COVERING ALL THOSE INVOLVED
IN ACCESSING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC-SECTOR DECISION MAKERS FROM
OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC SECTOR
170. We have already stated our view that there
is nothing that multi-client public affairs consultancies do that
is different from what other companies, organisations and individuals
do when trying to influence decisions, apart from the fact of
representing more than one client, and that to focus on the regulation
of multi-client firms might perversely make it harder for smaller
organisations to influence decisions, with little impact on the
larger organisations that tend to be the focus of what concern
there is.[150] It is
therefore crucial that a register should cover all contact between
public-sector decision-makers and those outside interests attempting
to influence their decisionsalthough with different degrees
of requirement for organisations lobbying on a regular basis and
individual citizens or voluntary groups approaching a Minister
about a specific issue of concern.[151]
171. There are a very restricted range of circumstances
in which such contacts ought not to be covered. In Canada, oral
and written communications are exempted from registration if:
a) they are made to a parliamentary committee
or to a similar body or person, in proceedings that are a matter
of public record;
b) they are made to a public office holder with
respect to the enforcement, interpretation or application by that
public office holder of any Act of Parliament or regulation with
respect to the person or organization on whose behalf the communication
is being made; or,
c) they are restricted to requests for information.
172. We can envisage other circumstances in which
communications or other information might be exempted from disclosure:
a) if they relate directly to legal proceedings,
or to the negotiation of a legal document, such as a contract,
with the relevant public office.
b) if their disclosure would harm an important
public interest such as national security, or constitute a risk
to individuals: for example, the fact that a lobbyist had previously
been employed by one of the Security Agencies,
c) if their disclosure would divulge information
that is genuinely commercially confidential or market-sensitive
in nature.
173. These exemptions should, however, be defined
as narrowly as possible. For example, if some of the content of
a communication was commercially confidential, this should not
prevent the publication of the remaining content, nor of the fact
that the communication had occurred. Similarly, legal firms would
not be exempt from disclosure where their activities were essentially
to do with influencing policy or other government decisions rather
than legal proceedings or negotiations.
174. A further consideration, mentioned above,
is that regulation could act as a barrier to the least professionalised
and least experienced. It is vital that disclosure requirements
should be tailored to circumstances. It would be counter-productive
to expect individual citizens or informal voluntary groups to
have to register before writing to a Minister with their views
on issues of concern. It would be less unreasonable for them to
expect that the fact of their correspondence and its subject matter
might be placed in the public domain.
MANAGED AND ENFORCED BY A
BODY INDEPENDENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENT AND LOBBYISTS
175. Trust in any register will depend on whether
it is seen to be managed competently and independently. Independent
procedures will also be needed to pursue complaints about failures
to provide information and about misleading or inaccurate information.
There is already an existing body, independent of Government,
which decides whether information should be released into the
public domain: the Office of the Information Commissioner. From
our perspective, this is the obvious body to take on this additional
role, provided it is given the necessary resources and powers.
WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED?
176. In our view, to meet the remaining key
principles, the following information would need to be provided: