Lobbying: Access and influence in Whitehall - Public Administration Committee Contents


6  Proposals for reform

Principles

143.  In this final part of the Report, we put forward our proposals for reform. The aim of any reform should be to be both proportionate and effective—even if the effect is only to improve public confidence or to make others aware that their activities may become subject to public scrutiny.

144.  What is clear to us is that reform is necessary. Lobbying the Government should, in a democracy, involve explicit agreement about the terms on which this lobbying is conducted. The result of doing nothing would be to increase public mistrust of Government, and to solidify the impression that Government listens to favoured groups—big business and party donors in particular—with far more attention than it gives to others. Measures are needed:

Promoting ethical behaviour by lobbyists

145.  We have set out above the problems as we see them with existing self-regulation. We do not believe that transparency requirements are ever likely to be enforceable through self-regulation. There may, however, be a role for a self-regulatory organisation in promoting ethical behaviour by those involved in lobbying. This will depend, however, on whether lobbyists are genuinely willing to be seen to be regulating themselves effectively. If they are, there are a number of simple and obvious steps that they could take to improve the current situation:

i.  Establish a single umbrella organisation with both corporate and individual membership, in order to be able to cover all those who are involved in lobbying as a substantial part of their work. A single organisation is needed to establish and exercise authority. Both corporate and individual membership are required so that both public affairs firms and individual lobbyists within corporate organisations can be included, and so that action including sanctions can be targeted at either level. The organisation would be funded by those it regulates, in a similar way to the Advertising Standards Authority and Press Complaints Commission.

ii.  Ensure that people from outside the lobbying world with a track record in regulation and in business ethics are involved in running the organisation, to provide a degree of external moderation as well as some reassurance that it will take action against its members when this is justified, rather than protecting them whenever possible.

iii.  Establish a clear separation between promoting and representing those involved in lobbying activity, and regulating that activity.

iv.  Subject the standards of the members of the organisation to more rigorous scrutiny, including external validation. PRCA members are required to meet a Consultancy Management Standard (CMS) which is externally audited. The CMS, however, is less about ethical standards than about the general quality of the service that consultancies provide to their customers. The public affairs industry should institute an externally assessed and validated standard—a kind of kite mark—which its members should be required to meet. The standard should integrate ethical issues, structural issues and service quality issues, all of which are interdependent.

146.  Standards will be needed at both the corporate and individual levels. A corporate standard would allow public affairs firms to show that they met certain requirements; an individual standard could extend to those working in-house as well as for freelance consultancies. Such a standard would only be worthwhile if it were assessed and validated externally by a trusted body outside the industry, and if companies and individuals did on occasion fail the tests that were set. It would also only be of value if companies knew that there was a business advantage in achieving it or in employing people who had achieved it.

147.  The business advantage we have in mind is to allow potential clients as well as targets of lobbying to judge the quality and reputation of those involved in public affairs. We would not expect all of those individuals and groups involved in lobbying decision-makers to belong to this body. Examples of where it would be unreasonable to expect this might be a local organisation opposing a single planning application or a small business lobbying on the unintended effects of a specific piece of legislation. We would, however, expect all of those involved in lobbying decision-makers on a regular and continuing basis to perceive an overwhelming advantage in membership. This would include campaigning organisations and in-house corporate lobbyists as well as self-professed public affairs consultancies.

148.  The body's effectiveness would be judged in part by its readiness to sanction those who fail to meet its criteria. If the perceived advantage of membership is strong enough, suspension and expulsion will be powerful sanctions. In some circumstances other sanctions, including the power to fine and to 'name and shame' might also be needed.

149.  For the lobbying industry to implement these recommendations will require rivalries to be set aside in the interests of genuine joint commitment to effective self-regulation. This suggests an unprecedented unity of purpose. It may concentrate minds to consider the alternative. We recommend that the Government should allow six months following the publication of this Report to see whether concrete and consistent progress can be made. Failing this, we recommend that the Government should bring forward a short bill to provide in statute for the kind of organisation we have described above, to be funded by lobbyists.

Ensuring maximum transparency in lobbying activity

150.  Transparency could be both a guardian against unethical activity and a means of assurance to a sceptical public. Any means of ensuring transparency can only be effective and comprehensive if it is imposed through a regulatory framework.

151.  A register is the regulatory solution proposed to us by campaigning groups and the one most commonly adopted in other jurisdictions. All of the variants of registers of which we are aware require those who are carrying out lobbying activity to provide information about this activity.

152.  Spinwatch, the only campaigning group that appeared to exist before our inquiry focusing predominantly on the negative aspects of public relations, has stated, rightly in our view, that self-regulation "has demonstrably failed to ensure transparency, does not cover all of the industry and suffers from a lack of effective oversight".[145] Following the launch of our inquiry, an Alliance for Lobbying Transparency was formed as a coalition of civil society organisations calling for lobbying regulation. Members of this alliance include larger organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FOE). A representative of FOE set out to us his vision of what a register might look like:

Very concretely in the register you have the name of the lobbyist, the person who is engaged in the activity, so if they work for a particular organisation you would have their name as well. You would have the area of legislation which they are trying to influence, whether that is a piece of legislation going through or a particular decision about a contract. Disclosure for different organisations works in slightly different ways but you would disclose who is paying and how much money and on which areas of policy … there should be a threshold of activity. Finance or time are two ways that it is being done but a threshold where below that amount of lobbying activity you are under no obligation to register.[146]

EXAMPLES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS

153.  It is useful to see the FOE suggestion in the light of the different registers that already exist in different jurisdictions, each of which has substantially different requirements.

154.  The United States register requires a large amount of detail from lobbyists, including estimates of total income from individual clients and a description of the issues on which lobbying has taken place. There are financial thresholds for registration, and different requirements for lobbyists with clients and firms employing lobbyists in-house. The US register carries the harshest penalties for non-compliance: a fine of up to $200,000 and a prison term of up to five years.

155.  The following is a sample declaration made by a large public affairs firm in respect of one of its clients:



156.  The Canadian federal register requires a similar level of detail to the US system, but concentrates less on the disclosure of financial information than on the identities of the lobbyists and the lobbied, the subject matters of any lobbying and the ways in which lobbying is carried out (eg. written communication, oral communication, and grassroots activities). Information also must be provided about meetings with designated public office holders. Lobbyists must also supply information about any public offices they have formerly held, even, as the example below illustrates, offices they held in the distant past. Penalties for non-compliance with the Lobbying Act are a fine of up to $25 000 and/or up to 6 months in jail, on summary conviction, and up to $100 000 and/or 2 years in jail on conviction by way of indictment.



157.  The new Australian register has a much lighter touch than the two examples above: only professional multi-client lobbyists are required to register, and they are required to provide only the names of those engaged in lobbying on their behalf and the names of their clients (a requirement which is delayed where market sensitivity is a concern). The only available penalty for non-compliance is removal from the register. A sample entry for the same company follows:


158.  The recently introduced European Commission register has the widest reach and asks for different kinds of broad financial information from in-house lobbyists (proportion of turnover dedicated to lobbying), multi-client lobbyists (proportion of income received from each client) and NGOs and think-tanks (sources of funding). It is a voluntary register, although the European Parliament has supported the creation of a mandatory register along similar lines. As a voluntary register, there are no sanctions envisaged for failure to disclose information.

159.  As of November 2008, none of the major public affairs consultancies operating in Brussels had registered, including the consultancy used in the examples above. The entry for the Association of British Insurers reveals that in 2007, the Association's estimated costs directly related to representing interests to EU institutions in that year amounted to between 850,000 and 950,000 euros. The entry for Friends of the Earth Europe shows estimated costs of between 500,000 and 550,000 euros. The sources of FoE's budget are also broken down by broad category (public financing, donations, member contributions etc), and it has chosen to name those individuals involved in lobbying activities on its behalf, although this is not information that is generally requested by the Commission.

Analysis

160.  The registers cited above have significant differences from one another. The information to be supplied is different in each of the four cases. The European Commission's register, unlike the other three, is voluntary rather than mandatory.

161.  All of the registers seek to identify who the lobbyists are, and who they are representing. The Australian register goes little further. The European Commission's register, unlike the other three, does not ask for the names of individual lobbyists. The differences in the information required by the other registers point to the different circumstances which led to their existence.

162.  One of the main differences between the registers is in the extent to which they ask for financial information.

Financial information

163.  The US register asks for financial information, in the case of multi-client lobbyists, a good-faith estimate of income from specific clients in a given period. This reflects the US political context, in which money, specifically campaign finance, is one of the main concerns about lobbying activity.

164.  The European Commission register asks for different kinds of financial information from different kinds of organisation, including a rough breakdown of income by client for multi-client lobbyists. The APPC has told us that it does not support this part of the Commission's initiative, as it believes it "to be irrelevant to the promotion of good practice in lobbying and an unnecessary (and potentially anti-competitive) intrusion into the commercial relationship between supplier and customer".[147] We heard these views reflected by lobbyists that we met in Brussels. Campaigning groups for transparency focussing on Brussels told us that the Commission register would be unlikely to address the wider concerns around lobbying, which were identified to us as privileged access and the provision of one-sided information to decision-makers.

165.  The Canadian register, perhaps reflecting that money is not as major a concern in Canada in this context, does not ask for financial information from those who register, apart from funding received from the Canadian or foreign governments.

166.  While it would be of genuine interest to be able to see how much money is being targeted at particular lobbying campaigns, it is doubtful that it is possible to obtain reliable information of this kind through a register. In addition, to provide financial information about lobbying activity is genuinely onerous, in that it involves calculations that would almost certainly not otherwise be attempted. In the words of Professor Pross:

lobbying campaigns are frequently multi-faceted and expenses will be deployed to a wide range of firms and organisations. Payments will be made not only to lobbyists themselves, but to polling firms, advertising agencies, lawyers, accountants, non-profit organisations and even to charities that espouse the same cause. Forensic accountants have the skills and information needed to look at the overall effort involved in a campaign, and to arrive at a shrewd guess as to what it all costs, but such assessments are extremely expensive, and usually available to the public, and to policy decision makers, only long after key decisions have been made.[148]

Conclusion

167.  It was suggested to us by campaigning groups in Brussels that the Commission should have started with basic transparency benchmarks and developed the register around these, but that instead it had taken as its starting point what it thought people would be prepared to sign up to. We agree. It is important to start from first principles when deciding what information needs to be included in a register of lobbying activity in the United Kingdom and how this information should be gathered.

A REGISTER OF LOBBYING ACTIVITY: FIRST PRINCIPLES

168.  We can identify five key principles for a register of lobbying activity:

a)  it should be mandatory, in order to ensure as complete as possible an overview of activity.

b)  it should cover all those outside the public sector involved in accessing and influencing public-sector decision makers, with exceptions in only a very limited set of circumstances.

c)  it should be managed and enforced by a body independent of both Government and lobbyists.

d)  it should include only information of genuine potential value to the general public, to others who might wish to lobby government, and to decision makers themselves.

e)  it should include so far as possible information which is relatively straightforward to provide—ideally, information which would be collected for other purposes in any case.

A MANDATORY REGISTER …

169.  We see no advantage whatsoever to a voluntary register, which, as has been shown in the European Commission's case, allows those who wish to hide the nature and scale of their activity to do so, and leads to the availability of uneven and partial information of no real benefit to those wishing to assess the scale and nature of lobbying activity.[149]

… COVERING ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN ACCESSING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC-SECTOR DECISION MAKERS FROM OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC SECTOR …

170.  We have already stated our view that there is nothing that multi-client public affairs consultancies do that is different from what other companies, organisations and individuals do when trying to influence decisions, apart from the fact of representing more than one client, and that to focus on the regulation of multi-client firms might perversely make it harder for smaller organisations to influence decisions, with little impact on the larger organisations that tend to be the focus of what concern there is.[150] It is therefore crucial that a register should cover all contact between public-sector decision-makers and those outside interests attempting to influence their decisions—although with different degrees of requirement for organisations lobbying on a regular basis and individual citizens or voluntary groups approaching a Minister about a specific issue of concern.[151]

171.  There are a very restricted range of circumstances in which such contacts ought not to be covered. In Canada, oral and written communications are exempted from registration if:

a)  they are made to a parliamentary committee or to a similar body or person, in proceedings that are a matter of public record;

b)  they are made to a public office holder with respect to the enforcement, interpretation or application by that public office holder of any Act of Parliament or regulation with respect to the person or organization on whose behalf the communication is being made; or,

c)  they are restricted to requests for information.

172.  We can envisage other circumstances in which communications or other information might be exempted from disclosure:

a)  if they relate directly to legal proceedings, or to the negotiation of a legal document, such as a contract, with the relevant public office.

b)  if their disclosure would harm an important public interest such as national security, or constitute a risk to individuals: for example, the fact that a lobbyist had previously been employed by one of the Security Agencies,

c)  if their disclosure would divulge information that is genuinely commercially confidential or market-sensitive in nature.

173.  These exemptions should, however, be defined as narrowly as possible. For example, if some of the content of a communication was commercially confidential, this should not prevent the publication of the remaining content, nor of the fact that the communication had occurred. Similarly, legal firms would not be exempt from disclosure where their activities were essentially to do with influencing policy or other government decisions rather than legal proceedings or negotiations.

174.  A further consideration, mentioned above, is that regulation could act as a barrier to the least professionalised and least experienced. It is vital that disclosure requirements should be tailored to circumstances. It would be counter-productive to expect individual citizens or informal voluntary groups to have to register before writing to a Minister with their views on issues of concern. It would be less unreasonable for them to expect that the fact of their correspondence and its subject matter might be placed in the public domain.

… MANAGED AND ENFORCED BY A BODY INDEPENDENT OF BOTH GOVERNMENT AND LOBBYISTS

175.  Trust in any register will depend on whether it is seen to be managed competently and independently. Independent procedures will also be needed to pursue complaints about failures to provide information and about misleading or inaccurate information. There is already an existing body, independent of Government, which decides whether information should be released into the public domain: the Office of the Information Commissioner. From our perspective, this is the obvious body to take on this additional role, provided it is given the necessary resources and powers.

WHAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE INCLUDED?

176.  In our view, to meet the remaining key principles, the following information would need to be provided:

Table 1: Information to be provided in a register

a)  the names of the individuals carrying out lobbying activity and of any organisation employing or hiring them, whether a consultancy, law firm, corporation or campaigning organisation.

b)  in the case of multi-client consultancies, the names of their clients.

These two categories of information are vital to identify who the lobbyists are, and who they might be representing.

c)  information about any public office previously held by an individual lobbyist—essentially, excerpts from their career history.

This would enable the public to judge the extent to which former public servants or politicians were using their contacts or experience to pursue a private interest.

All of the above categories of information could only be provided by the lobbyists themselves.

d)  a list of the relevant interests of decision makers within the public service (Ministers, senior civil servants and senior public servants) and summaries of their career histories outside the public service.

This would enable the public to judge the extent to which a decision maker's interests or connections from the past might be influencing the decisions they take.

This category of information could only be provided by the decision makers.

e)  information about contacts between lobbyists and decision makers—essentially, diary records and minutes of meetings. The aim would be to cover all meetings and conversations between decision makers and outside interests.

This would enable the public to see what contacts are taking place, and to reach a reasonably informed judgement as to whether decision makers are receiving a balanced perspective from those they are meeting.

This category of information could in theory be provided by either the lobbyists or the decision-makers.

What a register entry might look like

177.  To put these proposals into context, we are including here an imaginary register entry for an equally imaginary multi-client consultancy. We expect that the simplest way to make information readily and simply available would be online, with regular use of hyperlinks to avoid the need to reproduce information needlessly. Clearly, further thought needs to be given to the design of a register. The example below is not meant to be prescriptive, but is for illustrative purposes, to show how information could be provided and made available in a simple and accessible way.

Table 2: Illustrative sample entry for a register as proposed above

Organisation: Bloggs and Bloggs Solicitors LLP, 200 Park Lane, London, W1A 0AA

Individuals carrying out lobbying activity: Joe Bloggs, Kevin Bloggs,[152] Linda Bloggs

Clients: Cola Cola Plc, Government of Atlantis, Mega Supermarkets Ltd[153]

Contacts:

a. 1 November 2008,[154] Meeting between Kevin Bloggs and John Johnson MP,[155] Minister for Trade, on behalf of Mega Supermarkets Ltd.

b. 1 December 2008, Conference call between Joe Bloggs and civil servants,[156] on behalf of the Government of Atlantis, to support the easing of tariffs on the import of seaweed.[157]

Publishing client lists

178.  Our second proposal in Table 1 above is the subject of disagreement among lobbying consultancies. As we have already shown, when deciding whether to publish the names of their clients, multi-client lobbying firms differ in the weight that they give to public interest on the one hand and client confidentiality on the other. Our view is clear. The public interest in the fact that a person or organisation is a client of a lobbying firm far outweighs any invasion of privacy that publication would represent. We are not proposing that there should be any requirement to publish the detail of the relationship between the lobbyist and the client; merely to publish the fact of the relationship. This would mean that if the fact of an approach from a lobbyist to a decision-maker were known, it would also be possible to investigate on whose behalf the approach might have been made. We recommend that all multi-client organisations involved in public affairs should be required to publish in a timely and transparent way the names of all clients whose interests they represent to the government and other public bodies as well as all clients to which they give advice on how their interests would best be represented to the government and other public bodies.

179.  Legal firms continue to insist that to publish the names of clients for whom they lobby (as opposed to those whom they represent in a strictly legal capacity) would be in breach of the client confidentiality requirements of the regulatory regime established by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. This provision can therefore only be made effective through legislation.

Monitoring the revolving door

180.  Our third and fourth proposals in Table 1 above are intended to allow the public to see the extent of interchange between the public sector and those involved in lobbying it and to gain a sense of the potential interests at play. We would expect these provisions to apply only to those involved in lobbying Government on a regular basis from consultancies, from the corporate sector and from campaigning organisations, and, within the public sector, to Ministers, other elected decision-makers such as mayors and councillors with executive powers, and senior civil and public servants. We comment below on the mechanisms for controlling movement between the public and other sectors.[158]

181.  We also have concerns about current processes for recording gifts and hospitality, which appear not to have been followed as rigorously as they should. This is doubtless because the purpose of recording this information—ensuring that there is no temptation to impropriety—is not clear. Under the current system, once recorded, the information may never be looked at again and seems to be available only to those in the line management chain. This safeguard against impropriety would be significantly strengthened if the information were available to the general public, rather than only internally. This has been partly recognised by the commitment to publish hospitality received at Board level.

182.  Gifts and hospitality above a token value received by all Ministers and all civil servants should be recorded and made publicly available. The bureaucratic burden of providing this information should not be great: it is, in theory at least, being collected already. The Cabinet Office should provide central direction to Departments and Agencies to ensure that consistent processes are being followed.

Laying the detail of meetings and other communications open to scrutiny

183.  The fifth category of information in Table 1 above is the most far-reaching. As we have seen, some information of this type is already provided piecemeal by Government in response to Freedom of Information requests.[159]

184.  A first step towards greater transparency, and one that could be achieved without legislation, would be to publish routinely the information about ministerial and other high-level official meetings with outside interest groups which is currently produced only in response to specific FoI requests. Publishing this information would also encourage Government to ensure that it is seen to be reaching out beyond the 'usual suspects' to a widely representative selection of stakeholders, by making clear who was and who was not included.

185.  There are strong reasons for requiring government and other public-sector decision makers rather than those lobbying them to provide information of this kind:

a)  Minutes of meetings are generally taken by Government, but may not always be taken by lobbyists. Where minutes are taken by lobbyists, there is unlikely to be any consistency in the form in which they are taken.

b)  It would prevent the registration requirements from becoming a burden on those who may have little experience of lobbying Government.

c)  It would make decision-makers think carefully about who they communicated with and would give them every incentive to ensure that they heard views from a variety of perspectives.

d)  It would place an onus on the decision-maker to judge whether a communication might reasonably be considered to constitute an attempt to influence their decisions. This would require the registration in cursory form even of informal contacts—although we would not necessarily expect full minutes to be available of every lunch or chance meeting.

186.  This last point mirrors a comment made to us by Tom Watson MP, appearing for the Government: "There is not a cat's chance in hell that you are going to get a register of every politician who has lunch with a journalist."[160] Our concern is not with journalists, but lunches are the kinds of contacts which can be of as much potential concern as formal lobbying meetings on the record with business or other interest groups.

187.  This proposal relies on the supposition that formal meetings between Government and outside interests are regularly recorded. One suggestion made when FoI was first introduced was that, in order to prevent information from being subject to release, there would be more unrecorded meetings. The Committee on Standards in Public Life has pointed out that the new version of the Ministerial Code published in 2007 "no longer contains the specific requirement to record meetings between Ministers and outside interest groups".[161] We ask the Government to confirm that there remains a requirement to record meetings between Ministers and outside interest groups.

Conclusion

188.  Our proposal for a mandatory register involves placing new obligations on individuals and organisations outside the public sector: it will therefore necessarily involve legislation, and cannot be implemented overnight. Experience from other jurisdictions suggests, however, that such registers can be made to work relatively swiftly and in the public interest, and that they do not act as a barrier to free communication between Government and the electorate.

189.  There are also steps that the Government could take now and without legislation to make information about its meetings with outside interest groups publicly available. There is a perception that real government takes place behind closed doors. This may be partly because of media portrayal or innate distrust of those in power. But there seems to be a culture of secrecy in some parts of government beyond that which is strictly necessary, and beyond that seen in some other countries. Cultures and attitudes need to change. Government should and could be more open and more transparent about how it formulates policy and takes decisions.

Refreshing the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments and the Business Appointment Rules

190.  There seems to be widespread agreement that the guidance on lobbying given by the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments to those moving out of Government is not as clear as it could be.[162] Different individuals have scope to interpret the guidance they are given in quite different ways. Our impression is that the system could be operated more rigorously and more transparently, in particular through the provision of more detailed advice on lobbying, while maintaining the ability of the Advisory Committee to respond flexibly to individual circumstances in a changing work environment.

191.  All of the current members of ACoBA have been in place for at least five years; several of them for nearly ten. Few if any of them have recent direct experience of Government, business or civil society. They are unpaid, and no doubt as a result, are drawn exclusively from the great and the good. It is noticeable, though by no means their fault, that they are all white, male and of a certain age. They meet extremely rarely. Their decisions are generally agreed by correspondence.

192.  The Government is now in the process of seeking to refresh ACoBA's membership. It is important that some continuity is maintained. The members of ACoBA need to be respected and experienced, and to be able to reach disinterested opinions. However, they also need to be able to understand the world of work as it is today, and the growing movement of personnel between government and business, and to devote enough time to their work on the Advisory Committee, which should meet regularly. There is a continuing need for a strong Advisory Committee to instil confidence both in the public and in those whose careers they can affect, that processes are followed and decisions taken both robustly and fairly. There would be benefit to having an Advisory Committee that was more representative of society at large. Under these circumstances, the Government should consider providing some remuneration to members of the Advisory Committee, and should seek a wider field of applicants than might have been the case in the past.

193.  We hope that, when they are appointed, the new chairman and members will undertake a thorough review of the Advisory Committee's internal processes, to ensure that their advice, particularly on lobbying, is as unambiguous as possible in its meaning, and to provide enough transparency to allow the public and media the opportunity to assess whether or not this advice has been followed.

194.  The new Advisory Committee also needs to be given the opportunity to review the Business Appointment Rules themselves, to ensure that they provide as much protection as possible to the public without unreasonably restricting individual career prospects, and to ensure that they remain relevant to current circumstances, such as the increasing use in parts of Government of integrated project teams involving civil servants and contractors.

195.  We are strongly concerned that, with the rules as loosely and as variously interpreted as they currently are, former Ministers in particular appear to be able to use with impunity the contacts they built up as public servants to further a private interest. We think that this is unacceptable, particularly where they continue to be paid from the public purse as sitting Members of Parliament. The rules need to reflect this.

196.  There are limits to how far this can be taken. It would not be desirable or in all probability legally possible to prevent a former health Minister from taking up a post elsewhere which took advantage of their expertise in health issues. What we would like to ensure, however, is that consistent rules are strictly applied so that former Ministers and other public servants are effectively prevented for an extended period of several years from using the contacts and sensitive information that they acquired in public office to further their own and others' private interests.

MONITORING THE SCALE OF TRANSFERS BETWEEN THE CROWN SERVICE AND OTHER EMPLOYERS

197.  Government is doing little if anything to monitor moves between the civil service and business. We have concerns that individuals may find themselves facing conflicts of interest between their career and the public good, if they are asked, for example, to assess the balance of regulation in a sector into which several of their predecessors have moved. Government needs to be aware of the scale of transfer into (and indeed from) specific businesses and sectors, so as to be able to take measures against the capture of the public interest by the interests of those businesses or that sector. Our proposal for relevant information to be included in a mandatory register would help the Government to monitor this area.

198.  As we heard from Tom Harris MP, there are generally stringent measures in place to ensure that awards of contract cannot be tainted by personal prejudice.[163] There is far less rigour, however, around policy decisions—how the country's future energy needs should be met, for example, rather than who should construct and run a particular power station.

Application to the public service more widely

199.  Many decisions on public issues are taken not by Ministers or the civil service, but by a range of other public bodies, from local authorities responsible for planning decisions, to Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) with a range of important functions, including awarding large contracts.[164] While we have concentrated in this Report on Ministers and the civil service, the majority of the principles and solutions we have proposed apply equally across the whole of the public sector, and there is no reason why a statutory register should not cover the wider public sector.



145   Ev 221 Back

146   Qq 733-734 [Owen Espley] Back

147   Ev 146 Back

148   Pross, p 18 Back

149   Q 523 [Solicitors' Regulation Authority] Back

150   See paras 11 and 12 above. Back

151   See para 174. Back

152   Information about public offices previously held by Kevin Bloggs could be found by clicking on his name. Back

153   Clicking on the name of a client would bring up their own entry in the register, including the names of in-house lobbyists. Back

154   Clicking on the date would reveal summary minutes of the meeting. Back

155   Clicking on the name of the Minister would reveal his statement of interests and a summary of his career history outside the public service. Back

156   Clicking here would reveal the names and roles of the civil servants involved, and in the case of senior civil servants, statements of their interests and summaries of their career histories outside the public service. Back

157   In this case, because a minute was not taken or because to publish a detailed minute might jeopardise relations with the Government of Atlantis, a brief description of the meeting is provided instead. Back

158   See paras 189 to 197. Back

159   See para 72. Back

160   Q 822 Back

161   Ev 189 Back

162   Qq 544, 550-552 and 624 [Lord Warner], Q 585 [Richard Caborn], Q 623 [Stephen Haddrill]  Back

163   Qq 705-707 Back

164   Qq 603-605 Back


 
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