House of Commons - Global Security: Non-Proliferation

Global Security: Non-Proliferation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

5 Ballistic missiles and missile defence

219. A ballistic missile is a missile which is not powered beyond an initial launch phase. Once its initial fuel supply has been burnt up, it travels only by force of the launch plus gravity. Its trajectory is governed by its speed and flight angle at the end of the launch phase, plus gravity, and cannot be altered after the launch phase. Ballistic missiles may have single or multiple warheads, which in longer-range missiles typically separate from a booster section before detonation. They are classified according to their maximum ranges, which vary from under 1,000 kilometres to over 5,500 kilometres for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). They may be sea-launched or launched from land (usually from underground silos). In terms of military strategy, ballistic missiles offer a means of delivering a weapon to a distant target which is less vulnerable to conventional air defences than an attack using manned aircraft. Ballistic missiles which may be familiar include, for example, the SCUD used by Iraq against Israel during the first Gulf War, the Taepodong tested by North Korea in 1998 and 2006, and the UK's Trident missile.

220. Ballistic missiles may be used to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, as well as conventional ones. As such, their possession is a key potential means by which a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon might be made deliverable to a target, by a state or, possibly, a non-state group.[493] Without such missiles, WMD could currently only be delivered to the most distant targets by being transported by sea and/or land (or, in the case of state actors, by bomber aircraft). The proliferation of ballistic missiles to new countries is thus a key means by which the UK could become exposed to new WMD and conventional threats. In its National Security Strategy, the Government identified the "proliferation of the technology behind ballistic missiles" as something which "increases the chance of either new states or non-state actors being able to threaten the United Kingdom directly in the future".[494]

221. According to the US Missile Defense Agency, over 20 countries now have ballistic missile systems. Bill Rammell told us that in 2007 there were 100 non-US ballistic missile launches, 30% more than in 2006.[495] Countries with ballistic missiles include Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, Pakistan, North and South Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Vietnam and Yemen, as well as France, the UK and the US (see map).[496] Evidently, several of the countries with ballistic missiles are also ones about which the British Government has nuclear weapons proliferation concerns. Bill Rammell told us that there is "genuine concern about the spread of capacity in terms of ballistic missiles".[497]

Source: National Air and Space Intelligence Center222. Neither North Korea nor Iran currently possesses ballistic missiles capable of delivering payloads to the UK. The FCO told our "Global Security: Japan and Korea" inquiry in 2008 that Pyongyang had "demonstrated expertise in technologies that could, if developed successfully, give its missiles the capability to reach the UK".[498] North Korea has missiles capable of reaching Japan and the US Pacific island of Guam, and possibly the US mainland; its 2006 launch of a missile capable of reaching the US was unsuccessful. Iran's current ballistic missiles are believed to have a range of up to 2,000 kilometres, placing most of the Middle East and Gulf region, Turkey, parts of Eastern Europe, southern Russia and Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and part of north-west India within range.[499] The FCO told us that "both Iran and North Korea […] may have the capability to strike Europe within the next 20 years".[500]

223. On 5 April 2009 North Korea launched a long-range rocket which it said was intended to put a communications satellite into orbit. The rocket passed over Japan, with two stages falling into the sea, respectively to the west and east of the country. Whether a satellite was placed into orbit remains disputed. The US, UK, EU, NATO, Japan and South Korea regarded the launch as related to North Korea's ballistic missile programme and therefore a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in the aftermath of Pyongyang's 2006 nuclear test and which demanded that North Korea suspend all such activities. In correspondence in follow-up to our Japan and Korea inquiry, the FCO told us that it judged that the April 2009 launch had involved a Taepodong-2 rocket and that, despite its failure, the launch would have "provided the North Korean regime with a lot of useful information to further develop its ballistic missile programme".[501] The UN Security Council was unable to agree a resolution condemning the launch, owing to resistance from China and Russia, but on 13 April it agreed a Presidential Statement which declared the launch to have contravened UNSCR 1718. The Statement also activated a sanctions regime against North Korea which had been held in abeyance since 2006 so as to facilitate the Six-Party Talks on denuclearisation. In response, North Korea said that it would withdraw permanently from the Six-Party Talks and restore the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, its source of weapons-grade plutonium.

224. Many states have acquired their ballistic missiles through imports, either of the missiles themselves or of relevant components and equipment. Many components and materials used in the manufacture of ballistic missiles are dual-use items, with legitimate industrial applications, making the control of their transfer especially difficult. A particular feature of the ballistic missile scene is the way in which countries currently or previously of concern to the West which have developed ballistic missile arsenals provide assistance to each other's ballistic missile programmes, creating a network of bilateral flows: thus North Korea—which a recent US study called "the Third World's greatest supplier of missiles, missile components, and related technologies"[502]—may both have received relevant technologies or equipment from, and transferred them to, Iran, Pakistan and Syria.[503]

Action against ballistic missile proliferation

225. As we outlined in Chapter 2, two main international mechanisms have been established aimed at limiting the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies—the Hague Code of Conduct and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The latter involves a set of export control guidelines based on a common list of controlled items.[504] These may be supplemented by country-specific measures, such as those taken with respect to North Korea under UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, which provided for relevant travel bans and asset freezes and required UN Member States to prevent transfers of missiles and missile-related items to North Korea and to refrain from procuring such items from it.

226. In our Report on "Global Security: Japan and Korea" in November 2008, we concluded that "there is evidence that international efforts to deny North Korea both assistance and customers for its missile programme appear to be having some effect."[505] Following North Korea's rocket launch in April 2009, the FCO told us that it would continue to monitor North Korea's ballistic missile programme and missile-related activity, and "work with international partners in support of robust and united international approaches to discourage further proliferation". [506]

227. Bill Rammell told us that the MTCR "provid[ed] a way forward". However, he also admitted that it "need[ed] strengthening" and accepted that the Government "need[ed] to do more in that area."[507]

228. We conclude that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology is a significant security concern. We further conclude that the Government is correct to acknowledge that stronger action is required to curb the international transfer of ballistic missile technology. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out specific steps which it plans to take to this end.

Ballistic missile defence (BMD)

229. The Government regards ballistic missile defence as a means of mitigating the risk represented by the spread of ballistic missiles.[508] Ballistic missile defence (BMD) is a system of interceptor missiles which can destroy incoming ballistic missiles before they reach their target. BMD also involves a supporting network of radar to detect missile launches and trajectories.

230. US plans for a BMD system date back at least to former President Reagan's 'star wars' initiative.[509] Former President Clinton developed plans for a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. The United States' current BMD plans were developed under the Administration of former President George W. Bush, building on the NMD plans. The US plans are for a single integrated BMD system spanning the US and Europe and capable of protecting the territory of the US and US allies and US troops deployed overseas, by being able to destroy incoming missiles of all types and at any stage of their flight. The planned system involves radar and other sensors deployed on satellites, at sea and on land, in Alaska, Greenland and the UK (see below); and interceptor missiles launched from sea, air and three land sites—in Alaska, California and Poland (see below).

231. The US plans are controversial because, in order to pursue them, in 2002 the Bush Administration withdrew the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed between the US and the then USSR in 1972. The Treaty limited the scale of the two parties' missile defences, with the aim of preventing either side from deploying missile defences so extensive as to undermine the value of the other's nuclear arsenal and thereby destabilise the mutual nuclear deterrent. The Bush Administration prioritised what it saw as the need to develop defences against new missile threats from states such as Iran and North Korea. Talks between the US and Russia aimed at renegotiating the ABM Treaty, and thereby preventing a US withdrawal, failed.

232. The US BMD plans became especially controversial in Europe after the US announced in January 2007 that it planned to place elements of its system on the European mainland—specifically, that it was negotiating with the Czech Republic on the siting of a radar there, and with Poland for the siting of ten interceptor missiles there. In July 2008, the US and the Czech Republic signed an agreement allowing the siting of a ground-based early warning midcourse radar at Brdy, 90 kilometres south-west of Prague. The site is expected to be staffed by up to 200 US personnel. In August 2008, the US and Poland signed an agreement for the deployment of ten long-range interceptor missiles in underground silos in Slupsk-Redzikowo, in northern Poland. The associated US personnel are expected to number up to 500. Initial deployment of the Czech and Polish elements is planned for 2011, with full operational capability to be achieved by 2013-2014. Alongside the missile defence agreement, the US and Poland signed a declaration on strategic cooperation under which the US will deploy a Patriot air and missile defence battery to Poland.[510]

233. Russia has rejected the United States' original European BMD plans. Moscow says that the US deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland are aimed at it, not the claimed 'rogue' states. At various stages in response to the US plans, Russia has suspended its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, appeared to threaten to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, announced plans to develop new missiles capable of penetrating the US shield, threatened to make the Czech and Polish sites military targets, threatened to deploy missiles into the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, next to Poland, and threatened to jam electronically the US BMD system.[511] We examined Russia's reaction to the BMD plans in greater detail in our Report on "Global Security: Russia" in November 2007.[512]

234. Partly because of Russia's reaction, the US European BMD plans have not been universally welcomed among Washington's NATO allies. Most recently, French President Sarkozy said in November 2008 that the planned deployment would do "nothing to bring security" and urged that it be put on hold.[513] However, at their Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO leaders said that the planned US deployment would make a "substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles". They confirmed that they wished to explore ways in which the US system could be integrated with NATO's own possible missile defence plans.[514]

235. In 2003, the British Government acceded to a US request that the radar at RAF Fylingdales be upgraded so that it could be incorporated into the US BMD system. In July 2007, the Government announced that it had agreed that RAF Menwith Hill would also participate in the system. In our "Global Security: Russia" Report, we regretted the fact that the Government announced the involvement of Menwith Hill by written statement, the day before the start of Parliament's summer recess. We called for a full Parliamentary debate on the issue.[515]

236. We received a large number of submissions to our present inquiry arguing that the US European BMD plans threatened the international non-proliferation effort, primarily because of their potential to provoke new weapons development or deployments from Russia. For example, Dr Hudson of CND said that missile defence was "contributing to the development of a new nuclear arms race [...] and increasing the likelihood of wider proliferation."[516] Mr Butcher said that the case of European BMD showed how the "deployment of military defence systems intended to bring greater security can actually undermine that objective security".[517] Many witnesses called on the British Government to deny the US use of RAF Fylingdales and Menwith Hill for its BMD system. The FCO rejected such criticisms, saying that it is "clear that ballistic missile defence is a response to the current proliferation and strategic uncertainty, and not the cause."[518]

237. Mr Fitzpatrick, Baroness Williams and Sir Michael Quinlan all questioned whether the current US European BMD plans offered a security gain commensurate with the risks surrounding the deployments.[519] Sir Michael said bluntly that he thought the deployments were a "bad idea" and noted that he saw "an awful lot of 'military-industrial complex' around".[520]

238. Our witnesses outlined a number of ways in which the US BMD plans could be developed so as to make them less of a source of conflict with Russia:

Baroness Williams and Lord Robertson argued that Russia should be brought into a common missile defence system.[521] The Minister reaffirmed the Government's positive stance towards this possibility.[522]
Professor Chalmers referred to the possibility of some form of Russian verification of the nature of the installations in the Czech Republic and Poland, although when we were in Poland in January 2009 we heard that this would be difficult politically if it were to involve Russian personnel on the ground. Baroness Williams also suggested that some of the work which the UK Government is supporting on verification might be applied to the missile defence system.[523]
Professor Chalmers recommended that the US should make it clear that it would not activate the interceptors in Poland until there was clear evidence that Iran had ballistic missiles capable of reaching central Europe.[524]

All these ideas had been floated within NATO and between the US and Russia before the change of US Administration, and received largely favourably in general terms. In our "Global Security: Russia" Report in November 2007 we concluded that "As long as it remains committed to the US BMD plans, […] the Government [should] seek ways to build cooperation around them, both within NATO and with Russia".[525]

239. There has been considerable uncertainty about prospects for BMD under the new US Administration, as before taking office Mr Obama appeared more cautious about the system than then-President Bush, partly on political and partly on cost and technical grounds. We were exposed to this uncertainty during our discussions in Prague and Warsaw in January 2009. In his Prague speech in April, Mr Obama reiterated his position that any missile defence system should be "cost-effective and proven". He also appeared to confirm the way in which his Administration is making the Czech and Polish missile defence deployments conditional to a far greater extent on the development of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. "If the Iranian threat is eliminated", the President said, "we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defence construction in Europe will be removed."[526] This approach appears to hold out to Russia the prospect that the Czech and Polish deployments could be cancelled, especially if Iran's nuclear and missile programmes are rolled back owing partly to Russian assistance.

240. Professor Chalmers suggested that, precisely because of Russia's objection to the European BMD deployments, it had become "very difficult for the US, in terms of its relations with new members of NATO, to withdraw" from them completely.[527] Giving evidence in February 2009, Bill Rammell told us that his "gut instinct" was that the US would probably proceed with its BMD plans, "but maybe with a slower time frame."[528]

241. We are not convinced that, as they are currently envisaged and under current circumstances, the United States' planned ballistic missile defence (BMD) deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland represent a net gain for European security. We conclude that if the deployments are carried out in the face of opposition from Russia, this could be highly detrimental to NATO's overall security interests. We reaffirm our 2007 recommendation that BMD in Europe should be developed, if at all, as a joint system between the US, NATO and Russia. Given the Government's stated commitment to a rules-based international system, we further conclude that its early agreement to the inclusion of RAF Fylingdales and Menwith Hill in the US BMD system was regrettable, given that the United States' development of its system involved its abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the NATO element of European BMD developments, in the light of the April 2009 NATO summit. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should state whether any changes made to the planned US BMD deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland would affect RAF Fylingdales or Menwith Hill. We further conclude that the uncertainty surrounding prospects for the US European BMD system has made a Parliamentary debate on this issue all the more necessary, and we recommend that the Government should schedule one before the end of this Parliament.

493 See paras 262-263 below. Back

494 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, p 12 Back

495 Q 284 Back

496 US Missile Defense Agency, "Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities", November 2008 Back

497 Q 284 Back

498 Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Japan and Korea, HC 449, Ev 70 Back

499 See the map after para 18 of Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Iran, HC 142. Back

500 Ev 186 Back

501 Letter to the Committee Specialist from the Parliamentary Relations Team, FCO, 20 April 2009, GS(JK) 33, published online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/japan/ucjk3302.htm Back

502 Daniel Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2008, p 57 Back

503 Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Japan and Korea, HC 449, para 156 Back

504 See paras 27-28. Back