3 Public finances|
State of the public finances
36. The 2009 Budget revealed a sharp increase in
public spending, and a severe reduction in tax revenues as a result
of the recession.
Government borrowing is now forecast to be higher than at any
time since World War II, and the national debt is set to remain
high for at least a generation. The forecasts for the public finances
were also subject to an even greater degree of uncertainty than
previously, as the Chancellor acknowledged: "Inevitably in
forecasting, which is difficult even when times are pretty settled,
the uncertainty around in this country and other countries makes
matters more complicated".
Table 1 below sets out the key fiscal projections from Budget
Table 1: Summary of fiscal projections.
Source: HM Treasury, Budget 2009, p 20, Table
37. At the time of the 2008 Budget, the Treasury
forecast that the current budget would move into surplus in 2010-11.
In our Report arising from that document, we noted that this forecast
was subject to "considerable downside risks".
Our scepticism was vindicated by the 2008 Pre-Budget Report (PBR),
which projected a significant further deterioration in the public
finances, with the current budget in deficit throughout the forecast
period, peaking at 5.3% of GDP in 2009-10, and then falling to
1.1% by 2013-14. The cyclically-adjusted current deficit was forecast
to fall from 4.4% of GDP in 2009-10, to 1.0% in 2013-14, when
the economy was "projected to return to trend, driven by
a recovery of tax receipts and lower spending growth".
38. The 2009 Budget announced a further marked deterioration
in the borrowing forecasts. Projections for the current budget
deficit in each and every year until the end of the forecast period
(2013-14) had increased by at least £50 billion from those
made at the time of PBR 2008.
Net borrowing, which also includes net investment, is set to peak
in this financial year at £175 billion, an alarmingly high
12.4% of GDP. Chart 1 places the size of public sector borrowing
in some historical context and shows that since 1946 at least,
borrowing has not been so high as it is projected to be this year.
Chart 1: Public sector net borrowing.
"UK Budget 2009: Living on borrowed money", 23 April
39. The Chancellor explained that borrowing had increased
because, on the income side, revenue from the financial services
sector was "way down" not least because of lower revenues
arising from corporation taxes and taxation of financial sector
bonuses, and stamp duty revenues were lower too "because
of the general slowdown in the economy". Secondly, borrowing
had risen because of the fiscal stimulus, which included deliberate
policy choices such as the temporary VAT reduction, the increase
in personal allowances, and various other measures set out in
the Pre-Budget Report and the Budget. Thirdly, borrowing had risen
because of the "automatic stabilisers", via which the
cost of welfare payments rises with unemployment.
40. Roger Bootle, writing in the Daily Telegraph,
pencilled in a more pessimistic prediction of peak borrowing of
£230 billion, or 16% of GDP next year, compared with the
Chancellor's forecast of £173 billion.
In oral evidence, he explained that the reason why he took a different
view from the Government on the future of the public finances
was primarily because he took a more pessimistic view of the economy
in general"If I believed the Chancellor's economic
forecast, I suspect my fiscal forecast would be largely the same".
Mr Ramsden, defending the Budget's forecasts, pointed out that
they were less optimistic than the average of new independent
forecasts had been prior to the Budget's publication, and advised
us that this was because some of the Treasury's underlying assumptions
"do build in some caution". He accepted that other forecasters
predicted higher borrowing, but nevertheless considered the Budget's
projection to be a realistic forecast.
41. According to the Budget, in 2009-10 public sector
net borrowing will be 12.4% of GDP, of which 9.8% of GDP (or 79%
of borrowing) is accounted for by structural, rather than cyclical
factors. A structural
deficit represents borrowing that is not going to disappear when
the economy returns to growth. Mr Ramsden explained that the large
structural deficit in 2009/2010 resulted from the way in which
the Treasury's method for making cyclical adjustments recognised
the 5% permanent loss of productive capacity in the economy caused
by the recession. If the recession's impact on the supply side
of the economy turned out to be less than 5%, then the percentage
of the deficit that was structural would be correspondingly lower.
42. The Budget announced that public sector net debt
(PSND) would increase rapidly through the forecast period. PSND
excluding liabilities and unrealised losses from financial sector
interventions, rises over the period to 2013-14, in particular
in 2009-10 and 2010-11, reflecting the surge in additional borrowing
in these years. By 2013-14 PSND on this measure reaches 76.2%
of GDP. The inclusion of potential impacts arising from financial
sector interventions on PSND makes for even worse readingby
2013-14, PSND on this basis stabilises at around 79% of GDP.
43. Until Pre-Budget Report 2008, public sector net
debt had been limited by the Sustainable Investment Rule, which
stated that PSND should be maintained below 40% of GDP in each
and every year of the economic cycle.
The Treasury chose to depart from this Rule in PBR 2008, until
such a time as the global shocks had worked their way through
the economy in full.
The parlous state of the public finances can be ascertained when
it is recognised that, if the Sustainable Investment Rule were
still in force in 2013-14, the projected PSND would have been
double that permitted by the rule. Indeed, a return to the 40%
level is by no means imminent. The IFS has calculated that, based
on Budget 2009 assumptions, this would not occur until February
2032. Chart 2 below portrays this trajectory for the national
Chart 2: Public sector net debt.
Source: IFS, Public finances: two parliaments
of pain, 23 April 2009
44. The Chancellor's forecasts for public borrowing
and national debt make sobering reading. By any measure, those
forecasts, along with those of many other OECD countries, are
extremely high: they have exceeded the fiscal rules from which
the Government departed in PBR 2008 by a wide margin and these
figures represent the worst fiscal outlook since the Second World
War. We are very concerned about the state of the public finances.
What is now of critical importance is that the public, and crucially
the markets, believe that the Chancellor is working to an adequate,
and credible, plan to restore the public finances to good health.
The credibility of any attempt to restore the public finances
will depend on an acceptance that the structural deficit must
be addressed as well as the consequences of the current extraordinary
circumstances. We discuss this plan in the next section of this
Recovering the public finances
45. The Chancellor told us there were two elements
to his approach to fiscal policy. On the one hand, he was "trying
to support the economy now" but, on the other, he was scheduling
in "quite a substantial tightening as we come into recovery",
because it was important "to send a clear signal that whilst
you support the economy now, like all countries, like all businesses,
you have got to live within your means in the medium and longer
term and we have got to have sustainable public finances".
In Mr Chote's opinion, the credibility of the public finances
depended crucially "on the quality of the plan the Government
has in place to repair the underlying problem" and whether
people believed that the Government, or a future government, was
going to pursue the sort of fiscal tightening over the next Parliament,
that was necessary.
46. The Chancellor argued that the reason why borrowing
and debt were "much, much higher" than previously was
because of "the extraordinary circumstances" of the
last couple of years. But he added that he was in no doubt that
it was absolutely necessary, "to have a pretty clear view
that this level of borrowing and the levels of debt need to come
back down". In line with that recognition, the 2009 Budget
set a path for halving the deficit over the next five year period.
It also reaffirmed the Government's commitment to ensuring sound
public finances and protecting fiscal sustainability:
Sound public finances are essential for macroeconomic
stability, which gives businesses and individuals the confidence
to plan and invest for the long term. They also help to deliver
low long-term interest rates, supporting businesses' access to
new financing and resources for growth.
In order to ensure such sound public finances, the
Budget set out tax and spending measures to be implemented at
a time when the economy is forecast to be recovering and able
to support fiscal consolidation. These plans "will deliver
an average adjustment of over 0.8% a year in the cyclically-adjusted
current budget between 2010-11 and 2013-14".
Mr Chote explained that this plan gave somewhat limited information
about where that tightening would fall:
About 10% of that is achieved by the tax increases
that have already been announced,
and then in addition
the Government is anticipating getting about 15% of that gap filled
by cuts in capital spending over the duration of the next Parliament,
, and about 25% from squeezing current spending,
That then leaves about half, which the Treasury is presuming will
come either from as yet unannounced tax increases or as yet unannounced
squeezes on non-investment spending.
Mr Chote observed that "there is an awful lot
of detail that needs to be filled in", not least where any
cuts would fall within current spending and within capital spending
47. Professor David Heald argued that the "key
feature of Budget 2009 is the collapse of tax revenue projections"
between November 2008 and April 2009.
A decline in revenues is, of course, to be expected in a recession,
as firms make lower profits and incomes fall. This recession has
seen particularly sharp declines in revenues from the financial
sector, both through corporation and income tax receipts. Financial
company corporation tax had accounted for around 25% of overall
corporation tax, and the sector provides significant amounts of
income tax and national insurance contributions on salaries and
bonuses. The housing sector provides revenue directly through
stamp duty, inheritance tax and capital gains tax and indirectly
through the VAT collected on housing-related consumption. Receipts
from these sectors dropped sharply in 2008-09 and are expected
to fall further in 2009-10. The Budget suggested that receipts
were then expected to recover but not to the levels experienced
in 2007-08. Chart
3 below shows the Budget's projections for housing and financial
Chart 3: Housing and financial sector receipts.
Source: HM Treasury, Budget 2009, p 229
48. Mr Weale was sceptical of the Budget's projections
for the recovery of the financial sector, believing that they
were "grossly optimistic".
He pointed out that the Treasury was expecting housing and financial
sector receipts as a proportion of GDP to rebound to 1999 levels
by 2013 and doubted
whether this was likely.
But if revenues from financial services and housing do not bounce
back fully, Mr Whiting contended, it was difficult to see which
sectors would provide any substitute revenue growth:
the financial sector in particular is very vulnerable
and it is hard to see that getting back to the sorts of yields
for the Government that they have done in recent years for many,
many years, if at all. The energy sector has been a significant
contributor and maybe that will continue, but with the decline
in North Sea [oil] there is clearly a bit of a risk to the downside
in that as well. Housing you have alluded to. The retail sector
is depressed. It is difficult to see which sector is going to
deliver the increased tax yields that arguably we need.
Karen Ward, HSBC's UK Economist, has observed that,
even if growth were to return to the levels projected by the Budget,
that growth could well see "a very different mix" of
In his Budget, the Chancellor expressed his vision of growth rebalanced
towards investment by businesses in low-carbon, advanced manufacturing
But, Ms Ward observed, this was likely to generate "significantly
less revenue" than growth driven by financial services, because
whilst the financial sector only accounts for 3% of jobs, it accounted
for 9% of total household income.
49. One of the important determinants of the restoration
of health to the public finances is the extent to which tax revenues
are able to rebound from their current low levels. It should be
recognised that even before the current crisis the UK was running
a structural deficit, although the scale of that deficit has been
disputed and has been justified by the Chancellor on the grounds
that this was a necessary investment. In our view, any restoration
is not merely contingent on the economy meeting the challenging
growth projections set in this year's Budget. What is also of
importance is the composition of that growth. We note the inevitable
shift away from the UK economy's dependence on financial services,
and the Chancellor specified several industrial sectors which
had promising futures. But it would be wrong to assume that these,
or other sectors, will necessarily be as profitable as financial
services. We recommend, therefore, that future Pre-Budget Reports
and Budget documents provide a sectoral analysis of tax revenues,
so that the basis of Treasury forecasts in a changing economy
can be scrutinised. The Treasury already has the means to provide
this information, as evidenced by its commentary on the financial
and housing sectors, so to do this should not be particularly
Delaying the difficult decisions?
50. The Budget's proposes a consolidation in the
cyclically-adjusted current budget so that balance is achieved
in 2017-18. In the years to 2013-14, this consolidation path derives
from policy decisions and the projected recovery in the economy,
but from 2014-15 onwards, the consolidations needed in each year
of 0.8% of GDP, are merely "illustrative projections".
For this period, no information is provided in the Budget as to
what a consolidation of 0.8% of GDP per year would mean in policy
terms. Chart 4 below depicts the consolidation in the public finances:
green bars represent consolidation from announced policies; white
bars represent illustrative projections, and so do not represent
any specific policy choices.
Chart 4: Balancing the cyclically-adjusted current
Source: HM Treasury, Budget 2009, p 35, Chart
51. Mr Chote said that it was "understandable"
that there was "a degree of vagueness at this stage"
regarding whether an incoming government in 2014 ought to be relying
more or less on tax increases rather than spending cuts, and doubted
whether a fully detailed plan would be any more credible than
specifying "the broad orders of magnitude" as set out
in the Budget document.
Mr Weale agreed that it would be wrong for the Chancellor to say
now what the balance between taxation and spending was going to
be in five years' time, not least because there could be two general
elections between now and then, but he thought that "some
sense of how things might turn out and how the gap could be remedied
purely as a guide would be quite helpful".
Mr Bootle said that in "normal circumstances" macroeconomists
were not particularly concerned about how future Governments would
plug any gaps in the public finances, and that, largely, this
decision could be left to the politicians. However, he argued
that these were not normal times, and thought that a consolidation
in the public finances based on tax rises would have a worse macroeconomic
impact than one based on spending cuts:
if the public believed that the gap was going
to be closed through much higher taxation I could see this having
a much greater downward effect, serious effect, on confidence
and, therefore, on spending than if the public in general and
businesses believed it was going to be closed through expenditure
restraint. That is not a particularly orthodox answer and in different
circumstances I think it could be proved wrong, but I suspect
in the current conjuncture that is the balance of it.
Mr Weale disagreed, suggesting that the economy could
bear a tax burden of, say, 38-39% of GDP," without the economy
falling apart", should that be needed.
52. In the medium term, the options for returning
the public finances to balance present uncomfortable choices for
the Government and consequences for the public, the broad alternatives
being substantial tax increases, unprecedented cuts in public
services, or a combination of the two. We recommend that in the
Pre-Budget Report 2009, the Government sets out a range of options
for closing the projected fiscal gap.
The fiscal framework
53. The Code for Fiscal Stability defined two rules
against which the Government's stewardship of the public finances
could be assessed.
In October 2008, the Chancellor announced that the Government
would temporarily depart from these two fiscal rules.
In their stead, the Government introduced a Temporary Operating
to set policies to improve the cyclically-adjusted
current budget each year, once the economy emerges from the downturn,
so it reaches balance and debt is falling as a proportion of GDP
once the global shocks have worked their way through the economy
54. Roger Bootle and Martin Weale both labelled the
Temporary Operating Rule as a "tautology" rather than
a rule. Mr Weale explained what he meant as follows:
The tautology is that the Treasury can claim
that the global shocks have not worked their way through the economy
in full until it reaches a point where the current budget is in
balance and debt is falling. As a consequence the question whether
the Treasury is set to meet its rule is not worth asking unless
there is a more precise definition of what is meant by it and
a clear statement of how it will be assessed.
55. Budget 2009 stated that the temporary operating
rule was designed "to underpin a sustained fiscal consolidation
once the economy is recovering",
and contended that "on the assumption that the Government
delivers a further consolidation of 0.8% of GDP a year in the
cyclically-adjusted current budget beyond 2013-14", the fiscal
projections were consistent with the Rule.
56. We do not see how the Temporary Operating
Rule acts as any kind of constraint at all on the current fiscal
decisions made by the Chancellor, and we struggle to imagine any
course of action he might have taken in this year's Budget that
would have been inconsistent with it. For this Rule to have any
bite whatsoever, the identification of the point in time at which
"the global shocks have worked their way through the economy
in full", cannot be left to the judgement of the Treasury
alone, but should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. It is
clear to us that the only real financial discipline that is currently
imposed on the Chancellor is the opinion of the gilt market on
the sustainability of the public finances.
57. Following our inquiry into PBR 2008, we concluded
The fact that a temporary departure from the
fiscal rules has been required serves to reinforce our view that
a revised fiscal framework is needed. The forthcoming period during
which the Temporary Operating Rule applies provides a good opportunity
to re-evaluate the fiscal framework for the future. We recommend
that the Treasury conduct a full public consultation on the design
of such a framework.
58. The Government rejected our recommendation, stating
that "in advance of the public finances reaching cyclically-adjusted
current balance, the Government will set out how it will apply
the fiscal framework in future to continue to deliver its objectives".
In oral evidence, the Chancellor said his "main focus at
was to work towards reducing the amount of borrowing
and reducing the amount of debt".
59. Mr Chote argued strongly that there should be
a rethink of the fiscal framework, stating that such a framework
was inadequate if it only saved enough for "normal times".
Over the next 30-40 years, in his view, it was quite likely that
there would be another recession, and so fiscal policies should
be designed "with the aim of saving up for the next disaster
instead of on the assumption that there will not be any more disasters".
Although the Government had only 'temporarily departed from',
rather than abandoned, the fiscal rules, Mr Bootle did not wish
to see a return to the same fiscal framework. He contended that
the 40% ceiling set by the Sustainable Investment Rule had "come
out of the blue without very much rationale" and had turned
out to have been "extraordinarily high" when confronted
with the events of the last two years:
if one wanted to establish the debt to GDP ratio
at a level which was sufficiently low that it gave governments
quite a lot of scope to respond, then we had set the objective
much too high because here we are with Government quite closely
I am very struck by the fact that on the
two previous occasions
when we had massive public borrowing
at 250% of GDP, it came after we had fought two huge wars. What
I find concerning about the current situation is that if there
were to be an enormous burden on the public finances from that
source or perhaps from, God forbid, some ghastly pandemic
heaven help us, how would we cope?
Mr Bootle expressed the hope that there would be
an effective national debate about the fiscal rules because they
"had done an enormous amount of harm in this country":
"they were misconceived, misapplied and they provided a smokescreen
for a very destabilising policy".
60. We believe that the Chancellor should now
engage in what we regard as a crucial debate about the future
of the UK fiscal framework. The majority of our expert witnesses
found fault with the Golden Rule and Sustainable Investment Rule,
so an eventual return to an unreformed framework would seem misguided.
We sense that there is little consensus on what the best framework
might be, which is all the more reason to commence a thorough
analysis of all the options, drawing on international best practice,
practical experience and academic theory. We are not suggesting
that a new framework should be implemented now, but that the Treasury
should open up a debate. To this end, we renew our recommendation
made in our Report on PBR 2008 for a full public consultation.
61. The burgeoning budget deficit, combined with
the cost of financial sector interventions, has fed through to
a substantial increase in the Central Government Net Cash Requirement
to £220.8 billion, and a net financing requirement of £237.8
billion in 2009-10, the vast majority of which£220
billionis to be raised by gross gilt issuance.
The Treasury forecasts that its rate of interest will stay roughly
the same (albeit on a much larger stock of debt).
62. Richard Lambert, director-general of the CBI,
said that "the key question for this Budget was whether it
set out a credible and rigorous path for restoring the public
finances to health. The CBI's preliminary judgment must be that
it does not." He regarded as optimistic the Chancellor's
economic forecasts of a rapid end to the recession and growth
well above trend from 2011-2014. In his view, "with annual
government bond issue expected to exceed £200bn in the coming
years and debt doubling by 2013, the government is running too
much of a risk with the willingness of investors to finance UK
risk would be that a reduction in demand for gilts would increase
the financing costs of the UK Government at a time when the stock
of debt was exceptionally high.
63. However, Mr Ramsden, for the Treasury, was bullish
about the market, telling us of his confidence that appetite for
gilts, which had been "very strong" throughout 2008-09,
would be sustained in 2009-2010 because "at the macro level
we think we have set out a transparent and realistic set of forecasts
and a credible consolidation plan into the medium term".
Martin Weale added support to this prediction, telling us that
the best forecast of future interest rates was what the long-term
bond market was indicating, and that was saying rates were likely
to stay in the 4-5% range for the foreseeable future.
64. The sustained demand for Government debt investments
might be considered surprising by some, as there could be an expectation
of upward pressure on yields stemming from the supply shock of
increased debt issuance over the fiscal forecast period, and the
potential that the market might lose faith in the credibility
of the Government's stewardship of the public finances. On the
other hand, in recessions there tends to be a flight to quality.
Because Government debt is considered lower-risk than other assets
such as corporate debt, investors seek the safety, and relative
liquidity, of gilts rather than corporate bonds. In addition to
other factors, the UK Government is, of course, in competition
with other governments in its issuance of Government Stock. However,
there is relatively buoyant demand for UK gilts from UK banks
for regulatory reasons, and the Bank of England is also now buying
gilts as part of its quantitative easing programme. The Chancellor
added that investors liked the fact that UK sovereign debt was
"comparatively longer dated than a lot of the stock that
is available in the European markets".
65. Mr Bootle viewed the Treasury's assumption about
costs of financing as by no means unreasonable or outrageous:
I should have thought it was quite unlikely that
we would get both a prolonged recession, or the absence of recovery,
which produced even worse borrowing numbers than we have here
and, therefore, a vastly increased supply of gilts and lack of
demand for gilts at existing interest rates because if we were
to get a very, very weak real outturn then that would bring on
the deflationary prospect I was talking about earlier on and it
would surely underpin a prolonged period of effectively zero short-term
interest rates. On that basis I could imagine the demand for gilts
being very strong indeed. In fact, historically there are a number
of examples of this. It has tended to be when bond issuance has
been terribly high that yields have been very low and one particular
example of that is Japan in the 1990s, not unlike the position
we are currently inthe numbers are slightly differentbut
at one point, despite the government having a huge deficit, not
quite as large as ours but around about 8% of GDP, ten year Japanese
Government bonds fell to a yield of 0.6%.
66. David Miles, of Morgan Stanley, argued in the
IFS Green Budget in January 2009 that "there was no reason
yet to be alarmed about borrowing costs rising significantly,
but clearly there is huge uncertainty either way".
Mr Chote observed that this was "a classic example"
of a case where it was just as important for the Government to
say how it would respond if things turned out differently from
the central forecast, as whether the central forecast itself was
Chancellor admitted that there was uncertainty"we
are in uncertain times but so far there appears to be a healthy
demand for our gilts"but
when we asked him, given this uncertainty, what he would do if
the gilt markets started to lose faith in the Government's ability
to manage the public finances, he said it was "quite pointless"
to speculate on "something that I do not anticipate being
67. One of the harbingers of such an eventuality
would be if there were to be a sequence of uncovered gilt auctions
by the Debt Management Office (DMO). One such uncovered auction
did occur on 25 March 2009.
Mr Bootle was unconcerned by the failure of this single gilt auction,
because it was "perfectly possible to have a situation in
which a gilt auction fails for whatever reason and yet the demand
for gilts is still very strong over a prolonged period".
He would be more concerned if there were to be a series of uncovered
gilt auctions as demand for gilts dried up. In this scenario,
bond yields would "shoot up very considerably", which
would result in the Government's cost of financing increasing
significantly. He did not say that this eventuality was likelyindeed,
he believed that the Treasury's projection that the cost of borrowing
would remain low was "reasonable" on recent formbut
it was "plausible", and if it happened, then we would
be "in serious trouble".
Nor had Mr Weale detected any great concern from the gilt market
about the public finances, at least not from expectations of long-term
interest rates on Government debt, which remained low. He cautioned
that "obviously the market can be wrong, but at the moment
the market does not appear to be frightened".
68. We note the reaction of the debt markets to
the Treasury's ambitious borrowing plans. We believe there are
strong reasons why the costs of financing the Government debt
could well remain low. But if the gilt market were to lose its
appetite for Government debt, which is by no means impossible,
the cost of financing that debt could climb to perilous levels.
Financial markets can be very volatile, and, as we have recently
learnt in the financial crisis, can be quite poor at pricing risks
initially, with any subsequent pricing corrections being sudden
and unexpected. Under these circumstances, we consider that it
would be prudent for the Treasury to work up contingency plans
for a weakening of demand for Government debt.
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Q 242 Back
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HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report 2008, Cm 7484, November
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Q 243 Back
Qq 19, 46 Back
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Ev 55 Back
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HSBC Global Research, UK Budget 2009: Living on borrowed money,
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Q 41 [Weale] Back
Q 41 [Bootle] Back
Q 41 [Weale] Back
The golden rule: over the economic cycle, the Government would
borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending; and the
sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion
of GDP would be held over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent
level. Other things being equal, net debt would be maintained
below 40 per cent of GDP over the economic cycle. Back
Speech by the Chancellor at the Cass Business School, London,
29 October 2008 [Mais lecture]. Back
HM Treasury, Government's Fiscal Framework, November 2008,
p 5 Back
Q 47 and Ev 56 Back
Budget 2009, p 31 Back
Budget 2009, p 19 Back
Treasury Committee, Second Report of Session 2008-09, Pre-Budget
Report 2008, HC 27, para 57 Back
Treasury Committee, Third Special Report of Session 2008-09,
Pre-Budget Report 2008: Government Response to the Committee's
Second Report of Session 2008-09, HC 431 Back
Q 315 Back
Q 44 Back
Qq 45, 73 Back
Q 73 Back
Q 45 Back
Budget 2009, p 245 Back
See Q 48 Back
"Concerns voiced over public finance risks", Financial
Times, 23 April 2009 Back
Q 147 Back
Q 50 Back
Q 313 Back
Referred to in Q 49. Back
Q 49 Back
Q 313 Back
Q 311 Back
HM Treasury, Debt and reserves management report 2009-10,
April 2009, p 12 Back
Q 40 [Bootle] Back
Q 40 [Weale] Back