2 The development context|
9. An illegal "Unilateral Declaration of Independence"
by white settlers in 1965 delayed independence and majority rule
by 15 years. Zimbabwe finally became independent on 18 April 1980.
For almost the entire period since then it has been ruled by the
ZANU-PF party, under the leadership of President Robert Mugabe.
In that time it has declined from a well-run state to one that
depends on remittances and aid for food and basic services, due
to political turmoil and economic maladministration. DFID says
that the ZANU-PF regime reacted to the country's decline "with
electoral manipulation, abuse of state power and increasing intimidation
of political opponents and civil society".
This was made clear to us during our visit.
10. Professor Brett of the London School of Economics
(LSE) believed that the decline began when the ZANU-PF government's
political monopoly was challenged in the late 1990s. He says that
it responded to the confrontation from radical civic groups and
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) by using a variety of
measures, including currency and financial market controls, restrictions
on the press, a grain and fuel market monopoly and land seizures
to transfer resources to political associates, the security services
and war veterans. Through these actions, ZANU-PF was able to win
elections, but at the same time it destroyed the economic system,
which has led to "fiscal, food, fuel and foreign exchange
11. In the 2008 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF
lost its majority for the first time since independence. Morgan
Tsvangirai's MDC-T faction of the Movement for Democratic Change
became the largest party in parliament. In the presidential elections,
Morgan Tsvangirai won the first vote with 47.9%, while President
Robert Mugabe gained 43.2%. As Morgan Tsvangirai did not achieve
the 50% of the votes cast in the first round necessary to be declared
the winner of the election, the Zimbabwe Election Commission announced
in May that a second round of voting should take place. In June,
before the votes could be cast, Morgan Tsvangirai announced that
he was withdrawing from the run-off because of the increased violence
and intimidation aimed at his supporters. In the second round
election, Mr Mugabe took a majority of the vote and was sworn
in as President on 29 June.
12. Controversy over the presidential vote led to
a protracted period of uncertainty. Finally, in September 2008,
a Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the parties was brokered
by the then South African President Thabo Mbeki, acting on behalf
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). After a
four-month delay, on 30 January 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai's wing
of the MDC agreed to form a coalition government with President
Mugabe's ZANU-PF, and the Government of National Unity (GNU) came
into existence. Under
the GNU Robert Mugabe retained his position as President, and
Morgan Tsvangirai became Prime Minister.
The Global Political Agreement
and the Government of National Unity
13. Dr Steve Kibble of the Zimbabwe European Network
considered the GPA to be "a very badly drafted document"
and one that:
[...] in the context of the problems facing Zimbabwe
(especially on human rights violations and related security sector
reform needs) is replete with omissions. Most analysts agreed
that it lacked a time-frame, was riddled with contradictory statements
and laid up as many problems as it solved [...].
Nevertheless, DFID's view is that "the Inclusive
Government remains Zimbabwe's best hope". It has "largely
succeeded" in stabilising the economy but "there has
been far less progress in restoring the rule of law and ensuring
human rights are respected."
Donald Steinberg, Deputy President of the International Crisis
Group, believed that the new government "started out reasonably
Schools and hospitals re-opened. Civil servants
were paid a small stipend and returned to work. As the Zimbabwe
dollar was shelved, goods returned to empty store shelves. A cholera
epidemic was brought under control; and a bipartisan parliamentary
committee was formed to reform the constitution. Human rights
activists reported a significant drop in government abuses. An
ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction programmethe Short-Term
Economic Recovery Programmecalled for about $8.5 billion
in resources, including foreign assistance and investment, and
was generally well-received by foreign donors and the Bretton
Woods institutions. 
14. However, he also highlighted serious concerns,
including the continuation of farm seizures and the decline of
human rights. Security forces "continued to arrest and detain
activists and MDC parliamentarians". He pointed to the reappointment
of ZANU-PF stalwarts Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and the
Attorney General Johannes Tomana as very negative developments.
He said that "top generals boycotted the new national
security establishments and showed public disdain for Tsvangirai,
and ZANU-PF delayed or ignored key commitments under the GPA."
He believed that "some old regime elements, especially
hard-line generals and other Mugabe loyalists" had "actively
thwarted the new government, and undermined it by refusing to
implement its decisions".
Professor Brett agreed that ZANU-PF had not implemented most of
the agreements in the GPA, and believed that it "still intended
to extricate itself from it in order to retain its mantle as the
only dominant and ascendant political party."
15. Witnesses believed that a stable political environment
in Zimbabwe was far from guaranteed. Donald Steinberg identified
a number of "formal" challenges which the GNU had to
meet. These were: completion of the GPA; agreement of a new Constitution;
and the holding of elections. In addition, there were a set of
"informal" challenges: a need for political maturity
in the process; resolution of the security situation; and rebuilding
of the economy. He
told us that:
[...] major threats could still derail the process,
including the resistance of intransigent senior security officials;
fractious political in-fighting, especially within [ZANU-PF];
a growing gap between the political class and civil society; a
battered economy unable to address a 90% unemployment rate and
meet the immediate expectations for a peace dividend; and the
capricious and ever-dangerous whims of President Robert Mugabe.
16. The GNU has continued to function for just over
a year, albeit with sporadic breakdowns. Particularly serious
divisions arose in October 2009 following the arrest of Roy Bennett,
a senior MDC member. The Prime Minister and the MDC announced
that they were boycotting Cabinet meetings and refusing to engage
with the rest of government.
DFID says that this period "saw a particular ramping up of
immediate crisis was resolved the following month, following intervention
by SADC, and the MDC re-engaged with the GNU.
17. Mr Tsvangirai remains publicly optimistic about
the GNU. In an address to Zimbabwean expatriates at Southwark
Cathedral in June last year he said that Zimbabwe had already
made great strides towards recovery after years of a downward
When we met him during our visit, he reiterated his comments about
progress since the formation of the Inclusive Government. He believed
that there were two main objectives for the transitional government:
to revive the economy and to implement a constitutional agenda.
His view was that there would be no reversal in the political
progress which had been made.
18. We welcome the Global Political Agreement
(GPA), which, although not perfect, created the basis for formation
of the Government of National Unity. Progress has been made since
the settlement was reached, including the re-opening of schools
and hospitals, the introduction of a budget and stabilisation
of the economy. However, movement towards full implementation
of the Agreement has been slow and important provisions have been
ignored by some of the parties involved. Adherence to the rule
of law and respect for human rights are two areas requiring urgent
and significant improvement.
The new Constitution
19. Article 6 of the GPA provides for the adoption
of a new Constitution for Zimbabwe within 18 months of implementation
of the GPA, subject to approval in a referendum. 
A parliamentary select committee, comprising the three parties
(ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M) has been established to guide the constitution-making
process. DFID believes that a "successful review and implementation
of the Constitution would likely strengthen the separation of
powers and could increase the prospects of free and fair elections."
It says that, together with other donors, it "is considering
support which can make this a more open and accountable process,
including strengthening parliamentary oversight and supporting
wider civil society engagement."
20. There are differences over whether the "Kariba
Draft" for a new Constitution, which provides for substantial
presidential executive powers, or a more "people-driven"
approach, as called for by civil society and some within MDC-T,
should form the basis of the new Constitution.
Dr Kibble questioned the scope for public involvement in the process:
"Despite the existence of a Constitutional Parliamentary
Committee (COPAC), one of its three chairs has recognised that
a culture of fear gripping a population that has endured years
of political violence [...] could hamper free debate."
21. We regret that development of a new Constitution
for Zimbabwe is making such slow progress. We agree with DFID's
assessment that its implementation could increase the prospects
for free and fair elections in the future. We recommend that,
in response to this Report, DFID provide us with more information
about the support it is giving, jointly with other donors, to
the constitution-drafting process.
DFID support for the Prime Minister's
22. DFID's governance support has included technical
assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The aim
of the support was to enable the OPM to fulfil its functions set
out in the GPA to lead policy design and implementation. DFID's
£450,000 funding has supported a core team of two consultants
from the Adam Smith International, with experience in supporting
central government systems. The aim of the programme, which started
in June 2009 and operated until the end of December, was to "strengthen
the systems for designing, monitoring and communication of Government
of Zimbabwe's policies and priorities."
23. Mr Tsvangirai has written to DFID requesting
an extension of the support which would maintain the same focus,
including to the Prime Minister's role in leading executive business
in Parliament. When we met him, he reiterated his appreciation
of the support his Office had received and the need for this to
be extended. The DFID Minister of State told us that he would
look sympathetically at further requests for assistance from the
Prime Minister. DFID's support was designed to enable the Office
of the Prime Minister to perform the normal functions that a head
of government's office would usually undertake, including oversight
of the budget, ensuring ministries followed through on the Government's
agreed work plan and helping to resolve disputes between government
24. DFID's support for the Office of the Prime
Minister has clearly been valuable and has been much appreciated
by him. We recommend that DFID extend this support for a further
period. This will enable progress achieved to date to continue,
in terms of strengthening the capacity of the Office to oversee
the smooth running of government departments and implementation
of policy, and to lead on executive business in Parliament.
Political violence and lack of
25. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) states that "political instability and related
violence in Zimbabwe has placed considerable strain on coping
mechanisms and income-generating activities, and contributed to
[an] increase in unemployment".
Widespread repression and human rights abuses occurred before,
during, and after the 2008 elections. OCHA has estimated that
post-election violence in May 2008 displaced over 36,000 Zimbabweans.
DFID reports that incidents have decreased under the GNU. However,
arrests of civil society activists and trade unionists have continued,
as well as land invasions and politically motivated attacks against
parliamentarians, with "weak and inconsistent responses from
the judiciary." There have also been recent reports of serious
human rights abuses in the Marange diamond fields.
We were also told that diamonds were probably being illegally
expropriated and proceeds diverted to ZANU-PF.
26. DFID stresses that "reform of the security
and justice sector into a set of professional and accountable
institutions is essential."
Dr Kibble was concerned that the militarisation of the state which
had occurred over the last 10 years had not been challenged.
He told us that:
[...] despite the signing of the [...] GPA [...]
little progress has been made in the protection and promotion
of human rights in Zimbabwe as seen by the sustained levels of
violence from month to month [...] Some reports received by the
Human Rights Forum indicate that ZANU-PF bases that were used
as places to torture and maim supporters and purported supporters
of the MDC during the electoral violence [
] are still operational
or re-activated. [...] The harassment and intimidation of human
rights and MDC activists was persistent [...] Rape is also reported
to be used as a political weapon. The legacy of nine years of
abuses against Zimbabwean citizens still has to be addressed.
An estimated 25,000 people have been the victims of human rights
abuses, along with 200,000 displaced, endemic torture, beatings
It has been reported that Gertrude Hambira, Secretary-General
of the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe,
whom we met during our visit, is in hiding and fears for her safety
after police raided the union's head office.
This illustrates the continuing threat of political violence and
the need for such cases to be highlighted internationally.
27. Continuing political violence and lack of
security has resulted in the displacement of many Zimbabweans,
the migration of many thousands to neighbouring countries and
the closure of many schools and medical facilities throughout
the country. It compromises donors' ability to provide support
to Zimbabwe's development and should be an ongoing concern to
the international community.
28. Article 3.1 of the Global Political Agreement
(GPA) states that the parties agree:
To give priority to the restoration of economic
stability and growth in Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the
process of developing and implementing an economic recovery strategy
and plan. To that end, the parties are committed to working together
on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate
Zimbabwe's economy, which will urgently address the issues of
production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the challenges
of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.
to the World Bank, Zimbabwe's economy grew strongly in the decade
following independence, and living standards improved considerably.
Economic growth started to slow down in the 1990s due to a balance
of payments crisis and droughts. In 1998 agriculture accounted
for 22% of GDP.
The effect of land seizures and drought on agricultural
productivity has therefore been one of the key elements in the
economic decline (see below). Zimbabwe's economy has continued
to deteriorate, reaching critical levels. GDP fell by a third
between 1999 and 2006.
Economic decline was accompanied by hyper-inflation: in
July 2008, Zimbabwe's Central Statistical Office announced the
official inflation rate to be 231 million per cent. However, some
international economists considered that the real rate was substantially
30. Unemployment reached 94% in January 2008. Out
of the country's 12 million people, only 480,000 had formal jobs,
a reduction from 3.6 million (30%) in 2003.
The high rate of unemployment has, according to Dr Kibble, "driven
tens of thousands of professionals to leave the country to find
work abroad [and] millions of less-skilled others into the southern
Africa region and Europe."
31. In January 2009 the Zimbabwean Government decided
to abandon the Zimbabwean dollar and use the US dollar.
A budget statement in the same month indicated that the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe would be taking a less prominent role in economic
management of the country. The Finance Minister, Tendai Biti,
announced a revised budget in March, which introduced an economic
plan (the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme) aimed at reinstating
fiscal discipline and resuscitating productivity. These changes
have had a positive impact in many areas.
GDP growth for 2009 is estimated at 3.7% and forecast to be 6.0%
32. Concern about the economy increased again in
February 2010 when President Mugabe introduced a law, which came
into effect on 1 March, that required white-owned companies with
an asset value of over $500,000 to surrender 51% of their shareholdings
to black Zimbabweans. The law was introduced by the President
without consultation with his partners in the coalition government.
He compared it to his "revolutionary land reforms" (see
below). He said that only "indigenous" people could
control the country's resources. He had previously declared that
white Zimbabweans were not "indigenous, even though they
were born here [Zimbabwe]. They are the offspring of settlers."
It has been reported that when the new law was announced there
was an immediate halt on billions of dollars of investment plans,
including a $500 million project for the expansion of a platinum
mine by a South African-based company.
The Financial Times has reported that economists, business
leaders and trade unionists have warned that the new "indigenisation"
law would "wreck any chance of attracting foreign investment
and strangle the economy's weak recovery."
We agree with this assessment.
RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
33. In 2001, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
imposed a series of measures on Zimbabwe in response to the high
level of arrears to two of its main funding mechanisms for developing
countries, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and
the General Resource Account (GRA). In 2002, Zimbabwe's further
failure to meet its financial obligations resulted in the IMF
suspending the provision of technical assistance to Zimbabwe;
and in 2003 Zimbabwe's voting rights at the IMF were suspended.
Zimbabwe settled its GRA arrears in 2006.
34. Following the recent improvement in Zimbabwe's
economy and its co-operation on economic policies there has been
progress towards normalisation of the country's relationship with
the IMF. The IMF approved the provision of technical assistance
in May 2009. On 19 February 2010, following a request from Zimbabwe's
Finance Minister, the IMF Executive Board announced that Zimbabwe's
voting and related rights had been restored, together with its
eligibility to use resources from the GRA. However, the IMF says
that "notwithstanding the restoration of eligibility to use
GRA resources, Zimbabwe will not be able to use resources from
the GRA or the Poverty and Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) until
it fully settles its arrears to the PRGT" of $140 million.
35. Normalisation of Zimbabwe's relations with
the international financial institutions will clearly be a major
contributor to its economic recovery. We welcome the IMF's approval
of technical assistance to Zimbabwe and the restoration of its
voting and related rights as a major step in this process, in
response to the economic recovery in the country. We would urge
the IMF to continue to engage with the Government of National
Unity, with a view to making further progress towards restoring
the availability of funding, and to support Zimbabwe in its efforts
to work towards meeting the loan approval criteria.
EU restrictive measures
36. In February 2002 the European Council imposed
restrictive measures ("sanctions") against Zimbabwean
individuals following the expulsion of the head of the EU observer
team covering the presidential elections. The Council said that
the "EU remained profoundly concerned at the continuing political
violence, the serious violations of human rights and the restrictions
on the media in Zimbabwe." They questioned the prospects
for free and fair elections.
The Council agreed a Common Position which stated that it "prohibits
the direct or indirect sale or supply of equipment capable of
being used to repress the people of Zimbabwe." It also "freezes
all funds, financial assets or economic resources of persons [named
in an annex to the Common Position] who are engaged in activities
that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and
the rule of law in Zimbabwe." Additionally, a ban on travel
to the EU was imposed on named individuals.
37. The restrictions target approximately 200 individuals
and 40 companies, linked to the ZANU-PF party.
The US has also imposed sanctions that have frozen the assets
of named Zimbabwean individuals.
Since their imposition the sanctions have been used for political
purposes by ZANU-PF, who claim that they favour the MDC party.
The state-controlled media argues that the sanctions are targeted
at all Zimbabweans, not just named individuals. President Mugabe
and his supporters have repeatedly demanded that the UK remove
the sanctions. President Mugabe has also used the restrictive
measures to accuse the UK and US "of seeking to oust him
by imposing economic sanctions."
38. In February 2010 the European Council renewed
the restrictive measures for a further year. However, it also
emphasised its "readiness to work closely with the Government
of National Unity in addressing the challenges the country faces
and in the implementation of its commitments as set out in the
Global Political Agreement". While recognising the progress
made by the GNU after a year in office, the Council nevertheless
noted "with concern" that insufficient progress had
been made with "regard to the rule of law, respect for human
rights, constitutional reform, power sharing on equal terms, national
reconciliation, security sector reform and the protection of investors."
It said that the restrictive measures would be kept under review
and that they would be revoked "in response to further concrete
developments in the implementation of the GPA."
39. Donald Steinberg of the International Crisis
Group told us that:
Tough targeted sanctions against such individuals
and the companies they control should remain in place to secure
the commitment of the recalcitrant parties to their commitments
under the GPA. At the same time, the international community must
recognize and encourage changes now occurring. One tangible step
would be to consider lifting sanctions of certain entities, such
as the Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe, that help revitalize key
sectors of the economy without overly benefitting the intransigent
He suggested that "The UK and EU should make
clear to Zimbabwe the specific steps it needs to see in order
to lift these and other sanctions."
40. President Zuma of South Africa made a state visit
to the UK at the beginning of March. He argued for the lifting
of sanctions both in advance of and during the visit, saying that
they were "one-sided" and had "served only to divide
the already fragile power-sharing government in Zimbabwe".
He believed that Zimbabwe could not be expected to sort out its
problems while the GNU was subject to two different sets of rules.
The UK Prime Minister's response was that some sanctions had been
lifted but that those which remained in place targeted individuals
with a history of supporting violence, rather than ordinary Zimbabweans.
He stressed the need for the Commissions on human rights, media
and governance established under the GPA "to move forward
quickly so people can see the future of Zimbabwe as a democratic,
prosperous country with freedom of the press and where there is
respect for human rights."
41. The EU has renewed the restrictive measures
on named individuals and organisations in Zimbabwe for another
year. We agree that further progress on democracy and human rights
needs to be demonstrated before all the measures can be lifted.
The UK should continue to make clear the basis of the measures,
and their specific terms, to the people of Zimbabwe. It should
also continue to support governance reforms which will help Zimbabwe
move to a position where the measures can be removed.
42. The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement placed restrictions
on land acquisition which protected white farm-owners. A system
of "willing-seller, willing-buyer", at full market value,
was instituted in the first 10 years following independence. In
1990 President Mugabe amended the constitution to allow compulsory
acquisition of white-owned land, but few farms were acquired at
that time. DFID says
that in 2000 the Government began the Fast Track Land Reform Programme
"ostensibly to address the inequitable distribution of land
once and for all". In practice, it resulted in the occupation
of thousands of commercial farms "at a high cost to the economy
and the people in general".
43. Since the land seizures started, more than 200,000
farm-workers have lost their jobs and a million people have been
displaced. DFID says that total commercial agricultural production
has more than halved,
(although, more positively, the Commercial Farmers Union told
us that they had recently successfully promoted advisory programmes
for farmers which had led to increased production). Professor
Brett told us that the land seizures "have removed most of
the best commercial farmers from their land and replaced them
with small-holders operating at little more than subsistence level,
and political cronies on large farms that they cannot run effectively."
He believed that the current land reform process had resulted
in a situation where "handing over the land to the people
means handing it over to generals who are now starving the people."
44. When our predecessors examined Zimbabwean land
reform as part of their inquiry into the humanitarian crisis in
Southern Africa in 2003 they said that "the disruption caused
by the government's disastrous land reform programme has severely
undermined agricultural production and created a [...] new class
of vulnerable people, farm workers and their families, who have
lost their livelihood as a result of the land resettlement programme."
Seven years on, the situation has not changed: agricultural production
is still severely reduced and even more farm-workers and their
families have lost their livelihoods and homes. The DFID Minister
condemned the farm invasions that had taken place and pointed
out that "terrible human rights abuses" had been committed
as part of the invasions. This was "completely unacceptable"
on an individual basis, but also in terms of the "devastating
impact it has had [...] on the rural agricultural economy."
45. A recent report from the Africa All-Party Parliamentary
Group (APPG), Land in Zimbabwe: past mistakes, future prospects,
says that the major consequence of the Fast Track Land Reform
Programme has been the loss of farming skills, not just the management
and agricultural skills of the white famers, but also those of
their skilled farm-workers.
It recommends that any future land reform policy must seek
the political as well as the economic tensions at the heart of
the land issue in Zimbabwe;
the dual land tenure system and ensure that there is a uniform
institutions to consult with the stakeholders, administrate land
policy and implement transparent, fair and sustainable land reform
and resettlement within the rule of law;
and pay fair compensation for land acquisition and losses;
agricultural production to its full potential and address the
ongoing under-utilisation of land.
46. The Global Political Agreement includes provision
for the "conduct [of] a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan
land audit [...] for the purpose of establishing accountability
and eliminating multiple farm ownerships".
The NGO Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) said that the "issues
are who owns, controls and benefits from the land." It called
for a "comprehensive response" that addressed land title,
historic injustices of land ownership, sustainable livelihoods
and poverty reduction. It supported appeals for a land audit and
suggested that the UK Government should provide funding to support
a transparent and accountable process of land reform.
47. DFID agrees that the first step towards reform
would be for a land audit to take place. However, the Minister
believed that there would only be merit in conducting a land audit
if there was confidence that the information obtained would be
used to "promote the type of pro-poor, sensible, transparent
land reform" that would revive the rural economy. He said
that DFID was ready to support a land audit, as part of a wider
international effort, if the conditions were right. He considered
that they were not right at present.
Moreover, it was far from clear that all parties in the Inclusive
Government wished a fairer land policy to be introduced.
48. The GNU Finance Minister allocated $30 million
(£18.8 million) for the land audit in his December 2009 budget,
to clarify who owns what land and to ensure that no-one owns more
than one farm. Zimbabwe has, however, undertaken land audits in
the past. A Presidential Land Review Commission produced an audit
in 2003, but the full report was not published.
Donald Steinberg highlighted that the Minister of Agriculture
had said that it was too soon to undertake a new land audit. His
own view was that a land reform programme was "absolutely
necessary" but that now may not be the right time for the
international community to be putting funds into the process.
49. Land reform in Zimbabwe is a complex issue.
It is also a highly-charged political issue between Zimbabwe and
the UK. However, resolution is essential for political stability
and continued economic recovery. Land seizures have had a devastating
impact, both on individual farm-owners and workers and on the
agricultural economy, and should cease. We agree with the DFID
Minister that the terrible human rights abuses which have taken
place as part of farm invasions are completely unacceptable. The
first stage in the land reform process should be a comprehensive
and transparent land audit, as laid down in the Global Political
Agreement. The timing of the audit is a matter for the Government
of National Unity. The process should be supported by the international
community, including the UK.
50. In the longer term, the UK should be prepared
to join other donors to fund land reform as part of a wider rural
and agricultural development strategy, provided the Government
of Zimbabwe is able to give credible assurances that such a process
will transfer land to the landless poor. However, the responsibility
for compensating people for land seizures lies with those who
seized land or condoned seizures.
7 Ev 48 Back
Ev 48 Back
Ev 38 Back
See FCO Zimbabwe Country Brief available at www.fco.gov.uk Back
International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive
Government, April 2009. See also Ev 48 Back
Ev 64 Back
Ev 48 Back
Ev 77 Back
Ev 77 Back
Ev 39 Back
Q 1 Back
Ev 77 Back
"MDC boycotting Zimbabwe Cabinet", BBC News website,
16 October 2009 Back
Ev 49 Back
"Zimbabwe back from brink as Morgan Tsvangirai calls off
boycott", The Guardian, 6 November 2009 Back
"UK Zimbabweans jeer Tsvangirai as he urges them to return
home", The Independent, 21 June 2009 Back
Government of Zimbabwe, Global Political Agreement, Article
6, September 2008 Back
Ev 49 Back
Although the Kariba draft was agreed by senior party members from
each of the three groupings in the context of negotiations in
2007, it is now rejected by many in MDC-T. It is, however, specifically
referred to in the GPA document Back
Ev 66 Back
Q 58, Ev 51; see also information available on the Project Details
section of the DFID website at www.dfid.gov.uk Back
Q 58 Back
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
Zimbabwe Consolidated Appeal: Mid-year Review 2008, p 1 Back
UN OCHA, Annual Report 2008, p 95 Back
Ev 49 Back
This information was provided in informal discussions. It was
also referred to in the Zimbabwean press- see for example "ZANU-PF
looting natural resources", The Zimbabwean, 12 January
Ev 49 Back
Q 2 [Dr Kibble] Back
Ev 71-72 Back
See"Zimbabwean union leader in hiding after police raid",
Amnesty International website, 24 February 2010 and "Union
leader flees to South Africa", zimonline, 2 March 2010 Back
Government of Zimbabwe, Global Political Agreement, Article
3.1, September 2008 Back
World Bank, Zimbabwe At A Glance Back
World Bank, Zimbabwe Country Brief, March 2009 Back
"Dollarization of Zimbabwe's economy appears to vanquish
hyperinflation", VoANews.com, 24 March 2009 Back
"Zimbabwe unemployment soars to 94%", AFP, 29
January 2009 Back
Dr Steve Kibble, "Who Controls the 'New' Zimbabwe?",
February 2009, p 3 [Unpublished paper] Back
Ev 49. The South African Rand is also widely used in some parts
of the country, Ev 69. See also "Has Zimbabwe's runaway inflation
been tamed?", Time, 26 March 2009 Back
Stuart Doran, "Zimbabwe's Economy: A Report Card, mid-2009",
The Brenthurst Foundation, p 4 Back
Global Finance magazine, Zimbabwe Country Report, available
at www.gfmag.com Back
"Mugabe seeks local ownership for every company", Financial
Times, 2 March 2010, p 11. The law is referred to in the press
as the "Indigenisation Act" but is in fact a Statutory
Instrument, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General)
Regulations 2010. Back
"Mugabe forces handover of white-owned companies to black
Zimbabweans", Times Online, 1 March 2010 Back
"Mugabe seeks local ownership for every company", Financial
Times, 2 March 2010, p 11 Back
"IMF executive board restores Zimbabwe's voting rights and
takes steps towards unfreezing access to the General Resource
Account", IMF press release, 2010/pr1053, 19 February 2010.
The PRGF has since been renamed the PRGT- Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust Back
European Commission, Bulletin of the European Union, 1/2-2002
Council Common Position 2002/145/CFSP Back
"EU renews sanctions on Zimbabwe", BBC News
website, 16 February 2010 Back
United States of America, Executive Order 13288, 23 November 2005 Back
"Mugabe denies blame for Zimbabwe woes", CNN,
24 September 2009 Back
European Union Press Notice, "European Council conclusions
on Zimbabwe", 22 February 2010 Back
Ev 79 Back
Ev 79 Back
"Zuma will ask UK to lift sanctions", Financial Times,
24 February 2010 and "Zuma calls for sanctions on Zimbabwe
to be lifted", The Guardian, 2 March 2010 Back
"Brown firm on Zimbabwe sanctions", BBC News website,
4 March 2010 Back
"Brown rebuffs Zuma on Zanu-PF sanctions", Financial
Times, 5 March 2010 Back
Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, Land in Zimbabwe: past
mistakes, future prospects, December 2009, p 32. Available
on the Royal African Society website at www.royalafricansociety.org Back
Ev 61 Back
Ev 61 Back
Ev 41 Back
Q 6 Back
Third Report of Session 2003-03, The Humanitarian Crisis in
Southern Africa, HC 116-I, para 32 Back
Q 75 Back
Africa All-Party Parliamentary Group, Land in Zimbabwe: past
mistakes, future prospects, December 2009, p 38 Back
ibid, p 40 Back
Government of Zimbabwe, Global Political Agreement, Article
5.9, September 2008 Back
Ev 36-37 Back
Q 76 Back
Q 75 Back
"Mugabe allies block land audit", BBC News website,
4 February 2010 Back
Q 20 Back