DFID's Assistance to Zimbabwe - International Development Committee Contents

4  DFID's work in Zimbabwe

DFID's current approach

63. DFID told us that the formation of the GNU changed the balance of risk and opportunity, and "justified a structured and incremental re-engagement with Zimbabwe".[96] It said that:

    We have focussed on aligning behind the Government of Zimbabwe's own commitments as agreed by the three main parties in the GPA. This cohesion has been time-consuming to build and maintain but it has become a very useful mechanism to communicate clearly with the Inclusive Government around the kind of reform needed in Zimbabwe for donors to increase their support.[97]

Although the GNU has provided an opportunity for greater engagement and an improved working relationship between DFID and elements of the Zimbabwean Government, DFID's view is that "the Inclusive Government is not yet the partner we require to sustain a full development relationship."[98] It says that "no money at present goes through Government systems. However, in line with the cross-Whitehall strategy for Zimbabwe, [DFID has] recently begun to provide technical assistance and policy support to reforming Ministries to help build momentum for political and economic change."[99]

64. Donor re-engagement will be determined against implementation of the GPA and progress towards the "Hague Principles" established for international engagement with Zimbabwe.[100] These state that non-humanitarian assistance will be closely linked to progress on governance and democracy. Any approved assistance would be targeted only towards reform-minded elements of the transitional government. The reforms specified in the Principles include:

·  full and equal access to humanitarian assistance;

·  commitment to macro-economic stabilisation;

·  restoration of the Rule of Law, including enforcement of contracts, an independent judiciary, and respect for property rights;

·  commitment to the democratic process and respect for internationally accepted human rights standards, including a commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of print and broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association; and

·  commitment to timely elections held in accordance with international standards, and in the presence of international election observers.[101]

65. DFID highlights that the uncertain future in Zimbabwe requires "a flexible and adaptable strategy" to ensure that it can continue to deliver "a high impact aid programme under volatile and challenging conditions and under a range of potential scenarios, from strong reform and change to sharper decline and deterioration". The core of its programme aims to deliver practical assistance "to poor and vulnerable people in greatest need, including humanitarian assistance and protracted relief and basic services".[102]

66. The UK is one of the leading donors in Zimbabwe, as shown in the table:

UK, EC, US and all donor aid to Zimbabwe: ODA disbursements, since 1980

($ millions & %)

Note: (a) Multilateral agencies were -$16.3 million, and non-DAC countries -$0.6 million in 2000.

Source:  OECD, Development Assistance Committee database, table 2a (accessed 12 March 2010)

DFID has allocated £60 million to Zimbabwe for 2009-10. £55 million is being spent on meeting humanitarian and other essential needs; £4 million is supporting local food production, including tools, seeds and fertilisers; and a contribution of £1 million has been made to procurement of school textbooks. DFID delivers its aid programme in Zimbabwe through UN agencies and established NGOs.[103] The division of funding between NGOs and multilateral agencies is shown in the figure below.

Delivery routes for DFID bilateral aid to Zimbabwe

(excluding humanitarian assistance)

Source: DFID, Statistics on International Development 2004/05 - 2008/09, p 46

Working with NGOs

67. NGOs who work with DFID were positive about its approach. World Vision welcomed DFID's efforts to address the complex causes of vulnerability in Zimbabwe. It said that DFID balances "the needs of relief and transitional work in the country". The "focus on social protection and the rights of vulnerable groups" was especially appreciated as these policies had made funding available to agencies not previously engaged in human rights issues.[104] Christian Aid also praised DFID's work: "In Harare, DFID has consistently been one of the most forward-thinking donors; often setting the agenda for counterpart donors, UN agencies and NGOs."[105]

68. However, Christian Aid also voiced some concerns. It said that DFID had "appeared to channel a large proportion" of financial aid for its short-term emergency support through UN agencies, which had occasionally worked against NGOs. It pointed to the UN administration fee applied when agreeing contracts with implementing NGOs and the "seemingly bureaucratic nature of grant disbursement for relief activities", which could take many months. It argued that this "has the potential to render DFID's response to rapid onset emergencies, such as health epidemics, less effective."[106] NGOs also raised with us some specific concerns about DFID's use of managing agents for the Protracted Relief Programme (PRP). We discuss these in the section on the PRP below.

69. Many international NGOs supported by DFID implement their programmes in Zimbabwe through local civil society organisations (CSOs). As well as playing a key part in delivering services, DFID says that CSOs play an important role in strengthening state accountability through:

    [...] protecting the human rights of Zimbabwe's citizens, supporting their participation in key decision making processes, strengthening the media and doing more to monitor state performance. Key priorities include the Constitution-making process, media, Parliament and the next elections.[107]

Support for these activities is made available to CSOs through DFID's normal central funding channels including the Civil Society Challenge Fund, Programme Partnership Agreements and the Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF). Funding from the Zimbabwe country office is also provided through the Conflict Pool and a Gender Support Programme.[108]

Working with other donors

70. The UN is the largest manager of DFID funding in Zimbabwe. DFID says that UN agencies, particularly UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP):

    [...] have offered effective and practical ways of working to respond to critical needs, ranging from food aid to essential drugs and [...] ensuring safe drinking water. They have national coverage and are able to negotiate access in politically challenging situations.[109]

DFID currently leads the Donor Steering Committee in Zimbabwe. The DFID Minister believed that donor co-ordination with OECD DAC bilateral donors was working fairly well but that co-ordination with the World Bank and UN agencies could be improved.[110]

71. World Vision commended DFID's leadership, but believed that co-ordination among donors needed to be further improved, to address inconsistencies and overlaps in funding. It was encouraged by the formation of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) (see below) and the pivotal role DFID played in its development. However, it called for DFID to "lead the development of a broader common strategy among donors for Zimbabwe, which should include common needs and [...] impact assessments for the whole country".[111] Rob Rees of CAFOD expressed concern about DFID funding through multilateral agencies in the health sector. In particular he said that there had been "lots of delays [...] in the provision of the relief assistance" which DFID had channelled through UNICEF during the cholera epidemic in 2009.[112]


72. Between 1980 and 2000 the World Bank provided $1.6 billion in assistance to Zimbabwe. The World Bank suspended its lending programme to Zimbabwe in 2000, when the country went into arrears. In 2008 these were estimated at $600 million with a further $429 million owed to the African Development Bank (AfDB). The World Bank stated that resumption of financial support would hinge on arrears clearance and government commitment to a sound economic recovery programme with international support. Its role in Zimbabwe has been restricted to technical assistance and analytical work focusing on macroeconomic policy, food security, the social sector, infrastructure, and HIV/AIDS programmes.[113] Engagement with the AfDB has been similarly limited due to arrears.

73. However, as the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe has improved, the World Bank and AfDB have both increased their involvement in the country. The AfDB is providing technical assistance and funding.[114] The World Bank is providing the secretariat for a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). DFID's written evidence indicated that:

    A second MDTF mechanism focused on major programme funding will now enable donor funding to flow into infrastructure investment, using World Bank procedures to ensure funds are allocated and implemented effectively. These funds will be mostly targeted at critical poverty reducing and growth enhancing investments (eg water supplies and possibly energy) where the World Bank is especially well placed.[115]

However, the DFID Minister stressed that this second MDTF was "not up and running yet".[116]

Humanitarian aid

74. Analysis on which DFID has drawn shows that humanitarian assistance will continue to be required in Zimbabwe for at least another two years. It attributes this to "the impact of failed policies—including chaotic land reform, economic mismanagement and collapse, the erosion of basic services and the general challenge of erratic rainfalls" which has led to "hunger, and disease outbreaks, coupled with the inability of the most vulnerable to access life-saving services."[117] Wherever possible DFID is providing multi-year funding to address hunger and vulnerability, while also ensuring it is able to respond rapidly to "sudden onset emergencies".[118] The table below shows the amount of humanitarian and total bilateral aid provided by DFID since 2003/04.

DFID bilateral aid and humanitarian assistance, 2003/04 - 2008/09
Total bilateral aid
of which humanitarian aid

Source: DFID, Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2008-09, Volume 2, p 76

75. The TUC recognised the "significant contribution" which DFID had made to humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe and expressed its support for its continuation, where necessary and appropriate. However, the TUC also called for the "the expansion of DFID action beyond humanitarian relief into more development-oriented interventions including the provision of technical advice and assistance where appropriate in collaboration with multi-lateral agencies and bilateral donors."[119] ACTSA believed that "DFID in Zimbabwe has in challenging circumstances supported an informed and effective humanitarian response". However, it stressed that "humanitarian assistance should avoid seeing Zimbabweans as passive recipients of aid. It should seek to build up self reliance, community organisation and responsibility."[120]

76. We asked witnesses whether DFID had the right balance between humanitarian aid and development assistance. Dr Kibble pointed out that, with 2.2 million people still food insecure, humanitarian aid should continue, but there was a need to examine how it could be translated into development aid, in a sequential way. He thought that money could be directed into long-term developmental assistance provided it used "clean [...] mechanisms" such as international NGOs and multilateral agencies. He believed that there could be steady progress towards "straightforward developmental assistance" but that direct budgetary support was "quite a long way off yet."[121]

77. Professor Brett argued that the creation of employment was the most effective intervention to enable people to generate what they needed to support themselves. He felt that DFID had not been investing sufficiently in microfinance and called on it to support small micro-enterprise projects that would encourage people to become involved in small businesses.[122]


78. When our predecessors reported in 2003, 7.2 million Zimbabweans were in need of food aid. They noted that the immediate cause then was a "huge shortfall in cereal production" and that poor government was a key factor in the crisis. They concluded that "politicisation of food aid, the exclusion of the private sector from any role in importing food and poor relationships between the government and donors had hindered responses to the crisis."[123] Last year, the requirement was at a similar level: DFID reported that 7 million Zimbabweans received food aid in early 2009; £9 million was provided by DFID to the World Food Programme (WFP) for this. [124]

79. Food availability has improved in the last year, which DFID says was due to "a good harvest, an end to the Grain Marketing Board monopoly on importing cereals into the country, dollarisation of the economy and availability of donor-funded agricultural inputs." Nevertheless, it stresses that "extensive humanitarian support will remain critical to avoid the erosion of livelihoods and protect the health and nutrition status of the vulnerable."[125] WFP estimated that 2.8 million people would require food aid in early 2010 and DFID has allocated £4 million to WFP for this year.[126] Mark Lowcock, the Director General for DFID Country Programmes, told us in oral evidence that estimates of future food aid requirements would be updated in late March, once the likely quality of this year's harvest became clearer.[127]

80. DFID has provided essential humanitarian support to Zimbabwe, including food aid, over the last decade. Although the situation has improved, DFID believes it will be necessary for humanitarian assistance to continue for at least another two years. We recognise the priority which DFID and other donors have to give to meeting humanitarian needs in Zimbabwe's current situation. However, we would hope that, as the economy continues to recover, people will be more able to support themselves and donors can then review the need for food aid and other short-term interventions. We recommend that DFID regularly reassess the balance between humanitarian aid and development assistance and that more of its programmes shift to a longer-term development approach at the earliest opportunity.

Internally displaced people

81. The UNDP has estimated that a million farm-workers and their families lost their homes and livelihoods as a result of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. A further 570,000 people were made homeless by the urban demolitions of Operation Murambatsvina ("clear the filth") in 2005. In late 2006 and early 2007 the Government destroyed the homes of thousands of informal mine workers in Operation Chikorokoza Chapera ("stop the gold panning"). Estimates of the displacement caused by electoral violence in 2008 range from 36,000 to 200,000 people.[128]

82. A substantial proportion of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been displaced multiple times by successive operations. For example, many displaced farm-workers who went to the towns and cities or to mining areas were later caught up in Operation Murambatsvina or Operation Chikorokoza Chapera. Some of the people who were internally displaced have left Zimbabwe and are included in the estimate of three to four million migrants.[129]

83. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) says that UN agencies and international NGOs have struggled to respond to the needs of IDPs, because of obstruction by the authorities and a lack of clear arrangements for leadership on IDPs' protection.[130] The Government of Zimbabwe had consistently failed to acknowledge that its actions have caused a displacement crisis in Zimbabwe, or to take responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to the victims. It has been extremely difficult for humanitarian agencies to obtain access to displaced communities; even where access has been granted, the Government has often withdrawn its permission on arbitrary grounds. Humanitarian agencies have also often had to plan their interventions on the basis of incomplete information. Both local NGOs and international donors have voiced strong concerns over what they describe as the UN's overly cautious approach in its dealings with the Government of Zimbabwe. Local NGOs in particular have expressed disappointment that the UN has not done more to create a space for them to assist Zimbabwe's IDPs.[131]

84. DFID has allocated £6.5 million over four years for emergency and humanitarian assistance to IDPs.[132] This includes a programme with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) that provides emergency assistance, in the form of food, non-food items and temporary shelter, to IDPs, together with humanitarian assistance at border crossings. The IOM are currently assisting 251,000 individuals. In 2006 it established the Beitbridge Reception Centre on Zimbabwe's border with South Africa, which has assisted 320,000 returning migrants. DFID's programme is due to end in March 2010.[133]

85. We asked the DFID Minister about the level of support available for IDPs. He believed that the Inclusive Government was more willing to recognise their existence and needs, but said that he "would not want to downplay the challenges that still remain." In addition to the direct support DFID provided, many of its mainstream programmes were assisting IDPs. He accepted that there was a clear need for more to be done "across the range", but believed that DFID's programmes, and those of others in the international community, were helping to deliver aid to IDPs.[134]

86. Hundreds of thousands of people in Zimbabwe have been driven from their homes as a result of deliberate, forced evictions by the Government in pursuit of political ends, or in reaction to more general insecurity, violence and intimidation or unemployment. Some have been forced to move several times. DFID is providing support to internally displaced persons (IDPs) through targeted projects and through its general livelihoods and basic service assistance. Its emergency assistance programme for IDPs is due to end shortly but substantial need clearly remains. We recommend that, in response to this Report, DFID clarify how support for IDPs will be provided by the donor community over the next two years and the role which it will play in this assistance.

Protracted Relief Programme

87. DFID's Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) provides a good example of an intervention which combines humanitarian assistance with longer-term livelihoods support. DFID states that the PRP:

    [...] assists the poorest and most vulnerable households suffering from the effects of erratic weather, economic decline and the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Its main objectives are to improve the food security of the poorest through production and income-generating activities, to improve access to water and sanitation, and to provide social protection and care to the most vulnerable such as the chronically ill.[135]

Phase I of the programme began in mid-2004 and ran for two years at a cost of £18 million. The range of activities helped beneficiaries to increase their food production, and provided home-based care to the chronically ill. PRP I was implemented by 10 international NGOs, many of whom worked with local NGOs and community-based organisations. UN agencies helped provide technical co-ordination, while three international agricultural research centres in Zimbabwe supplied further technical services.[136]

88. Phase II of the PRP started in 2008-09 and will continue until 2012-13. The UK will contribute £54.8 million over that period, with £14.5 million being allocated in 2009-10. PRP II is now a multi-donor programme and includes Australia, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, the EC and the World Bank. These donor partners will contribute a further £24 million over the lifetime of the programme, most of which will be channelled through DFID. The programme is implemented by a broad range of NGOs.[137]

89. DFID told us that the target for the programme was to reach 300,000 households, which was about two million people, or between 15% and 20% of the population.[138] Mark Lowcock said that the programme was already reaching the target number of beneficiaries.[139] DFID says that in 2008-09 the PRP:

·  helped almost two million of the poorest people to grow more food;

·  helped one million of the poorest people to gain access to clean water;

·  provided food vouchers, shelter and access to education for 700,000 urban poor; and

·  distributed agricultural inputs to 200,577 households. [140]

PRP II aims to build on the experience of the first phase, with closer collaboration with government. There will be increased emphasis on social protection and the use of "relevant participatory tools", which will lead to "increased community participation in the planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of partner programmes".[141]

90. The PRP received praise from several witnesses. Christian Aid said that:"It is arguably the pre-eminent large-scale institutional donor-funded humanitarian programme in Zimbabwe. It is driven by the needs of vulnerable communities, and is relevant, sustainable and cost-effective through NGO implementation".[142] This was reiterated in oral evidence where it was described as "a flagship programme" which DFID "should be proud of ".[143] World Vision said that: "The implementation of PRP II has been greatly helped by the highly participatory nature of DFID's design process, which takes into consideration local realities and changing contexts."[144] Its Chief Executive, Justin Byworth, welcomed the programme's "focus on the vulnerable, including vulnerable children, combined with a focus on livelihoods to lift up the communities, through such things as conservation agriculture, together with safety net and social protection programming to support those who are most vulnerable."[145] CARE International UK commended the PRP for the flexibility which it gave DFID "to respond to the basic needs of people [...] with provision of [...] services, such as food distribution, HIV/AIDS support, [and] agricultural [and] livelihoods capacity building".[146]

91. We saw a number of examples of PRP projects during our visit to Zimbabwe. These included such diverse activities as home-based care; employment generation, including floor-wax production and tailoring; and agricultural development, including provision of fertilisers and seeds, small-livestock farming and farming education. Participants told us about the benefits that they had gained and the difference it had made to their lives.

92. DFID's Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) has already reached millions of vulnerable people in Zimbabwe and has been praised by the NGOs who participate in it as an innovative, flagship programme of which DFID should be proud. We agree with this assessment. Other donors have already seen the value of funding Phase II of the PRP and it has become an effective multi-donor intervention. Its excellence lies in its ability to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people and the breadth of its reach, from home-based care for sick people to agricultural extension and employment generation. There is clearly further scope for scaling up the programme in Zimbabwe, where the need is still acute for many people, and indeed using the lessons learned to replicate it in other countries. We recommend that DFID explore both these options.


93. As we have described above, the PRP is implemented through a range of NGOs who in turn contract local organisations to deliver services. DFID uses a managing agent, GRM, to administer the programme.[147] NGOs drew our attention to some problems which arose from this. Christian Aid told us that the "decision to outsource the management of the PRP to a managing agent needs to be supported by more accessible evidence of cost-effectiveness and efficiency."[148] Rob Rees of CAFOD said that, while he understood DFID's obligation to reduce transaction costs, the use of managing agents had increased the distance "between civil society organisations that are actually implementing the programme on the ground and the donor." The partners CAFOD worked with "would like to feel that they have some opportunity for more direct contact with DFID" so that both they and DFID had a "good understanding of the situation that they are working in." He called for improvements in communications and dialogue between civil society and DFID.[149]

94. World Vision was critical of the onerous requirements made of PRP implementing partners. It said that the "impact measurement and meeting requirements are, at times excessive and a symptom of a lack of internal co-ordination." These affected its capacity to deliver quality programmatic work.[150] Its Chief Executive, commented that, although his organisation was happy with the use of agents, and that they worked effectively, they could be more co-ordinated and that "internal systems tend towards silos". He agreed that there had been a loss of communication with DFID. He called for "a bit more access to DFID perhaps in terms of policy dimensions."[151]

95. We put these concerns to the Minister. He told us that a decision had been taken to use managing agents in Phase II of the PRP as it was a more ambitious programme than Phase I had been and more complex in that it involved other donors. This put pressure on DFID staff, and their ability to work on other important projects would have been reduced if they had continued to run the programme directly. The Minister said that there were quarterly meetings with civil society and that he was satisfied with the level of direct contact with NGOs.[152] Mark Lowcock pointed out that there were three members of DFID staff in the Harare office who still worked primarily on the PRP: "they are spending less of their time on the routine administration and more of it on the strategic dialogue". They travelled to local areas at least once a month to check on PRP implementation.[153]

96. Another area of concern was the administrative costs of the programme, given the number of levels through which funding has to pass before it reaches the eventual beneficiaries: managing agents, NGO partners and then local organisations which actually deliver the assistance in the villages and communities. The Minister believed that involving all these players helped accountability by ensuring that funding went to the most needy people. He acknowledged that, as the programme had expanded, some concerns had been expressed, but he thought that it was important that "we have the administration element in there so that we do have proper checks and balances."[154] Mark Lowcock pointed to the cost-effectiveness of the programme:

    As well as the cost of delivering the programme we need to think about what the returns and benefits of the programme are. It costs about $70 per household to provide the assistance we provide under the PRP and the value of the production that is generated by that $70 is about $140, it is a very high rate of return. The alternative to providing some of the inputs that we have provided would be in many cases to provide food aid which would cost us between $700 and $1,000. The opportunity saving of this programme is very high and the rate of return on the programme is also very high. The numbers I have given you reflect the administration costs as well as the costs of the inputs. We honestly think that in terms of value for money this is a very effective programme.[155]

97. We asked the Minister for a breakdown of programme expenditure for the PRP. DFID told us that:

·  6% of costs are allocated to the management agents to cover: programme administration; technical advice and support; best practice and knowledge sharing; and monitoring and evaluation;

·  3% is used for financing and procurement fees, and covers the "costs of working as seamlessly as possible in a difficult and rapidly changing environment";

·  25-30% is allocated to delivery on the ground, including NGO overheads and the costs of local community staff who provide services for poor households;

·  Over 60% covers physical transfers to households in the form of agricultural inputs, small livestock support, soap and hygiene items and small-scale food and cash transfers.[156]

These administrative costs seem quite high. However, as we have said in relation to DFID's programmes in Bangladesh and Nepal, targeted programmes to reach the most vulnerable and poorest in society are inevitably more expensive to run because of the staff time needed to devise and implement them, whether this is done directly by DFID staff or through NGOs and agents.[157]

98. We accept the concerns expressed by delivery partners that the use of managing agents to administer the Protracted Relief Programme creates a distance between NGOs and DFID. DFID needs to do more to address these concerns. However, given the headcount constraint under which DFID operates, we believe it is sensible to contract out management of programmes once they are in operation, in order to release specialist DFID staff to undertake more strategic and innovative work.

99. The administration costs of the PRP are quite high but this has to be weighed against the cost-effectiveness and the value for money offered by the programme. Moreover, other donors would not be so keen to join the PRP if they did not consider that it was a worthwhile use of their funds. We believe the crucial point is that the most vulnerable and needy people in Zimbabwe are reached through the PRP. DFID should monitor the programme closely to ensure pro-poor benefits continue to be the focus, particularly if the programme is extended. DFID should also satisfy itself that its auditing mechanisms are sufficiently robust to ensure that PRP funding is reaching the intended beneficiaries, particularly given that it passes through several organisations first.

Conservation agriculture

100. One component of the PRP programme supports conservation agriculture. Christian Aid said that it recognised "DFID's consistent support to this area despite initial reluctance by other key stakeholders" and highlighted that it "has been particularly beneficial to vulnerable communities" and "proven to lift households out of subsistence poverty".[158] William Anderson of Christian Aid explained to us the benefits it brought: "conservation agriculture is teaching people how to better manage their land and how to get a profitable harvest." A family of six requires 1.2 metric tonnes of grain per annum to meet its food needs but the national average in Zimbabwe is 0.2 metric tonnes. "Conservation agriculture practice enables households to get at least 2, 3, 5 and in many cases over 10 metric tonnes per hectare." He believed that the conservation agriculture aspect of the PRP programme was "an excellent agricultural practice that should be promoted across Africa."[159]

101. We saw examples of conservation agriculture projects during our visit. We heard from project beneficiaries about the conservation farming techniques that they had been taught and how they had been provided with fertilisers, seeds and tools. We were told that the increased production that had been achieved had helped move the farmers from below subsistence to having surplus crops to sell. The additional income was used for such things as paying school fees and investing in small savings schemes.

102. We were impressed by the benefits which the conservation agriculture element of the Protracted Relief Programme is bringing to communities in Zimbabwe, some of whom are the most vulnerable people in the country. Moving farmers from below subsistence to generating an income from selling crops provides direct and quick support for livelihoods. We recommend that DFID explore how this work can be expanded, both within Zimbabwe and in other African countries.

96   Ev 51 Back

97   Ev 52 Back

98   Ev 52 Back

99   Ev 48 Back

100   Ev 52 Back

101   See USAID, FY 2009 Supplemental Justification, pp 32-33, available at www.usaid.gov Back

102   Ev 50 Back

103   Ev 52 Back

104   Ev 92 Back

105   Ev 43 Back

106   Ev 43 Back

107   Ev 54 Back

108   Ev 54 Back

109   Ev 54 Back

110   Q 80 Back

111   Ev 90 Back

112   Q 24 Back

113   World Bank, Zimbabwe Country Brief, March 2009 Back

114   Ev 54 Back

115   Ev 54 Back

116   Q 109 Back

117   Ev 55 Back

118   Ev 55 Back

119   Ev 80 Back

120   Ev 36 Back

121   Q 19 [Dr Kibble] Back

122   Q 19 [Professor Brett] Back

123   Third Report of Session 2002-03, The Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa, HC 116-I, paras 9-10 Back

124   Ev 49 Back

125   Ev 55 Back

126   Ev 49 Back

127   Qs 124-5 Back

128   Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Zimbabwe, available at www.internal-displacement.org Back

129   ibid Back

130   ibid Back

131   IDMC, The Many Faces of Displacement: IDPs in Zimbabwe, August 2008, pp 4-6 and 43 Back

132   Ev 56 Back

133   Ev 97 Back

134   Q 127 Back

135   Ev 96 Back

136   Protracted Relief Programme: output to purpose review, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network, available at www.fanrpan.org Back

137   Ev 60-61 Back

138   Q 83 and Ev 61 Back

139   Qs 83-86 Back

140   Ev 61 Back

141   Protracted Relief Programme: Zimbabwe website at www.prpzim.info/ Back

142   Ev 43 Back

143   Q 22 [Mr Anderson] Back

144   Ev 90 Back

145   Q 22 [Mr Byworth] Back

146   Ev 42 Back

147   Ev 53 and Ev 96 Back

148   Ev 43 Back

149   Q 24 Back

150   Ev 90 Back

151   Q 43 Back

152   Qs 89-90 Back

153   Q 90 Back

154   Q 92 Back

155   Q 92 Back

156   Ev 94 Back

157   See Third Report of Session 2009-10, DFID's Programme in Bangladesh, HC 95-I, paras 50-61 and Sixth Report of Session 2009-10, DFID's Programme in Nepal, HC168-I, paras 143-6 Back

158   Ev 43 Back

159   Qs 22 and 25 [Mr Anderson] and Ev 43 Back

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