to refine these capabilities;
of Consultant led Emergency Medicine, Anaesthetic and Surgical
teams on arrival at the Role 3;
- The deployment
of advanced diagnostic capabilities, to a level never before deployed
brings emergency care ever closer to that available in a major
trauma centre; and
- Two additional
new CT scanners.
27.6 Royal Centre for Defence Medicine / Queen
The new Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB)
opened its doors on 16 June 2010. The transfer of services is
staged over six phases; the military ward capability transferred
as part of Phase 1 and is fully operational. The military ward
provides care for Service personnel in single or four bedded rooms
further instilling the military ethos within the establishment.
The QEHB has the UK's largest single floor critical care unit
consisting of 100 beds. As part of the switchover the Royal Centre
for Defence Medicine (RCDM) Clinical Unit HQ will transfer to
the new hospital in October 2010.
Leading edge care for the most complex and challenging
polytrauma has been an enduring feature of the current campaign
with a requirement for proven capacity to respond to an increase
in casualty numbers. The treatment of these highly complex cases
has afforded QEBH a level of experience and expertise that is
unique in the UK. Much of this is due to changes in medical doctrine,
informed by academic work at RCDM.
27.7 Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre,
The numbers and complexity of trauma survivors with
amputations continues to rise. This has resulted in a requirement
to increase staff numbers overall at DMRC including within the
DMRC prosthetics department, and in the physical space required
to support the prosthetics unit; this has required urgent estate
Over the last six months there has been an organisational
change in the way specialist teams are configured to deliver care,
with the patient going to a single therapy area to receive care
from their assigned multidisciplinary team. At the end of August
10, a new ward was handed over accompanied by a new dining facility
for the trauma cohort. The in patient bed capacity at DMRC will
now have 96 established beds with access to 15 step-down beds
within Wood House.
Modelling is currently being undertaken at DMRC and
the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) to predict future
bed capacity for trauma rehabilitation. The DMRC gait and physiological
research facility continues to develop with the Clinical Area
Development (CAD) the next highest priority. This project is being
planned and is intended to include a purpose built accommodation
block for delivery of ward based care to current standards of
health, safety and infection control.
27.8 Mental Health Support
All deployed personnel undergo pre-operational stress
briefing. In theatre psychological-education is delivered on arrival
and throughout deployment the TRiM system
provides individuals with early support following traumatic events.
A Force Mental Health Team consisting of three mental health nurses
provides in-theatre mental health assessments and mental health
liaison in forward areas. A Consultant Psychiatrist visits every
three months, providing oversight and support.
28.1 Cross-Government Approach
The UK's current Afghanistan Communications Strategy,
approved by the previous government in October 2009 and now in
the process of being revised, sets four communications objectives
UK public support for the mission in Afghanistan;
the capacity of the Afghan government and media to communicate
with the Afghan public, and vice versa;
and demonstrate the unity of the international coalition; and
understanding of the links between the Afghanistan mission and
counter terrorism in Pakistan as part of a regional strategy.
HM Government aims to achieve this through a cross-governmental
approach which co-ordinates Departmental effort and ensures all
activities are consistent with the overall strategic narrative.
The PUS of Government Communications chairs a weekly meeting of
Communication Directors and officials from key departments. Day
to day co-ordination at working level is led by the Cross-Government
Afghan Communications Team (ACT), based in the FCO and reporting
to Number Ten. A weekly meeting of the Afghan Information Strategy
Group brings together officials from the ACT, FCO, MoD, DfID,
Stabilisation Unit, British Embassy Kabul, Provincial Reconstruction
Team Lashkar Gah and the UK Delegation to NATO to discuss current
Communication activities include regular media briefings
by Ministers, a programme of Cross-Government briefings, a media
embed programme to Helmand, quarterly meetings with key interest
groups including NGOs and Parliament and the Afghan diaspora,
digital diplomacy (websites, Twitter Q&A), outreach events,
seminars, debates and visits. Specific activities are also carried
out around significant events, such as the London Conference and
Kabul Conference in January and July 2010 respectively, significant
military operations, and Afghan Presidential and Parliamentary
The UK public remains supportive of UK Forces involvement
in Afghanistan (source: MoD polling), but less supportive of overall
UK involvement (source: various polling). Opposition has grown
over recent years at the same time as a reduced perception of
progress. Media focus on the security challenge and continuing
British casualties in the fight against the insurgency continues
to impact upon public opinion on the international campaign.
28.2 MoD Communications Strategy
The MoD has a detailed Communications Strategy. This
strategy is an integral part of the UK cross-Government approach
to communicating on Afghanistan planning led by ACT and complimentary
to and co-ordinated with NATO and ISAF communication plans Detailed
subordinate communication delivery plans for specific topics direct
and co-ordinate all communications activity across Defence.
Within this delivery framework, the MoD stresses
the importance of:
and consistency of all MoD communications;
need for integration with all elements of the campaign; especially
making communications an integral part of operational planning;
importance of proactive planning and delivery of communications
effects across the full spectrum of media and communications channels;
including the exploitation of new and social media;
media and communications focus; includes growing emphasis on ensuring
that messaging resonates with Afghan audiences and that our media
and communications activity is not focused exclusively on UK domestic
The Directorate of Media and Communications (DMC)
leads the management and co-ordination of MoD's departmental communications
on Afghanistan through a network of military and civilian Press
Officers in London, PJHQ and on the ground in Afghanistan. DMC
are also the Department's lead on cross-Government engagement
on communications issues.
29. LESSONS LEARNED
Every six months, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
proposes to Chiefs of Staff potential subjects for Audit, producing
an endorsed Defence Operations Centre (DOC) programme of work;
this can be adjusted if higher priorities emerge. DOC must also
maintain an awareness of emerging topics to allow a dynamic response
to "targets of opportunity". The output of this process
falls into one of three main categories:
Operational Audit ReportAn independent
assessment of capability produced in consultation with the associated
Chain of Command and key Force Elements. It is not a consensus
report. Examples of recent Operational Audits include: "CIMIC";
"Air-Land Integration"; "ISTAR"; "UK
Operations Command and Control"; "Carrier Strike";
"United Kingdom Special Forces".
Operational Lessons ReportWhen
a joint operation is mounted, Vice Chief Defence Staff (VCDS),
Deputy Chief Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS(Ops)) and Chief
of Joint Operations (CJO) determine if a DOC Lessons Report is
required to encapsulate the strategic lessons identified from
various areas of the operation. Examples of recent Operational
Lessons Reports include: "Operation HIGHBROW"; "Operation
MONOGRAM"; "Operation HERRICK Volume 2".
workDOC will produce individual
briefs on particular topics for the Defence Secretary, Minister
for the Armed Forces and the Defence Board on demand and may also
be called on to answer Parliamentary Questions.
29.2 The DOC Audit and Lessons ReportProcess
The DOC Audit and Lesson Report process has five
distinct phases: Preparation; Initial Data Gathering; Interviews
and Evidence Gathering; Report Writing and Staffing; Implementation,
Monitoring and Reporting:
The lead DOC Staff Officer scopes the subject to assess the main
areas for the report by analysis of current policy papers, doctrine
and previous reports if available; appropriate desk-level liaison
throughout Defence is also undertaken. DOC may also canvass opinion
from key 1*/2* stakeholders for their assessment of areas that
may warrant investigation. The output will be a set of VCDS endorsed
Terms of Reference.
Data Gathering: DOC will ask key stakeholders
for their written assessment of the "Top five" issues
affecting their organisation for the capability under audit. This
should include an assessment of any areas of risk and its impact,
as well as detailing any action plans already in place, or problems
that are preventing resolution. This "Top five" will
form the basis of the DOC interviews.
Interviews: The DOC interview consists
of an informal interview with the Principal to explore the issues
highlighted in the "Top five", as well as seeking opinions
on areas that may have been raised by other returns or previous
interviews. Whilst DOC must be able to justify any observations
or findings, interviewees are assured confidentiality to ensure
as frank and open a discussion as possible.
Writing and Staffing: Once the main interviews
are complete, the Report is drafted and issued for comment to
the Chain of Command and a 1* Reference Group (1*RG) is convened.
Each member of the 1*RG is responsible for drawing together comments
from their sphere of responsibility, including from their Chain
of Command. Factual inaccuracies will be corrected, but DOC reserves
the right to decide on the inclusion of any matters of opinion
or judgement. The final report is forwarded to VCDS two weeks
prior to the report being circulated to the Chiefs of Staff (COS).
COS receive their copy two weeks prior to the committee meeting,
circulated by COS Secretariat (COSSEC), providing an opportunity
for the single Service Chiefs to be made aware of the key issues.
The recommendations and lessons from the report are refined if
necessary, and once amendments made, COSSEC will distribute the
report and DOC passes it to the Joint Lessons Cell for inclusion
Monitoring and Reporting: COS-endorsed
Recommendations and Lessons are implemented, monitored and reported
within Defence by means of a "follow-up" process which
is common to both Audit and Operational Lessons Reports. The first
stage of this process occurs at the 1*RG (described above) where
appropriate personnel are nominated to staff and implement each
Recommendation or Lesson.
Operational lessons studies have been conducted into
the following operations in Afghanistan:
VERITASUK contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom2001-04.
ORACLEMaritime & Air Interdiction 2001.
FINGALUK contribution to ISAF2002.
JACANA45 Commando Battle-group deployment2002.
TARROCKUK Mil contribution to PRT 2003-04.
HERRICK Vol 1 (Prelim Ops, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
deployment to HQ ISAF & initial deployment to Helmand2005-06).
HERRICK Vol 2 (Op HERRICKS 4 and 52006-07).
The following Operational Audits (amongst others)
have reference to operations in Afghanistan:
Defence Language Capability.
Mounting of Operations.
Logistics Command and Control.
Civil Military Co-operation.
Protection of the Deployed Force.
Prisoner Detention and Tactical Questioning.
Air Land Integration.
UK Special Forces.
After conducting work in other areas for over a three
year period, DOC is currently working on an Operation HERRICK
Volume 3 Lessons Study (April 2007-October 2009). This work has
aimed at the strategic level and attempts to include all the relevant
reviews and studies that have resulted in changes during the period.
See also Annex F (Security classified, not publicly
availableavailable to Committee Members at Defence Committee
30 September 2010
|1* RG||1 Star Review Group
|2ALOC||Second Air Line of Communication
|2IR||Second Impressions Report
|A1P||Afghan First Policy
|AAR||After Action review
|ACBAR||Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
|ACT||Afghanistan Communications Team
|AINC||Army Incident and Notification Cell
|ALOC||Air Line of Communication
|ANCOP||Afghan National Civil Order Police
|ANP||Afghan National Police
|ANSF||Afghan National Security Forces
|AOR||Area of Responsibility
|APOD||Airport of Delivery
|ARRC||Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
|ARTF||Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
|ATO||Ammunition Technical Officer
|AUP||Afghan Uniformed Police
|BAAG||British Agencies Afghanistan Group
|BEK||British Embassy Kabul
|BXP||Border Crossing Point
|CAA||Civil Aviation Authority
|CAD||Combat Arms Directorate
|CAOC||Coalition Air Operations Centre
|CAS||Close Air Support
|CBRN||Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
|CCS||Common Core Skills
|CESO (A)||Chief Environment and Safety Officer (Army)
|CFORM||Campaign Formation Operational Readiness Mechanism
|CIMIC||Civil Military Cooperation
|CIWG||Capability Integration Working Group
|CJO||Chief of Joint Operations
|CJSOR||Combined Joint Statement of Requirement
|CMD||Conventional Munitions Disposal
|CNPA||Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
|COS||Chief of Staff|
|CPP||Conflict Prevention Pool
|CSO||Contractor Support to Operations
|CSTC-A||Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan
|CTC4||Collective Training Competence Level 4
|CTWG||Counter Threat Working Group
|DASA||Defence Analytical Services Agency
|DCC||Dismounted Close Combat
|DDP||District Development Programme
|DFID||Department for International Development (UK)
|DMC||Directorate Media and Communications
|DMRC||Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre
|DMS||Defence Medical Services
|DNBI||Debilitating Non-Battle Injury
|DNPERS||Directorate of Naval Personnel
|DOC||Defence Operations Centre
|EOD||Explosive Ordnance Device
|EOF||Escalation of Force
|ESS||Equipment Service Support
|EUPOL||European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
|FAC||Forward Air Controller
|FFIR||Friendly Force Information Requirement
|FCO||Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|FTX||Final Training Exercise
|GIROA||Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
|GCPP||Global Conflict Prevention Pool
|HMG||Her Majesty's Government
|HPTC||Helmand Police Training Centre
|HRT||High Readiness Team
|IAT||Initial Assessment Teams
|IED||Improvised Explosive Device
|IJC||ISAF Joint Command
|IMF||International Monetary Fund
|ISAF||International Security Assistance Force
|ISR||Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
|ISTAR||Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
|ITAS||Inter Theatre Airlift Support
|JANIB||Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board
|JCOTR||Joint Commanders Operational Training Requirement
|JFSp(A)||Joint Force Support (Afghanistan)
|JOC||Joint Operations Centre
|JTAP||Joint Tactical Air Picture
|JTR||Joint Training Requirements
|KAF||Kandahar Air Field
|LAIT||Land Accident Investigation Team
|LOAC||Law of Armed Conflict
|LogT-S||Logistics Tracking System
|LPPV||Light Protected Patrol Vehicle
|MDG||Millennium Development Goals
|MDP||Ministry of Defence Police
|MERT||Medical Emergency Response Team
|MoD||Ministry of Defence
|MOI||Ministry of Interior (Afghanistan)
|MRAP||Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
|MSST||Military Stabilisation Support Team
|MST||Military Stabilisation Team
|MTA||Military Technical Agreement
|NAMSA||NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
|NATO||North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
|NCC||National Contingent Commander
|NCO||Non Commissioned Officer
|NDN||Northern Distribution Network
|NGO||Non Governmental Organisation
|NOTICAS||Notification of Casualty
|NSA||National Security Advisor
|NSC||National Security Council
|NTM-A||NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
|OEF||Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
|OMLT||Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
|OPTAG||Operational Training Advisory Group
|PACE||Police and Criminal Evidence Act
|PJHQ||Permanent Joint Headquarters
|POMLT||Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
|PRT||Provincial Reconstruction Team
|QEHB||Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham
|RAC||Royal Armoured Corps
|RAF||Royal Air Force|
|RCDM||Royal College of Defence Medicine
|RCV||Remote Controlled Vehicle
|RiP||Relief in Place|
|RLS||Real Life Support
|ROE||Rules of Engagement
|RNMMC||Royal Navy Mobilisation and Mounting Centre
|SCR||(UN) Security Council Resolution
|SCR||(NATO) Senior Civilian Representative
|SHAPE||Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
|SINCREP||Serious Incident Report
|SIR||Shooting Incident Report (acronym can be conflated with SINCREP)
|SLOC||Sea Line of Communication
|SOP||Standard Operating Procedure
|SSAFA||Soldiers, Sailors, Air Force Association
|TES||Theatre Entry Standard
|TFH||Task Force Helmand
|TiC||Troops in Contact
|TRB||Theatre Reserve Battalion
|TSV||Tactical Support Vehicle
|TTP||Tactics, Training and Procedures
|UAS||Unmanned Aerial Surveillance
|UAV||Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
|UNAMA||United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
|UNODC||UN Office on Drugs and Crime
|UNSCR||United Nations Senior Civilian Representative
|UOR||Urgent Operational Requirement
|USAID||United States Agency for International Development
|USMC||United States Marine Corps
|VCDS||Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
that which is characterised by adversaries (conventional, irregular
and terrorist) who employ a blend of traditional and irregular
tactics using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative
ways, decentralised planning and execution conducted amongst and
about the people. Back
TRiM = Trauma Risk Management, a peer delivered risk assessment
at 3 and 28 days following traumatic events, aiming to detect
problems early, signpost personnel at risk to medical services
and address stigma. Back