Policing and Crime Bill


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James Brokenshire: A number of these amendments repeat some of my earlier arguments about the need for proportionality, for judicial oversight to come from the Crown court rather than the magistrates court and for appeal rights to be to the Court of Appeal. In the light of our previous debate I do not intend to rehearse those arguments again. However, I ask the Minister to reflect carefully on the points that have been made not just by me but by the Bar Council and Liberty on the appropriate level of judicial oversight. Obviously we look forward to seeing further Government amendments on the proportionality of the use of these provisions.
It is interesting to note that Government amendment 270 adds a right for third parties to make representations prior to the realisations of assets. If that concept is accepted in that context why should it not equally apply if an order is granted authorising the detention of such assets for an extended period? While we are looking at this part of clause 36, could the Minister tell us why proposed new section 47N(3), on the discharge, variation and lapse of detention orders, provides that an application must be made to the court to discharge the detention order where proceedings for the offence mentioned have been concluded? Why is that not automatic? Why is that court application required? Why does the order not simply lapse in these circumstances?
Mr. Coaker: Let me deal with what the hon. Gentleman has said. I think he will be pleased with one or two of the points that I shall make, to continue with this constructive approach. He has made one or two interesting points with his amendments—
Mr. David Ruffley (Bury St. Edmunds) (Con): You’ll ruin his career at this rate.
Mr. Coaker: I am trying to enhance his career. Constructive debate is a way to enhance one’s career.
These amendments deal with when the hearing takes place, rather than the level of judicial oversight for the prior approval that we debated earlier. They are about which court is appropriate to deal with the various parts of the Bill. Amendments 114, 116 and 118 to 122 are about which court is appropriate for making an order for further detention of the seized property and for considering appeals. As I explained earlier, these new powers are based on similar provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as regards detention and forfeiture of cash. Judicial oversight as regards seized cash is provided by the magistrates court or a justice of the peace. An appeal against forfeiture of cash is heard in the Crown court. We will, therefore, not create a precedent with such further detention powers and the appeals provisions in clause 36.
As I have stressed from the outset, we expect that higher value or complex cases would be subject to a restraint order. In those cases, the authority for further detention of property would come from the Crown court—as I have said on numerous occasions, restraint orders can be dealt with only by the Crown court. It is only in those cases where there is no restraint order that application further to detain seized property is made to the magistrates court. The magistrate must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the seized property might be disposed of or hidden, or that the value of the property might be diminished.
Regarding amendment 115, I again recognise the importance of the detention period being reasonable and proportionate. It will be for the magistrates courts to consider what is a reasonable and proportionate period for which the property can be detained. In addition, as I have previously explained, any person affected by an order can apply at any time for variation or discharge of the order. More generally, the proposed new sections 47B(9) and 47B(10) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, set out in clause 36, mean that the powers cannot be exercised in cases where there is undue delay in the criminal proceedings, or the application to reconsider the confiscation order. Furthermore, a proposed new section 47M(3) prevents undue delay creeping in as regards the continued detention of the property. Such delay is a ground for a discharge of a detention order.
Amendment 117 draws attention to the important issue of the rights of third parties. Let me assure the Committee and the hon. Gentleman that we fully recognise the need to take account of third party interests in detained property. The defendant, or indeed any third party affected by a detention order, can apply for the discharge or the variation of that order. That gives third parties the opportunity to apply to the court for the release of seized property.
The provisions on third party rights in clause 36 mirror those in section 42(3) of the 2002 Act, as regards the rights of third parties to apply for the variation or discharge of a restraint order. There is also a right of appeal to the Crown court against a magistrates court’s decision. As I have said before, those are all appropriate safeguards to ensure that the seizure and detention powers are used proportionally. However, I accept that the rights of third parties are important and therefore I would like to consider further the scope for allowing third parties the opportunity, on application, to make representations in respect of hearings under proposed new section 47N.
Beyond that, a code of practice will contain further details on the exercise of the search and seizure powers, including the need to take account of third party rights, in order to ensure that they are exercised lawfully and proportionately. On the issue of the code of practice, I will take the opportunity to respond to an issue raised by the Bar Council in regard to the dissipation of assets. I confirm to the Committee that the code will make it clear that the risk of dissipation will have to be significant before the property is seized.
I hope that with those remarks and explanation, the offer to consider some of the hon. Gentleman’s points and to consider further the question of the rights of third parties, the hon. Gentleman might consider withdrawing his amendments.
11.30 am
James Brokenshire: I am grateful for the way in which the Minister responded to this group of amendments in that he is prepared to reflect on which is the appropriate court in respect of the provisions in the clause. Equally, I am grateful that he will look also at other points, for example third party rights. While he says that it will be open to a third party to make an application, it needs to be clear that third parties are not prejudiced and that if they have rights in respect of the assets, they are able to make representations at an appropriate stage. If there is an initial hearing, it should be possible to make representations then, rather than the party being forced subsequently to make an application to challenge or override an order that has been granted. However, I accept the spirit in which the Minister replied, and in light of his assurance that he will look at the matter—we will listen carefully to how he responds on Report—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 167, in clause 36, page 33, line 20, leave out ‘free property held by the defendant’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 168, in clause 36, page 33, line 20, before ‘, and’ insert
‘other than exempt property (within the meaning of section 47C(4))’.
Amendment 169, in clause 36, page 34, line 1, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert ‘or
( ) any person affected by the order.’.
Amendment 170, in clause 36, page 34, line 26, at end insert—
‘( ) a person mentioned in section 47M(3), or’.
Amendment 171, in clause 36, page 34, line 27, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
‘( ) any person affected by the order.’.—(Mr. Coaker.)
Amendment proposed: 172, in clause 36, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
‘47OA Detention of property pending section 47O appeal
(1) This section applies where—
(a) an application for an order under section 47M is made within the period mentioned in section 47J, and
(b) the application is refused.
(2) This section also applies where—
(a) an order is made under section 47M extending the period for which property may be detained under section 47J, and
(b) the order is discharged or varied so that detention of the property is no longer authorised by virtue of the order.
(3) The property may be detained until there is no further possibility of an appeal against the decision to refuse the application or discharge or vary the order (as the case may be).’.—(Mr. Coaker.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 5.
Division No. 7]
AYES
Austin, Mr. Ian
Blackman-Woods, Dr. Roberta
Campbell, Mr. Alan
Cawsey, Mr. Ian
Coaker, Mr. Vernon
Fitzpatrick, Jim
Wilson, Phil
NOES
Brokenshire, James
Burns, Mr. Simon
Holmes, Paul
Kirkbride, Miss Julie
Ruffley, Mr. David
Question accordingly agreed to.
Amendment 172 agreed to.
Amendments made: 262, in clause 36, page 34, line 31, at end insert—
‘47OB Hearsay evidence in detention order proceedings
(1) Evidence must not be excluded in detention order proceedings on the ground that it is hearsay (of whatever degree).
(2) Sections 2 to 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 apply in relation to detention order proceedings as those sections apply in relation to civil proceedings.
(3) Detention order proceedings are proceedings—
(a) for an order under section 47M;
(b) for the discharge or variation of such an order;
(c) on an appeal under section 47O.
(4) Hearsay is a statement which is made otherwise than by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings and which is tendered as evidence of the matters stated.
(5) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence which is admissible apart from this section.’.
Amendment 173, in clause 36, page 35, line 12, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
‘(3) Omit section 45 (seizure).’.—(Mr. Coaker.)
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Search and seizure of property: Scotland
Amendments made: 174, in clause 37, page 36, line 1, leave out ‘property held by the person’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 175, in clause 37, page 36, line 9, leave out ‘property held by the person’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 176, in clause 37, page 36, line 16, leave out ‘property held by the accused’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 177, in clause 37, page 36, line 21, leave out ‘property held by the accused’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 178, in clause 37, page 37, line 4, at end insert—
‘(11) In relation to the first or second condition references in sections 127C to 127P to the accused are to the person mentioned in that condition.’.
Amendment 179, in clause 37, page 37, line 4, at end insert—
‘(12) In relation to the first or second condition section 144(8) has effect as if proceedings for the offence had been started against the accused when the investigation was started.’.
Amendment 180, in clause 37, page 37, line 7, leave out ‘free property held by the accused’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 181, in clause 37, page 37, line 24, at end insert—
‘(4A) In relation to realisable property which is free property held by the recipient of a tainted gift, references in subsection (4) to the accused are to be read as references to the recipient of that gift.’.
Amendment 182, in clause 37, page 39, line 2, at end insert—
‘(4A) An officer exercising a power under subsection (4) may detain the vehicle for so long as is necessary for its exercise.’.
Amendment 263, in clause 37, page 40, line 43, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
‘(2) The property may be detained initially for a period of 48 hours.
(2A) But it must be released if within that period the appropriate officer—
(a) ceases to be satisfied as mentioned in section 127B(1), or
(b) ceases to have reasonable grounds for the suspicion mentioned in section 127C(1).’.
Amendment 183, in clause 37, page 41, line 10, at end insert—
‘(3) If such an application is made within that period and the application is refused, the property may be detained until there is no further possibility of an appeal against (or review of)—
(a) the decision to refuse the application, or
(b) any decision made on an appeal against (or review of) that decision.’.
Amendment 184, in clause 37, page 41, line 10, at end insert—
‘(4) In subsection (2) the reference to the period mentioned in section 127J includes that period as extended by any order under section 127M.’.
Amendment 185, in clause 37, page 41, line 20, at end insert—
‘(3) If such an application is made within that period and the application is refused, the property may be detained until there is no further possibility of an appeal against (or review of)—
(a) the decision to refuse the application, or
(b) any decision made on an appeal against (or review of) that decision.’.
Amendment 186, in clause 37, page 41, line 32, leave out ‘free property held by the accused’ and insert ‘realisable property’.
Amendment 187, in clause 37, page 41, line 32, before ‘, and’ insert
‘other than exempt property (within the meaning of section 127C(4))’.
Amendment 188, in clause 37, page 42, line 12, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert ‘or
( ) any person affected by the order.’.
Amendment 189, in clause 37, page 42, line 37, at end insert—
‘( ) a person mentioned in section 127M(3), or’.
Amendment 190, in clause 37, page 42, line 38, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
‘( ) any person affected by the order.’.
Amendment 191, in clause 37, page 42, line 41, leave out ‘30’ and insert ‘21’.—(Mr. Coaker.)
Amendment proposed: 192, in clause 37, page 42, line 44, at end insert—
‘127OA Detention of property pending section 127O appeal
(1) This section applies where—
(a) an application for an order under section 127M is made within the period mentioned in section 127J, and
(b) the application is refused.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 5.
 
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Prepared 25 February 2009